We will not reverse the trial court's decision to admit a will to probate unless it is against the manifest weight of the evidence. In re Estate of Koziol, 236 Ill. App.3d 478, 485, 603 N.E.2d 60 (1992). J. LeVelle Williams' case rests entirely on Spencer's testimony, 21 years after the execution of the will, that he did not see the decedent sign the will and did not think the decedent saw him sign the will.
This prima facie case can only be overcome by testimony of noncompliance with all the statutory requisites. In re Estate of Koziol, 236 Ill. App. 3d 478, 484 (1992). Even if the witnesses' recollection is faded, the attestation clause speaks authoritatively for their actions.
An order admitting a will to probate is not final as to the validity of the will where a timely, direct contest of the will is initiated in the same proceeding. The question presented in a will contest is not whether the will was properly admitted but whether the will is to be declared valid or invalid, and all questions concerning the validity of the will are tried de novo. Sternberg v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 394 Ill. 452, 459 (1946); In re Estate of Koziol, 236 Ill. App.3d 478, 485-86 (1992). The procedures and quantum of proof are quite different in the two types of litigation.
In Illinois, the act of notarization tends to prove the authenticity of the witness' signature. In re Koziol, 236 Ill.App.3d 478, 177 Ill.Dec. 279, 603 N.E.2d 60, 63 (1992). The certificate of acknowledgment by a notary is βprima facie proof of the execution of the instrument.β
Nevertheless, White's identity is irrelevant as to whether there is a rational basis for finding the document to be sufficiently authenticated. See In re Estate of Koziol , 236 Ill. App. 3d 478, 482-83, 177 Ill.Dec. 279, 603 N.E.2d 60 (1992) (testimony from notary public who notarized purported will's attestation clause was admissible to prove authenticity of attestation clause and verification of signatures). ΒΆ 54 A finding of authentication is simply a finding confirming that there is sufficient evidence to justify presenting the offered document to the trier of fact.
In re Estate of Nicola, 275 Ill. App. 3d 497, 499 (1995). If the instrument shows all of the formalities required by law have been met, and the signatures on the instrument are admittedly genuine, a prima facie case has been made in favor of the due execution of the will. In re Koziol, 236 Ill. App. 3d 478, 484 (1992). ΒΆ 37 The admission of a will to probate does not preclude further proceedings regarding the validity of the will.
The purpose of notarization is to prove the authenticity of a signature. In re Estate of Koziol, 236 Ill. App. 3d 478, 483 (1992). Baek-Lee cannot now dispute she signed the Third Modification Agreement. Brummet, 217 Ill. App. 3d at 267 ("Judicial admissions are not evidence at all but rather have the effect of withdrawing a fact from contention.").
Section 4-3(a) of the Probate Act provides that every will must be in writing and signed by the testator. In re Estate of Koziol, 236 Ill. App.3d 478, 603 N.E.2d 60 (1992). "`The rules governing the admission of extrinsic evidence to aid in the construction of a will are well settled in this State, the crucial determination in each case being whether as a matter of law the will is ambiguous, necessitating extrinsic evidence.' [Citation.
Accordingly, when section 6-4 is read as a whole, the cited provision merely provides a proponent with the option of proffering additional evidence other than the testimony of the attesting witnesses to prove that the execution of the will complied with the requirements of the Act. See In re Estate of Koziol, 236 Ill. App.3d 478, 483-84 (1992) (court relied on notary's testimony as evidence of will's validity where two of the three attesting witnesses denied that the will was properly attested). To construe the provision in the manner that appellee urges would effectively eliminate all the formalistic requirements set forth by the legislature for the formation of wills under section 4-3. This, we cannot do. Young, 20 Ill. App.3d at 243-44; Spangler, 390 Ill. at 154 (statute controls right to dispose of property and adherence to it is mandatory).