Moreover, the exercise of the mayoral veto in issue here, effectively denying a special exception use permit, is a quintessentially administrative act that is subject to judicial review pursuant to CPLR article 78. A determination to grant or deny a special exception use permit is subject to review in a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 even where that authority is exercised by the local legislative body ( see Matter of Sunrise Plaza Assoc. v. Town Bd. of Town of Babylon, 250 AD2d 690, 693). The action of the City Council in approving a special exception use permit is thus subject to judicial review and has been reviewed as such ( see Matter of Exxon Corp. v. Restiano, 237 AD2d 356; Matter of Sarah Lawrence Coll. v. City Council of City of Yonkers, 48 AD2d 897; Carriage House Realty Co. v. Municipal Corp. of City of Yonkers, 80 Misc 2d 586). Since the action of the legislative body itself is subject to judicial review, the Mayor cannot avoid judicial review of his veto simply by characterizing the veto as "legislative." A use permitted by special exception use permit is a use that has been found by the local legislative body to be appropriate for the zoning district and "in harmony with the general zoning plan and will not adversely affect the neighborhood" ( Matter of North Shore Steak House v. Board of Appeals of Inc. Vil. of Thomaston, 30 NY2d 238, 243).

The City Council's denial of an application for a special permit may not be "impermissibly based upon generalized objections expressed by members of the community." Exxon Corp. v. Restiano, 237 A.D.2d 356, 357 (2d Dep't 1997). The Council, however, is "free to consider matters related to the public welfare in determining whether to grant or deny a special exception or permit[.