"Where the husband has in his possession both community and separate funds, the presumption is that he pays debts from the fund from which properly they should be met." In re Finn's Estate, 106 Wn. 137, 179 P. 103. See, also, In re Woodburn's Estate, 190 Wn. 141, 66 P.2d 1138.
The case of In re Finn's Estate, 106 Wn. 137, 179 P. 103, is distinguished in the later case of Rawlings v. Heal, supra, and need not be here further referred to. [2] Upon the cross-appeal of Eliza Parker, little need be said.
This Court will not reverse a probate court's decision setting a personal representative's compensation absent an abuse of discretion. See In re Finn's Estate, 281 Mich. 478, 484; 275 N.W. 215 (1937); In re Ach Estate, 7 Mich. App. 228, 230; 151 N.W.2d 363 (1967). The burden of proof is on the person claiming compensation.
The courts of the State of Washington have uniformly held that money borrowed by a husband is presumed to be community property and that the property acquired with such borrowed money is presumed to be community property, but these presumptions are rebuttable. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Lee, 58 Wash. 16; 107 Pac. 870; Katterhagen v. Meister, 75 Wash. 112; 134 Pac. 673; In re Finn's Estate, 106 Wash. 137; 179 Pac. 103. Where, as here, the Commissioner determines that the borrowed money and the property acquired were the separate property of petitioner, his determination ‘effectually overcomes the ordinary presumptions of law, and the petitioners continue to have the duty of going forward with their proof. Shea v. Commissioner, 81 Fed.(2d) 937.‘ J. Z. Todd, 3 T.C. 643; affirmed and remanded, 153 Fed.(2d) 553; Henry Dillon Winship, 8 T.C. 744.
As stated in Re Ward's Estate, 152 Mich. 218, 241, questions so raised are "to be determined by the circuit court substantially in accordance with the same rules of law governing their settlement in the probate court." See, also, Holbrook v. Cook, 5 Mich. 225; Casserly v. Casserly, 123 Mich. 44; In re Finn's Estate, 281 Mich. 478. In accordance with the established practice the duty rested on the circuit court on appeal to determine the correctness of the challenged items in the accounts.
As the claim for fees is in a lump sum, it must be broken down into statutory fees allowable and extraordinary fees. The allowance of fees for extraordinary services is discretionary with the court, see In re Finn's Estate, 281 Mich. 478, and Wisner v. Mabley's Estate, 70 Mich. 271. The statutory provision regarding such fees reads in part as follows: "Provided, however, that such allowance shall only be made upon the filing of a petition therefor, setting forth in detail such extraordinary services, or the reasons for considering the case one of unusual difficulty or responsibility." Act No. 314, chap. 62, § 15, Pub. Acts 1915 (3 Comp. Laws 1929, § 15929 [Stat.
In re Sanderson's Estate, 118 Wn. 250, 203 P. 75. If William B. King had separate property or income, it is also to be presumed that the improvements upon his separate property were made with separate funds. Guye v. Guye, 63 Wn. 340, 115 P. 731, 37 L.R.A. (N.S.) 186; In re Finn's Estate, 106 Wn. 137, 179 P. 103; In re Woodburn's Estate, 190 Wn. 141, 66 P.2d 1138. But these presumptions may be overcome and a lien in favor of the community established by proof that community funds, in a substantial amount, have been used in the improvement of the property. Worthington v. Crapser, 63 Wn. 380, 115 P. 849; Jacobs v. Hoitt, 119 Wn. 283, 205 P. 414.
The rule which the majority insists is applicable to the facts in the case at bar is not out of harmony with the community property law of this state, and is in accord with the rationale of our following prior opinions on community property questions like or similar to the one now presented: Jacobs v. Hoitt, 119 Wn. 283, 205 P. 414; In re Carmack's Estate, 133 Wn. 374, 233 P. 942; Rawleigh Co. v. McLeod, 151 Wn. 221, 275 P. 700, 64 A.L.R. 238; Salisbury v. Meeker, 152 Wn. 146, 277 P. 376; In re Buchanan's Estate, 89 Wn. 172, 154 P. 129; Katterhagen v. Meister, 75 Wn. 112, 134 P. 673; Yesler v. Hochstettler, 4 Wn. 349, 30 P. 398; Heintz v. Brown, 46 Wn. 387, 90 P. 211, 123 Am St. 937; Main v. Scholl, 20 Wn. 201, 54 P. 1125; Rawlings v. Heal, 111 Wn. 218, 190 P. 237; Guye v. Guye, 63 Wn. 340, 115 P. 731, 37 L.R.A. (N.S.) 186; Morse v. Johnson, 88 Wn. 57 152 P. 677; Mattson v. Mattson, 29 Wn. 417, 69 P. 1087; In re Finn's Estate, 106 Wn. 137, 179 P. 103; In re Woodburn's Estate, 190 Wn. 141, 66 P.2d 1138; In re Curtis' Estate, 116 Wn. 237, 199 P. 309; Legg v. Legg, 34 Wn. 132, 75 P. 130; and In re Deschamps' Estate, 77 Wn. 514, 137 P. 1009 . See, also, Lake v. Bender, 18 Nev. 361, 4 P. 711, 7 P. 74. The decree is affirmed.
On the contrary, where a husband has separate income, it is presumed that charges against his separate property are paid out of such income. Guye v. Guye, supra; In re Finn's Estate, 106 Wn. 137, 179 P. 103."
On the contrary, where a husband has separate income, it is presumed that charges against his separate property are paid out of such income. Guye v. Guye, supra; In re Finn's Estate, 106 Wn. 137, 179 P. 103. That the income received from the property in question was more than sufficient to pay all charges of every kind and nature incurred against it, we think is clear from the evidence.