Opinion
No. 107,132.
2012-10-5
In the Matter of the ESTATE OF Harold Terry HUTCHINGS, Deceased.
Appeal from Wyandotte District Court; Kathleen M. Lynch, Judge. Charles Ball, of Kansas City, for appellant. Jon A. Blongewicz, of Jon A. Blongewicz, Attorney at Law, P.A., of Leawood, for appellees.
Appeal from Wyandotte District Court; Kathleen M. Lynch, Judge.
Charles Ball, of Kansas City, for appellant. Jon A. Blongewicz, of Jon A. Blongewicz, Attorney at Law, P.A., of Leawood, for appellees.
Before GREEN, P.J., ATCHESON and BRUNS, JJ.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
PER CURIAM.
This case arises out of a dispute over real property in the estate of Harold Terry Hutchings. Cynthia Hutchings, Harold's ex-wife, asserted an interest in the property based on the decree of divorce ending their marriage. Nathan Hutchings, their son and a coadministrator of his late father's estate, countered that Cynthia released her interest in the property in exchange for the estate's agreement not to pursue claims that she had violated the divorce decree by failing to relinquish other assets. Following a bench trial, the Wyandotte County District Court ruled for the estate, finding that Cynthia had entered a settlement with the estate. Particularly in light of the controlling standard of appellate review, this court affirms that ruling.
The parties are familiar with the facts, so no detailed recitation is required here. Harold died intestate on January 6, 2009. Nathan and his wife Ginger served as administrators of the estate, which was closed later that year. About 11 months later, Cynthia sought to reopen the estate. Nathan and Ginger did not object. Cynthia asserted a claim against the estate for $45,000, an amount awarded to her in the decree of divorce to offset her interest in real property granted to Harold.
The estate opposed the claim on the grounds it was barred by the affirmative defenses of payment and accord and satisfaction. At the bench trial, Nathan testified that he entered an oral settlement of the claim with Cynthia on behalf of the estate. According to Nathan, Cynthia agreed to give up her claim for the $45,000 and to sign a quitclaim deed to the real property and in exchange the estate agreed not to pursue a claim that Cynthia had breached the divorce decree by failing to take steps to transfer certain rights in pension benefits and life insurance policies to Harold. As coadministrator, Nathan took the position that those rights had value to the estate and that Cynthia's purported breach could be asserted in a proceeding to enforce the divorce decree. Although Cynthia had signed a quitclaim deed, she testified that she and Nathan never reached an agreement resolving her claim against the estate. Cynthia testified she signed the quitclaim deed only because Nathan said he needed it to dispose of the real property. She testified that Nathan agreed to pay her $45,000 from the estate.
In short, the district court was presented with two conflicting versions of the status of Cynthia's claim against the estate and circumstances surrounding the execution of the quitclaim deed. The versions essentially were irreconcilable and pitted Cynthia's credibility against Nathan's. Following the bench trial on August 15, 2011, the district court entered a written memorandum decision finding for the estate. The district court ruled that the estate had entered into an accord and satisfaction with Cynthia on the terms Nathan outlined in his trial testimony. The district court described Cynthia as fully aware of the implications of the divorce decree and of signing a quitclaim deed as to the real property. The district court concluded that Cynthia would not have signed the deed without receiving something of value in exchange. The district court further found Nathan's “testimony was more persuasive and more credible than [Cynthia's].”
Cynthia has timely appealed. The district court rejected the estate's alternative defense based on payment. The estate did not cross-appeal that ruling, and it is not before this court.
In reviewing a judgment entered following a bench trial, an appellate court affords marked deference to the credibility determinations of the district court and its overall assessment of the evidence as reflected in specific factual findings. See K.S.A. 60–252 (In an action tried to the district court, “[f]indings of fact shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses.”); Hodges v. Johnson, 288 Kan. 56, 65, 199 P.3d 1251 (2009) (“In evaluating the evidence to support the district court's factual findings, an appellate court does not weigh conflicting evidence, evaluate witnesses' credibility, or redetermine questions of fact.”). If the factual findings rest on substantial evidence, they should be accepted. Progressive Products, Inc. v. Swartz, 292 Kan. 947, 961, 258 P.3d 969 (2011). This court has neither any reason nor any legal justification for quarreling with the credibility determinations. The district court observed the witnesses as they testified. That is a powerful tool in assessing credibility. Indeed, the judicial process treats an appearance on the witness stand, with the taking of an oath and the rigor of cross-examination, as perhaps the most discerning crucible for separating honesty and accuracy from mendacity and misstatement. State v. Scaife, 286 Kan. 614, 624, 186 P.3d 755 (2008) ( “[T]he ability to observe the declarant is an important factor in determining whether he or she is being truthful.”). An appellate court cannot replicate that crucible from a trial transcript and would be seriously remiss if it sought to.
An accord and satisfaction is a species of contract in which one party makes an offer of a performance, typically payment of money, to another party in exchange for a full and complete discharge from an existing obligation. EF Hutton & Co. v. Heim, 236 Kan. 603, 610, 694 P.2d 445 (1985). A party relying on accord and satisfaction must establish the traditional elements of a contract—offer, acceptance, and consideration. Lippertv. Angle, 215 Kan. 626, 630, 527 P.2d 1016 (1974).
Nathan's testimony coupled with the district court's credibility determination establishes sufficient factual grounds for an accord and satisfaction. Cynthia presented a claim against the estate. On behalf of the estate, Nathan offered to forego a distinct claim against Cynthia in exchange for the full and complete release of her claim and the execution of a quitclaim deed. On appeal, Cynthia effectively asks this court to reevaluate her credibility versus Nathan's and to find her to be more persuasive. We will not do so.
Cynthia repackages that argument by suggesting the evidence failed to establish a “meeting of the minds” as to the terms of the accord and satisfaction because she said there was no agreement while Nathan said there was. Her argument misconstrues the facts and the law. Meeting of the minds, of course, refers to the parties to a contract sharing an understanding of the rights and obligations they have created through their agreement. Here, Cynthia testified there never was a contract. That's materially different from asserting she and Nathan had an agreement and arguing Nathan had misrepresented its terms. Here, the district court credited Nathan on both the existence of an accord and satisfaction and its terms. The district court, therefore, properly concluded the parties had reached an agreement on particular terms and, thus, had a meeting of the minds.
Cynthia also argues that the consideration Nathan offered-an agreement not to pursue pension and life insurance benefits he says should have been transferred to Harold under the divorce decree—is of questionable value and, therefore, cannot support an accord and satisfaction. Even assuming the claim against Cynthia were of doubtful validity (something we do not decide and something that is hardly self-evident from her argument), it would still provide legally sufficient consideration for the agreement. International Motor Rebuilding Co. v. United Motor Exchange, Inc., 193 Kan. 497, 499–500, 393 P.2d 992 (1964); Ralston v. Mathew, 173 Kan. 550, 552, 250 P.2d 841 (1952) (forbearance of a reasonably doubtful claim furnishes legally adequate consideration).
Finally, Cynthia questions the clarity of some of the language in the quitclaim deed. While that sort of argument might bear on the efficacy of the deed should the estate attempt to sell the real estate, it is legally beside the point as to whether Cynthia and the estate entered into an accord and satisfaction.
In sum, Cynthia has presented no sound reason for reversing the factual findings or legal conclusions of the district court in barring her claim against the estate based on an accord and satisfaction.
Affirmed.