In re Estate of Moerschel

13 Citing cases

  1. Robinson v. First State Bk. of Monticello

    104 Ill. App. 3d 758 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982)   Cited 10 times
    In Robinson, the court refused to recognize the action for intentional interference with an expectancy where the plaintiffs had decided not to contest a will which had been admitted to probate but then attempted to sue in tort after the statutorily prescribed period for the will contest had expired.

    [Citations.]" 341 Ill. App. 141, 143, 93 N.E.2d 85, 86. In In re Estate of Moerschel (1980), 86 Ill. App.3d 482, 407 N.E.2d 1131, a widow sought declaratory judgment that the will of her deceased husband was void. The trial court concluded that the declaratory judgment action was in the nature of a will contest and was barred for failure to file within six months.

  2. In re Estate of Jeziorski

    162 Ill. App. 3d 1057 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987)   Cited 20 times
    Distinguishing Robinson on same grounds

    ( Sternberg v. St. Louis Union Trust Co. (1946), 394 Ill. 452, 68 N.E.2d 892; Robinson v. First State Bank (1982), 104 Ill. App.3d 758, 433 N.E.2d 285.) Defendants argue that a will contest brought within six months is the exclusive means of directly attacking an otherwise incontestable will. In re Estate of Moerschel (1980), 86 Ill. App.3d 482, 407 N.E.2d 1131; In re Estate of Ariola (1979), 69 Ill. App.3d 158, 386 N.E.2d 862. The tort action for intentional interference with an expected inheritance has only recently been recognized in Illinois.

  3. Dragan v. Miller

    679 F.2d 712 (7th Cir. 1982)   Cited 79 times
    Finding probate exception bars jurisdiction to hear action to declare will invalid "because of undue influence" and to have decedent's property pass through state intestacy statute

    The Illinois courts have rejected all other attempts that have been made to get around the exclusivity of section 8-1 by relabeling. See Blyman, supra, which was brought as an action for the partition of real estate; Ruffing, supra, brought as an action for relief from a probate judgment; and Estate of Moerschel, 86 Ill.App.3d 482, 41 Ill.Dec. 633, 407 N.E.2d 1131 (1980), brought as a declaratory-judgment proceeding. We think they would reject this one as well.

  4. Estate of Miller v. Miller

    51 F. Supp. 3d 861 (E.D. Ark. 2014)   Cited 1 times

    Nor is it a substitute or alternate method of contesting the validity of wills.”); Farthing v. Farthing, 235 N.C. 634, 635, 70 S.E.2d 664, 665 (1952) (North Carolina) (same). But see In re Estate of Boote, 198 S.W.3d 699, 715 (Tenn.Ct.App.2005) (holding that a plaintiff's “declaratory judgment petition, with a copy of the third codicil attached, was sufficient to initiate a will contest” in a probate proceeding); Harkins v. Crews, 907 S.W.2d 51, 57 (Tex.App.1995) (holding that the trial court's determination that the invalidity of an unprobated will under Texas's declaratory judgment act was not error where the action was joined with a probate action and multiple wills were before the court); Matter of Moerschel's Estate, 86 Ill.App.3d 482, 485, 41 Ill.Dec. 633, 407 N.E.2d 1131, 1134 (1980) (holding that an action under the Illinois declaratory judgment act to void a will must be construed as a will contest that is governed by the laws controlling such contests in probate proceedings). Assuming, without deciding, that an action to contest the validity of a will may be brought under Arkansas's declaratory judgment act, the question remains whether such an action is cognizable under the general jurisdiction of the Arkansas courts.

  5. Koester v. First Mid–Illinois Bank & Trust, N.A. (In re Estate of Koester)

    2012 Ill. App. 4th 110879 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012)   Cited 3 times
    Applying the manifest weight of the evidence standard to inferences drawn from uncontested evidence

    See also Sternberg v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 394 Ill. 452, 459, 68 N.E.2d 892 (1946) (“A will after it has been admitted to probate may be contested on any grounds including its revocation.”); In re Estate of Moerschel, 86 Ill.App.3d 482, 485, 41 Ill.Dec. 633, 407 N.E.2d 1131 (1980) (an allegation that a will had been revoked is a will contest within the meaning of section 8–1). In the evidentiary hearing on the petition to contest the validity of the will, “[t]he contestant shall in the first instance proceed with proof to establish the invalidity of the will.”

  6. Koester v. First Mid-Illinois Bank & Trust, N.A. (In re Estate of Koester)

    2012 Ill. App. 4th 110879 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012)

    See also Sternberg v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 394 Ill. 452, 459 (1946) ("A will after it has been admitted to probate may be contested on any grounds including its revocation."); In re Estate of Moerschel, 86 Ill. App. 3d 482, 485 (1980) (an allegation that a will had been revoked is a will contest within the meaning of section 8-1). In the evidentiary hearing on the petition to contest the validity of the will, "[t]he contestant shall in the first instance proceed with proof to establish the invalidity of the will."

  7. Thinschmidt v. Cartalino

    357 Ill. App. 3d 1011 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005)   Cited 5 times
    Holding that, where trial court, during the six-month period, granted the plaintiff leave to file will contest at some point in future, it did not err in dismissing will contest that was filed after expiration of six-month period; trial court lacked jurisdiction to hear will contest that was not filed within statutory period

    This court has consistently recognized "Illinois' long-standing policy favoring the orderly administration of estates." In re Estate of Jeziorski, 162 Ill. App. 3d 1057, 1062 (1987), citing In re Estate of Moerschel, 86 Ill. App. 3d 482 (1980). "We further recognize the purpose of [the] legislature[] in passing probate acts is to ensure that all claims relating to the administration of estates are handled in the probate proceedings, thereby providing a single forum for settling the rights of the parties."

  8. Hall v. Eaton

    259 Ill. App. 3d 319 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994)   Cited 7 times
    Reviewing dismissal of suit to construe one clause in father's will

    This action was for construction of the devise to Hall and it was not required that the petition be filed within six months of admission of the will to probate. See In re Estate of Moerschel (1980), 86 Ill. App.3d 482, 485, 407 N.E.2d 1131, 1134; see Blue v. Bryant (1966), 77 Ill. App.2d 467, 471-72, 222 N.E.2d 512, 514 (applying laches to a will construction case). Although we disagree with the trial court's ruling that this cause of action is barred by the statute of limitations, we may sustain a judgment upon any ground which is called for by the record, regardless of whether the ground was relied upon by the trial court and regardless of whether the reason given by the trial court was correct.

  9. Coussee v. Estate of Efston

    262 Ill. App. 3d 419 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994)   Cited 18 times

    The Illinois will was admitted to probate on October 27, 1989. Efston's estate filed its first petition to admit the Greek will on May 23, 1991. Coussee argues that by raising a subsequent will which purports to revoke a will already admitted to probate, the action is in the nature of a will contest and subject to the six-month time limitation. We disagree. Although it is generally true that an allegation that a will has been revoked is considered a will contest ( In re Estate of Moerschel (1980), 86 Ill. App.3d 482, 407 N.E.2d 1131), where the revocation is based upon the existence of a subsequent will not lost or destroyed, the proper action is to seek admission of the subsequent will to probate as the last will of the decedent. ( Crooker v. McArdle (1928), 332 Ill. 27, 163 N.E. 384; Abdill v. Abdill (1920), 295 Ill. 40, 128 N.E. 741.)

  10. Colvin v. Hobart Brothers

    229 Ill. App. 3d 1018 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992)   Cited 2 times

    ) The scope of declaratory judgment relief is broad, liberal, and unrestricted by technicalities. ( In re Estate of Moerschel (1980), 86 Ill. App.3d 482, 407 N.E.2d 1131.) It is designed not to supplant existing remedies, but as an alternate or additional remedy to facilitate the administration of justice and to settle and fix rights of the parties based upon an actual justiciable controversy.