Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Fresno County No. 07CEJ300129, Jamileh Schwartzbart, Commissioner.
Julie E. Braden, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Kevin Briggs, County Counsel, William G. Smith, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
OPINION
Wiseman, Acting P.J.
In this juvenile dependency case, the mother contends that the juvenile court abused its discretion when it denied her petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 388 to modify its previous order denying reunification services. We disagree. The judgment is affirmed.
Subsequent statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise noted.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORIES
In May 2007, before the dependency petition was filed, L.T., the mother, was living with her two boys, E.T., age eight, and D.T., age seven. She also had joint custody of her daughter I.T., age two, who lived with her half of the time and with I.T.’s father, D.M., half of the time. An older daughter, A.T., lived in Reno with L.T.’s mother. The boys’ father, B.D., was in prison for an incident in which he severely abused the mother.
L.T. had a history of 12 prior child protective services referrals, beginning in 2002. Three of these referrals were found to be substantiated by the agency receiving the referral: emotional abuse and general neglect of E.T. and D.T. on December 31, 2003; general neglect of E.T. on August 4, 2004; and general neglect of D.T. on April 30, 2007. In the August 4, 2004, incident, E.T., then five years old, was found walking alone outside at night. In the April 30, 2007, incident, school personnel made the referral after L.T. failed to pick D.T. up after school. She finally arrived an hour and a half late. She had failed to pick him up on time on numerous previous occasions. The facts of the December 31, 2003, incident are not in the record.
L.T. had longstanding problems with drug and alcohol abuse. On April 27, 2004, she was convicted of using a controlled substance and sentenced to probation. She completed a course of outpatient substance abuse treatment pursuant to Proposition 36 at that time, but was still using drugs and drinking in 2007. On May 11, 2007, as part of a substance abuse evaluation, she said she had consumed alcohol to the point of intoxication on 20 of the past 30 days and had used methamphetamine every day for the past 30 days. She said she had been a methamphetamine user for six years. D.M., the two-year-old’s father, also admitted to methamphetamine abuse. After two arrests for driving under the influence, he participated in a Proposition 36 drug treatment program.
As noted, L.T. had a history of domestic violence at the hands of B.D., the boys’ father. B.D. was convicted of violating Penal Code section 206 (torture) and is serving a sentence of 26 years to life for the final incident in which he battered L.T. She reported that she was a victim of domestic violence almost every day when she was married to B.D. In connection with B.D.’s case, L.T. received services from the Kings County Victim Witness Services program.
D.M. was arrested for domestic battery while L.T. was with him, but she told a social worker that it was really she who had hit him; he volunteered to take the blame. D.M. confirmed this account. He was released without being charged. D.M. had a criminal record that included two convictions of driving under the influence and one of receiving stolen property.
L.T. began to receive psychological counseling after the beating that resulted in B.D.’s incarceration. She received diagnoses, beginning in 2001, of post-traumatic stress disorder, depression, anxiety, and multiple personality disorder. She took prescription drugs for her conditions. In March 2007, she was hospitalized for mental illness pursuant to section 5150.
E.T., the older boy, also had mental health issues. He was aggressive and received a diagnosis of severe emotional disturbance. D.M., the younger boy, liked to wear girls’ clothes and was in the habit of telling people he was a girl.
Matters came to a head between May 3 and May 9, 2007. On May 3, someone saw E.T. and D.T. riding bicycles unsupervised on a busy street. Police were summoned and an officer found D.T. on the street crying for his mother. He was dirty and smelled bad. The officer picked up E.T. inside a nearby K-Mart. After finding L.T. in her house, the officer reported that she was not concerned about the situation and thought it was not a big deal. The officer took the children to a police station. A county social worker met the children at the police station and took them to a foster home.
On May 7, 2007, the Department of Children and Family Services (the department) held a meeting attended by L.T. and department personnel. After discussion, department staff concluded that the boys should be returned to L.T. with Voluntary Family Maintenance services. The services included drug testing, with the first test to be administered immediately. After L.T. provided a sample, the department retrieved the children from the foster home and transported the family back to L.T.’s home.
Later that day, however, the department received the drug test results, which were positive for methamphetamine at a level indicating use the same day or during the preceding weekend. Department personnel went to the family’s home. A social worker asked L.T. when she last used methamphetamine. She said she could not remember.
The department convened another meeting on May 9, 2007. L.T. and D.M. were both present. When D.M. said he had not used drugs in a long time, L.T. replied that they had used methamphetamine together the previous Sunday, the night before the May 7, 2007, meeting. D.M. conceded that this was true. Department personnel decided to file a dependency petition for all three children. The petition, which was filed the same day, alleged that the children were at a substantial risk of serious physical harm within the meaning of section 300, subdivision (b), because of the parents’ drug abuse and domestic violence. The juvenile court held a detention hearing on May 10 and 15, 2007, and issued detention orders.
The jurisdictional hearing took place on June 12, 2007. The parents submitted the case upon the petition and the court found the allegations in it true. E.T. and D.T. were placed in foster care together at first, but E.T. was later moved to a separate foster home because of aggression he exhibited toward D.T. and the foster parents. I.T. was placed with her father’s parents.
The dispositional hearing began on July 17, 2007, continued on August 29, September 11, October 3, October 31, November 6, November 7, and November 8, 2007, and concluded on November 20, 2007. In its reports for this hearing, the department cited section 361.5, subdivision (b)(13), and recommended denying the mother reunification services. Section 361.5, subdivision (b)(13), provides that reunification services need not be provided if the juvenile court finds, by clear and convincing evidence:
“That the parent or guardian of the child has a history of extensive, abusive, and chronic use of drugs or alcohol and has resisted prior court-ordered treatment for this problem during a three-year period immediately prior to the filing of the petition that brought that child to the court’s attention, or has failed or refused to comply with a program of drug or alcohol treatment described in the case plan required by Section 358.1 on at least two prior occasions, even though the programs identified were available and accessible.”
Section 361.5, subdivision (c), further provides that if the court makes the finding in any of several subdivisions, including subdivision (b)(13), reunification services shall not be ordered unless the juvenile court finds by clear and convincing evidence that reunification would be in the best interests of the child.
The department reported that L.T. admitted to long-term abuse of drugs and alcohol. It further stated:
“According to [L.T.,] she was ordered to complete a substance abuse treatment program through Proposition 36, and completed an outpatient substance abuse treatment program in 2004. Ms. Torres tested positive for methamphetamine in May 2007 when her children were removed, and therefore she has resisted Court-ordered treatment.”
The court applied section 361.5, subdivision (b)(13), and denied the mother reunification services in a minute order dated November 20, 2007. It also found that “[t]he extent of progress made by the mother, [L.T.], toward alleviating or mitigating the causes necessitating out-of-home placement has been minimal.”
On November 26 and December 1, 2007, L.T. filed a notice of intent to file a writ petition and a notice of appeal to challenge the denial of reunification services. This court docketed the matter as an appeal. L.T.’s appointed counsel filed a letter pursuant to In re Sade C. (1996) 13 Cal.4th 952, declaring that she would not file a brief. We provided L.T. an opportunity to submit a letter brief herself; she did not do so, and the matter was dismissed.
The juvenile court viewed I.T.’s father, D.M., differently. In reports dated July 17, August 29, and November 6, 2007, the department recommended that D.M. be denied reunification services under section 361.5, subdivision (b)(13). Like the mother, D.M. completed substance abuse treatment pursuant to Proposition 36 but resumed or continued using methamphetamine afterward. In a report dated November 7, 2007, however, the department changed its position. It still considered that D.M. had resisted court-ordered treatment for chronic drug abuse under section 361.5, subdivision (b)(13), but now believed that, in spite of this, reunification would be in the best interests of I.T. under section 361.5, subdivision (c). The court granted reunification services to D.M.
On March 19, 2008, four months after the court denied reunification services to L.T., she submitted a form JV-180 to the juvenile court. This is the Judicial Council form used to submit a petition pursuant to section 388 to modify a previous order. L.T. requested that the court reverse its earlier decision and order reunification services for her on the ground that there had been a change of circumstances demonstrating that reunification would be in the children’s best interests. The court held a hearing on the petition beginning on July 30, 2008, continuing on August 7, August 28, September 4, September 24, and October 1, 2008, and concluding on October 2, 2008.
By the time the hearing concluded, much had happened since the court first denied reunification services to L.T. A plan to place the boys with L.T.’s father and stepmother in Wisconsin—which the boys and mother all favored if the boys could not return to the mother—had been abandoned; they were in separate foster care placements, each having been moved multiple times, and the social worker’s recommended permanency plan was long-term foster care. E.T.’s placement was a group home. The boys continued to experience psychological issues, with D.T. now exhibiting aggressive behavior, as well as E.T. The grandparents lived a long distance from the nearest city with mental health services, and the department found “it would [be] in the best interest of the children to remain in Fresno where they will continue to be treated for their mental health and behavioral issues and where they can continue to visit with their mother regularly.” I.T. was reported to be doing well and the recommended permanency plan for her was reunification with D.M. As of June 10, 2008, however, she was still placed with D.M.’s parents. The department believed that D.M. had made substantial progress and probably would be able to have I.T. move back in with him by November 15, 2008, but that there was still a substantial risk to her well-being at that time.
L.T. had received substance abuse treatment at a facility called WestCare. After a rocky start—she was disciplined for allowing other residents to use her urine for drug tests—she completed a 90-day residential substance abuse treatment program ending December 7, 2007, and an outpatient aftercare program ending in April 2008. When she testified at the hearing on August 7, 2008, she was attending Narcotics Anonymous/Alcoholics Anonymous meetings three times a week and had been free of drug and alcohol use for over a year. Random drug test results confirmed this.
L.T. had also received mental health services. She sought out and received psychological counseling from February to April 2008, after her grandmother died. “I wanted to help my mental health,” she testified. “I didn’t want to go down because I was in emotional distress at that time.” She also completed 26 weeks of domestic violence and anger management classes. Asked about her present mental health status, she said her understanding was that it was “fine according to several therapists.” She was not receiving mental health counseling at the time of her testimony and did not believe she needed it. She continued to receive Supplemental Security Income for her post-traumatic stress disorder.
Two psychologists’ reports on L.T. were submitted to the court. Aimée V. Riffel, Ph.D., issued a report on February 15, 2008. She rendered diagnoses of post-traumatic stress disorder, mood disorder NOS (i.e., not otherwise specified), alcohol and amphetamine abuse in partial remission, and mild borderline personality disorder. Though Dr. Riffel thought L.T. was capable of utilizing reunification services, she also opined that her condition impaired her parenting ability:
“[L.T.] is suffering from the effects of a chronic personality disorder with associated mood and clinical features (Borderline Personality Disorder) for which … she has previously indicated to be in need of prescribed medications. [L.T.] appears to somewhat minimize the impact of her illness upon her ability to appropriately care for her children. In addition, she has some destabilizing factors which also place her at greater risk for neglect of her children such as: previous history of psychiatric treatment, previous involvement with [the department], limited vocational skills, limited insight, and a tendency to minimize and underestimate the degree of psychological distress she may be experiencing. Additionally, she is lacking insight regarding the influence of these stressors upon her emotional health. These factors place her at a moderate to higher level of risk for mental health relapse, which would most likely result in her inability to appropriately care for her children. Should her mental condition remain untreated, her level of risk for neglect would greatly increase.”
One symptom of borderline personality disorder listed by Dr. Riffel was “poor judgment in choosing partners.…” In light of these issues, Dr. Riffel wrote that if the family is reunified, “it may be necessary to have [department] involvement, initially after reunification, to assure the safety of” the children.
Laura A. Geiger, Psy.D., issued a report on August 18, 2008. Her evaluation differed dramatically from Dr. Riffel’s earlier one. Dr. Geiger rendered diagnoses of post-traumatic stress disorder in remission and alcohol and amphetamine abuse in remission. She found no personality disorder and stated that L.T. had adequate insight and did not try to present herself in an overly positive light. She found that the services previously provided were adequately addressing the problems that led to the dependency findings and that L.T. would be able to utilize reunification services and learn from them within the applicable time limits. Her report included the following paragraph:
“Does the parent suffer from a mental disability such that it renders the parent unable to adequately care for and control the [children]? No, at this time, the mother does not appear to be suffering from a mental disability. Although [L.T.] reported she had a history of post trauma, depression, and multiple personality disorders, at this time, the treatment that she has pursued appears to be working and she is in remission on these symptoms. Current testing shows [L.T.] exhibits average cognitive skills, neuropsychological problems are ruled out, she has average reading skills, and no clinical disorders were noted on personality testing. In addition, she appears to be adequately attached to her children with no noted need to further address parent-child dynamics.”
The public defender’s office relayed questions from the court to Drs. Riffel and Geiger. They responded by submitting letters to the public defender, each dated October 1, 2008. Dr. Geiger’s letter addressed a “gap between [her] initial contact” with L.T. and the date of the report. The initial interview was on September 17, 2007. Dr. Geiger’s letter explained that for the August 18, 2008, report, she updated her assessment by interviewing L.T. again and administering further personality testing.
Dr. Riffel’s letter addressed the conflict between her assessment and Dr. Geiger’s. The letter discussed a general presumption that a more recent assessment should be given primary importance; it concluded that “it would be reasonable to argue … that although my report provided … detailed archival information, it is not representative of [L.T.’s] present state of functioning. The most recent evaluation conducted by Dr. Geiger would most likely reflect recent and accurate information regarding her current mental health status and recommendations about her ability to benefit from reunification services.”
L.T. gave birth to a fifth child, L.S., on February 19, 2008. The department performed an assessment and determined that there was no evidence of substantial risk to the baby and she would remain with her mother.
At the time of her testimony on August 7, 2008, L.T. was enrolled at a community college and had completed two summer session courses and earned a grade point average of 3.5. She planned to earn a degree in social work and drug and alcohol counseling.
L.T. was living with A.S., the baby’s father, at the time of the hearing. A.S. has a history of drug abuse and a criminal record. For an incident in 2005, he was convicted of being under the influence of a controlled substance and driving under the influence; he received jail time, probation, and Proposition 36 treatment. For an incident in 2006, he was convicted of contempt of court for disobeying a court order. In 2007, he was convicted of being under the influence of a controlled substance and misdemeanor possession of burglary tools and sentenced to jail time and probation. A.S. was arrested on numerous other charges between 2002 and 2007, ranging from possession of drug paraphernalia to murder, but none of these resulted in convictions. He described himself as a “drop out gang member,” having been previously affiliated with a Norteño gang. He said he stopped affiliating with gang members in 2004. He testified that seven or eight of his arrests were for substance abuse and that in 2006 he was ordered to undergo treatment but failed to complete the program. He used methamphetamine for six years. L.T. admitted that she and A.S. used methamphetamine together until April 2007. A.S. testified that he last used methamphetamine on November 3, 2007, stopping because of a “spiritual awakening” he experienced afterward in jail. At the time of his testimony on August 7, 2008, he was on probation in Fresno and Kings Counties. He was undergoing Proposition 36 drug treatment, which involved a program at WestCare. He was also taking parenting classes at WestCare and had completed a church program called Hope Now for Youth, which was designed to impart “[j]ob training skills and practical everyday skills to help you become a better person, and spiritual growth.” He was attending relapse-prevention (i.e., 12-step) meetings three times a week. He had a full-time job at a warehouse and supported the baby. He has an older child from a previous relationship who was living with the child’s mother.
The court was presented with evidence of the family’s bonds and the children’s desire for reunification. Both boys wanted to go home. D.T. had asked to return to his mother on many occasions. E.T. called her every two days and repeatedly asked L.T. to take all the classes she needed so he could come home. The mother called I.T. frequently. I.T. said she missed her mother and felt sad when visits were over. The children were sad to be separated from their siblings. L.T. never missed visits with the children, brought snacks and toys, and was affectionate with them throughout the visits. The children behaved well during the visits and enjoyed them. E.T. once told a social worker that A.S. was mean, but the reason for this complaint was never investigated. In its written response to the section 388 petition, the department stated that “no one is contesting the fact that the children love their mother.…” L.T. testified that she, A.S., and the baby lived in a two-bedroom apartment and that if E.T., D.T., and I.T. returned home, the boys would sleep in one bedroom, the girls in the other, and the parents in the living room.
In its written opposition to L.T.’s section 388 petition, the department focused on A.S. and argued that L.T.’s relationship with him showed that she had not changed her life and behavior:
“The [department’s] major concern is [L.T.’s] significant other, A.S. If [L.T.] is allowed to reunify with the children they would be exposed to the same lifestyle not unlike the one they were removed from.… [T]his would hinder any progress made in therapy by the children.… [A.S.] is 24 years old and already has a lengthy criminal history that shows that he has a propensity towards violence, aggression and clearly no respect for authority as evidenced by the warrants issued for failure to comply with court ordered programs. Before any consideration is given to [A.S.] having a ‘step-father’ role to [E.T., D.T., or I.T.], he would need to complete his court ordered programs and then agree to an assessment by the Department. [E.T. and D.T.] already show aggressive behaviors the children themselves state they learned while in the care of their mother.
“While [L.T.] may have completed her domestic violence programs it does not appear that she is relating or applying the tools learned to her everyday life. Just the numerous contacts that [A.S.] has had with law enforcement in separate counties is of concern let alone the fact of some of the dismissed charges, such as shooting from a vehicle. [L.T.] should be aware of his contacts with law enforcement since they reside in the same household. It is clear that [L.T.] still needs to work through unresolved substance abuse issues, domestic violence and mental health issues. [L.T.’s] ultimate request is to allow her children to be returned to her care. [L.T.] appears to lack an understanding of the significant impact her associations with people [have] on her children.”
The department’s written response was authored by Maria Ortiz, one of the social workers who was assigned to the case. She testified at the hearing on August 7, 2008. Ortiz believed A.S. had a high propensity for domestic violence because of his criminal history, but admitted that his record included no convictions of violent crimes—only arrests for them—and that there was no evidence of domestic violence between L.T. and A.S. She testified that the department’s written response said L.T. had to “work through unresolved substance abuse issues, domestic violence and mental health issues” simply because she was in a relationship with A.S., A.S. had a criminal record and drug abuse history, and E.T. once said A.S. was “mean.” Ortiz admitted there were no current manifestations of substance abuse, domestic violence, or mental health issues. Similarly, though she opined that L.T. failed to address her own mental health needs, Ortiz admitted that she was aware of no evidence that L.T. was currently in need of mental health services. When asked why L.T. could not be given reunification services during the time when A.S. was completing his court-ordered programs and undergoing an assessment by the department, Ortiz said she would oppose that because the boys had behavioral problems and she did not “know how [A.S.] would react to them.” When asked whether she would change her recommendation if L.T. were not in a relationship with A.S., she said she would not because the children “would prefer to be with the grandparents.” She admitted immediately afterward that this was not the case, acknowledging that being with their mother was their first choice. On cross-examination, Ortiz said she did not believe L.T. “would have the stability in dealing with the children” because she might return to drug use, as she had after periods of sobriety in the past; she thought L.T.’s relationship with A.S. increased this risk. She later admitted, however, that any estimate about how long a period of sobriety would be needed before L.T. could parent effectively was speculative.
Another social worker assigned to the case, Summer Verhines, testified at the hearing on September 4, 2008. She stated that, although an addendum report she prepared for that day’s hearing indicated that L.T. had not presented evidence of her participation in mental health services, this was no longer the case, as L.T. had presented this evidence at a settlement conference on July 30, 2008. Relying on Dr. Riffel’s report, Verhines testified that “mental health issues may still be a problem,” but this testimony was given before the court received Dr. Riffel’s letter stating that Dr. Geiger’s more recent evaluation, denying the existence of current symptoms, should be relied on instead. When asked if there was any evidence, other than Dr. Riffel’s report, of current mental health issues, Verhines said L.T.’s “relationship with somebody who has significant criminal history” was evidence that current mental health issues existed. Verhines said the department viewed the relationship as a continuation of a “‘fixed and enduring pattern of relationship and parenting problems,’” a pattern established by L.T.’s relationships with B.D. and D.M. Asked what the department feared would happen because of L.T.’s relationship with A.S., Verhines replied:
“The concern is that he may not be a good influence on the children based on his past history. I can’t speak to where he’s at now because I didn’t receive the packet so I can’t speak to that. All I can say is that we have concerns as to his background that we have.”
Counsel asked Verhines about a statement in her addendum report that “‘[b]y continuing to choose relationships with men who have extensive criminal behavior [L.T.] is not able to offer [E.T. and D.T.] an environment that will meet their needs.’” She asked Verhines what environment L.T. would, as matters presently stood, be able to offer. Verhines replied that she had not been to the home and did not know; she could not say whether the home was clean and stocked with food. As to the effect of A.S.’s presence in the home, Verhines said, “I know very little about [A.S.].” She was not aware of his full-time employment and had not seen the certificates showing his completion of programs at WestCare, though she was conscious that he had participated in those programs and knew he attended 12-step meetings. Based on his history, however—and acknowledging the speculative nature of predictions about relapse and recidivism—she said his presence meant a risk of substance abuse and criminal behavior. Verhines acknowledged that the department had no knowledge of domestic violence between A.S. and L.T. and conceded that, after completion of her substance abuse treatment, L.T. had been attending 12-step meetings and consistently tested negative for drugs. She testified that D.T.’s therapist said she would not oppose reunification if L.T. was diligent in completing recommended services. Verhines said she was not “able to get a hold” of E.T.’s therapist to ask him for an opinion on reunification.
When pressed on what mental health issues L.T. needed to address, Verhines admitted that she did not know whether there were any current mental health issues affecting L.T.’s parenting and that the department’s view that mental health issues stood in the way of reunification referred to past mental health issues it feared would recur. Asked whether the department “doesn’t really know her current mental health status,” Verhines conceded that it did not. With respect to current issues, Verhines could only say she wanted to “get a progress report from the current therapist to see where that therapist feels she’s at as far as all these issues.” In their closing arguments, the deputy district attorney representing the children and counsel for the department both argued that the petition should be denied because L.T. had failed to address mental health issues.
In its oral ruling, the court addressed the two elements that must be proven by a section 388 petition: that circumstances have changed, and that the requested modification of a previous order will be in the best interests of the children. It concluded that neither had been shown and denied the petition.
DISCUSSION
The mother’s burden in bringing a petition under section 388 was to demonstrate a change of circumstances or new evidence and show that modification of the prior order would be in the children’s best interests. (In re Kimberly F. (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 519, 526.) She was required to make this showing by a preponderance of the evidence. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.570(h).) We review for abuse of discretion the juvenile court’s determination of whether the parent made this showing. (In re Jasmon O. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 398, 416.) The court abused its discretion if its decision exceeded the bounds of reason. (In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 318-319.)
Because we think the court acted within its discretion in finding that L.T. did not prove modification of the prior order would be in the children’s best interest, we need not reach the question of whether L.T. showed a change in circumstances. There was evidence that she made substantial strides with respect to both her addiction and her mental health issues, achievements we do not mean to denigrate. Showing a change of circumstances would not be enough to compel the court to grant the petition, however; L.T. was also required to show that providing her a path to reunification was in the children’s best interests.
In re Kimberly F., supra, 56 Cal.App.4th 519, is often cited for the factors it applied in carrying out the children’s-best-interests part of the section 388 analysis. These are: (1) “the seriousness of the problem which led to the dependency, and the reason for any continuation of that problem”; (2) “the strength of the existing bond between the parent and child” and conversely “the strength of a child’s bond to his or her present caretakers”; and (3) the degree to which the problem that led to the dependency “may be easily removed or ameliorated, and the degree to which it actually has been.” (Id. at pp. 531, 532.)
In this case, the first element—the seriousness of the problems that led to the dependency—is not a subject of dispute. L.T. had a substance abuse problem spanning many years and showed signs of overcoming it only recently. She also had long-term mental health issues and a history of entering into relationships with men who were physically abusive, had criminal histories, or were drug abusers.
The third element—the degree to which these problems could be or were being ameliorated—was a matter of much dispute, but the record is sufficient to support the juvenile court’s decision under the abuse of discretion standard. Although the most recent psychologist’s report found no current symptoms, the court reasonably could take account of the extensive symptoms found in a report six months earlier, symptoms consistent with L.T.’s long-term conditions. The court also could reasonably take account of the department’s concerns about L.T.’s relationship with the father of her fifth child. This relationship continued a pattern of relationships with men who have criminal and drug-abuse histories.
We acknowledge that there was considerable evidence in support of L.T.’s position with respect to the second element, the family’s bonds. The juvenile court did not act outside the bounds of reason, however, in finding this factor to be outweighed by the ongoing risks.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
WE CONCUR: Gomes, J., Kane, J.