Opinion
2012-11-13
Carol Kahn, New York, for appellant. John R. Eyerman, New York, for respondent.
Carol Kahn, New York, for appellant. John R. Eyerman, New York, for respondent.
Tamara A. Steckler, The Legal Aid Society, New York (Judith Waksberg of counsel), and Proskauer Rose, LLP, New York (William H. Weisman of counsel), attorneys for the child.
Order of fact-finding and disposition, Family Court, Bronx County (Gayle P. Roberts, J.), entered on or about August 19, 2011, which, upon a finding of permanent neglect, terminated respondent mother's parental rights to the subject child, and committed custody and guardianship of the child to petitioner agency, and the Commissioner of the Administration for Children's Services for the purpose of adoption, unanimously affirmed, without costs.
Petitioner met its burden of establishing, by clear and convincing evidence that the child was permanently neglected ( seeSocial Services Law § 384–b [7] [a] ). Petitioner made diligent efforts to strengthen and encourage the parent-child relationship by, among other things, scheduling visitation with the child, referring respondent for mental health services, and assisting respondent in obtaining suitable housing ( see Matter of Shaqualle Khalif W. [Denise W.], 96 A.D.3d 698, 698–699, 947 N.Y.S.2d 116 [1st Dept. 2012] ). Despite these efforts, respondent failed to appear at many of the scheduled visits, behaved inappropriately when she did attend the visits and failed to bond with the child. In addition, respondent failed to seek and regularly attend recommended mental health services and failed to cooperate with petitioner's attempts to refer her to a shelter or other suitable housing ( id. at 699, 947 N.Y.S.2d 116).
We reject respondent's contention that petitioner's activities were deficient because she is mentally retarded. There is no evidence of mental retardation beyond the conclusory statements of respondent's counsel and, as noted above, petitioner referred respondent for mental health services which respondent failed to consistently attend.
Respondent may not appeal from the dispositional aspect of the order which was entered on default ( see Matter of Serenity Celene M. [Roy Enrique M.], 93 A.D.3d 448, 939 N.Y.S.2d 697 [1st Dept. 2012] ). In any event, a preponderance of the evidence shows that termination of respondent's parental rights is in the best interest of the child who has resided in the pre-adoptive foster home, where he is thriving, for almost all of his life, and where his special behavioral and emotional needs have been met by his foster parents ( see In re Guardianship of Star Leslie W., 63 N.Y.2d 136, 147, 481 N.Y.S.2d 26, 470 N.E.2d 824 [1984]; Matter of Raquel Olivia M., 37 A.D.3d 279, 280, 830 N.Y.S.2d 96 [1st Dept. 2007] ).