See In re Holloway, 251 Ga.App. 892, 894 (555 S.E.2d 228) (2001) (under the prior, materially identical version of OCGA § 29-4-3, evidence supported the trial court's determination that good cause was shown to refuse to appoint the ward's children as guardians when their actions called into question whether they could act in the ward's best interests); see also In re Estate of Kaufmann, 327 Ga.App. 900, 902-903 (761 S.E.2d 418) (2014) (good cause shown under OCGA § 29-4-3 (b) to disregard the ward's preferred guardians when the trial court concluded that two of the proposed guardians would probably abandon their role and that appointing the other proposed guardian would have deteriorated the family's relationships to the detriment of the ward). 2. Mrs. Jenkins further argues that the trial court erred by appointing Wesley as the guardian without stating the basis for the selection, in violation of OCGA § 294-13 (a) (1), and by overruling her priority statutory preferences without stating the factual basis for doing so.
Because there is evidence in the record to support the trial court's finding that appointing Mrs. Jenkins as guardian would not be in Mr. Jenkins’ best interest, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by passing over Mrs. Jenkins when it appointed a legal guardian for Mr. Jenkins. See In re Holloway , 251 Ga. App. 892, 894, 555 S.E.2d 228 (2001) (under the prior, materially identical version of OCGA § 29-4-3, evidence supported the trial court's determination that good cause was shown to refuse to appoint the ward's children as guardians when their actions called into question whether they could act in the ward's best interests); see also In re Estate of Kaufmann , 327 Ga. App. 900, 902-903, 761 S.E.2d 418 (2014) (good cause shown under OCGA § 29-4-3 (b) to disregard the ward's preferred guardians when the trial court concluded that two of the proposed guardians would probably abandon their role and that appointing the other proposed guardian would have deteriorated the family's relationships to the detriment of the ward). 2. Mrs. Jenkins further argues that the trial court erred by appointing Wesley as the guardian without stating the basis for the selection, in violation of OCGA § 29-4-13 (a) (1), and by overruling her priority statutory preferences without stating the factual basis for doing so.