Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Robert Ambrose, Juvenile Court Referee., Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. JJ14002.
Jonathan B. Steiner and Ann Krausz, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Assistant Attorney General, and Susan D. Martynec and Alene M. Games, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
SUZUKAWA, J.
The Los Angeles County District Attorney’s Office filed a petition pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 602, alleging that Fernando A. (minor) committed willful, deliberate, and premeditated attempted murder (Pen. Code, §§ 187, subd. (a); 664, subd. (a) (count 1)) and threatened to use force on a witness (§ 139, subd. (a) (count 2)). The petition also charged that minor used a firearm during the commission of the attempted murder. (§ 12022.53, subd. (b).) The juvenile court sustained the petition as to count 1, declared minor to be a ward of the court, ordered minor placed in a long-term Camp-Community Placement program, and determined the maximum period of confinement to be 19 years. Minor appeals from the order, claiming there is insufficient evidence to establish that he intended to kill the victim. He also argues that if the court properly found him guilty of attempted murder, it erred by finding that the attempt was willful, deliberate, and premeditated. We agree with the latter contention. Thus, we affirm the juvenile court’s order sustaining the attempted murder count in the petition, but reverse its finding that the attempt was willful, deliberate, and premeditated.
All further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
The prosecution did not present any evidence as to count 2 and it was dismissed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On April 10, 2006, Alfredo Galvan was standing on the corner of 109th Street and Figueroa, when he saw 16-year-old Miguel C. and 14-year-old minor. Galvan recognized Miguel because approximately a week before, Miguel appeared at Galvan’s house carrying a machete. Miguel said that he wanted to speak to Galvan, but Galvan replied they had nothing to say to one another. Miguel left and Galvan called the police to report the incident.
On the day in question, Galvan was speaking on his cellular telephone when he saw the youths walk by him. Miguel came back and said to Galvan, “You son of a bitch.” Miguel pushed Galvan. Galvan shoved Miguel, causing Miguel to fall to the ground. Miguel turned to minor and said, “Fire (or shoot) at him. Fire at him. Kill him. Kill him.” Minor pulled out a chrome pistol and pointed it at Galvan. Galvan ran and took cover behind a truck that was parked next to where he had been standing. Miguel and minor chased Galvan around the truck for one to two minutes, attempting to box him in. Galvan ran around the truck four times with the youths in pursuit. During this time, minor pointed the gun at Galvan, but did not fire it.
Rogelio Cardenas, Galvan’s friend, was standing across the street. As he watched the youths chasing Galvan, he yelled, “Don’t shoot him.” A woman came out of a house across the street and told Galvan to go into her house. She also loudly declared that she was going to call the police. Other people came out from nearby apartments, and Miguel and minor ran from the scene.
DISCUSSION
Minor contends the evidence is insufficient to sustain the court’s finding that he committed attempted murder because the prosecution failed to prove that he intended to kill Galvan.
“The same standard of appellate review is applicable in considering the sufficiency of the evidence in a juvenile proceeding as in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction. In either type of case, we review the whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it discloses substantial evidence—that is, evidence that is reasonable, credible and of solid value—from which a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” (In re Sylvester C. (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 601, 605, fns. omitted.)
Attempted murder requires that the perpetrator possess a deliberate intention to kill a human being unlawfully. (People v. Bland (2002) 28 Cal.4th 313, 327.) The intent to kill may be proven through circumstantial evidence, including the perpetrator’s words and actions. (People v. Lashley (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 938, 945-946.) Minor argues the evidence shows that he lacked such intent: 1) he did not declare that he intended to kill Galvan; 2) he did not fire the gun; and 3) his decision not to fire the gun represents a completely volitional act expressly negating an intent to kill. We disagree.
“Whether a defendant possessed the requisite intent to kill is, of course, a question for the trier of fact. While reasonable minds may differ on the resolution of that issue, our sole function is to determine if any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citations.]” (People v. Lashley, supra, 1 Cal.App.4th at p. 946.)
The testimony established that Miguel had a prior disagreement with Galvan. On the day in question, the youths walked past Galvan, returned, and Miguel cursed at Galvan. After Galvan pushed Miguel to the ground, Miguel told minor to shoot and kill Galvan. Minor immediately produced a handgun and pointed it at Galvan. Fearing that he was going to be shot, Galvan took cover behind a nearby truck. Minor chased Galvan, all the while pointing the gun at him. The juvenile court could reasonably conclude that minor, who responded to Miguel’s exhortation to kill Galvan, harbored the intent to carry out Miguel’s bidding and chased the victim for the purpose of effectuating that intent. Galvan testified that he ran around the truck four times in an effort to avoid being shot. It was only after people in the neighborhood began gathering and yelling that they were going to call the police that minor abandoned his attempt. While he asserts his failure to fire the gun is evidence of his lack of intent to kill, the trier of fact could rationally conclude that minor was unable to get a clear shot at the elusive Galvan before being forced to flee. Minor asks us to reweigh the evidence and find in his favor. As we have noted, that is not our role. There is sufficient evidence to sustain the attempted murder count of the petition.
Minor cites In re Tameka C. (2000) 22 Cal.4th 190, for the purpose of comparing the facts in that case to those in the instant case. In the cited case, the minor shot the victim, however, the juvenile court dismissed the attempted murder allegations. Minor’s attempt to apply that case here is unpersuasive. First, the case does not stand for the proposition that a conviction for attempted murder requires that the perpetrator fire a weapon. Second, as we have explained, our task is to determine whether the evidence supports the findings of the juvenile court. A determination made by another trial court in a different case has no bearing on our inquiry.
Minor urges that even if we find the evidence sufficient to find him guilty of attempted murder, the finding that the attempt was willful, deliberate, and premeditated cannot be sustained. We disagree.
Our Supreme Court in People v. Anderson (1968) 70 Cal.2d 15 (Anderson)identified three categories of evidence relevant to the issue of premeditation and deliberation, namely, planning activity, motive, and manner of killing. In surveying the cases it had reviewed, it determined that it sustained findings of premeditation and deliberation where there was evidence of all three types, or strong evidence of planning, or evidence of motive in conjunction with evidence of either planning or the manner of killing. (Id. at p. 27.) With this in mind, we review the evidence presented. In determining whether there is sufficient evidence to affirm the juvenile court, we draw all reasonable inferences in support of the judgment. (People v. Stitely (2005) 35 Cal.4th 514, 543.)
Minor contends there is no evidence to support a finding of planning. He argues the record is devoid of any explanation as to how Miguel and he knew Galvan would be in the neighborhood. As to motive, he asserts the conclusion that he shared Miguel’s animosity toward the victim is pure speculation. Indeed, he points out, there is no evidence he was aware of the earlier dispute between Miguel and Galvan. Moreover, there is no evidence minor had previous contact with the victim, thereby defeating any claim that minor harbored a separate motive to kill.
We agree the evidence of planning is weak. We can only guess that minor knew Galvan would be standing on the street in that particular neighborhood at that certain time. We know that the youths walked past Galvan before confronting him. That evidence is more indicative of a chance encounter than a planned confrontation. Further, there is no evidence that minor was armed for the purpose of confronting and attempting to kill Galvan.
However, the evidence of motive is plainly established. When Galvan knocked Miguel to the ground, Miguel told minor to fire at Galvan, to kill him. Although minor may not have shared Miguel’s feelings of ill will toward Galvan caused by their prior encounter, the juvenile court could reasonably conclude that minor’s motive was simply to do Miguel’s bidding. The manner of the attempt also supports the juvenile court’s finding. After producing the weapon, minor chased Galvan around the truck four times in an effort to get a clear shot. During his pursuit of Galvan, minor had an opportunity to reflect on the purpose of his chase. The fact that he was unable to fire a shot does not negate his thoughtful effort to do so. The evidence of motive and the manner of the attempt are sufficient to find that minor’s attempt to kill was premeditated and deliberate. (Anderson, supra, 70 Cal.2d at p. 27.)
We admit the evidence of premeditation and deliberation is not overwhelming. However, “the relevant question on appeal is not whether we are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt, but whether any rational trier of fact could have been persuaded beyond a reasonable doubt that [minor acted with premeditation and deliberation].” (People v. Perez (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1117, 1127.) We find the evidence sufficient to support the juvenile court’s finding that minor committed willful, premeditated, and deliberate attempted murder.
DISPOSITION
The juvenile court’s order sustaining the petition is affirmed.
We concur: WILLHITE, Acting P. J., MANELLA, J.