In other words, "if the legislature desired to limit the application of [RSA 651:5, II,] it could have done so explicitly . . . ." Grafton County Attorney's Office v. Canner, ___ N.H. ___ (decided Aug. 23, 2016) (slip op. at 7) (citing In re Estate of McCarthy, 166 N.H. 548, 551 (2014)). Although it is equally true that paragraph V does not contain language of exception relating to paragraph II (e.g., "except as provided in paragraph II . . ."), this makes sense given that none of the provisions of the annulment statute note when a preceding paragraph or subparagraph creates an exception, only when a subsequent paragraph or subparagraph does so.
"Moreover, we do not consider words and phrases in isolation, but rather within the context of the statute as a whole." In re Estate of McCarty, 166 N.H. 548, 550, 100 A.3d 523 (2014). RSA 458:16–a, II provides, in pertinent part: "When a dissolution of a marriage is decreed, the court may order an equitable division of property between the parties."
See, e.g., In re Estate of McCarty , 166 N.H. 548, 551, 100 A.3d 523 (2014) (observing that if the legislature desired to limit the application of a statute it could have done so explicitly and "we will not add language that the legislature did not see fit to include"). Doe also argues that, because he was acquitted of all charges, the purpose of an annulment—to "eliminate the negative consequences of having a criminal record"—can be achieved only if the "social and economic stigma resulting from having an arrest record and publicly accessible records relating to [his] criminal case" is removed.
In matters of statutory interpretation, we are the final arbiter of the intent of the legislature as expressed in the words of the statute considered as a whole. In re Estate of McCarty, 166 N.H. 548, 550, 100 A.3d 523 (2014). We first look to the language of the statute itself, and, if possible, construe that language according to its plain and ordinary meaning.
We review the trial court's rulings on questions of law, including statutory interpretation, de novo. In re Estate of McCarty, 166 N.H. 548, 550, 100 A.3d 523 (2014). In matters of statutory interpretation, we are the final arbiter of the intent of the legislature as expressed in the words of the statute considered as a whole.