Because all three of the agreement drafts contained a clause specifying that the parties should not be construed as partners, and because there is no evidence that nClosures objected to the inclusion of this clause, we are persuaded that nClosures and Block did not contemplate a partnership when structuring their business relationship. nClosures argues that the district court incorrectly considered this language, citing Matter of Holder's Estate, 42 Ill.App.3d 35, 355 N.E.2d 333, 334–35 (1976) for the proposition that a court may not rely on unexecuted agreements as proof of a subsequent agreement or its terms. However, Holder more correctly stands for the proposition that an oral agreement to convey property cannot be enforced through specific performance when the agreement was merely an agreement to reduce the terms of the conveyance to writing.
• 3 In an action for specific performance, the existence of the contract that a plaintiff seeks to enforce and the terms thereof must be established by clear, explicit, and convincing evidence. ( Monahan v. Monahan (1958), 14 Ill.2d 449, 153 N.E.2d 1; Wolford v. James E. Kolls Investment Co. (1978), 61 Ill. App.3d 405, 377 N.E.2d 1314; In re Estate of Holder (1976), 42 Ill. App.3d 35, 355 N.E.2d 333.) In the present case, the trial court concluded that plaintiff failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that there existed a contract for a monthly benefit of $1,000.
When this security failed, the court could properly impose an equitable lien on behalf of Erickson because there existed a mutual mistake as to the validity of the deed. Mutual mistake involving improvements on the land of another is a basis for the imposition of an equitable lien. (See Stegeman v. Smith (1966), 67 Ill. App.2d 451, 214 N.E.2d 597; In re Estate of Holder (1976), 42 Ill. App.3d 35, 355 N.E.2d 333; Restatement of Restitution sec. 170 (1937).) Thus the equitable lien served as the source for the creation of a special fund.
• 1 The law is clear in Illinois that it is essential in pleading the existence of a valid contract for the pleader to allege facts sufficient to indicate the terms of the contract. In re Estate of Holder (1976), 42 Ill. App.3d 35, 355 N.E.2d 333; see Pollack v. Marathon Oil Co. (1976), 34 Ill. App.3d 861, 341 N.E.2d 101. Plaintiff's amended complaint alleges that although a subscription agreement was not submitted to him for his signature, "* * * he was always, and is now, ready willing and able to execute such a subscription agreement * * *."
Was there an oral contract between the Pendletons and the Kings sufficiently definite in its terms to permit specific enforcement? Assuming there was an oral contract, is enforcement barred by the Statute of Frauds? If a contract does exist, and if it is not barred from enforcement, does it bind Frank A. King only, or is it also binding on his wife, Carolyn King? Have the purchasers violated a covenant in their agreement by placing a mobile home trailer on the lot? Finally, evidentiary objections are raised by the defendants. • 1 In In re Estate of Holder (1976), 42 Ill. App.3d 35, 37, 355 N.E.2d 333, the court restated the basic rule regarding specific enforcement of contracts, when it said: "* * * To justify a decree of specific performance, our supreme court has held the proof of the terms of the agreement to be performed `must be clear, conclusive and so convincing as to leave no doubt in the mind of the court and it must be made to appear that the terms of the contract are certain, definite, and unequivocal.' ( Moehling v. W.E. O'Neil Construction Co. (1960), 20 Ill.2d 255, 265, 170 N.E.2d 100, 106; Pocius v. Fleck (1958), 13 Ill.2d 420, 150 N.E.2d 106.) Apart from the above-mentioned unexecuted contract, there is nothing in this record to show a meeting of the minds on the price or terms of the contemplated transaction for which specific performance is sought."