Opinion
A102272.
10-31-2003
In re FRANK S., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. FRANK S., Defendant and Appellant.
Frank S., a minor, appeals from an order declaring him a ward of the juvenile court and committing him to the California Youth Authority. He argues that the juvenile courts finding that he committed two counts of attempted second degree robbery is not supported by substantial evidence. We conclude that substantial evidence supports the juvenile courts finding, and we affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On November 23, 2002, Edward Thompson and Darryl Hughes were visiting a friend in Pittsburg. While they were there, according to Thompson, Frank S. and two other men showed up at the friends house, talked to the friend—who professed not to know them—and then left.
Later in the afternoon, Thompson and Hughes walked to a market to buy cigars. On the way, they were passed by a car containing Frank S. and the same two men they had seen at their friends house. Once inside the market, they discovered they were short 10 cents, and Frank S., who came into the store right behind them, gave them a quarter.
Thompson and Hughes left the store and crossed the street. Frank S. left the store behind them. Thompson testified that a man approached them, hit first Thompson and later Hughes in the head with a gun, pointed the gun at them, and ordered them to "strip." The gunman repeated the order seven or eight times. Thompson and Hughes lay on the ground. Thompsons testimony is ambiguous as to whether they removed any clothing.
Thompson testified that he saw Frank S. walking toward them in the street and looking up and down the street. The car Frank S. and the other men had been in drove past. Frank S. said, "Dont move," and then, "Pop that nigger." The gunman shot Hughes in the groin, then Thompson saw the gunman and Frank S. run off in the same direction.
A Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 petition charged Frank S. with assault with a firearm (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(2) —count five), two counts of attempted second degree robbery (§§ 211, 212.5, subd. (c), § 664—counts six and seven), two firearm enhancements (& sect; 12022, subd. (a)(1)), and four other counts unrelated to the November 23 incident.
At a contested jurisdictional hearing, Frank S. testified in his own defense. On November 23, Frank S. caught a ride from a friend to a market and noticed Thompson and Hughes on the way there. He testified that it was the only time he was at the market that day, and denied seeing Thompson earlier in the day. While Frank S. was at the market, Thompson asked him for change, and he gave Thompson change. After he left the market, Frank S. saw an unidentified male approach Thompson and Hughes and hit them repeatedly with a gun. He saw Thompson and Hughes get down or fall to the ground. He neither entered the street nor said anything to the gunman, Thompson, or Hughes. When he heard a shot, he ran off alone. He went to a friends house and played video games the rest of the afternoon.
A surveillance tape from the market showed Frank S. in the market on two separate occasions on November 23.
At the close of evidence, the juvenile court sustained the petition. The court credited Thompsons testimony, found that Frank S. and the gunman were acting in concert, and found true the attempted robbery allegations. The court also found the remaining counts true.
At the dispositional hearing, the juvenile court declared Frank S. a ward of the court, set aside the previously deferred entry of judgment on counts one through three, and committed Frank S. to the California Youth Authority for a maximum period of nine years four months.
On appeal, Frank S. challenges the sufficiency of the evidence as to counts six and seven, the attempted robbery counts.
DISCUSSION
We review a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the juvenile courts finding under the familiar substantial evidence rule. (In re Jerry M. (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 289, 297-298.) "In reviewing appellants insufficiency of evidence argument, we ask not whether there is evidence from which the trier of fact could have reached some other conclusion, but whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to respondent, and presuming in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the trier reasonably could deduce from the evidence, there is substantial evidence of appellants guilt, i.e., evidence that is credible and of solid value, from which a reasonable trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Thus, our sole function as a reviewing court in determining the sufficiency of the evidence is to determine if any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. This same standard of review is applicable to juvenile appeals." (In re Michael M. (2001) 86 Cal.App.4th 718, 726, fns. omitted.)
Robbery is defined as "the felonious taking of personal property in the possession of another, from his person or immediate presence, and against his will, accomplished by means of force or fear." (§ 211.) An attempted robbery requires the specific intent to commit a robbery, plus a direct, but ineffectual, act done toward its commission. (People v. Dillon (1983) 34 Cal.3d 441, 452-453; see § 21a.) Frank S. does not contest that the gunmans use of a firearm satisfies the act requirement, nor does he contest that the evidence was sufficient to show that Frank S. and the gunman were acting in concert. He argues only that insufficient evidence established a specific intent to commit a robbery.
We disagree. "While a specific intent to steal [personal] property [in the possession of another] is a necessary element of the crime of robbery, this intent need not be directly proved but may be inferred from all of the circumstances of the case." (People v. Hall (1967) 253 Cal.App.2d 1051, 1054.) The record contains substantial evidence from which an inference of intent can be drawn. The gunman directed Thompson and Hughes to "strip" seven or eight times. A reasonable fact finder could construe this order as evidence of an intent to deprive Thompson and Hughes of their clothes and anything of value contained therein. While Frank S. contends that this is only "speculation," it is the most logical and reasonable interpretation of the command.
Frank S. points to his and the gunmans subsequent conduct—shooting Hughes, and then fleeing—as proof that neither harbored any intent to steal the victims possessions. However, it matters not whether one might draw a different conclusion than the trier of fact did given this evidence. It matters only that the conclusion actually drawn was a reasonable one. (People v. Catlin (2001) 26 Cal.4th 81, 139; In re Michael M., supra, 86 Cal.App.4th at p. 726.) The juvenile court reasonably could conclude that Frank S. and the gunman changed their minds and decided to shoot Hughes instead, and/or that after doing so, they aborted the robbery and elected to flee immediately to avoid being caught. On appeal, we will not disturb the juvenile courts findings.
DISPOSITION
The jurisdictional and dispositional orders are affirmed.
We concur. STEVENS, ACTING P. J. and SIMONS, J. --------------- Notes: All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.