Opinion
No. COA16-79
07-19-2016
IN THE MATTER OF: E.R.D.
Holcomb & Cabe, LLP, by Samantha H. Cabe, for Petitioner-Appellee Chatham County Department of Social Services. Elon University School of Law Guardian ad Litem Appellate Advocacy Clinic, by Alan D. Woodlief, Jr., for the Guardian ad Litem. Campbell Law School, by Allegra Collins for the Respondent-Appellant Mother. Reece & Reece, by Mary McCullers Reece for the Respondent-Appellant Father.
An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure. Chatham County, No. 13 JA 21, 13 JT 21 Appeal by Respondent-Parents from orders entered 23 April 2015 and 29 October 2015 by Judge Beverly Scarlett in Chatham County District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 20 June 2016. Holcomb & Cabe, LLP, by Samantha H. Cabe, for Petitioner-Appellee Chatham County Department of Social Services. Elon University School of Law Guardian ad Litem Appellate Advocacy Clinic, by Alan D. Woodlief, Jr., for the Guardian ad Litem. Campbell Law School, by Allegra Collins for the Respondent-Appellant Mother. Reece & Reece, by Mary McCullers Reece for the Respondent-Appellant Father. DILLON, Judge.
Respondents ("Mother" and "Father") appeal from orders terminating their parental rights to their minor child E.R.D. ("Emily"). Father also appeals the order ceasing reunification efforts. After careful review, we affirm.
A pseudonym.
I. Background
In April 2013, DSS filed a juvenile petition alleging that one-year-old Emily was a neglected and dependent juvenile based upon unsafe and unsanitary conditions of Respondents' home. Pursuant to a safety plan developed by DSS, Respondents moved into an apartment and agreed to keep the apartment clean. However, on 29 October 2014, DSS received a report that the family had moved back into the unsafe home. A social worker visited the home and found piles of trash strewn everywhere, a sex toy on the floor, an exposed-blade knife within reach of Emily, marijuana and drug paraphernalia, piles of dirty diapers, and cigarette butts and batteries within reach of Emily. Emily was removed from the home, and was later found to have speech delays.
On 31 October 2014, DSS filed a second petition alleging Emily to be neglected and dependent. After a hearing on the matter, the trial court entered an Adjudication and Disposition Order finding Emily to be neglected and dependent and ordering that Emily continue in non-secure custody with DSS. After a subsequent permanency planning hearing, the trial court entered an order ceasing reunification efforts. Respondents filed notices to preserve their rights to appeal those orders.
In April 2015, DSS filed motions to terminate Respondents' parental rights, alleging grounds of neglect and dependency. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(1), (6) (2015). After a hearing on the matter, the trial court entered orders terminating Respondents' parental rights. Mother and Father appealed from the orders terminating each of their parental rights. Father also appealed the order ceasing reunification efforts.
II. Analysis
On appeal, Mother argues that the trial court erred by failing to make a written finding required under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1110(a) (2015) and that the trial court abused its discretion in determining that it was in Emily's best interests to terminate Mother's parental rights. Father's counsel has submitted a "no-merit" brief pursuant to N.C.R. App. P. 3.1(d).
A. Mother's Appeal
Mother first argues that the trial court erred by failing to make written findings as to the bond between Emily and Mother as required by N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1110(a)(4). We disagree.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1110(a) provides, in relevant part:
(a) After an adjudication that one or more grounds for terminating a parent's rights exist, the court shall determine whether terminating the parent's rights is in the juvenile's best interest. The court may consider any evidence, including hearsay evidence as defined in G.S. 8C-1, Rule 801, that the court finds to be relevant, reliable, and necessary to determine the best interests of the juvenile. In each case, the court shall consider the following criteria and make written findings regarding the following that are relevant:
(1) The age of the juvenile.
(2) The likelihood of adoption of the juvenile.
(3) Whether the termination of parental rights will aid
in the accomplishment of the permanent plan for the juvenile.N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1110(a) (2015) (emphasis added). The court is required to make written findings of fact for all of the above factors that are "relevant." Id. However, when making those written findings, the court is not required to "recite the statutory language verbatim." In re L.M.T., 367 N.C. 165, 165-66, 752 S.E.2d 453, 454 (2013). "When reviewing the sufficiency of such orders, an appellate court should consider whether the trial court's findings of fact address the substance of the statutory requirements." Id. at 166, 752 S.E.2d at 454.
(4) The bond between the juvenile and the parent.
(5) The quality of the relationship between the juvenile and the proposed adoptive parent, guardian, custodian, or other permanent placement.
(6) Any relevant consideration.
Although Mother contends that the trial court did not make any findings regarding the bond between her and Emily, our review of the record shows that the trial court sufficiently considered all the relevant statutory criteria. The trial court made two factual findings that describe the nature of the bond between Mother and her child; specifically, paragraph seventeen (17) states, "the juvenile did not cry when she was removed from the home," and paragraph thirty-three (33) states, "the juvenile did not talk a lot while in the care of [Mother and Father]; however [Mother] could understand what she was saying before the minor child started to use actual words." Paragraph 17 suggests the absence of a strong bond between the mother and child, while paragraph 33 suggests that the mother had formed a significant connection with her daughter. We conclude that the trial court adequately addressed the statutory factors. Therefore, we hold that the court made findings sufficient to satisfy N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1110(a)(4).
Mother next contends that the trial court abused its discretion in determining that it was in Emily's best interests to terminate Mother's parental rights. However, when we review for abuse of discretion, we reverse only upon a showing "that the challenged actions are manifestly unsupported by reason." Clark v. Clark, 301 N.C. 123, 129, 271 S.E.2d 58, 63 (1980). After reviewing the record on appeal, we conclude that the trial court's termination of Mother's parental rights was supported by reasoned findings of fact and an appropriate application of law. Accordingly, we affirm.
B. Father's Appeal
Father's appellate counsel has filed a no-merit brief pursuant to N.C.R. App. P. 3.1(d), stating that, after conscientious and thorough review of the record on appeal, she has concluded that there is no issue on which we might grant relief to her client. We agree.
In accordance with Rule 3.1(d), appellate counsel provided Father with copies of the no-merit brief, trial transcript, and record on appeal, and advised him of his right to file a brief with this Court pro se. Father has made no pro se filing in this appeal.
As an initial matter, we have reviewed the trial court's order ceasing reunification efforts and determined that the findings are based upon credible evidence, that the findings of fact support the trial court's conclusions, and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion with respect to the disposition. See In re C.M., 183 N.C. App. 207, 213, 644 S.E.2d 588, 594 (2007). As a result, the trial court's order ceasing reunification efforts is affirmed.
Furthermore, we are unable to find any possible prejudicial error by the trial court in ordering termination of Father's parental rights to Emily. Our review of the record reveals that the termination order includes sufficient findings of fact, supported by clear and convincing evidence, to conclude that Father had neglected Emily. While Father contends that the determination that Emily was dependent arguably was not supported by the evidence, the finding of neglect alone sufficed as a ground for termination. See In re Taylor, 97 N.C. App. 57, 64, 387 S.E.2d 230, 233-34 (1990) (stating that any one of the enumerated statutory grounds is sufficient to support termination). Finally, the court made appropriate findings on each of the relevant dispositional factors and did not abuse its discretion in determining that termination was in Emily's best interests. Therefore, we affirm the termination of Respondents' parental rights to Emily.
AFFIRMED.
Judges CALABRIA and INMAN concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).