In applying RSA 551:10, "[t]he court's task is not to investigate the circumstances to divine the intent of the testator; rather, it is to review the language contained within the four corners of the will for a determination of whether the testator named or referred to" the petitioner. In re Estate of Treloar, 151 N.H. 460, 463, 859 A.2d 1162 (2004) (quotation omitted); accord In re Estate of MacKay, 121 N.H. 682, 684, 433 A.2d 1289 (1981) ; see RSA 551:10 ; In the Matter of Jackson, 117 N.H. at 902-03, 379 A.2d 832 (extrinsic evidence is inadmissible to show the testator's intent in omitting their children from their will). Because the probate division is in no better position than are we to undertake this task, our review is de novo.

"This rule is conclusive unless there is evidence in the will itself that the omission was intentional." In re Estate of MacKay, 121 N.H. 682, 684, 433 A.2d 1289, 1290 (1981) (quotation omitted). "[N]o testator should be understood to intend to disinherit one of his children or grandchildren upon any less clear evidence than his actually naming or distinctly referring to them personally so as to show that he had them in his mind."

The effect of the statute is to create a conclusive rule of law that pretermission of a child is accidental, unless the testator devises or bequeaths property to the child or names or refers to the child in the will. See In re Estate of MacKay, 121 N.H. 682, 684, 433 A.2d 1289, 1290 (1981); Royce v. Estate of Denby, 117 N.H. 893, 896, 379 A.2d 1256, 1258 (1977). The statutory presumption will be upheld even if the testator's intent is defeated as a result.

"The statute creates a conclusive rule of law that a child who is neither named nor referred to in a will and is not a devisee or legatee of the will, nonetheless may take under the will, unless there is evidence in the will itself that the omission is intentional." Robbins, 147 N.H. at 45, 780 A.2d 1282 ; see also In re Estate of MacKay, 121 N.H. 682, 684, 433 A.2d 1289 (1981) ("the statute does not create a presumption that pretermission of a child or issue of a child is accidental, but a rule of law" (quotation and brackets omitted) ). Unlike rules of law, rules of construction need not always apply; rules of construction may be dispensed with depending upon the circumstances.

The statute does not create merely a presumption that pretermission is accidental, but a rule of law. In re Estate of MacKay, 121 N.H. 682, 684 (1981). This rule of law "is conclusive unless there is evidence in the will itself that the omission was intentional."

The statute creates a rule of law that the omission of a child or issue of a child from a will is accidental "unless there is evidence in the will itself that the omission was intentional." In re Estate of MacKay, 121 N.H. 682, 684, 433 A.2d 1289, 1290 (1981) (quotation and emphasis omitted). "[T]he statute . . . is not a limitation on the power to make testamentary dispositions but rather is an attempt to effectuate a testator's presumed intent.