Opinion
D040999.
7-8-2003
In re FABIAN N., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. FABIAN N., Defendant and Appellant.
The juvenile court committed Fabian N. to the California Youth Authority (CYA) for a maximum term of three years eight months after declaring him a continuing ward. (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 602.) Fabian contends this was error.
FACTS
On September 7, 1999, when Fabian was 14 years old, he was arrested after the school principal found marijuana in Fabians sock and a marijuana pipe in his pocket on school grounds. The court placed him on probation after Fabian admitted possessing less than 28.5 grams of marijuana on school grounds. (Health & Saf. Code, § 11357, subd. (e).) On January 16, 2000, Fabian pulled a knife on another boy and threatened to stab him. The two scuffled, Fabian grabbed the boys gold chain and fled with it. Fabian admitted exhibiting a deadly weapon (Pen. Code, § 417) and grand theft person (Pen. Code, § 487, subd. (c)). The court committed him to Breaking Cycles program for a maximum term of 240 days. On July 26, 2000, Fabian admitted running away from the juvenile camp. (& sect; 871, subd. (a)). The court again committed him to Breaking Cycles for a maximum term of 240 days. On February 22, 2001, the court continued Fabian as a ward under the supervision of the probation department and placed him with his mother and continued probation. On April 20, Fabian admitted violating probation conditions regarding curfew, attending school, vandalism, and using controlled substances. The court extended his commitment to Breaking Cycles for 150 days. On August 21, the probation department alleged that after the Breaking Cycles commitment Fabian was placed in the Youth Day Center (YDC), was returned to juvenile hall for rules violations, returned to YDC, tested positive for methamphetamine, had not complied with curfew, associated with gang members, and had been terminated from YDC and permanently removed from the juvenile ranch facility. On September 25, the court committed Fabian to the Youth Correctional Center (YCC) for a maximum term of 270 days. On February 11, 2002, Fabian was back before the court after being terminated from YCC for "very disruptive behavior." While at Camp Barrett, he was reported to have admitted he was a gang member, displayed a poor attitude, failed to complete assigned school work, was repeatedly late for class, admitted a serious anger problem, was repeatedly disrespectful to staff, almost started a fight, engaged in gang talk and instigated a fight, had difficulty controlling his temper, needed intensive psychiatric treatment, used abusive language toward staff, urinated and spit in another wards lotion bottle, refused to follow directions, and spit in another wards book. On April 18, the court ordered placement of Fabian in a residential treatment facility. On June 19, he was placed in the Masada group home in Gardena. On July 29, Fabian admitted battery. The People alleged he accosted a female Japanese exchange student while he and the victim were visiting a campground at Fort McArthur. Fabian asked her how many guys she could "satisfy sexually," grabbed her hand and sucked on her fingers, and grabbed her shoulders and made four or five thrusts against her buttocks. The juvenile court in Los Angeles County entered a true finding Fabian committed battery (Pen. Code, §§ 242/243, subd. (a)) and transferred the case to San Diego. In San Diego, the court committed Fabian to CYA for a maximum term of three years eight months.
DISCUSSION
Fabian contends the trial court abused its discretion in committing him to CYA because there was an alternative placement available, and the trial court did not find he would benefit from CYA commitment. " `It is well settled in California that when a public offense has been committed by a juvenile, certification of the juvenile to the CYA is within the sound discretion of the committing court, be it the juvenile court [citation] or the superior court [citations.] The decision of the juvenile or superior court may be reversed on appeal only upon a showing that the court abused its discretion in committing the minor to the CYA. [Citations.] A reviewing court must indulge in all reasonable inferences to support the findings of the juvenile court, and such findings will not be disturbed on appeal when there is substantial evidence to support them. [Citation.] [Citation.]" (In re Michael R. (1977) 73 Cal. App. 3d 327, 332-333, 140 Cal. Rptr. 716.)
Section 734 provides
"No ward of the juvenile court shall be committed the Youth Authority unless the judge of the court is fully satisfied that the mental and physical condition and qualifications of the ward are such as to render it probable that he will be benefited by the reformatory educational discipline or other treatment provided by the Youth Authority."
Fabian argues the trial court failed to comply with section 734 although the court said, "I do find that Fabians mental, physical condition and qualifications of the ward render it likely that hell benefit from reformatory education and other programs provided by the California Youth Authority. And that court is ordering California Youth Authority." (RT II, p. 9)!
Fabian argues the courts finding was insufficient because it failed to make the specific finding required by section 734. He is mistaken because the court found it probable Fabian will benefit for the reformatory, educational and other treatment at CYA.
Noting that he underwent psychiatric evaluation on four separate occasions, and that the evaluators unanimously expressed concern for his psychological problems, and three recommended placement in a residential treatment facility, Fabian argues the trial court abused its discretion in failing to give sufficient weight to the opinions of the experts. In January 2000, after the true findings that Fabian committed grand theft person and exhibited a deadly weapon, Dr. Thomas Barnes found he had a low tolerance for frustration exhibited through angry outbursts. Barnes recommended placement in Breaking Cycles with psychotherapy. In August 2000, after Fabian displayed difficulties in, and had run away from, the Breaking Cycles program, Dr. Charlotte Houston found him impulsive and aggressive. She recommended his return to the Breaking Cycles. In August 2001, after Fabian was terminated from YDC, Dr. Beatriz Heller found he needed an environment of containment and direction. She recommended placement in a residential placement facility. Before the court placed Fabian at Masada, Dr. Dennis Alters found him impulsive and reckless and recommended the need for careful monitoring of safety, psychiatric, chemical dependency, and a strong commitment to evaluating and treating his learning disabilities. After the battery true finding, Dr. Robert Klein recommended Fabian be given another chance in a residential treatment facility with a stayed CYA commitment.
Focusing on In re Aline D. (1975) 14 Cal.3d 557, 121 Cal. Rptr. 816, 536 P.2d 65, Fabian argues the court erred in committing him to CYA when, the alternative, a residential treatment program had not been reasonably attempted.
In In re Aline D., the Supreme Court recognized CYA commitment is "the final treatment resource available" to the juvenile court and the Welfare and Institutions Code contemplates a progressively restrictive and punitive series of disposition orders. (In re Aline D., supra, at p. 564, italics omitted.) Holding the court must find the minor will benefit from the placement, the Supreme Court reversed an order committing a troubled girl to CYA after the juvenile court found she was not an appropriate candidate for the placement, but the county had no other available facility. In dictum, the Supreme Court noted juvenile commitments are designed to rehabilitate, not punish. (Id. at pp. 565-567.)
After the In re Aline D. decision, the Legislature added protection of the public as one of the purposes of juvenile court law, and specifically listed punishment as one of the means of fulfilling the purpose. With the exception of the dictum regarding the purpose of the juvenile law, In re Aline D. remains viable authority.
There is no absolute requirement every possible alternative be attempted before placing a minor in CYA. (In re Ricky H. (1981) 30 Cal.3d 176, 183, 178 Cal. Rptr. 324, 636 P.2d 13.) As the court noted in In re Jose R. (1983) 148 Cal. App. 3d 55, 61, 195 Cal. Rptr. 633:
"Among considerations for commitment which courts have found to be valid are: escape from a less secure facility [citation], the recommendation of the probation report [citation], a pattern of increasingly serious delinquent behavior [citation], and the need for a locked facility."
The record supports a finding that all these criteria, except possibly the third, existed here.
In In re Aline D., the Supreme Court reversed a CYA commitment because the trial court had found the minor would not benefit from the commitment. Here, there was no such finding. To the contrary, the juvenile court clearly saw Fabian could benefit from CYA.
Before committing Fabian to CYA, the juvenile court sought to rehabilitate him through probation in his own home, commitment to Breaking Cycles, a second commitment to Breaking Cycles, a third commitment to Breaking Cycles, placement in YDC, commitment to YCC, and placement in a residential treatment facility. The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in ultimately committing him to CYA.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
WE CONCUR: McDONALD, J., and OROURKE, J. --------------- Notes: All statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless other specified.