Various courts have interpreted Law to mean that they may not graft a bad faith exception into the right to dismiss under Section 1307(b) because the statute states that the debtor may "at any time" request dismissal prior to conversion, and that "the court shall dismiss" the case, and therefore that this right is in fact absolute. See, e.g.,In re Fisher , No. 14-61076, 2015 WL 1263354, at *3–6 (Bankr. W.D. Va. Mar. 19, 2015) (finding that " Law change[d] the playing field" and that the plain language of the statute indicates that a debtor's right to dismiss a case which has not been converted is absolute, bad faith concerns do not curb this right, no statutory provision limiting the right to dismiss exists, and application of a bad faith exception contravenes the Bankruptcy Code and exceeds the authority of the bankruptcy court); see alsoIn re Sinischo , 561 B.R. 176, 193 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2016) ("The Court finds that § 1307(b) of the Bankruptcy Code requires that the Debtor's request to voluntarily dismiss her case must be granted, despite creditor requests under § 1307(c) that the case be converted to a case under chapter 7 for Debtor's bad faith"); In re Mills , 539 B.R. 879, 884 (Bankr. D. Kan. 2015) ("[ Section] 1307(b)mandates dismissal on the debtor's request by using the words ‘at any time’ and ‘shall.’ It only limits the debtor's ability to dismiss cases that have previously been converted to chap
Because the Fourth Circuit has not yet addressed this issue, the split of authority has also arisen among the districts within the Fourth Circuit. CompareIn re Fisher , No. 14-61076, 2015 WL 1263354, at *6 (Bankr. W.D. Va. Mar. 19, 2015) (holding that § 1307(b) provides a Chapter 13 debtor with an absolute and unqualified right to dismiss an unconverted Chapter 13 case voluntarily); In re Hamlin , No. 09-05272-8-SWH, 2010 WL 749809 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. Mar. 1, 2010) (recognizing that Chapter 13 debtors had unqualified right to dismiss their Chapter 13 case before confirmation of their Chapter 13 plan); In re Campbell , No. 07-457, 2007 WL 4553596, * (Bkrtcy.N.D. W. Va. Dec. 18, 2007) ("Regarding this split of authority, this court concludes that a debtor's right to voluntarily dismiss a Chapter 13 case under § 1307(b) is absolute and is not conditioned by § 1307(c)."); Clearstory & Co. v. Blevins , 225 B.R. 591, 592 (D. Md. 1998) (" Section 1307(b) is unequivocal in stating that the debtor may request dismissal ‘at any time’ and that when such a request is made, the court ‘shall’ dismiss the case.")
Because of the use of the word "shall" in this provision, Debtors contend they have an absolute right to dismiss a chapter 13 case. In re Mills, 539 B.R. 879 (Bankr. D. Kan. 2015); In re Fisher, 2015 WL 1263354 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 2015). This court is not of the same opinion, having previously determined
3. A bad faith exception to § 1307(b) is unnecessary because "alternative remedies exist to address such behavior post-dismissal." In re Fisher, 2015 WL 1263354, * 4 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 2015) (citation omitted). Court imposed a 180 day bar to refiling under 11 U.S.C. § 109(g)(2).
In re Barbieri , 199 F.3d at 619-23 ; e.g. , In re Sinischo , 561 B.R. 176, 188-191 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2016) ; In re Mills , 539 B.R. 879, 883-85 (Bankr. D. Kan. 2015) ; In re Williams , 435 B.R. 552, 554-56 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2010). According to this line of cases, § 1307(b) reflects Congress's intent to create an entirely voluntary chapter of the Bankruptcy Code. E.g. , In re Barbieri , 199 F.3d at 620 ; In re Fisher , No. 14-61076, 2015 WL 1263354, at *4 (Bankr. W.D. Va. Mar. 19, 2015) ; In re Hamlin , No. 09-05272-8-SWH, 2010 WL 749809, at *4 (Bankr. E.D. N.C. Mar. 1, 2010).
SeeIn re Mills, 539 B.R. 879, 884 (Bankr. D. Kan. 2015).SeeRoss v. AmeriChoice F.C.U. , 530 B.R. 277 (E.D. Pa. 2015) ; In re Mills , 539 B.R. 879, 884 (Bankr. D. Kan. 2015) ; In re Fisher , 2015 WL 1263354 (Bankr. W.D. Va. March 19, 2015) ; In re Procel , 467 B.R. 297, 308 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (citing Barbieri v. RAJ Acquisition Corp. (In re Barbieri), 199 F.3d 616, 619 (2d Cir.1999) ); In re Darden , 474 B.R. 1, 7 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2012) ; In re Williams , 435 B.R. 552 (Bankr. N. D. Ill. 2010) ; In re Sickel , 2008 WL 5076981 (Bankr. D.D.C. 2008) ; In re Campbell , No. 07–457, 2007 WL 4553596, at *1 (Bankr.N.D.W.Va. Dec. 18, 2007) ; Zeman v. Dulaney (In re Dulaney) , 285 B.R. 10 (D. Colo. 2002).SeeIn re Brown , 547 B.R. 846 (Bankr. S. D. Ca. 2016) ; In re Mitrano , 472 B.R. 706, 710 (E. D. Va. 2012) ; In re Kotche , 457 B.R. 434, 440 (Bankr. D. Md. 2011) ; In re Jacobsen , 609 F.3d 647, 657 (5th Cir. 2010) ; In re Armstrong , 408 B.R. 559, 569 (Bankr. E. D. N. Y. 2009) ; In re Rosson , 545 F.3d 764 (9th Cir. 2008) ; In re Letterese , 397 B.R. 507, 512 (Bankr. S. D. Fla. 2008) ; Molitor v. Eidson (In re Molitor) , 76 F.3d 218, 220 (8th Cir.1996).