Opinion
Case No. 8:16-bk-07504-RCT
07-19-2018
In re: Roderick Ford, Debtor.
Chapter 13 ORDER DENYING DEBTOR'S MOTIONS FOR RECONSIDERATION AND TO VACATE ORDERS , AND GRANTING, IN PART, MOTION TO DOCKET ORDER
The case is considered, following oral argument, on the (1) Motion to Vacate Modify, and Reinstate Orders on Debtor's Objection to Florida Department of Revenue's Claims 2 and Motion For Disallowance of Claim 2, pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 501-502, 553 (Civil Rights) ("Motion to Vacate") (Doc. 85); (2) Motion for Reconsideration of Court Rulings/Orders of October 4, 2017 ("First Reconsideration Motion") (Doc. 95); (3) Motion for Reconsideration of Debtor's Motion To Vacate Orders and for Disallowance of Claim 2 (Doc. 85), which was not addressed in the Order Denying Motion (Doc. 101) ("Second Reconsideration Motion") (Doc. 103); and (4) Motion to Court to Docket Order Denying Motion to Vacate (Doc. 85); Re: Amended Notice of Appeal ("Motion to Docket Order") (Doc. 120), all filed by Debtor Roderick Ford (together, the "Several Motions"). The court also considers Mr. Ford's post- hearing Omnibus Memorandum of Law (Doc. 142).
In the Motion to Vacate, Mr. Ford asks the court (1) to vacate docket entry number 47, which is the court's proceeding memo from a hearing held on February 13, 2017, and the Order Granting Debtor's Motion to Correct Scrivener's Error appearing at docket entry number 54, and (2) to enter an order disallowing the claim of the Florida Department of Revenue ("DOR"). Although Mr. Ford references the applicable rule, Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9024, which incorporates Fed. R. Civ. P. ("Rule(s)") 60, the motion does not identify the grounds for relief under Rule 60(b) nor, through argument, addresses any of the enumerated grounds in Rule 60(b)(1) - (5).
The court entered an order embodying its oral ruling on March 30, 2017. (Doc. 65). Were the court to grant the Motion to Vacate, it would necessarily vacate this order. The court notes that this order is the foundation of Mr. Ford's argument that collateral estoppel binds the state court.
The February 13 hearing was a continued hearing on Mr. Ford's Objection to Claim No. 2 of the Florida Department of Revenue. (Docs. 12 and 34).
The court presumes therefore that Mr. Ford seeks to invoke the "catch-all" ground in Rule 60(b)(6), which authorizes release from an order for "any other reason that justifies relief." But reviewing the motion, the court finds that Mr. Ford has not demonstrated the "requisite exceptional circumstances" to warrant relief on this ground. Mr. Ford asserts simply that upon reflection, he believes the court misapplied the law. Although a basis for an appeal, it is not a proper basis for a Rule 60(b)(6) motion. Such motions may not serve "as a substitute for a timely and proper appeal." Accordingly, the Motion to Vacate must be denied.
Williams v. N. Fla. Reg'l Med. Ctr., Inc., 164 F. App'x 896, 899 (11th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation omitted); see also Galbert v. W. Caribbean Airways, 715 F.3d 1290, 1294-95 (11th Cir. 2013) (noting that arguments that could have been raised prior to entry of the judgment sought to be vacated do not constitute extraordinary circumstances that might justify relief under Rule 60(b)(6)).
Mr. Ford also suggests the matter raises issues of constitutional import. However, he cites no applicable provision and merely conclusorily asserts that to deny him relief is to deny his constitutional rights.
Paul v. William Morrow & Co., 380 F. App'x 957, 958-59 (11th Cir. 2010) (citing Rice v. Ford Motor Co., 88 F.3d 914, 919 (11th Cir. 1996)); see Aikens v. Ingram, 652 F.3d 496, 500-01 (4th Cir. 2011).
Both the First and Second Reconsideration Motions suffer from a similar defect. Motions for reconsideration are governed by Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9023, which incorporates Rule 59. A court may grant relief under Rule 59(e) to "(1) account for an intervening change in controlling law, (2) consider newly available evidence, or (3) correct clear error or prevent manifest injustice." However, a motion under Rule 59 is not "a vehicle to relitigate old matters or present the case under a new legal theory . . . [or] to give the moving party another 'bite at the apple' by permitting the arguing of issues and procedures that could and should have been raised prior to judgment."
In re Trombacco, No. 6:16-BK-00188-KSJ, 2017 WL 56705, at *1 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. Jan. 4, 2017).
Mathis v. United States (In re Mathis), 312 B.R. 912, 914 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2004) (quoting Mincey v. Head, 206 F.3d 1106, 1137 n.69 (11th Cir. 2000)).
Neither reconsideration motion articulates a proper basis for relief under Rule 59. Mr. Ford cites no change in controlling law or presents new evidence. Although Mr. Ford might claim the court committed "clear error," a review of the motions indicates that Mr. Ford, dissatisfied with court's rulings, seeks to relitigate the issues and to offer new arguments not previously presented. For this reason alone, both motions must be denied.
The court notes that the Second Reconsideration Motion is virtually identical to the First Reconsideration Motion, differing only as to the exhibits and documents attached.
The court grants, in part, the Motion to Docket Order. By that motion, Mr. Ford asks the court to rule on the Motion to Vacate for purpose of prosecuting an appeal. The Motion to Docket Order is based upon a misperception that the court had ruled orally on the Motion to Vacate and thereafter failed to reduce that oral ruling to writing. But the court had not ruled on the Motion to Vacate and instead continued the matter for future hearing. As the court now considers and rules on the Motion to Vacate, the Motion to Docket Order is granted, in part, limited to the extent that the court enters an order.
Procedural issues aside, at the crux of this dispute is this court's ability to determine, as a final matter, the total amount of the domestic support obligation Mr. Ford owes under Florida law. At oral argument on the Several Motions, the court raised, and DOR echoed, that the Eleventh Circuit's decisions in In re Davis and In re Diaz foreclose the matter. Mr. Ford, stating he was unfamiliar with these decisions, asked for an opportunity to brief the issue.
State of Florida v. Davis (In re Davis), 481 F. App'x 492 (11th Cir. 2012).
State of Florida v. Diaz (In re Diaz), 647 F.3d 1073 (11th Cir. 2011).
Mr. Ford's post-hearing brief is well-argued, and he successfully draws a distinction between the fact of his case and the facts in In re Davis and In re Diaz. Nevertheless, the court finds it is a distinction without a meaningful difference.
As a preliminary matter, Mr. Ford concedes that there are "two conflicting [state court] Final Judgments, one of which expressly authorizes him to make in-kind payments as a domestic support obligation." This acknowledged conflict aside, he argues that this court's finding in its March 30, 2017 order (the "Order") that "Debtor is entitled to a credit of up to $1,700/month for actual support payments made . . . , including mortgage and utility payments" is final and binding both in this case as to DOR's claim and upon the state court.
Doc. 95 p. 14 and n.14; see also Doc. 120 p. 10 and n.6.
Doc. 65.
Mr. Ford asserts that unlike the debtor in In re Diaz, he argues that based upon the Order, DOR's claim is "completely paid and satisfied" and that upon completion of his chapter 13 plan, "there will be no out-standing [sic] child support, alimony, or other domestic support obligations." Mr. Ford distinguishes In re Davis noting that in that case, the bankruptcy court determined the debtor had "no liability" for DOR's claim because the proof of claim was filed untimely and not because as here, the DOR's claim was "completely extinguished through actual payment."
Doc. 142 ¶¶ 4-5.
Doc. 142 ¶¶ 7-8.
To begin, Mr. Ford reads too much into the Order. It is true the Order states that Mr. Ford is "entitled to a credit" as against the prepetition claim filed by DOR. But the order does not determine the specific amount of the credit due nor, importantly, does it state that the credit satisfies the claim. It is that precise determination that the court referred to the state court.
Mr. Ford emphasizes DOR "admitted" its claim is subject to an "off-set." (Doc. 142). Though the Order reflects DOR agreed that Mr. Ford should receive a credit, the agreement included that "the exact amount of [the credit] will be determined in state court." (Doc. 65).
The Order also does not address matters post-petition. Though discussed at hearings, the ability of Mr. Ford to confirm his chapter 13 plan given the requirements of 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(8) are not properly framed at this time. But given the issues discussed herein and the unanimous agreement that the state court's judgments are not entirely clear, it would seem that any decision on confirmation also must wait for a determination by the state court as to Mr. Ford's domestic support obligations.
Mr. Ford's argument confuses the allowance of claims within a bankruptcy case with the determination by the state court of the underlying domestic support obligation. For debts like domestic support obligations that by nature are non-dischargeable, the bankruptcy court decides only a single issue—what amount of the obligation, if any, is payable under a plan. And regardless of what portion of the obligation is paid through a plan, the debtor remains liable for the full balance of the amount owed as determined by the state court.
See In re Davis, 481 F. App'x at 494-95; In re Diaz, 647 F.3d at 1090.
The Eleventh Circuit's direction on these matters is clear. First, as a general principal, a bankruptcy court should refrain from involving itself in family law matters. Second, and more importantly, any determination by a bankruptcy court as to the allowance or disallowance of claim for a domestic support obligation is not binding upon the state court in determining whether a debtor has fulfilled his support obligation under state law or in determining the total amount of the debt owed including sums that may have accrued before the bankruptcy.
See generally Carver v. Carver, 954 F.2d 1573, 1578-79 (11th Cir. 1992) ("It is appropriate for bankruptcy courts to avoid incursions into family law matters out of consideration of court economy, judicial restraint, and deference to our state court brethren and their established expertise in such matters." (quotation omitted)). --------
Simply put, this court cannot do the math. The bankruptcy court is without proper authority to determine the total amount of the domestic support obligation from which it might subtract the credits claimed by Mr. Ford.
It is therefore ORDERED:
1. The Motion to Vacate (Doc. 85) is DENIED.
2. The First Reconsideration Motion (Doc. 95) is DENIED.
3. The Second Reconsideration Motion (Doc. 103) is DENIED.
4. The Motion to Docket Order (Doc. 120) is GRANTED, in part.
5 The court reaffirms its decision to defer ruling on Debtor's objection to DOR's proof of claim until such time as the state court (1) resolves the apparent conflict in its judgments regarding any credit or offset to which Mr. Ford may be entitled and (2) determines the total amount due of Mr. Ford's domestic support obligation.
ORDERED. Dated: July 19, 2018
/s/_________
Roberta A. Colton
United States Bankruptcy Judge Attorney Roderick O. Ford is directed to serve a copy of this Order on interested parties and file proof of service within 3 days of its entry.