Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County No. J224414, James A. Edwards, Judge. Retired judge of the San Bernardino Super. Ct. assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to art. VI, § 6 of the Cal. Const.
Eleanor M. Kraft, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Gary W. Schons, Assistant Attorney General, Lilia E. Garcia, and Elizabeth S. Voorhies, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
OPINION
McKinster J.
In November of 2008, the San Bernardino District Attorney filed a juvenile petition alleging that E.W. (minor) came within the provisions of Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 for having committed the felony offense of residential burglary under Penal Code section 459. Following a contested jurisdictional hearing, the juvenile court found the allegation true.
All statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise specified.
At the dispositional hearing on December 23, 2008, the juvenile court declared minor a ward of the court and placed him on probation in the home of his aunt.
On appeal, minor contends that the judgment must be reversed because (1) the juvenile court applied the wrong standard of proof in making its true finding; and (2) the court’s true finding is not supported by substantial evidence. For the reasons set forth below, we shall affirm the judgment.
I
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In November of 2008, Mario Gonzales lived in a small street-level residence located on Cedar Avenue on San Bernardino. Gonzales knew minor in passing, as the two individuals lived directly across from each other.
On November 12, 2008, Gonzales awakened at noon and was picked up by a friend about five minutes later to go to the store. Gonzales was gone only a short time. He arrived back home before 12:30 p.m. Gonzales went into his bedroom, looked out a window he had left open, and, from a distance of approximately 25 feet away, saw minor exit Gonzales’s yard by hopping over a six-foot chain link fence leading to a neighbor’s property. Minor was carrying a small, about 14-inch, flat-screen computer monitor and a similarly-sized keyboard which had previously been in Gonzales’s living room.
Gonzales was “going to yell [minor’s] name actually and call him back,” but then decided to catch up with him by car. Gonzales left his residence, went back into his friend’s car, and asked the friend to drive around the block so he could check if minor took the computer and keyboard from Gonzales’s house.
It took the men about two minutes to drive around the block. During that time, Gonzales spotted minor and saw that minor “definitely had something in his hands” but could not identify what it was. The friend made a U-turn and the two men confronted minor. Minor dropped the items he was holding and ran away. Gonzales retrieved his abandoned computer monitor and keyboard. He then immediately called the police.
San Bernardino Police Officer Gerald Walent responded to the scene at approximately 12:35 p.m., shortly after the arrival of his colleague, Officer Adams. Minor and a second suspect, who was later identified as a lookout during the incident, were not at the location. Officer Walent talked to minor’s aunt and then interviewed Gonzales. Officer Walent conducted a walk-through of Gonzales’s residence. Upon examining the outside of Gonzales’s residence, the officer saw that a lawn chair had been placed underneath the bedroom window and the screen to the window had been forced off.
While a police technician attempted to obtain fingerprints from the window screen, Gonzales informed Officer Walent that minor and his cohort had just returned to his aunt’s home. At some point thereafter, Officer Walent attempted to recontact Ms. Turner, but her front door was locked and nobody answered. Therefore, Officers Adams and Walent went around back and entered the residence through the open rear door. Ms. Turner responded to the officer’s inquiry by stating that the two suspects were in the living room.
Officer Walent made contact with minor shortly after 1:00 p.m. Gonzales saw minor as he was escorted from his residence. Gonzales observed that minor was now wearing different clothes but was able to identify minor as the person who hopped over the fence about half an hour earlier. Gonzales made the same identification at the time of trial.
At trial, minor admitted that he had previously seen Gonzales around. Minor, however, denied that on the day in question, he entered Gonzales’s home, hopped over the fence, or was chased by Gonzales. Minor testified that he was walking his cousins home from school at roughly the same time Gonzales’s home was being burglarized. As he was returning home, he saw police cars out front. Minor, however, also saw his brother walking toward him so he left the scene with his brother to chat with some friends before returning to his home.
II
ANALYSIS
A. The Trial Court Applied the Correct Standard of Proof
Minor contends that the juvenile court applied an incorrect standard of proof in finding true the allegation that he committed the crime of burglary. We disagree. There is nothing on the record to rebut the presumption that the court applied the well-established beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard.
1. Background
At the conclusion of the prosecution’s case-in-chief, minor moved to dismiss the petition on the ground that Gonzales gave “two different stories of what happened that day.” The prosecutor countered that Gonzales’s identification testimony was credible. The juvenile court stated:
“Having observed the victim witness, I agree with the district attorney. I think [Gonzales’s] testimony declared that he identified [minor] as the person he observed going over the fence and later on with the items that were removed from his home. [¶] So I will deny the motion.”
During closing argument to the court, defense counsel reasserted these same evidentiary challenges, arguing that due to the inconsistencies in the victim’s testimony and the dearth of corroborating evidence, the People failed to prove minor “entered the house with the intent to steal anything” and that Gonzales failed to “appropriately identify [minor].”
Again, the juvenile court responded:
“Well my recollection of the evidence is not quite the same as yours, but as I indicated before, I think the evidence is sufficient for me to believe that there is a reasonable doubt; that the victim of this case positively identified [minor] as the person he saw going over the fence and I think it’s reasonable to infer that they removed the objects that were removed from the house. [¶] In any event, I am persuaded that he did commit the offense and that the allegation in the petition is true.”
2. Discussion
When a minor is charged with a crime, due process requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt, as to each element of the crime, at the jurisdictional stage of a criminal delinquency proceeding before a petition can be sustained. (In re Eddie M. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 480, 487, citing In re Winship (1970) 397 U.S. 358, 368; In re Alex U. (2007) 158 Cal.App.4th 259, 265.)
As a general rule, a lower court is presumed to have known and followed the applicable law. (Evid. Code, § 664; People v. Coddington (2000) 23 Cal.4th 529, 644, overruled on another ground in Price v. Superior Court (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1046, 1069.) This rule “encompasses a presumption that the trial court applied the proper burden of proof in matters tried to the court.” (Ross v. Superior Court (1977) 19 Cal.3d 899, 913 (Ross).) Therefore, the appellate record need not affirmatively reflect that the proper standard was used; the presumption of correctness will be upheld in the absence of contrary evidence. (Id. at pp. 913-915.)
In this case, minor claims that the juvenile court applied the “wrong standard of proof in reaching its conclusion that [minor] committed the burglary.” In support of his claim, minor relies on the statement by the court that “there [was] a reasonable doubt[,]” prior to concluding that minor was guilty of committing the crime, as quoted in detail above.
We disagree with minor’s analysis. Read in proper context, the court’s statement regarding reasonable doubt appears to have been a linguistic slip or stenographic error. In the record, when the court denied minor’s midtrial motion to dismiss the petition, the court upheld Gonzales’s identification of minor as the person he saw leaving his yard, and later, in possession of his property. Thereafter, when defense counsel challenged the sufficiency of Gonzales’s identification testimony during closing argument, the juvenile court stated that it had a different “recollection of the evidence” and that, as it had “indicated before,” the evidence was “sufficient for [the court] to believe that there is a reasonable doubt; that the victim of this case positively identified [minor] as the person he saw going over the fence....” When reviewing the record as a whole, it is clear that the court intended to state, or that the transcript should have read, that “there is no reasonable doubt.”
Moreover, the juvenile court did not find it “‘reasonable to infer’ [minor’s] guilt.” Instead, the court found that, upon accepting Gonzales’s identification testimony, it could be reasonably inferred that minor was the person who committed the crime alleged in the petition. Such an inference does not support minor’s argument that the court applied the wrong standard of proof in making its jurisdictional finding.
In sum, absent contrary evidence, the presumption that the court applied the proper standard of proof will be upheld. (Ross, supra, 19 Cal.3d at pp. 913-915.)
B. The Court’s Finding Is Supported by Substantial Evidence
Defendant contends that the juvenile court’s true finding on the burglary allegation is not supported by substantial evidence because Gonzales gave uncorroborated and inconsistent testimony when identifying minor as the perpetrator.
Our review of any claim of insufficiency of the evidence is limited. In reviewing a claim that the evidence is insufficient to support a conviction, “[w]e review the whole record in a light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it contains substantial evidence, i.e., evidence that is credible and of solid value, from which a rational trier of fact could find beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused committed the offense.” (In re Ryan D. (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 854, 859, citing People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 578; see also People v. Rodriguez (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1, 11.) “‘Reversal on this ground is unwarranted unless it appears “that upon no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient substantial evidence to support [the conviction].”’ [Citations.]” (People v. Gaut (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 1425, 1430.) “‘The standard of proof in juvenile proceedings involving criminal acts is the same as the standard in adult criminal trials. [Citation.]’” (In re Babak S. (1993) 18 Cal.App.4th 1077, 1088, quoting In re Jose R. (1982) 137 Cal.App.3d 269, 275.)
Given this court’s limited role on appeal, minor bears an enormous burden in claiming there was insufficient evidence to sustain his conviction. If the verdict is supported by substantial evidence, we are bound to give due deference to the trier of fact and not retry the case ourselves. (Jackson v. Virginia (1979) 443 U.S. 307, 319, 326; People v. Ochoa (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1199, 1206.) In determining whether substantial evidence exists, “we do not reweigh the evidence, resolve conflicts in the evidence, or reevaluate the credibility of witnesses.” (People v. Cortes (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 62, 71; see also People v. Jones (1990) 51 Cal.3d 294, 314 (Jones).) “Although it is the duty of the [trier of fact] to acquit a defendant if it finds that circumstantial evidence is susceptible of two interpretations, one of which suggests guilt and the other innocence [citations], it is the [trier of fact], not the appellate court which must be convinced of the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. ‘“If the circumstances reasonably justify the trier of fact’s findings, the opinion of the reviewing court that the circumstances might also be reasonably reconciled with a contrary finding does not warrant a reversal of the judgment.”’” (People v. Bean (1988) 46 Cal.3d 919, 932-933.) The standard of review applies even “when the conviction rests primarily on circumstantial evidence.” (People v. Kraft (2000) 23 Cal.4th 978, 1053.)
In the present matter, minor contends that the judgment must be reversed because the court’s finding on the burglary allegation is supported only by Gonzales’s uncorroborated and inconsistent testimony identifying minor as the perpetrator of the crime. However, the testimony of a single witness is sufficient to uphold a judgment, even if it is inconsistent or contradicted by other evidence. (People v. Scott (1978) 21 Cal.3d 284, 296; see also People v. Boyer (2006) 38 Cal.4th 412, 480 [“Identification... by a single eyewitness may be sufficient to prove the defendant’s identity as the perpetrator of a crime.”].) Only if a witness’s testimony is physically impossible or inherently improbable may it be discounted by the reviewing court. (People v. Scott, supra, at p. 296.) Minor does not contend that Gonzales’s identification testimony was either physically impossible or inherently improbable.
Contrary to minor’s contention, the record shows that the juvenile court’s true finding is supported by substantial evidence. Gonzales and minor were neighbors who had seen each other on prior occasions. Gonzales recognized minor when Gonzales initially spotted minor hopping over Gonzales’s fence. Within the next few minutes, minor and Gonzales had a face-to-face confrontation, at which time Gonzales saw minor with the stolen property. About half an hour later, Gonzales saw minor outside his aunt’s residence, and while noticing minor had changed clothes, positively identified minor as the person Gonzales had seen leaving his yard and then in possession of his property. Gonzales thereafter identified minor at trial.
Based on the testimony by Gonzales, we find that the juvenile court’s true finding is supported by substantial evidence.
III
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur, Hollenhorst Acting P.J., Miller J.