Opinion
J-S95003-16 No. 2496 EDA 2016
02-08-2017
IN THE INTEREST OF: D.D.G., A MINOR APPEAL OF: D.G., FATHER
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
Appeal from the Decree Dated July 27, 2016
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Family Court at Nos: CP-51-DP-0002035-2014; and CP-51-AP-0000378-2016 BEFORE: STABILE, MOULTON, and MUSMANNO, JJ. MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.:
Appellant D.G. ("Father") appeals from the July 27, 2016 decree of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County ("trial court"), which involuntarily terminated his parental rights to his male child, D.D.G. ("Child"), born on November 17, 2005, under Section 2511(a)(1), (2) and (b) of the Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (2) and (b), and changed the permanency goal to adoption under Section 6351 of the Juvenile Act, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6351. Upon review, we affirm.
The facts and procedural history underlying this case are uncontested and thoroughly recited by the trial court in its Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion. Briefly, on August 19, 2014, the Department of Human Services ("DHS") received a General Protective Services ("GPS") report, alleging that in June of 2014, Child's mother ("Mother"), S.S., left him with his maternal aunt for the weekend and failed to return for him. The report also alleged that Father physically had abused Child and that Father forced Child to vomit as a form of punishment. Additionally, the report alleged that Child had witnessed his parents use drugs and that he did not wish to return to his Mother's care. On December 2, 2014, Child was adjudicated dependent. DHS received legal custody of Child who continued to be placed with maternal aunt. Parents were provided with opportunities to rectify their conduct for purposes of regaining custody of Child, but failed to complete the objectives of their respective single case plan ("SCP"). Specifically, Father's objectives included attending MENERGY, where he was to participate in a domestic violence and spousal abuse program, which he never completed. Father's other objectives were to complete a parenting class, receive drug and alcohol treatment, and obtain employment. He failed to satisfy these objectives. Also, Father tested positive for cocaine use on December 2, 2014.
On April 20, 2016, DHS filed petitions for involuntary termination of the parental rights of parents, and for a change in the permanency goal for Child to adoption. Following a hearing, the trial court terminated the parents' parental rights to Child and changed the permanency goal to adoption. Father timely appealed. Father filed a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal under Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i) and (b). In response, the trial court issued a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion, concluding that it did not abuse its discretion in terminating Father's parental rights to Child under Section 2511(a)(1), (2) and (b) of the Adoption Act.
Mother does not contest the termination of her parental rights to Child.
On appeal, Father raises three issues for our review, reproduced here verbatim:
Our standard of review for orders terminating parental rights is as follows:
When reviewing an appeal from a decree terminating parental rights, we are limited to determining whether the decision of the trial court is supported by competent evidence. Absent an abuse of discretion, an error of law, or insufficient evidentiary support for the trial court's decision, the decree must stand. Where a trial court has granted a petition to involuntarily terminate parental rights, this Court must accord the hearing judge's decision the same deference that we would give to a jury verdict. We must employ a broad, comprehensive review of the record in order to determine whether the trial court's decision is supported by competent evidence.In re S.H., 879 A.2d 802, 805 (Pa. Super. 2005) (quoting In re C.S., 761 A.2d 1197, 1199 (Pa. Super. 2000) (en banc)), appeal denied , 982 A.2d 824 (Pa. 2005).
I. Whether the trial court erred and/or abused its discretion by terminating the parental rights of Father, D.G. pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. [§] 2511(a)(1) where Father presented evidence that he tried to perform his parental duties but was denied access to his son.
II. Whether the trial court erred and/or abused its discretion by terminating the parental rights of Father, D.G. pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. [§] 2511(a)(2) where Father presented evidence that he has remedied his situation by taking parenting classes, attending drug and alcohol treatment attended Menergy to address his goal domestic violence counselling [sic] and obtaining adequate housing for his family. Father has the present capacity to care for his child.
III. Whether the trial court erred and/or abused its discretion by terminating the parental rights of Father, D.G. pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. [§] 2511(b) where the evidence was presented that established [Child] had lived with his Father for the first part of his life. Additionally, Father was denied visitation with his child while his child was in placement.Father's Brief at 7.
Insofar as Father argues that he was denied access to Child, we decline to address this argument because Father failed to preserve it in his Rule 1925 statement. Established law makes clear any issues not raised in a Rule 1925 statement will be deemed waived. Commonwealth v. Castillo , 888 A.2d 775, 780 (Pa. 2005) (quoting Commonwealth v. Lord , 420, 719 A.2d 306, 309 (Pa. 1998)). The concise statement must properly specify the error to be addressed on appeal. Commonwealth v. Dowling , 778 A.2d 683 (Pa. Super. 2001). Moreover, the waiver standards apply in the family law context. See In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 509-10 (Pa. Super. 2007) (applying Lord standard to appeal from order terminating parental rights); In re C.P., 901 A.2d 516, 522 (Pa. Super. 2006) (holding mother waived claim challenging termination of her parental rights because it was not included in her concise statement, among other reasons); In re C.M., 882 A.2d 507, 515 (Pa. Super. 2005) (holding father waived issues regarding goal change when he failed to specify argument in his concise statement). Even if this argument was not waived, Father still would not be entitled to relief. As the trial court noted, since November 2015, Father has failed to contact the case manager to inquire about Child. Father similarly has failed to meet the required SCP objectives to be reunified with Child, who continues to feel uncomfortable being around his Father.
After careful review of the record and the relevant case law, we conclude that the trial court accurately and thoroughly addressed the merits of the Father's claims. See Trial Court Rule 1925(a) Opinion, 10/13/16, at 10-19. As the evidence of record reveals, Father's repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect, and refusal has caused Child to be without essential parental care for the entire life of the case and Father has failed to meet the goals necessary to remediate the causes of his incapacity, abuse, neglect, and refusal. Moreover, as the trial court observed, "termination of Father's parental rights would be in the best interest of Child, who lived with his [m]aternal [a]unt and [u]ncle since placement started and is clearly bonded with them." Id. at 17. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in terminating Father's parental rights to Child. We, therefore, affirm the trial court's July 27, 2016 decree. We further direct that a copy of the trial court's October 13, 2016 Rule 1925(a) opinion be attached to any future filings in this case.
Because we may affirm the trial court's decision regarding the termination of parental rights on any one subsection of Section 2511(a), we focused on Section 2511(a)(2) and (b). See In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en banc), appeal denied , 863 A.2d 1141 (Pa. 2004).
A parent's limited success with services designed to remedy barriers to effective parenting may support termination under Section 2511(a)(2). See B.L.W., 843 A.2d at 385. Termination of parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(a)(2) may be predicated upon either incapacity or refusal to perform parental duties. In re A.L.D., 797 A.2d 326, 337 (Pa. Super. 2002).
Decree affirmed. Judgment Entered. /s/_________
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary Date: 2/8/2017
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