Opinion
J-S09032-21 No. 1442 EDA 2020
04-13-2021
ESTATE OF: JAMES KIRK A/K/A JAMES ALLEN KIRK A/K/A JAMES ALLAN KIRK APPEAL OF: ESTATE OF JAMES KIRK
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
Appeal from the Decree Entered June 24, 2020
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Orphans' Court at No(s): No. 189DE of 2018 BEFORE: OLSON, J., McCAFFERY, J., and MUSMANNO, J. MEMORANDUM BY MUSMANNO, J.:
The Estate of James Kirk ("the Estate") appeals from the June 24, 2020, Decree, which reversed and vacated a Decree entered on January 17, 2020, and reinstated in its entirety a Decree entered on January 3, 2020. The January 3, 2020, Decree had found in favor of Stapleton Roofing, Inc. ("Stapleton"). We affirm.
For the purpose of this appeal, we adopt the trial court's recitation of the factual and procedural history of the instant case, as set forth in its Opinion. See Trial Court Opinion, 11/2/20, at 1-6.
The Estate presents the following claims for our review:
A. Did the Orphans' Court err when it found that the contract failed to satisfy the requirements of the Home Improvement Consumer Protection Act[,] 73 P.S. §[§] 517.1[-517.18, ("the Act")] and entered an award in favor of [Stapleton] in quantum meruit?
B. Did the Orphans' Court err in finding for "Stapleton Roofing, Inc.[,]" when the agreement was with "Stapleton Contract, Inc.[,]" an entity which does not exist?Brief for Appellant at 5.
C. Did the Orphans' Court err in finding that the amount due to [Stapleton], $61,716.03, was correctly calculated?
D. Did the Orphans' Court err by denying [the Estate's] Motion for Reconsideration?
As this Court has explained,
[t]he findings of a judge of the [O]rphans' [C]ourt division, sitting without a jury, must be accorded the same weight and effect as the verdict of a jury, and will not be reversed by an appellate court in the absence of an abuse of discretion or a lack of evidentiary support. This rule is particularly applicable to findings of fact which are predicated upon the credibility of the witnesses, whom the judge has had the opportunity to hear and observe, and upon the weight given to their testimony. In reviewing the Orphans' Court's findings, our task is to ensure that the record is free from legal error and to determine if the Orphans' Court's findings are supported by competent and adequate evidence and are not predicated upon capricious disbelief of competent and credible evidence.
When the trial court has come to a conclusion through the exercise of its discretion, the party complaining on appeal has a heavy burden. It is not sufficient to persuade the appellate court that it might have reached a different conclusion if, in the first place, charged with the duty imposed on the court below; it is necessary to go further and show an abuse of the discretionary power. An abuse of discretion is not merely an error of judgment, but if in reaching a conclusion the law is overridden or misapplied, or the judgment exercised is manifestly unreasonable, or the result of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill-will, as shown by the evidence of record, discretion is abused. A conclusion or judgment constitutes an abuse of discretion if it is so lacking in support as to be clearly erroneous.
We are not constrained to give the same level of deference to the [O]rphans' [C]ourt's resulting legal conclusions as we are
to its credibility determinations. We will reverse any decree based on palpably wrong or clearly inapplicable rules of law. ... [W]e will not lightly find reversible error and will reverse an [O]rphans' [C]ourt decree only if the Orphans' [C]ourt applied an incorrect rule of law or reached its decision on the basis of factual conclusions unsupported by the record.In re Jackson , 174 A.3d 14, 23-24 (Pa. Super. 2017) (citation omitted). In the exercise of the limited jurisdiction conferred on it by statute, the Orphans' Court must apply the rules and principles of equity. Estate of Hahn , 369 A.2d 1290, 1292 (Pa. 1977); accord In re Estate of Pedrick , 482 A.2d 215, 222 (Pa. 1984)
The Estate first claims that the Orphans' Court erred when, despite finding that the contract between the Estate and Stapleton failed to comply with the Act, the court nevertheless awarded Stapleton "the reasonable value of services performed pursuant to 73 P.S. § 517.7(g), under the theory of quantum meruit." Brief for Appellant at 17 (emphasis omitted). The Estate argues that Stapleton never pled quantum meruit or unjust enrichment as a basis for relief. Id. According to the Estate, the Act applies to "compliant contractors." Id. at 18 (emphasis omitted). The Estate asserts that "to allow quantum meruit [recovery] to non-compliant contractors would eviscerate the protections of the Act." Id.
The Estate argues that case law, including our Supreme Court's holding in Shafer Elec. Constr. v. Mantia , 96 A.3d 989 (Pa. 2014) (" Shafer Electric "), "simply allows quantum meruit recovery for contractors that have complied with the requirements of the Act, but was not intended to deny quantum meruit for contractors that were non-compliant with the Act." Brief for Appellant at 18. The Estate argues that the trial court's interpretation of the Act would allow contractors to recover for quantum meruit no matter how egregious the contractor's non-compliance with the Act. Id. According to the Estate, the record clearly indicates that Stapleton did not advise the Estate of "the basic material facts of the contract[,] and never required change orders for additional charges." Id.
Issues of statutory interpretation present this Court with questions of law; accordingly, our standard of review is de novo, and our scope of review is plenary. Shafer Electric , 96 A.3d at 994. The interpretation of Section 517.7(g) is guided by the Statutory Construction Act, 1 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 1501-1991. Pursuant to the Statutory Construction Act, the object of all statutory construction is to ascertain and effectuate the General Assembly's intention. 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1921(a). When the words of a statute are clear and free from ambiguity, the letter of the statute is not to be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing its spirit. 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1921(b). Finally, "it is not for the courts to add, by interpretation, to a statute, a requirement which the legislature did not see fit to include." Commonwealth v. Rieck Inv. Corp., 213 A.2d 277, 282 (Pa. 1965); accord Shafer Electric , 96 A.3d at 994.
Section 517.7(g) provides as follows:
(g) CONTRACTOR'S RECOVERY RIGHT.— Nothing in this section shall preclude a contractor who has complied with subsection (a) from the recovery of payment for work performed based on the reasonable value of services which were requested
by the owner if a court determines that it would be inequitable to deny such recovery.73 P.S. § 517.7(g).
In its Opinion, the Orphans' Court addressed the Estate's claim and concluded that it lacks merit. See Orphans' Court Opinion, 11/2/20, at 7-11. We agree with the sound reasoning of the Orphans' Court and, discerning no error, affirm on this basis with regard to the Estate's first claim. See id.
In its second claim, the Estate argues that the Orphans' Court improperly found in favor of "Stapleton Roofing, Inc.," where the Estate's agreement was with "Stapleton Contract, Inc.," an entity that does not exist. Brief for Appellant at 19. The Estate argues that Stapleton Contracting, Inc. was never legally created, and there is no fictitious name registration for that entity. Id.
In its Opinion, the Orphans' Court addressed this claim and concluded that it lacks merit. See Orphans' Court Opinion, 11/2/20, at 12-13. We agree with the sound reasoning of the Orphans' Court, and affirm on the basis of its Opinion with regard to the Estate's second claim. See id.
In its third claim, the Estate challenges the Orphans' Court's calculation of the amount due to Stapleton. See Brief for Appellant at 19. According to the Estate, although the award is presumably based upon quantum meruit, there was no testimony regarding the value of the specific services rendered by Stapleton; there was no testimony regarding credit for items not performed; and there was no testimony regarding charges that were duplicative. Id. The Estate claims that change orders were never properly prepared or signed by the Estate. Id. at 20. Further, the Estate claims that "Stapleton charged for extras that were not included in the initial proposal[,] in almost every instance." Id. In addition, the Estate asserts that there were contracted items never completed, such as sanding and refinishing of wood steps, and drywall of the outside walls." Id. The Estate also directs our attention to Thomas Stapleton's testimony that his company was paid $40,183.97. Id. However, the Estate asserted that Stapleton was paid a total of $50,183.97, as evidenced by a check. Id.
The Orphans' Court's Opinion addresses this claim and concludes that it is without merit. See Orphans' Court Opinion, 11/2/20, at 13-14. We agree with the Orphans' Court's reasoning and conclusion, and affirm on the basis of its Opinion with regard to the Estate's third claim. See id.
Finally, the Estate argues that the Orphans' Court erred in not granting its Motion for Reconsideration. See Brief for Appellant at 21. However, the refusal of a trial court to reconsider a final decree is not reviewable on appeal. See Huntington Nat'l Bank v. K-Cor , Inc , 107 A.3d 783, 787 (Pa. Super. 2014) (stating that "Pennsylvania case law is absolutely clear that the refusal of a trial court to reconsider, rehear, or permit reargument of a final decree is not reviewable on appeal.") (quotation omitted). We therefore affirm the Decree of the Orphans' Court.
Decree affirmed. Judgment Entered. /s/_________
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary Date: 4/13/2021
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