Daniel M. appeals an order of the separate juvenile court of Lancaster County, Nebraska, terminating its jurisdiction over Daniel's son, Ethan M. This case has previously been on appeal to this court on a number of occasions. See, In re Interest of Ethan M., 15 Neb.App. 148, 723 N.W.2d 363 (2006) (Ethan M. I ); In re Interest of Ethan M., 18 Neb.App. 63, 774 N.W.2d 766 (2009) ( Ethan M. II ); In re Interest of Ethan M., 19 Neb.App. 259, 809 N.W.2d 804 (2011) (Ethan M. III ); In re Interest of Ethan M., No. A–13–058, 2013 WL 4036465 (Neb.App. Aug. 6, 2013) (selected for posting to court Web site) (Ethan M. IV ).In the present appeal, Daniel has assigned numerous errors, including the juvenile court's finding that jurisdiction should be terminated. Because we find no error with the court's termination of its jurisdiction, we affirm.II. BACKGROUND

Upon Daniel's appeal, we found plain error in the court's order. In In re Interest of Ethan M., 18 Neb. App. 63, 72, 774 N.W.2d 766, 773 (2009), we held that "where the only issue placed in front of the county court is whether a case plan is in the child's best interests, permanent child custody cannot be modified merely through the adoption of the case plan." We stated, however, that "a case plan could be used to place a child with a noncustodial parent as a dispositional order under the continuing supervision of the juvenile court.

Upon Daniel's appeal, we found plain error in the court's order. In In re Interest of Ethan M., 18 Neb.App. 63, 72, 774 N.W.2d 766, 773 (2009), we held that “where the only issue placed in front of the county court is whether a case plan is in the child's best interests, permanent child custody cannot be modified merely through the adoption of the case plan.” We stated, however, that “a case plan could be used to place a child with a noncustodial parent as a dispositional order under the continuing supervision of the juvenile court.”

In such cases, the parental preference doctrine is not implicated, because there is no controversy between a biological parent and one who is neither a biological nor adoptive parent. See In re Interest of Ethan M. , 18 Neb. App. 63, 774 N.W.2d 766 (2009). Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-245(12) (Reissue 2016) provides in part: "Nothing in the Nebraska Juvenile Code shall be construed to deprive the district courts of their habeas corpus, common-law, or chancery jurisdiction or the county courts and district courts of jurisdiction of domestic relations matters as defined in section 25-2740."

Ponseigo v. Mary W., 267 Neb. 72, 672 N.W.2d 36 (2003). See In re Interest of Ethan M., 18 Neb.App. 63, 774 N.W.2d 766 (2009).The Legislature was apparently concerned that district courts had interpreted our decision in Ponseigo to mean that they did not have jurisdiction to decide the custody of children who were subject to a juvenile court's exclusive jurisdiction.

In Nebraska, when an action involves child support, child custody, parenting time, visitation, or other access, a final order must incorporate a parenting plan. See, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42-364(1) (Reissue 2016) (in action under Chapter 42 involving child support, child custody, parenting time, visitation, or other access, parenting plan shall be developed as provided in Parenting Act); In re Interest of Ethan M., 18 Neb. App. 63, 774 N.W.2d 766 (2009) (§ 42-364(1) requires that final order incorporate parenting plan). Although the record before us does not include the original pleadings leading to the 2013 stipulated order, whether dealing with modification of a marriage dissolution or a paternity action, the requirements of § 42-364 would apply.

In 2008, the Legislature modified the jurisdiction of juvenile courts and county courts sitting as juvenile courts so that these courts could exercise jurisdiction over custody matters when the court already had jurisdiction over the juvenile for another purpose. See In re Interest of Ethan M., 18 Neb.App. 63, 774 N.W.2d 766 (2009). Because the juvenile court had jurisdiction in this case pursuant to § 43–247(3)(a), the juvenile court could exercise jurisdiction over custody matters in this case.