Statutes that increase the punishment for an offense affect substantive rights. See, e.g., In re F.G., 318 Ill. App. 3d 709, 717-18 (2000) (finding that an amendment reviving a statute previously found to be unconstitutional was substantive because it increased the punishment for an offense). ¶ 97 Nothing in Public Act 95-688 indicates that it was intended to apply retroactively.
Those doubts have become even stronger after Green. See In re F.G., 318 Ill. App.3d 709, 743 N.E.2d 181 (2000) (holding, on identical issue, that statute "correcting" single subject violation not "retroactive," distinguishing Dobbert). See alsoGreen, ___ So.2d at ___ [28 FLW at D346](Casanueva, J., concurring)(indicating that retroactive application of 02-212 would violate the ex post facto clause).
We note that an Illinois court has come to the same conclusion. In re F.G., 743 N.E.2d 181 (Ill.App. 2000) (holding that when law violating the Illinois single subject rule was void ab initio, it was not an "operative fact" underDobbert). We recognize that our discussion of the efficacy of a law passed in violation of the single subject rule may be at philosophical odds with the majority opinion in Martinez v. Scanlan, 582 So.2d 1167 (Fla. 1991).
We disagree. We point out the First District in In re F.G., 318 Ill. App. 3d 709, 715, 743 N.E.2d 181, 185 (2000), stated "Public Act 90-593 did not violate the single subject clause of the Illinois Constitution. Ramsey, 192 Ill. 2d at 157.
In People v. Bryant, 278 Ill. App.3d 578, 585, 663 N.E.2d 105 (1996), this court noted that the juvenile transfer provision "merely defined the applicability of the Juvenile Court Act." The fact that the transfer provision in question does not itself increase the punishment for the crimes committed by defendant distinguishes the instant case from In re F.G., No. 1-97-0682 (December 28, 2000), and In re R.T., 313 Ill. App.3d 422, 729 N.E.2d 889 (2000), relied upon by defendant. In both F.G. and R.T., the juvenile offenders were sentenced under a provision of Public Act 88-680 that required a mandatory minimum commitment of five years.