Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Super. Ct. Nos. JV07393, JV07394
HULL, J.
Appellant V.R. (Mother), appeals from an order of the juvenile court terminating her parental rights. Mother’s sole claim on appeal is that the juvenile court abused its discretion in denying her attorney’s request for a continuance. Finding the claim to be without merit, we shall affirm the juvenile court’s order.
Facts and Proceedings
On June 5, 2007, the Yolo County Department of Employment and Social Services (the Department) filed petitions under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (b) (unspecified section references that follow are to the Welfare and Institutions Code) regarding the minor children J.R. (13 months old) and E.R. (two years old). Removed from the family home and placed in foster care, the minors were detained by the court on June 6, 2007.
The original petition alleged that Mother was arrested as a parolee at large, with a history of methamphetamine abuse, and the family’s home was filthy, unsafe, and unsanitary. The petition also alleged that Mother previously failed to reunify with the minors’ five siblings, and each of those children had been adopted into new families.
Initially, the identity and whereabouts of the minors’ father was unknown. By the time of the detention hearing, however, the father had been identified and the court was informed that both Mother and Father were in prison.
On August 1, 2007, the children were placed together in a foster home. That same month, the jurisdiction hearing, which was initially scheduled for August 15, 2007, was continued to September 26, 2007. That hearing was continued again in September.
Then, on October 16, 2007, the Department filed amended petitions, including allegations regarding the minors’ father. The amended petition alleged that the father’s parental rights were terminated as to two of the minors’ siblings, was found in possession of methamphetamine in March 2007, and tested positive for methamphetamine in September 2007.
That same day, both parents appeared in court and the matter was set for a contested jurisdiction hearing on December 7, 2007. Approximately two weeks later, Mother and Father were again arrested for parole violations, and later, the December 7, 2007 contested jurisdiction hearing was continued.
The contested jurisdiction was then held on February 27, 2008, nearly nine months after the children were removed. Both parents were present at the hearing. The court took jurisdiction over the minors and sustained the allegations in the amended petitions. A disposition hearing was scheduled for March 12, 2008.
Prior to the disposition hearing, the Department issued its report, recommending neither parent be provided reunification services pursuant to section 361.5, subdivisions (b)(10) and (11). The disposition hearing proceeded as scheduled and the court adopted the Department’s recommendation, refusing services to either parent. The court scheduled the section 366.26 hearing for July 16, 2008, and ordered both parents to appear.
On July 16, 2008, Mother was present but Father was not; apparently there had been a death in Father’s family that prevented him from appearing in court. Nevertheless, Father’s attorney, along with Mother, requested a contested section 366.26 hearing; Father’s attorney also requested time to file a section 388 motion. The court agreed with the Department’s position that the case already had taken too long to reach resolution, but gave Father until August 1, 2008, to file a section 388 motion. The court then set the contested section 366.26 hearing for August 21, 2008, scheduling a trial readiness conference for August 13, 2008.
Neither Mother nor Father appeared at the trial readiness conference, and neither of them contacted their attorney or the social worker to explain why they would not be present. The Department nevertheless requested the trial court confirm the trial date over the objection of minors’ counsel and the parents’ attorneys agreed.
On August 21, 2008, the date confirmed for trial, neither Mother nor Father appeared in court. Mother’s counsel explained that after the trial readiness conference, Mother left counsel a message indicating she and Father had been ill with the flu and thus had been unable to appear at the trial readiness conference. The only explanation offered for their absence at the section 366.26 hearing was a message Mother left with the social worker indicating her mother was “seriously ill.”
Mother offered no explanation for why her mother’s illness prevented her and Father from attending the hearing. Father’s attorney objected to the court proceeding in his absence, but the court was “not impressed.” Mother’s attorney raised no objection.
The court thus found that “[g]iven the seriousness of the matters before the [c]ourt that both parents... failed to appear [at] the last court date as well as this. And in order to get some clarification, perhaps permanency in the lives of the children being three and one, the [c]ourt will proceed to a hearing today.” The court noted the objection from Father’s counsel.
The court then accepted the Department’s report into evidence. Neither parent offered any additional evidence but offered their objections “to the position of [their] parental rights.” Having read and considered the Department’s report, the court adopted “the findings and orders as presented. And specifically, the parental rights of the mother and the father that will be permanently terminated.” Mother appeals.
Discussion
Mother asserts the denial of her attorney’s request for a continuance was an abuse of the trial court’s discretion. She further contends it requires reversal of the order terminating her parental rights.
As an initial matter, Mother’s counsel did not raise this objection in the juvenile court. Contrary to the assertion in her reply brief, the only arguable objection raised to going forward with the hearing was raised by Father’s attorney. Accordingly, the issue is forfeited on appeal. (In re Dakota S. (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 494, 501-502; In re S.B. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1287, 1293, fn. 2 [forfeiture is proper term].) Even assuming an objection can be inferred, the claim lacks merit.
Section 352 addresses the issue of continuances at dependency hearings. It provides that except when it is contrary to the interests of the minor, the dependency court may continue a hearing beyond the time limit within which it is required to be held. Section 352 also states that the best interests of the child require the court to give substantial weight to the child’s need for a prompt resolution of custody status, a stable environment, and the avoidance of damage from prolonged temporary placements. Further, section 352 provides that a continuance must be based on evidence that demonstrates there is good cause for granting the continuance, and the convenience of the parties is not good cause.
Thus, section 352 discourages continuances, and an order that denies a continuance is reversed only upon a showing that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied the continuance. (In re Gerald J. (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 1180, 1187.) Abuse of discretion is demonstrated when the trial court exceeds the bounds of reason and makes a determination that is arbitrary, capricious or patently absurd. (In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 318-319.)
In this case, we find no abuse of discretion in the denial of the request for a continuance at the section 366.26 hearing. Mother’s only excuse for her failure to appear and request for a continuance was that her mother was “seriously ill.” No explanation was given as to why her mother’s illness prevented either parent from being present at this critical hearing. Moreover, at the time of the hearing, the children were only two and three years old and had been in foster care for 14 months, and both parents failed to appear at the trial setting conference only one week earlier.
There was no abuse of discretion also because there is no indication that a different result would have occurred had a continuance been granted. (In re Gerald J., supra, 1 Cal.App.4th at p. 1187; In re J.I. (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 903, 912.) The record makes clear that none of the section 366.26, subdivision (c) exceptions to termination of parental rights could apply in this case, and given the foster parents’ stated desire to adopt the children, there was no argument to be made that they were not adoptable. Because adoption is the preferred permanent plan for minors who cannot be reunified with their parents (§ 366.26, subd. (b)), termination of parental rights naturally followed.
Disposition
The order terminating parental rights is affirmed.
We concur: RAYE , Acting P. J., ROBIE , J.