Although courts have differentiated between corporate and individual executors, the distinction more accurately is described as that between professional and nonprofessional executors. While the rule holding professional and nonprofessional executors to the same standard of care has been recited recently as the law in Illinois (see, e.g., Hamilton v. Nielsen (N.D. Ill. 1981), 513 F. Supp. 204, 207; In re Estate of Lindberg (1979), 69 Ill. App.3d 714, 721, 388 N.E.2d 148, 154), the only authority cited by these courts for this rule is In re Estate of Venturelli (1977), 54 Ill. App.3d 997, 370 N.E.2d 290. (See also In re Estate of Vanderwater (1945), 326 Ill. App. 81, 61 N.E.2d 392 (abstract of opinion) (without citation to authority, court stated that executor which qualified as a trust company and advertised for business was subject to the same standard of care applicable to all other executors).) However, the Venturelli court cites no authority from the supreme court, appellate court, or from any Illinois statute in support of its conclusion.

When the matter first went to trial, the trial court entered a directed finding for the Bank at the close of petitioners' case in chief. Petitioners appealed, and we reversed ( In re Estate of Lindberg (1979), 69 Ill. App.3d 714, 388 N.E.2d 148), finding that the trial court's conclusion that the Bank had acted reasonably was against the manifest weight of the evidence. ( 69 Ill. App.3d 714, 723.)

I acknowledge that there is at least some Illinois authority indicating that professional and nonprofessional fiduciaries should be held to the same standard of care. In In re Estate of Lindberg, 69 Ill. App. 3d 714, 721 (1979), the court dismissed a professional-nonprofessional distinction as follows: "Petitioners' first contention is that the Bank, as a professional fiduciary which has held itself out as having greater than average expertise, must be judged by that higher standard.

But again we note that the plaintiff is not complaining about the riskiness of the portfolio but about the failure of the executors to act with a celerity that would have been required only if they had, or could be held to have, foreseen the decline in the stock market in general or in the prices of Hall and Zenith United in particular. In re Estate of Lindberg, 69 Ill.App.3d 714, 26 Ill.Dec. 524, 388 N.E.2d 148 (1979), heavily relied on by the plaintiff, is not in point. As in the present case, an executor was accused of negligence for having failed to sell a stock that was the major asset of the estate; but there the resemblance ends.

• 3 Generally, an executor has a fiduciary duty to act with the highest degree of fidelity and utmost good faith in handling estate assets. ( In re Estate of Lindberg (1979), 69 Ill. App.3d 714, 721, 388 N.E.2d 148, 154.) The objectors assert the executors breached this duty by the distribution of estate assets to a beneficiary, who was also an executor, and the subsequent sale of it to the co-executor.

The burden is on the plaintiff to make this showing by clear and convincing evidence, and the standard of review of the trial court's determination on this issue in a bench trial is whether it is against the manifest weight of the evidence. Guthrie v. Annabel (1977), 50 Ill. App.3d 969, 365 N.E.2d 1367; see In re Estate of Lindberg (1979), 69 Ill. App.3d 714, 721, 388 N.E.2d 148 (standard of review of a directed finding is the same as after a complete bench trial). • 3 The court below found that plaintiff had not met her burden of showing actual malice.