Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
San Mateo County Super. Ct. No. 79802.
Bruiniers, J.
On September 28, 2009, pursuant to a plea agreement, appellant Erick M. admitted allegations of a juvenile court petition that he had committed a felony robbery in which a principal was armed. (Pen. Code, §§ 212.5, subd. (c); 12022, subd. (a)(1).) He was declared a ward of the court and placed in a local camp detention facility, with a commitment to the Division of Juvenile Justice (DJJ) stayed. On January 22, 2010, after a series of incidents in which appellant repeatedly violated the rules of the program to which he had been committed, a probation violation notice was filed. Appellant admitted the violations and was committed to DJJ. He appeals. We affirm.
All further code references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
We briefly summarize the facts of the underlying offense since it seems they have little, if any relevance to this appeal. We say “seems” because, as discussed post, it is impossible to tell precisely what appellant urges as reversible error in his case. We rely upon respondent’s brief in summarizing the facts, since appellant makes only passing reference to the record below.
On August 16, 2009, appellant was arrested by Daly City police officers shortly after participating with three others in the robbery of a pizza delivery man at gunpoint. All of the suspects were arrested in a nearby apartment where they had fled. A search of the apartment yielded the gun used in the robbery, along with several other handguns, ammunition, pipe bombs, gang indicia, gang clothing, and the victim’s cell phone. Appellant admitted that he agreed to participate when the robbery was planned, that he was present during the robbery, and that he demanded that the victim go back to his car and “get more cash.”
A wardship petition was filed and appellant, with the assistance of counsel, admitted allegations that he had committed a felony robbery in which a principal was armed. (§§ 212.5, subd. (c); 12022, subd. (a)(1).) Other allegations of the petition were dismissed, as was a separate petition charging appellant with felony burglary (§ 460, subd. (b)) and misdemeanor theft (§ 484). He was declared a ward of the court and placed in the Camp Glenwood Program, a local camp detention facility. A commitment to DJJ was stayed.
Appellant did not do well in this placement and was, as described by his probation officer, “defiant” and “disruptive.” The probation violation notice alleged that appellant violated the rules of Camp Glenwood on eight occasions between December 1, 2009, and January 8, 2010. Appellant, represented by counsel, admitted these violations.
Appellant was committed to DJJ with a maximum term of confinement of six years, with credit for 319 days served in custody. A timely notice of appeal was filed. The notice recited that the appeal was from “[a]ll orders of the court, particularly the order declaring juvenile a ward of the court and the order committing the juvenile to the [DJJ].”
II. Discussion
As we initially observed, it is virtually impossible to discern from appellant’s briefing the error he complains of, or the legal basis for whatever claim he seeks to present. What orders of the juvenile court does he challenge here? His briefing provides no clue. What errors of law were made by the juvenile court? None are identified. Where in the record would we find evidence of error? He provides no guidance. What standard of review would we apply to any issue relevant to the jurisdictional or dispositional orders? He suggests none.
What remedy does he seek? He summarily concludes that “[t]he conviction below should be vacated and set aside” and that “this case should be done over[.]” Why? Appellant argues (again without any reference to any evidentiary record) that he was recruited to gang membership on his middle school campus, and that therefore the State of California “initially contributed to [his] recruitment into a criminal gang and criminal conduct....” He faults both the investigating officers and the probation department (and the court) for not properly investigating the causes of appellant’s gang activities.
In a concurrent petition for habeas corpus, appellant submits a declaration verified only by his mother, purporting to recite “facts” regarding appellant’s gang recruitment and the circumstances surrounding his admission of the underlying offense. None of these matters was presented to the juvenile court.
The sole legal authority cited in appellant’s briefs is article I, section 28, subdivision (f)(1), of the California Constitution, which provides: “Right to Safe Schools. All students and staff of public primary, elementary, junior high, and senior high schools, and community colleges, colleges, and universities have the inalienable right to attend campuses which are safe, secure and peaceful.” From this provision, he divines a rule that “If a child was recruited on campus, by force and violence, and the school administration knew about it and the local police or sheriff did nothing to provide a safe campus, the child should not be prosecuted.” Even assuming that there was a factual predicate for this claim, as the People note, “[t]he Victims’ Bill of Rights, enacted by voter initiative as Proposition 8, is expressly concerned with strengthening the criminal justice system by reforming ‘the procedural treatment of accused persons and the disposition and sentencing of convicted persons, ’ in order to fully protect the rights of crime victims. [Citation.]” (Clausing v. San Francisco Unified School Dist. (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 1224, 1236 (Clausing).) The constitutional provision “declares a general right without specifying any rules for its enforcement. It imposes no express duty on anyone to make schools safe. It is wholly devoid of guidelines, mechanisms, or procedures from which a damages remedy could be inferred. Rather, ‘ “it merely indicates principles, without laying down rules by means of which those principles may be given the force of law.” ’ [Citation.]” (Leger v. Stockton Unified School Dist. (1988) 202 Cal.App.3d 1448, 1455.) “There is nothing in the legislative history of section 28, [subdivision (f)(1)], to suggest that it was intended to create... an affirmative duty to insure that schools are free from all risk of crime and violence.” (Clausing, at p. 1237.) Appellant does not even bother to respond to these authorities in his reply brief.
Appellant miscites to the relevant constitutional provision under its former numbering as “Section 28(c).” Article I, section 28 is known as the “Victim’s Bill of Rights.”
Appellant claims that the police should have recognized that he was a “victim, ” but does not explain how any of this exculpates him, or would provide a legal excuse for his admitted conduct. He asserts that there was a “duty to investigate in a fair and in depth manner, ” but does not articulate how any violation of this alleged duty would render either his wardship adjudication or his DJJ commitment factually or legally deficient. If an argument is made without citation of authorities on the point made, “ ‘the court may treat it as waived, and pass it without consideration. [Citations.]’ [Citations.]” (People v. Stanley (1995) 10 Cal.4th 764, 793.).
An appellate brief is not an appropriate vehicle for counsel to rant about societal ills, nor is it an opportunity to present arguments more properly made to a trial judge at the time of sentencing. Absolutely nothing presented here raises any cognizable issue for our review.
III. Disposition
The juvenile court’s orders adjudicating appellant a ward of the court and committing him to DJJ are affirmed.
We concur: Jones, P.J., Simons, J.