In re the Tax Appeal of Fasi

29 Citing cases

  1. Gray v. Administrative Director of Court

    84 Haw. 138 (Haw. 1997)   Cited 187 times
    Ruling that legislation will be construed to avoid an absurd result

    In the past, this court has subscribed to the proposition that, "[w]here [the] verbs [`shall' and `may'] are used in the same statute, especially where [they] are used in close juxtaposition, we infer that the legislature realized the difference in meaning and intended that the verbs used should carry with them their ordinary meanings." In re Tax Appeal of Fasi, 63 Haw. 624, 626-27, 634 P.2d 98, 101 (1981) (citations omitted). Not surprisingly, we have therefore construed the "close proximity of the contrasting verbs `may' and `shall' [to] require a mandatory effect for the term `shall.'"

  2. University v. City Cty. of Honolulu

    102 Haw. 440 (Haw. 2003)   Cited 6 times

    In Sodexho, the court held that the contract was a service contract rather than a lease and, thus, did not create an interest in the real property which would subject Marriott to any real property taxes. The court relied on In re Fasi, 63 Haw. 624, 634 P.2d 98 (1981). Consequently, it granted Marriott's motion for summary judgment, declared the assessments null and void, and ordered a full refund.

  3. Coon v. City and County of Honolulu

    98 Haw. 233 (Haw. 2002)   Cited 142 times
    Considering "the ‘purpose’ section of the ordinance" but noting that "such policy declarations are not substantive law that can expand the express terms of the operative provisions of the ordinance"

    See, e.g., In re Fasi, 63 Haw. 624, 634 P.2d 98 (1981) (recognizing the right to enter, maintain, and make improvements to real property as indicia of ownership); City of Franklin v. Crystal Ridge, Inc., 509 N.W.2d 730, 733 (Wis. 1994) (noting that the traditional indicia of land ownership include the rights, responsibilities, and benefits associated with that ownership, such as making improvements to the property, enjoyment of its use and profits, maintenance of fire and liability insurance, responsibility for repairs and maintenance, and payment of licenses, fees, and taxes on the property). We can discern nothing in either the Rules or ROH ch. 38 that grants the City the right to enter, use, or improve the land, the fee simple interest in which it transfers pursuant to the ordinance, or that imposes upon the City the responsibility for the land's repair and maintenance.

  4. Williamson v. HAWAI`I Paroling Auth

    97 Haw. 183 (Haw. 2001)   Cited 40 times
    Holding that “the procedural protections are adequate to safeguard prisoners' rights and ensure that the HPA does not arbitrarily set minimum sentences”

    In the past, this court has subscribed to the proposition that, "where the verbs `shall' and `may' are used in the same statute, especially where they are used in close juxtaposition, we infer that the legislature realized the difference in meaning and intended that the verbs used should carry with them their ordinary meanings." In re Tax Appeal of Fasi, 63 Haw. 624, 626-27, 634 P.2d 98, 101 (1981) (citations omitted). Not surprisingly, we have therefore construed the "close proximity of the contrasting verbs `may' and `shall' to require a mandatory effect for the term `shall.'"

  5. State v. Medeiros

    89 Haw. 361 (Haw. 1999)   Cited 24 times
    In Medeiros, a defendant who pled guilty to a charge of unauthorized entry into a motor vehicle filed a motion to enjoin enforcement of chapter 6, article 52 of the Revised Ordinances of the City and County of Honolulu (ROCCH) (Supp.

    In the past, this court has subscribed to the proposition that, "[w]here [the] verbs ['shall' and 'may'] are used in the same statute, especially where [they] are used in close juxtaposition, we infer that the legislature realized the difference in meaning and intended that the verbs used should carry with them their ordinary meanings." In re Tax Appeal of Fasi, 63 Haw. 624, 626-27, 634 P.2d 98, 101 (1981) (citations omitted). Not surprisingly, we have therefore construed the "close proximity of the contrasting verbs 'may and 'shall' [to] require a mandatory effect for the term 'shall.'"

  6. Sato v. Tawata

    79 Haw. 14 (Haw. 1995)   Cited 84 times
    Rejecting defendant's claim of prosecutorial misconduct because the trial court promptly instructed the jury to disregard the prosecution's improper question and the corresponding answer of the witness

    Although the use of the word "shall" is generally mandatory, it is not necessarily dispositive of the issue and has been considered directory in certain situations. In re Fasi, 63 Haw. 624, 626, 634 P.2d 98, 100-01 (1981) (citation omitted). However, where the words "shall" and "may" are used in close juxtaposition within a statute, the terms carry their ordinary meaning.

  7. Alpha Rho Zeta of Lambda Chi Alpha, Inc. v. Inhabitants of Waterville

    477 A.2d 1131 (Me. 1984)   Cited 11 times
    Concluding that a college's housing a fraternity on college property was reasonably incidental to its major purpose of providing college education, where it provided students a place to live while receiving that education

    Providing maintenance services for the properties and carrying insurance on them as the entity subject to loss in case of destruction are other proofs of ownership interests on the part of the College. See Matter of Fasi, 63 Haw. 624, 634 P.2d 98, 104 (1981); Hope v. Cavallo, 163 Conn. 576, 316 A.2d 407, 411 (1972). In our opinion, Colby College has such control over and holds such a bundle of rights and privileges respecting the fraternity houses involved in this case as to qualify such real estate for tax exemption under 36 M.R.S.A. § 652(1)(B) for being owned by a literary and scientific institution, if the property can be said also to be used solely for its own purposes.

  8. State v. Brantley

    84 Haw. 112 (Haw. Ct. App. 1996)   Cited 13 times
    Holding that "sentencing court must impose the mandatory minimum term of imprisonment specified under HRS § 706-660.1 upon the filing of an appropriate motion and a finding that a defendant had a semiautomatic firearm or automatic firearm in his or her possession or used or threatened its use while engaged in the commission of the felony"

    The word "shall" is generally considered mandatory. In re Fasi, 63 Haw. 624, 626, 634 P.2d 98, 101 (1981); Black's Law Dictionary 1375 (6th ed. 1990) ("As used in statutes, contracts, or the like, this word is generally imperative or mandatory. . . . The word in ordinary usage means `must' and is inconsistent with a concept of discretion.") (emphasis added); Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary 1075-76 (10th ed. 1993) ("used in laws, regulations, or directives to express what is mandatory"). Also, when a statute contains both mandatory and directory verbs such as "shall" and "may" in close juxtaposition, the court is to infer that the legislature intended that the verbs should carry with them their ordinary meanings.

  9. Consolidated Amusement v. Waikiki Business Plaza

    6 Haw. App. 312 (Haw. Ct. App. 1986)   Cited 9 times

    " The 1965 Agreement was a license, and a license in real property "is an `authority to do a particular act or series of acts upon another's land without possessing any estate therein.'" In re Fasi, 63 Haw. 624, 629 n. 8, 634 P.2d 98, 102, n. 8 (1981) (quoting McCandless v. John Ii Estate, 11 Haw. 777, 789 (1899)). See also, 25 Am.Jur.2d Easements and Licenses § 123 (1966).

  10. In re the Queen's Medical Center

    715 P.2d 349 (Haw. Ct. App. 1985)   Cited 2 times

    The problem in this case is the nature of the use of the buildings by the tenants. Queen's argues that, under the ruling of In re Fasi, 63 Haw. 624, 634 P.2d 98 (1981), the tax on real property is assessed to the owner, id. at 631, 634 P.2d at 104, and, therefore, it is the owners' use that determines the eligibility of the property for exemption. We find Fasi to be inapplicable, since in that case the City was trying to impose the property tax on a non-owner.