Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Contra Costa County Super. Ct. No. J0801766
Jenkins, J.
This is an appeal from a juvenile court order placing defendant E.S. (minor) in an inpatient treatment facility outside his county of residence after he pleaded no contest to one felony count of committing a lewd and lascivious act upon his female cousin, who was under the age of fourteen. Minor reasons that the order was an abuse of discretion because it was contrary to the evidence before the juvenile court and because less restrictive placements were available that would have met both his needs and those of the community. We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On November 3, 2008, a juvenile wardship petition was filed pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 602, alleging that minor had committed two felony counts of committing a lewd and lascivious act upon a child under the age of fourteen in violation of Penal Code section 288, subdivision (a). On March 24, 2009, minor pleaded no contest to one felony count, and the second count was dismissed.
Unless otherwise stated, all statutory citations herein are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
According to the probation report that was later admitted into evidence, on August 29, 2008, minor fondled his nine-year-old cousin’s vagina, orally copulated her, and attempted to put his penis into her vagina.
In June 2009, the juvenile court adjudged minor a ward of the court and held a contested hearing regarding his disposition. At the hearing, the juvenile court admitted into evidence two written reports, one from minor’s probation officer and the other from Dr. Mark Koetting, a psychologist who had performed a mental health assessment of minor. The juvenile court also heard testimony from both Dr. Koetting and the probation officer.
In his report, the probation officer recommended out of home placement for minor after interviewing him and considering the circumstances of his offense and personal background. In doing so, the officer noted that minor “needs to be made to realize that his actions were serious and therefore he must have serious consequences.” He further noted that “community protection and the minor’s rehabilitation require placement in a very structured, closely supervised program, that can provide a behavior modification plan, on site school, sexual abuse treatment, victim awareness counseling as well as individual and family counseling.”
At the hearing, the probation officer testified that he considered outpatient treatment options for minor as part of the placement process, but did not call Crossroads or A Step Forward, two outpatient treatment facilities in Contra Costa County, regarding minor’s case.
Dr. Koetting, in turn, concluded after a lengthy interview and testing process that minor was at a “moderate-low risk of committing a new sex offense in a period, roughly speaking, of about the next 10 years. This estimate is contingent on him participating in a reputable specialized treatment program designed for adolescent sexual abusers.” Dr. Koetting also noted uncertainty regarding minor’s diagnosis, but nonetheless concluded he could “safely receive the treatment that he needs on an outpatient basis.”
In connection with his recommendation of outpatient treatment for minor, Dr. Koetting recommended several supervision-related measures. Those measures included that minor must not live in any residence in which a child two or more years younger, or a developmentally disabled child, also resides; that minor must refrain from contact with a child two or more years younger unless such contact is supervised and approved by his probation officer and therapist; that minor must not have internet access at his home; and that minor must have minimum unstructured time all by himself.
Further, at the disposition hearing, Dr. Koetting acknowledged he could not say with certainty that minor would be able to control his sexual urges in the future when in the company of other potential victims.
On June 18, 2009, the juvenile court issued its dispositional order. Rejecting Dr. Koetting’s recommendation of outpatient treatment, the juvenile court placed minor in an inpatient treatment facility in Sacramento County. The juvenile court also set a date for a five-and-a-half month placement review. This timely appeal followed.
DISCUSSION
On appeal, minor contends the juvenile court’s order placing him in an inpatient treatment facility in Sacramento County was an abuse of discretion. Minor reasons that the order was contrary to the evidence, which demonstrated that inpatient, out-of-county placement was not necessary to protect the public and would be harmful to him, and because less restrictive placements were not considered.
In deciding upon the proper placement of a juvenile delinquent, the juvenile court has “maximum flexibility to craft suitable orders aimed at rehabilitating the particular ward before it.” (In re James R. (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 413, 432.) This flexibility is constrained by the policies underlying the juvenile court law and, in particular, section 202, which mandates that “[m]inors under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court as a consequence of delinquent conduct shall, in conformity with the interests of public safety and protection, receive care, treatment, and guidance that is consistent with their best interest, that holds them accountable for their behavior, and that is appropriate for their circumstances. This guidance may include punishment that is consistent with the rehabilitative objectives of this chapter.” (§ 202, subd. (b). See also In re Charles G. (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 608, 614-615.)
“A juvenile court’s commitment order may be reversed on appeal only upon a showing the court abused its discretion. (In re Todd W. (1979) 96 Cal.App.3d 408, 416 [157 Cal.Rptr. 802].) ‘ “We must indulge all reasonable inferences to support the decision of the juvenile court and will not disturb its findings when there is substantial evidence to support them.” ’ (In re Lorenza M. (1989) 212 Cal.App.3d 49, 53 [260 Cal.Rptr. 258].)” (In re Robert H. (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 1317, 1329-1330.)
Here, in placing minor in the inpatient treatment facility in Sacramento County, the juvenile court reasoned, based on “the entirety of the record, ” that the “offense is serious and the minor may pose a significant danger to the safety of the community as well as the victim. Although the minor appears remorseful the undersigned is not fully convinced the minor will take action to avoid a similar situation from reoccurring.... The minor clearly has no concept of the impact of his actions nor is he displaying the determination necessary to truly gain the tools he needs to control his impulses toward his cousin. It is concerning that the minor is more focused on returning home than on ensuring his negative behavior is not repeated.”
Minor contends the juvenile court’s ruling is an abuse of discretion. He reasons that the court failed to consider less restrictive placement options. Minor further reasons that inpatient treatment is against his interests and not necessary to protect the public. We disagree.
First, the record belies minor’s claim that the juvenile court failed to consider less restrictive alternatives to placing him in the inpatient treatment facility in Sacramento County. Indeed, minor’s counsel specifically argued to the juvenile court that the law required his placement to be the least restrictive available and the closest to home. In response, the juvenile court corrected counsel by advising that it also had to consider the community and minor’s needs and best interests. The juvenile court then rejected the recommendation from minor’s counsel that minor be placed in a group home with very strict supervision and outpatient treatment because it did not “believe he can be adequately and properly supervised” in such a setting. Instead, after considering comments from counsel and the probation department, the minor’s age and history, and the circumstances and gravity of his offense, the juvenile court decided placement in the residential treatment facility was more appropriate for minor.
In making this decision, the juvenile court acted in accordance with California law. As minor points out, “the statutory scheme guiding the superior court in its treatment of juvenile offenders ‘ “contemplates a progressively restrictive and punitive series of disposition orders... namely, home placement under supervision, foster home placement, placement in a local treatment facility and, as a last resort, Youth Authority placement.” ’ ([In re Aline D. (1975] 14 Cal.3d [557, ] 564; see also In re Bryan (1976) 16 Cal.3d 782, 788 [129 Cal.Rptr. 293, 548 P.2d 693]; In re Arthur N. (1976) 16 Cal.3d 226, 237 [127 Cal.Rptr. 641, 545 P.2d 1345].)” (In re Teofilio A. (1989) 210 Cal.App.3d 571, 577.) However, “less restrictive placements do not actually have to have been tried, ” so long as there is evidence in the record to support the judge’s determination that reasonable less restrictive alternative dispositions should be rejected. (See In re Teofilio A., supra, 210 Cal.App.3d at p. 577.)
Here, the evidence in the record is wholly consistent with the juvenile court’s finding that less restrictive alternatives should be rejected. Specifically, in deciding that inpatient rather than outpatient treatment was necessary, the juvenile court noted that minor’s offense is serious and that he may pose a significant danger to the safety of the community as well as to the victim. In light of the seriousness of minor’s offense, both the probation officer and Dr. Koetting agreed that minor was in need of a highly structured, closely supervised program in order to learn to modify his behavior to ensure his crime would not be repeated. While Dr. Koetting believed outpatient treatment was sufficient, as the juvenile court noted, the restrictions recommended by Dr. Koetting to enable such outpatient treatment were so “severe” that they were “very close to being impossible to implement when you look at it practically.”
As set forth above, Dr. Koetting’s recommendations included the following: (1) minor must not live in any residence in which a child two or more years younger, or a developmentally disabled child, also resides; (2) minor must refrain from contact with a child two or more years younger unless such contact is supervised and approved by his probation officer and therapist; (3) minor must not have internet access at his home; and (4) in general, minor must have minimum unstructured time all by himself.
Moreover, while the juvenile court acknowledged minor’s placement out of Contra Costa County was not ideal given the one hour distance from his family, the court iterated that “all of our sex offender residential programs are out of this county, ” a fact with which counsel agreed. In addition, as both the juvenile court and Dr. Koetting noted, minor’s mother, with whom minor lived, had admittedly abused methamphetamines until about a year ago, and had “slipped and fell a couple of times” since then. If minor were permitted to live at home during outpatient treatment, the juvenile court noted, and his “mom slipped and fell once, given the strict supervision [minor] is supposed to be under, that one time might be a catastrophe, possibly, for another victim.” Given Dr. Koetting’s acknowledgement at the hearing that he could not say with certainty minor would be able to control his sexual urges in the future when in the company of other potential victims, the juvenile court’s concern was far from unreasonable.
Minor had little, if any contact with his father, whose whereabouts were unknown.
Under these circumstances, we believe the juvenile court’s conclusion that minor should receive inpatient treatment at the Sacramento County facility was both well reasoned and supported by the record. While its conclusion is at odds with that of Dr. Koetting, who recommended outpatient treatment, “[t]he court was not required to take all the information properly considered by it at face value. The court was entitled to evaluate the credibility of the minor and the weight to be afforded to the psychological evaluation, as well as to accept or reject the recommendations of [others]. (See People v. Warner (1978) 20 Cal.3d 678, 683 [143 Cal.Rptr. 885, 574 P.2d 1237].)” (In re Robert H., supra, 96 Cal.App.4th at p. 1329.) On this record, particularly when indulging all reasonable inferences in favor of affirming the order, we agree with the juvenile court that the circumstances and seriousness of the offense, minor’s history, and his mother’s ongoing struggles with substance abuse call for inpatient rather than outpatient treatment. (See In re Jimmy P. (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1679, 1684 [§ 725.5 and the policies underlying juvenile court law require the court to consider “the broadest range of information” in reaching a disposition]; In re Robert H., supra, 96 Cal.App.4th at p. 1330 [“The gravity of the offense is by statute a proper consideration at disposition”].)
We acknowledge minor’s related argument that the probation officer had a statutory duty to consider less restrictive placements, which the probation officer in this case failed to perform. However, even if, hypothetically, we were to accept this argument, minor would have nonetheless failed to provide us with legal grounds for reversing the disposition, given that the record is clear in this case that the juvenile court properly considered and rejected less restrictive alternatives. (See In re Teofilio A., supra, 210 Cal.App.3d at p. 577.)
Accordingly, we conclude no abuse of discretion has been established.
DISPOSITION
The juvenile court’s placement order is affirmed.
We concur: McGuiness, P. J., Pollak, J.