Opinion
DOCKET NO. A-3422-12T1
06-30-2014
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF DOLORES P. FLOWERS-MARTIN, Deceased.
Luretha M. Stribling argued the cause for appellant Barbara Flowers Howard. Tracey L. Hackett argued the cause for respondent Janet Flowers Walker.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
Before Judges Ashrafi and St. John.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Probate Part, Essex County, Docket No. CP-0257-2011.
Luretha M. Stribling argued the cause for appellant Barbara Flowers Howard.
Tracey L. Hackett argued the cause for respondent Janet Flowers Walker. PER CURIAM
Plaintiff Barbara Flowers Howard appeals from the February 25, 2013 order, after a bench trial, dismissing her order to show cause and verified complaint which alleged that defendant Janet Flowers Walker fraudulently transferred real property owned by the estate of Dolores P. Flowers Martin to herself and that she be compelled to account for the rents from the property. We affirm.
Defendant is decedent's biological daughter and plaintiff is decedent's stepdaughter. Dolores Flowers-Martin died in September 1995, survived by her husband Harold Martin, defendant, plaintiff, Joanne Pierre (now deceased), adopted son, William Flowers, Jr., and several grandchildren, including Zachary Pierre. Decedent's last will dated July 21, 1994 was admitted to probate and named defendant executrix and plaintiff contingent executrix.
After the death of decedent, her husband contested the will and filed suit against the estate, arguing that he was entitled to one-third of the estate. That case has since been settled and is not the subject of this appeal.
The will provided that upon death, her real property, a multi-family dwelling in East Orange (the property), was to be sold and the proceeds were to be shared equally among her children, Barbara Flowers Howard, Joanne Pierre, Janet Flowers Walker, and William Flowers, Jr., and that $10,000 was to be provided to her grandson, Zachary Pierre. The will also stated that Harold Martin "shall remain in the property . . . for a period of no more than eight (8) months" after her death. Martin remained in the property longer than eight months and Walker did not sell the property once Martin had moved out.
In 1998, Walker drafted a deed in her capacity as executrix and attempted to convey the property to herself. In 2001, Walker drafted an amended deed to correct errors contained in the 1998 deed. The amended deed purportedly contained signatures from all the beneficiaries, including plaintiff and the deed transferred ownership of the property to defendant "in consideration of $30,000." The deed stated that "the purpose of the deed is to correct errors" in the 1998 deed. The deed was recorded in the County Clerk's Office of Essex County on February 20, 2002. In August 2006, Walker sold the property to a third party for $300,000. After the property was sold, Walker gave Howard $7,500, advising that everything would be settled at a later date.
On October 19, 2011, Howard filed an order to show cause and verified complaint in the Chancery Division against Walker, seeking to compel Walker to provide an accounting for the rents received from the property for the time period from September 1995 to August 11, 2006. The complaint further asserted that Walker should be compelled to produce the expenses for the property during that same time period; that she be required to explain the deed recorded in 2002; and that she be compelled to produce the proceeds from the 2006 sale of the property.
In November 2011, the court entered an order to show cause ordering that all interested parties, including Walker, produce the requested documentation and receipts. Walker filed a cross-motion to dismiss the complaint. Depositions of the parties occurred in May and July 2012. Thereafter, in November, the court entered an order compelling the production of documents.
After pretrial motions by both parties were decided by the court, trial commenced in January and concluded in February 2013. Walker testified that all parties came to her house on November 7, 2001, and signed the new deed, which actions were witnessed and notarized. Howard testified that she had no recollection of when she signed the deed, but stated that it looked like her signature.
In a February 11, 2013 oral opinion, the judge determined that although Howard claims that she never saw the 2001 deed before the lawsuit, "she concedes that the signature on the deed appears to be hers, and she believes that it was in some fashion placed on that document. However, she doesn't provide any real explanation as to how it got there."
The judge found that Howard's testimony was not credible and inconsistent with her deposition testimony. He noted that during the time the estate was administered from 1995 until 2006, Howard "never consulted with an attorney, never sought removal of her sister, never demanded an accounting." The judge also stated, "[t]here were some inconsistencies in her testimony. In her deposition, she indicated she only signed a document one time for this property, but she didn't know when she did it. When she got to court, her memory was much fresher and much clearer. She indicated now she knows it was in 2005." He further stated, "because of her education and her life experience, it's difficult for me to accept her version of these facts. She was familiar with the will and the proposed distribution. She knew that she was contingent executor under the will."
Walker testified that plaintiff, Harold Martin, William Flowers, Jr., and Zachary Pierre came to her house on November 7, 2001 and signed the deed in the presence of a witness and notary. She explained that the beneficiaries agreed to transfer their interest in the property for the sum of $30,000 to be paid sometime in the future. The judge found that Walker's testimony was credible.
The judge also considered Zachary Pierre's testimony and stated that Pierre "was very clear in his testimony. He signed the original deed in 2001 in the presence of a notary . . . as well as Ms. Walker. He indicated that William Flowers' signature was already on the document, Barbara Howard's signature was already on the document, and he signed it both for his mom's Estate and for himself[.]" The judge also found that Pierre's testimony was credible. The court ordered that the complaint against Walker be dismissed with prejudice and without costs. This appeal ensued.
Our review of a trial court's fact-finding in a non-jury trial is limited. Seidman v. Clifton Sav. Bank, S.L.A., 2 05 N.J. 150, 169 (2011). Our inquiry is "whether . . . there is substantial evidence in support of the trial judge's findings and conclusions." Sipko v. Koger, Inc., 214 N.J. 364, 376 (2013)(quoting Seidman, supra, 205 N.J. at 169). Appellate courts do not disturb the factual findings of the trial judge unless convinced that "they are so manifestly unsupported by or inconsistent with the competent, relevant and reasonably credible evidence as to offend the interests of justice." Tractenberg v. Twp. of W. Orange, 416 N.J. Super. 354, 365 (App. Div. 2010)(quoting Rova Farms Resort v. Investors Ins. Co., 65 N.J. 474, 484 (1974)); see also Beck v. Beck, 86 N.J. 480, 496 (1981).
"Deference is especially appropriate when the evidence is largely testimony and involves questions of credibility. Because a trial court hears the case, sees and observes the witnesses, and hears them testify, it has a better perspective than a reviewing court in evaluating the veracity of the witnesses." Seidman, supra, 205 N.J. at 169 (quoting Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 412 (1998)).
In her appeal, Howard contends that the trial judge erred in determining that the 2001 deed was legitimate and that the judge's opinion was arbitrary and capricious and against the weight of the evidence. We disagree.
In his extensive oral opinion, the trial judge found that the 2001 deed contained the signatures of plaintiff, Zachary Pierre, William Flowers, Jr., and Harold Martin. The judge found that the deed "is notarized and it's a recorded document," and it is "a self-authenticated document admissible under our Rules of Evidence. Furthermore . . . the acknowledgement by the notary established or constitutes prima facie evidence of due execution by the signatory." The judge further found that plaintiff did not meet the burden of refuting the prima facie evidence of due execution.
The judge said, "I reject [plaintiff's] explanation, which is not credible under the circumstances, that somehow Ms. Walker got those signatures on to that document and got it recorded." We are satisfied that the trial court's findings are supported by competent, relevant and credible evidence.
We also briefly address plaintiff's argument contending that the trial judge failed to address the distribution of the proceeds from the sale of decedent's property and that the doctrine of laches was incorrectly applied. In his opinion, the judge considered plaintiff's argument and determined that her requests were barred under the doctrine of laches, also finding prejudice to defendant based on the passage of time.
We review these determinations for abuse of discretion. Mancini v. Twp. of Teaneck, 179 N.J. 425, 436 (2004). The doctrine of "laches is 'invoked to deny a party enforcement of a known right when the party engages in an inexcusable and unexplained delay in exercising that right to the prejudice of the other party.'" Fox v. Millman, 210 N.J. 401, 418 (2012) (quoting Knorr v. Smeal, 178 N.J. 169, 180-81 (2003)). "Laches may only be enforced when the delaying party had sufficient opportunity to assert the right in the proper forum and the prejudiced party acted in good faith believing that the right had been abandoned." Knorr, supra, 178 N.J. at 181. "The key factors to be considered in deciding whether to apply the doctrine are the length of the delay, the reasons for the delay, and the 'changing conditions of either or both parties during the delay.'" Ibid. (quoting Lavin v. Bd. of Educ, 90 N.J. 145, 152 (1982)). "'[W]hether laches should be applied depends upon the facts of the particular case and is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court.'" Mancini, supra, 179 N.J. at 436 (2004) (internal citation omitted).
Here, the trial judge determined that the doctrine of laches applied starting in 2001, when the deed was signed. He stated, "[the beneficiaries] signed the deed . . . they had 11 years to do something about this and they didn't do it. They had five years until the property was sold and they could have done something about it." He further noted that "they had another four or five years after that, during which time they did nothing about it. So, 10 or 11 years goes by, and there's nothing here to indicate that they could not have done something."
The judge explained that since the deed was recorded in 2002 and was a matter of public record, plaintiffs were afforded the opportunity to uncover the existence of the deed years before filing the lawsuit. He stated, "[t]here has to be delay, and not just mere lapse of time. But there must be a sufficient length of time which is unreasonable and which is prejudicial. And here, obviously, I think a passage of . . . 10 or 11 years is a long time, and there is prejudice."
We find no abuse of discretion in the judge's determination that the equitable defense of laches was available to the defendant.
Affirmed.
I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the original on file in my office.
CLERK OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION