Opinion
No. 106,223.
2012-06-29
In the Matter of the EQUALIZATION APPEALS OF CALIFORNIA CROSSING L .L.C. FOR 2007 IN SHAWNEE COUNTY, KANSAS, PURSUANT TO KAN. STAT. ANN. 79–1409 & 79–1609.
Appeal from Court of Tax Appeals. Aimee Betzen, assistant county counselor, for appellant Board of County Commissioners of the County of Shawnee, Kansas. Carol B. Bonebrake, of Cosgrove, Webb & Oman, of Topeka, for appellee California Crossing L.L.C.
Appeal from Court of Tax Appeals.
Aimee Betzen, assistant county counselor, for appellant Board of County Commissioners of the County of Shawnee, Kansas. Carol B. Bonebrake, of Cosgrove, Webb & Oman, of Topeka, for appellee California Crossing L.L.C.
Before MARQUARDT, P.J., HILL, J., and LARSON, S.J.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
PER CURIAM.
Shawnee County (County) appeals a Court of Tax Appeals' (COTA) order valuing a shopping center (property) in Topeka owned by California Crossing, L.L.C. (Taxpayer) for $3,790,000 for ad valorem tax purposes for the tax year 2007.
The County argues that COTA erred when it adopted the Taxpayer's appraised value which removed the “leased fee interest” in the property. The County also maintains the court erred by finding the County did not establish rental and vacancy rates despite the County presenting a benchmark study which included the information and testimony from the County's appraiser as to how the benchmark study was used to establish the rates.
Factual and Procedural Background
The property in issue in this appeal is a 37–year–old shopping center located at the intersection of 29th and California in southeast Topeka.
The County, using the income approach of valuation had assigned values to the property of $3,380,550 and $3,524,650 respectively for January 1, 2005, and 2006. The County's initial valuation for 2007 of $6,814,000 precipitated an appeal by the Taxpayer, first to an unsatisfactory informal hearing with the County appraiser and then to COTA.
In describing the property in its order, COTA stated:
“The subject property was constructed in the early 1970s and was originally designed as an ‘L’ shaped shopping center with two large anchor tenant spaces at each end, an interior mall at the southeast elbow, and parking at the front and back of the property. The subject property also contains four free standing improved pad sites; however, the improvements situated upon one pad are owned by Columbian Bank subject to a ground lease. The original design of the subject property allowed access to the interior mall from the front and back of the property. The property was subsequently reconfigured to add approximately 10,000 square feet to the original structure at the elbow, leaving the interior mall inaccessible from the front.
“The interior mall is largely unfinished with no floor covering or ceilings. The subject property has bay depths of approximately 125 feet. Some of the small retail suites have interior partitions separating the front from the back.”
By the time COTA heard the matter on November 9, 2009, the County had further established a 2008 valuation of $6,814,800 which Taxpayer had also appealed and both appeals were consolidated into a single hearing upon the agreement of the parties. However, in this opinion we deal only with the appeal relating to the 2007 valuation.
At the hearing before COTA, the County stipulated it had the burden of proving the validity and correctness of the 2007 value. See K.S.A.2011 Supp. 79–1609.
Testimony Before the Court of Tax Appeals
Shawnee County presented one witness, David Meyer, a real estate property specialist in the County appraiser's office. Meyer, who had not initially appraised the property, modified the 2007 income approach and opined $6,644,700 as the fair market value of the fee simple interest in the property for both 2007 and 2008. Meyer utilized the income, vacancy, and expense rates from the County's 2007 and 2008 benchmark studies to calculate the income approach. Meyer described in detail the decisions he made in regard to rental rates, vacancy and collection loss percentages, expense rates, and capitalization rates from the benchmark studies he used to value the property under the income approach.
Meyer testified that the difference between the 2006 and 2007 value of the property was the increase in occupancy from 50% to 80% because the property leased up an additional 48,895 square feet of previously vacant space to three quality tenants. He admitted that although the property was 50% vacant, the County had used a benchmark rate of 27% in 2005–2006 and even with the property showing an actual vacancy rate of 20% in 2007 and 2008, he had utilized a 12% vacancy rate for both years.
Meyer opined that the effect of the additional space being leased caused the County to increase the property investment class from a D to a C for 2007 and 2008.
Meyer admitted the County did not have a mass appraisal program for a sales comparison approach but provided an analysis of various sales as a check on the value reached by the income approach. He indicated a value of $38 per square foot or $6,717,868 for the subject property based on another grocery store anchored strip center in north Topeka that he deemed comparable and had sold for $5,300,000 ($41.62 per square foot) in January 2007. Meyer admitted some of his comparables were smaller and of higher quality but he had not made adjustments based on these factors.
On cross-examination, Meyer testified to reallocation of 94,552 square feet between in-live retail space and the southeast corner mall space. The size differential he utilized was 8,188 square feet larger than shown on the rent roll, and he did not adjust his appraisal for this fact.
Meyer also admitted he reallocated 34,815 square feet to the interior mall and assigned a rent of $2 per square foot, an expense rate of $.40 per square foot, and a vacancy rate of 10% even though this interior mall space was vacant on January 1, 2007, and had been vacant for a period of years.
There was no adjustment for economic or functional obsolescence in the County's 2007 income approach which assumed all the subject property was in rentable condition. It clearly was not, and there was evidence the cost would have exceeded $300,000 to place the interior mall space in condition so it could be leased.
Meyer presented evidence that the Taxpayer had listed the property for sale in March 2006 for $5,960,000 and in October 2006 for $8,645,000 but the property had not sold for either price.
The Taxpayer presented two witnesses, Steve Weiser, the former property manager, and Tom Slack, an appraiser who valued the property for the Taxpayer.
Weiser explained why the subject property was not all in a rentable condition with the interior mall space lacking floor coverings and ceilings. He further testified as to the subject property's 125–foot bay depth as being an additional example of obsolescence because modern shopping centers' bay depths range from 55 to 70 feet. Weiser also testified he had remeasured the property and confirmed that 168,598 square feet as shown on the Taxpayer's 2007 rent roll accurately reflected the property's leasable area.
Slack appraised the subject property in compliance with USPAP Standard Rule 2 and testified on behalf of the Taxpayer. Slack testified he performed the three traditional approaches to value: cost, sales comparison, and income. Although his cost analysis resulted in a value comparable to his income approach, he opined that the age of the property and its need for improvements made cost an unreliable indicator of value.
Slack's sales comparison approach analyzed five Topeka area sales. He adjusted the sales for factors such as age, design, size, location, and desirability. This approach indicated a value of $23 per square foot or $3,960,000. Slack noted there were weaknesses in the sales comparison approach. He opined that leased fee sales had been involved which did not accurately reflect fee simple value. Further, the properties were generally smaller and superior in design to the subject property.
Slack principally relied on the income capitalization approach as it is the method sellers and buyers of income property usually utilize in determining fair market value in an arm's length transaction. He did not use the County's benchmark study but rather researched the market for comparable sized tenant spaces. He divided the subject's leasable space into small shop space, space accessible from on the back of the center, anchor space, and junior anchor space. Slack placed emphasis on the property's recently signed leases as indicative of current market rates in southeast Topeka. He compared the property to other lease rates of similar properties in northeast Kansas and northwest Missouri.
Slack determined market rental rates of $3.75 per square foot triple net for the large in-line suites, $3 per square foot gross for the large backside suites (former mall space), $9 per square foot triple net for the small in-line suites, $3 per square foot gross for the small backside areas, and $9 per square foot triple net for the pad site area. Utilizing these rates, he computed potential gross rent to be $728,766.
Slack utilized market vacancy rate of 12% and a 2% credit loss rate for a total vacancy and collection rate of 14% based on this survey of market vacancy rates in southeast Topeka. To determine market expenses, Slack utilized the property's actual expenses and reviewed published expense rates from a national publication. He determined expenses were $1.70 per square foot, slightly less than the subject property's actual 2006 expenses of $1.76 per square foot. These amounts were subtracted from potential gross rent. Common area maintenance reimbursements by tenant of $93,142 was added back in which resulted in net operating income (NOI) of $471,809.
To determine a capitalization rate, Slack utilized a base rate of 10% from his market analysis and added to this 0.98% to recognize that Taxpayer was responsible for payment of real estate taxes on vacant space.
Using all of the above stated parameters, Slack determined a value of $4,295,772 with a stabilized occupancy of 88%. Slack adjusted this value to reflect that the property was actually operating at 80% occupancy. Slack made deductions for lost income, leasing commissions, and deferred maintenance to result in an indicated value of $3,910,000. Because this value reflected a Columbian Bank improvement of $120,000 which the Taxpayer did not own, his final opinion of value without the bank improvement was $3,790,000.
Court of Tax Appeals Order
COTA issued its order on April 6, 2011. The court found the cost approach to be an unreliable indicator of value and further found the County's sales approach to be of limited probative value in view of the fact the subject property has a number of unique characteristics.
COTA agreed with both experts that the income approach was the best method for appraising the property considering its functional obsolescence and the fact that the property would be bought and sold based on its income-producing ability.
The court noted the County relied on its benchmark study for its income approach parameters for both years while the Taxpayer's expert performed a more detailed analysis of the southeast Topeka market to determine how the subject property performed relative to other properties. COTA further noted the County did not present evidence of current leases from comparable properties to support its large tenant rental rates while Slack had researched rental rates of other comparable large tenant spaces both inside and outside the Topeka market.
The COTA opinion noted that while the property is currently 80% leased, it has for years experienced difficulty in obtaining tenants. COTA specifically found:
“Given this undisputed evidence, the County's vacancy rates for the discount store and interior mall space are without support. Slack's stabilized occupancy of 88% with a rent loss adjustment and an allowance for leasing commissions provides a better basis for estimating the actual cost of chronic vacancy to the property.”
COTA also found Slack's method for determining operating expenses more reliable than the County's. The court found the County's expenses evidence had little “nexus to the specific attributes of the property,” being derived from a wide expense range provided from the benchmark study.
Both parties determined a 10% base capitalization rate was proper, but COTA approved Slack's inclusion of a .98% effective tax rate to address the gross leases and vacant space. The 10.98% cap rate was found to be reasonable and specific to the issues directly affecting the subject property.
Based on the foregoing, the COTA majority found the Slack appraisal to be the best indicator of value for the 2007 tax year and held the subject property's 2007 appraised value to be $3,790,000.
COTA Chief Judge Bruce F. Larkin dissented, stating he found substantial credible evidence supports a value substantially greater than that requested by the Taxpayer. The dissent did not appear to specify the value which should have been determined and concluded:
“I readily acknowledge the County's valuation was flawed as it did not include warranted appraisal adjustments to address the subject property's overall vacancy rate and functionally obsolete interior mall space. However, such adjustments, if properly implemented, would not result in the minimal value requested by the Taxpayer. For these reasons, I respectfully dissent from the majority decision in these matters.”
The County filed a motion for reconsideration with COTA which was denied.
The County appealed and now raises the two issues that were earlier stated.
Analysis
Was the County's First Argument Properly Raised Before COTA?
The County's first issue on appeal is that COTA erred when it adopted a value for the property in which the appraiser removed the “leased fee interest” in the property. The County contends that Kansas law requires real property to be valued at fair market value and such value includes the leased fee interest in the property.
Taxpayer counters this contention by stating that COTA complied with the statutory requirements by finding fair market value in money of the fee simple interest in the subject property. Taxpayer further contends the County's first issue was not raised at all in the County's petition for reconsideration.
The County replied that it was inherent in its argument that the value COTA adopted did not represent the fair market value of the Taxpayer's property. In support of this contention, the County noted that its motion for reconsideration specifically cited the testimony of both of the Taxpayer's witnesses in which they admitted that the property would not have been sold for the value as opined by Slack. The County concludes the issue is preserved because the only explanation for the COTA found valuation was its acceptance of Slack's testimony that the leased fee value should be subtracted from the fair market value of the property.
Under the provisions of the Kansas Judicial Review Act (KJRA), K.S.A. 77–601 et seq. , when the decision of an administrative agency is appealed, K.S.A.2011 Supp. 77–617 limits review to issues raised before the agency (with several exceptions not applicable here). Further, K.S.A.2011 Supp. 77–618 limits judicial review of disputed facts to the agency record (again with exceptions not applicable here). See Kingsley v. Kansas Dept. of Revenue, 288 Kan. 390, 411–13, 204 P.3d 562 (2009); Zorn v. Kansas Dept. of Revenue, 24 Kan.App.2d 749, 750–52, 953 P.2d 1053 (1998).
Our review of the motion to reconsider concludes that while the leased fee interest is very briefly mentioned in arguing that Slack's comparable sales analysis was not supported by substantial evidence, it was not a part of the County's argument before COTA as to the fair market value of the property as is argued on appeal.
The term “leased fee interest” was recently defined by our court in In re Equalization Appeal of Prieb Properties, L.L.C., 47 Kan.App.2d 122, Syl. ¶ 5, 275 P.3d 56 (2012), “as the ownership interest held by the lessor, which includes the right to contract rent specified in the lease plus the reversionary right when the lease expires.” But, in our case, as well as in Prieb Properties, it has been clearly recognized, held, and agreed that “[f]or purposes of ad valorem taxation, Kansas law requires the valuation of the fee simple estate and not the leased fee interest.” Prieb Properties, 47 Kan.App.2d 122, Syl. ¶ 6.
We might well conclude that the Taxpayer is correct that this issue is not properly before us. But, the County makes an interesting argument that COTA erred as a matter of law in adopting the Taxpayer's expert's opinion as the value of the property (a contention to which we do not agree). We will consign this issue further. Before doing so, it is necessary to set forth certain principles of our standard of review and applicable governing statutory provisions.
Standards of Review
Judicial review of rulings of COTA is governed by K.S.A.2011 Supp. 77–621. For purposes of this appeal, this statute requires us to grant relief if (1) the agency has erroneously interpreted or applied the law, K.S.A.2011 Supp. 77–621(c)(4); (2) the agency has engaged in unlawful procedure or has failed to follow prescribed procedure, K.S.A.2011 Supp. 77–621(c)(5); (3) the agency action is based on a determination of fact, made or implied by the agency, that is not supported to the appropriate standard of proof by evidence that is substantial when viewed in light of the record as a whole, K.S.A.2011 Supp. 77–621(c)(7); and (4) the agency action is otherwise unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious, K.S.A.2011 Supp. 77–621(c)(8).
As we earlier said, the County bore the burden of proof before COTA pursuant to K.S.A.2011 Supp. 79–1609. And, on appeal of a COTA decision, the burden of proving the invalidity of the agency action is also on the County as it is the party asserting the invalidity. K.S.A.2011 Supp. 77–621(a)(1).
When construing tax statutes, imposition provisions are considered penal in nature and must be construed strictly in favor of the Taxpayer. In re Tax Appeal of Harbour Brothers Constr. Co., 256 Kan. 216, 223, 883 P.2d 1194 (1994). Interpretation of a statute is a question of law over which appellate courts have unlimited review. Unruh v. Purina Mills, 289 Kan. 1185, 1193, 221 P.3d 1130 (2009). In making our unlimited review of a Kansas statute, deference is no longer being given to the agency's interpretation. See Ft. Hays St. Univ. v. University Ch. Am. Ass'n of Univ. Profs, 290 Kan. 446, Syl. ¶ 2, 228 P.3d 403 (2010). This ruling has been specifically applied to decisions of COTA in In re Tax Exemption Application of Kouri Place, 44 Kan.App.2d 467, 472, 239 P.3d 96 (2010).
To the extent that issues are raised herein concerning the existence of substantial competent evidence to support an agency's findings, our court in Herrera–Gallegos v. H & H Delivery Service, Inc., 42 Kan.App.2d 360, Syl. ¶¶ 1, 2, 3, 212 P.3d 239 (2009), stated:
“Under the Kansas Judicial Review Act, K.S.A. 77–601 et seq. , an appellate court reviews an agency's factual findings to see whether substantial evidence supports them in light of the whole record, considering evidence both supporting and detracting from the agency's findings. This substantial-evidence standard evaluates the reasonableness of an agency's conclusion in terms of the evidence. Substantial evidence is such evidence as a reasonable person would accept as sufficient to support a conclusion.
“If a hearing officer has made credibility determinations regarding a witness who appeared in person before that hearing officer, the appellate court must consider any credibility determinations made by the hearing officer. If an agency head disagrees with those credibility determinations, that agency head should give reasons for disagreeing, and the appellate court would need to consider those reasons on appeal as well.
“The appellate courts do not reweigh the evidence or engage in de novo review of an agency's factual findings. But the appellate court must consider all of the evidence—including evidence that detracts from an agency's factual findings—when assessing whether the evidence is substantial enough to support those findings. So the appellate court must determine whether the evidence supporting the agency's decision has been so undermined by cross-examination or other evidence that it is insufficient to support the agency's conclusion.”
Governing statutory provisions
All real and personal property in Kansas is subject to taxation on a uniform and equal basis unless specifically exempted. Kan. Const., art. 11, § 1(a) (2011 Supp.). Property is to be appraised at fair market value as of January 1 of each taxable year.
Each parcel of nonagricultural “real property shall be appraised at its fair market value in money.” K.S.A. 79–501. The term “fair market value” means “the amount in terms of money that a well informed buyer is justified in paying and a well informed seller is justified in accepting the property in an open and competitive market, assuming the parties are acting without undue compulsion.” K.S.A.2011 Supp. 79–503a. This statute also describes the following factors that are to be considered in determining fair market value.
“Sales in and of themselves shall not be the sole criteria of fair market value but shall be used in connection with cost, income and other factors including but not by way of exclusion:
“(a) The proper classification of lands and improvements;
“(b) the size thereof;
“(c) the effect of location on value;
“(d) depreciation, including physical deterioration or functional, economic or social obsolescence;
“(e) cost of reproduction of improvements;
“(f) productivity taking into account all restrictions imposed by the state or federal government and local governing bodies, including, but not limited to ...;
“(g) earning capacity as indicated by lease price, by capitalization of net income or by absorption or sell-out period;
“(h) rental or reasonable rental values or rental values restricted by the state or federal government or local governing bodies, including, but not limited to, restrictions on property rented or leased to low income individuals and families, as authorized by section 42 of the federal internal revenue code of 1986, as amended;
“(i) sale value on open market with due allowance to abnormal inflationary factors influencing such values;
“(j) restrictions or requirements imposed upon the use of real estate by the state or federal government or local governing bodies, including zoning and planning boards or commissions, and including, but not limited to ...;
“(k) comparison with values of other property of known or recognized value. The assessment-sales ratio study shall not be used as an appraisal for appraisal purposes.
“The appraisal process utilized in the valuation of all real and tangible personal property for ad valorem tax purposes shall conform to generally accepted appraisal procedures which are adaptable to mass appraisal and consistent with the definition of fair market value unless otherwise specified by law.” K.S.A.2011 Supp. 79–503a.
COTA Complied with Statutory Requirements in Finding Fair Market Value of the Fee Simple Interest in the Subject Property
Kansas law is clear that the interest to be valued for property tax purposes is the fee simple interest in the property. Prieb Properties most recently defined the ownership of the fee simple interest as “equivalent to ownership of the complete bundle of property rights that can be privately owned.” 47 Kan.App.2d 122, Syl. ¶ 5.
Both the County and Taxpayer's appraisers agreed that the fee simple interest was to be appraised. Both ultimately relied on the income approach to determine the fee simple interest, and COTA agreed that it was the best method.
The County's argument that the Taxpayer's expert improperly removed the “leased fee interest” which resulted in a conclusion that did not achieve fair market value is without support and is not shown by the record on appeal. The only mention in the record which related to a “leased fee interest” was Slack's answer that “I would think [it] would have been more than $3,950,000” when asked if the “leased fee estate” would as of January 1, 2007, have been more than $3,950,000. This exchange in no manner supports the County's arguments on appeal that the fee simple interest was determined in violation of Kansas law.
A review of COTA's decision regarding the 2007 valuation reveals it simply found the Taxpayer's appraisal more specific and detailed to the property in question. COTA even noted that for his income approach, “Slack placed particular emphasis on the subject property's recently signed leases, which he concluded were reflective of market rental rates.” Nowhere in the COTA decision is there any mention of leaving out the “leased fee interest” to determine fair market value.
It is clear from the record that Taxpayer's appraiser did not subtract any leasehold interest in arriving at his estimate of fair market fee simple value of the property. COTA followed Kansas law when it adopted Taxpayer's valuation of the fee simple interest of the subject property as of January 1, 2007. The County's first issue on appeal is without merit.
The COTA 2007 Valuation Decision was Supported by Substantial Competent Evidence
The County also contends COTA erred when it adopted Slack's appraisal for 2007 because it was an opinion which was not supported by substantial evidence.
Essentially, the County argues COTA should be reversed under K.S.A.2011 Supp. 77–621(c)(7) which allows relief from an agency decision when
“[it] is based on a determination of fact, made or implied by the agency, that is not supported to the appropriate standard of proof by evidence that is substantial when viewed in light of the record as a whole, which includes the agency record for judicial review, supplemented by any additional evidence received by the court under this act.”
As we earlier said, substantial competent evidence possesses both relevance and substance and provides a substantial basis of fact from which the issues can be reasonably determined. Frick Farm Properties v. Kansas Dept. of Agriculture, 289 Kan. 690, 709, 216 P.3d 170 (2009).
The Taxpayer, more convincingly, contends (1) there was substantial evidence to support the basic assumptions upon which Slack's opinion of value was based, (2) the County's benchmark study was flawed as it related to the property in issue, and (3) COTA was clearly justified in finding Slack's testimony was much more specific and applicable to the issues of the value of an aging and unique property. We agree with each of the Taxpayer's contentions.
COTA was clearly justified, both factually and legally, in not blindly adopting the County's benchmark. As the Taxpayer points out, COTA is not required to adhere to the values of any benchmark or mass appraisal study. Rather, the property must be valued according to the nonexclusive list of factors in K.S.A. 79–503a and its other directives. In Garvey Grain, Inc. v. MacDonald, 203 Kan. 1, 14–15, 453 P.2d 59 (1969), the Kansas Supreme Court determined that the property valuation assessment schedule used in the valuation of grain elevators failed to account for all the pertinent factors in K.S.A. 79–503a which resulted in a gross overvaluation of the property. The assessment was invalidated, clearly indicating that an assessment schedule or in this case, a benchmark study does not automatically supersede consideration of the factors found in K.S.A. 79–503a. Similarly, in In re Tax Appeal of Director of Property Valuation, 14 Kan.App.2d 348, 352, 791 P.2d 1338 (1989), a panel of this court found that the county appraiser was not required to strictly adhere to the values shown in a personal property appraisal guidelines in order to achieve fair market value.
Further, the County's arguments that COTA erroneously disregarded factors utilized to determine values from the benchmark study are without support.
COTA's decision correctly pointed out that the County relied on a benchmark study with little relevance to the property's specific attributes while Slack performed a more detailed analysis of the specific market area and the specific property. The County takes issue with COTA's statement that the “County did not present evidence of current leases from comparable properties to support its large tenant rental rate.” The County takes its objection out of context. The above statement followed the comment about Slack's analysis being more detailed and specific to the property being appraised. The statement in COTA's decision that the County did not support its rental rate with specific evidence is correct and supports COTA's findings and decision.
The County again takes issue with the COTA statement that its vacancy rates for the discount store and interior mall space were without support. The record reflects the County appraiser used vacancy rates pulled from the benchmark study which indicated a vacancy rate of 5 to 10% and ultimately used a 10% rate for the interior mall space. The evidence showed the interior mall space had been vacant for years, the property had an overall vacancy rate of 50% in past years, and the recent addition of three new lessees had only lowered the vacancy rate to 20%, its best in years. Slack's estimate accounted for the property's long-term history and trouble in obtaining tenants and assessed an occupancy of 88% which he adjusted to the property's actual 20% vacancy rate. His assessment was more specific, tailored to the property, and supported by the evidence, contrary to the County's contention.
The same analysis we have previously made likewise applies to the County's argument against the expense evidence and capitalization rate utilized by Slack. The COTA opinion correctly held the County's expense evidence in its benchmark study had little nexus to the specific property which was composed of “diverse tenant spaces and has both net and gross lease types.” The evidence presented clearly justified COTA finding that “Taxpayer's expense evidence more reliable because it is narrowly tailored to the specific property.”
Both parties determined a basic 10% capitalization rate, but Slack added a .98% effective tax rate to address the gross leases and vacant space. This was correctly found by COTA to be reasonable and specific to the property.
We specifically reject the County's argument that Slack's opinion of value was not supported by substantial evidence because it was in part based on confidential information from comparable properties. This argument is without merit as the County's benchmark study does not identify the actual properties and is essentially confidential as well. We also point out that Slack's expenses were in part derived from the actual experience of the subject property.
We further reject the County's basic argument that its benchmark study should automatically be assumed to be supported by substantial evidence and cannot be ignored in favor of a more tailored assessment using values and a multitude of information outside the benchmark. As we earlier pointed out, rigid adherence to a value schedule or benchmark study is not required.
Slack's opinion relied on all of the information he testified to. It was based on substantial competent evidence and correctly both legally and factually adopted by COTA. We hold that COTA's decision was supported by substantial competent evidence. COTA's assessment of the property's value for 2007 of $3,790,000 is affirmed.