This is a broad definition, and serves to promote the debtors "uncompromising duty to disclose." See In re Kim, 2011 WL 5902461, at *6 (quoting Lincoln Savs. Bank v. Freese (In re Freese), 2011 WL 2604750, at *5 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa June 30, 2011)). In the instant proceeding, the Debtor is alleged to have made false oaths by failing to disclose her interest in the life insurance policy, her personal injury claim, that she was involved in the probate filing, and that she had an interest in her mother's estate.
The rule encourages full disclosure by debtors; it is not for the debtor to decide whether information will be relevant to creditors. SeeIn re Kim , 2011 WL 5902461, at *6 (quoting Lincoln Savs. Bank v. Freese (In re Freese) , 2011 WL 2604750, at *5 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa June 30, 2011) ) ("Consequently, the debtor has an ‘uncompromising duty to disclose’ his or her financial information, not ‘to pick and choose or to obfuscate the answers.’ "); In re Matus , 303 B.R. at 675 ; see alsoIn re Chalik , 748 F.2d at 618 ("The veracity of the [debtor's] statements is essential to the successful administration of the Bankruptcy Act.").
Further, a court may infer deceptive intent from the cumulative effect of "a series or pattern of errors or omissions," In re Franklin-Graham, 2008 WL 7842108, at *6 (quoting In re Parnes, 200 B.R. at 714), and the debtor's business acumen is one factor relevant to determining fraudulent intent. In re Freese, No. 09-02627, 2011 WL 2604750, at *5 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa June 30, 2011). Finally, a debtor's deceptive intent may be established by a showing of recklessness and indifference to the truth.
Further, a court may infer deceptive intent from the cumulative effect of "a series or pattern of errors or omissions," In re Franklin-Graham, 2008 WL 7842108, at *6 (quoting In re Parnes, 200 B.R. at 714), and the debtor's business acumen is one factor relevant to determining fraudulent intent. In re Freese, No. 09-02627, 2011 WL 2604750, at *5 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa June 30, 2011). Finally, a debtor's deceptive intent may be established by a showing of recklessness and indifference to the truth.
See United States Trustee v. Warr (In re Warr), 410 B.R. 891, 897 (Bankr.D.Idaho 2009) (both knowledge by an action taken deliberately and consciously and an intent to defraud are required to deny a discharge under 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(4)).See, e.g., Lincoln Sav. Bank v. Freese (In re Freese), 2011 WL 2604750, *4 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 2011) (fraudulent intent may be established by circumstantial evidence) (quoting In re Bauder, 333 B.R. 828, 830 (8th Cir. BAP 2005); Singh, 433 B.R. at 150 (same).In re Khalil, 578 F.3d 1167, 1168 (9th Cir. 2009).