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In re Freedman

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department, New York.
Jun 25, 2015
141 A.D.3d 84 (N.Y. App. Div. 2015)

Opinion

06-25-2015

In the Matter of Theodore L. FREEDMAN (admitted as Theodore Levy Freedman), an attorney and counselor-at-law: Departmental Disciplinary Committee for the First Judicial Department, Petitioner, Theodore L. Freedman, Respondent.

Jorge Dopico, Chief Counsel, Departmental Disciplinary Committee, New York (Raymond Vallejo, of counsel), for petitioner. Ballard Spahr LLP (John B. Harris, of counsel), for respondent.


Jorge Dopico, Chief Counsel, Departmental Disciplinary Committee, New York (Raymond Vallejo, of counsel), for petitioner.

Ballard Spahr LLP (John B. Harris, of counsel), for respondent.

LUIS A. GONZALEZ, Presiding Justice, DAVID FRIEDMAN, KARLA MOSKOWITZ, SALLIE MANZANET–DANIELS, PAUL G. FEINMAN, Justices.

PER CURIAM. Respondent Theodore Levy Freedman was admitted to the practice of law in the State of New York by the First Judicial Department on May 4, 1992. At all times relevant, he maintained an office for the practice of law within this Judicial Department. On March 5, 2013, respondent pled guilty in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York to four counts of subscribing to false U.S. income tax returns in violation of 26 USC § 7206(1), a felony under the U.S.Code. Respondent admitted underreporting approximately $2 million of his K–1 income when he filed his federal income tax returns for tax years 2001 through 2004. He was subsequently sentenced to a period of imprisonment of one year and one day, and upon his release, three years of supervised release. He was also ordered to pay restitution totaling over $800,000 to the IRS and New York State.

Prior to his sentencing, this Court, by order entered July 9, 2013, had granted the petition of the Departmental Disciplinary Committee [Committee], deeming the offenses of which respondent was convicted as “serious crimes,” and immediately suspended him, on consent and until further order of the Court, and directed that upon his release from prison, he was to appear for a sanction hearing before the Committee (see 109 A.D.3d 151, 968 N.Y.S.2d 504 [1st Dept.2013] ).

The Committee now moves for an order pursuant to the Rules of the Appellate Division, First Department (22 NYCRR § 603.11 ), accepting respondent's February 27, 2015, affidavit of resignation from the practice of law, and striking his name from the roll of attorneys and counselors-at-law in the State of New York. In his affidavit, respondent indicates he is aware that a hearing will be convened to determine the appropriate sanction to impose upon him as a result of his federal conviction, and acknowledges that he cannot successfully defend himself against the charges of misconduct. Respondent avers that he is fully aware of the implications of submitting his resignation, which he tenders freely, voluntarily, and without coercion or duress. He asks that rather than deeming his resignation effective February 27, 2015, the date of his affidavit, this Court in our discretion accept his resignation effective October 15, 2010, the date he claims to have voluntarily stopped practicing law. Respondent states he retired from his law firm when he became aware of the investigation into his criminal conduct, realizing that his situation would jeopardize his ability to represent or advise clients.

Customarily, the effective date of resignation is the date on which the attorney's affidavit was sworn (see e.g. Matter of Schechter, 309 A.D.2d 197, 765 N.Y.S.2d 250 [1st Dept.2003] [attorney convicted of “serious crime” in 1997, serious-crime interim suspension order issued June 2003, resignation made effective July 2003, the date of the affidavit of resignation] ). We have previously declined to grant similar requests seeking retroactivity (see Matter of Ozer, 287 A.D.2d 196, 197, 733 N.Y.S.2d 31 [1st Dept.2001] [finding “no cogent basis” for accepting attorney's resignation effective the date of the serious-crime interim suspension order dated one-and-a-half years earlier]; see also Matter of Flores, 47 A.D.3d 335, 846 N.Y.S.2d 574 [1st Dept.2007] ). We have also granted such requests (see Matter of Bertel, 268 A.D.2d 112, 706 N.Y.S.2d 101 [1st Dept.2000] [following a sanction hearing, attorney convicted of federal conspiracy to defraud and filing fraudulent income tax returns was suspended for three years retroactive to date of serious-crime interim suspension order]; Matter of Rakov, 250 A.D.2d 27, 679 N.Y.S.2d 117 [1st Dept.1998] [same] ). Here, respondent has not provided a persuasive reason for this Court to grant his request for retroactive treatment of his resignation beyond the date of his affidavit. Accordingly, the Committee's motion should be granted, respondent's resignation from the practice of law accepted, and his name stricken from the roll of attorneys, nunc pro tunc to February 27, 2015.

All concur.


Summaries of

In re Freedman

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department, New York.
Jun 25, 2015
141 A.D.3d 84 (N.Y. App. Div. 2015)
Case details for

In re Freedman

Case Details

Full title:In the Matter of Theodore L. FREEDMAN (admitted as Theodore Levy…

Court:Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department, New York.

Date published: Jun 25, 2015

Citations

141 A.D.3d 84 (N.Y. App. Div. 2015)
31 N.Y.S.3d 72
2015 N.Y. Slip Op. 9781

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