There is no further indication of any activity, much less consideration, of the amended complaint until August 19, 1983 — the date on which it was filed with the clerk of the circuit court of Cook County. This occurred over five months after plaintiffs filed the notice of appeal. It is uncontroverted that every appellant has the duty of presenting to a reviewing court the entire record of trial proceedings so that an informed review of the issues can be made. ( Marshall E. Winokur, Ltd. v. Shane (1980), 89 Ill. App.3d 551, 552, 411 N.E.2d 1142; In re Estate of McGaughey (1978), 60 Ill. App.3d 150, 155, 376 N.E.2d 259.) Since error is never presumed by a court of review ( Flynn v. Vancil (1968), 41 Ill.2d 236, 241, 242 N.E.2d 237), any doubt arising from the incompleteness of the record must be resolved against the appellant ( In re Marriage of Macaluso (1982), 110 Ill. App.3d 838, 846, 443 N.E.2d 1). • 6 Regarding the case at bar, plaintiffs have failed to provide this court with a single reference to the record evincing both the averred denial of leave to amend, as well as the facts upon which it was premised.

As this court recently stated in First National Bank v. Oldenburg (1981), 101 Ill. App.3d 283, 286-87, 427 N.E.2d 1312, 1315, by statute a land trust agreement "vests title, both legal and equitable, to the real property in the trustee while the interest of the beneficiary of the trust is personal property" and "the trustee is absolute owner of the real estate." (See In re Estate of McGaughey (1978), 60 Ill. App.3d 150, 376 N.E.2d 259.) The due-on-conveyance clause in the present case provides that acceleration is allowed only upon conveyance or entry into an agreement to convey "title" to "all or a portion of the premises."

Chicago Title Trust Co., 389 N.E.2d at 543 ("[L]egal and equitable title lies with the trustee and the beneficiary retains what is referred to as a personal property interest."); In re Estate of McGaughey, 376 N.E.2d 259, 262 (Ill.App.Ct. 1978) (citing Levine v. Pascal, 236 N.E.2d 425, 428 (Ill.App.Ct. 1968)). See Old Orchard Bank Trust Co., 654 F. Supp. at 110 ("[T]he beneficiary's interest is a special kind of personal property: the rights to the earnings, avails and proceeds of the real estate."); Chicago Title Trust Co., 389 N.E.2d at 543.

After memoranda and an additional conference on the issues, it became clear that plaintiff does not consider itself confined to those remedies. Plaintiff takes the position, pursuant to Matter of Estate of McGaughey, 60 Ill. App.3d 150, 17 Ill.Dec. 260, 376 N.E.2d 259 (1978) that when the Cowserts assigned their beneficial interest to it — if not earlier — it became absolute owner of the real property which is the res of the land trust, because of the merger of its interests as land trustee and as creditor. Whatever the Illinois law in the context of probate class priorities (which was at issue in McGaughey) for purposes of this bankruptcy court's determination of litigation to lift the automatic stay, plaintiff cannot be other than a secured creditor. It claims to have obtained absolute ownership of the real property at the time it made its loan to the Cowserts, yet that absolute ownership, if such it was, was obviously subject to divestment if the loan were repaid. Likewise, it concedes that its ownership was only to the extent of the loan balance — and thus would vary from time to time. (In fact, it is only because of the possibility of an excess of res value over the debt to Elgin National which causes plaintiff to feel the automatic stay may apply to

While the non-uniform amendment to the Florida UCC may create a trap for unwary lenders in Illinois who have taken, as collateral, a Florida debtor's beneficial interest in a land trust, the application of the law is straightforward. Plaintiff asserts that this entire review of Uniform Commercial Code law is moot because Elgin National is excepted from the perfection requirements of the UCC. Relying on Matter of Estate of McGaughey, 60 Ill. App.3d 150, 17 Ill.Dec. 260, 376 N.E.2d 259 (1978), plaintiff states that Elgin National, being the land trustee as well as a creditor, had absolute ownership of the real property at the instant it made its loan to the Cowserts, and was at that time more than secured — the full complete owner — without any need for the execution of the ABI, much less perfection of that ABI, or any type of foreclosure. In its view, the ABI was mere "frosting on the cake".

Rather, this court has stated on multiple occasions that the statement of facts in an appellate brief is not part of the record and cannot be considered by the reviewing court as evidence where the record was incomplete. See Matter of McGaughey's Estate, 60 Ill.App.3d 150, 157 (1978) ("Appellate counsel cannot supplement the certified record by unsupported statements or allegations in their briefs or in oral argument."); Strand v. United (Methodist) Church of Sheldon, 12 Ill.App.3d 917, 922 (1973) ("Matters or facts which are alluded to, or statements which are made in a brief in this court, which are entirely outside the record, cannot be considered by this reviewing court in disposition of the cause[.]"). Additionally, it is axiomatic that closing arguments are not evidence. See Neuhengen v. Global Experience Specialists, Inc., 2018 IL App (1st) 160322, ¶ 157; Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Civil, Nos. 1.04(A)[14] and 1.01(C)[13] (May 2023).

"It is the duty of the appellant to present a complete record on appeal so that the reviewing court will be fully informed regarding the issues in the case, and any doubt arising from the incompleteness of the record must be resolved against the appellant." Pierson v. University Orthopedics, S.C., 282 Ill. App. 3d 339, 344 (1996) (citing In re Estate of McGaughey, 60 Ill. App. 3d 150 (1978)). Because the respondent did not provide this court with a sufficient record, we cannot determine whether a governmental official failed to comply with section 3-606.

Appellate counsel cannot supplement the certified record by unsupported statements or allegations in their briefs or in oral argument." In re Estate of McGaughey, 60 Ill. App. 3d 150, 157 (1978) (citing Witek v. Leisure Technology Midwest, Inc., 39 Ill. App. 3d 637, 640 (1976)). ¶ 46 Plaintiff asks this court to vacate the November 5, 2014, order, but that order is not contained in the record. In fact, the record contains no evidence the case was reopened.

It is the duty of the appellant to present a complete record on appeal so that the reviewing court will be fully informed regarding the issues in the case, and any doubt arising from the incompleteness of the record must be resolved against the appellant. In re Estate of McGaughey, 60 Ill. App.3d 150, 376 N.E.2d 259 (1978). We are bound to presume, therefore, that the circuit court was without subject matter jurisdiction to hear Dr. Pierson's petition.

• 1 Section 16-1(a) of the Act specifically provides that a citation proceeding may only be brought against one who is believed to have "concealed, converted or embezzled or * * * [has] * * * possession or control" of assets belonging to an estate. These terms are accorded their ordinary legal definitions and all the elements of the alleged wrongful act must be proved at the citation proceeding for the petitioner to be entitled to relief. ( In re Estate of McGaughey (1978), 60 Ill. App.3d 150, 376 N.E.2d 259.) Here, the petitions alleged respondents have "taken, converted or have in their possession or control certain property."