In re Englehart

9 Citing cases

  1. Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Rensin (In re Rensin)

    597 B.R. 177 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2018)   Cited 5 times

    On the other hand, the Tenth Circuit has held that the term "willful" in subsection (a)(6) requires the court to determine whether the defendant knew or believed the act was substantially certain to result in injury, a subjective standard. In re Englehart, 229 F.3d 1163. Where proof of the defendant's knowledge with regard to substantial certainty is required, the defendant is unlikely to admit that he or she acted with actual knowledge an injury would result.

  2. Stewart Tilghman Fox & Bianchi, P.A. v. Kane (In re Kane)

    Case No. 09-15557-EPK (Bankr. S.D. Fla. May. 10, 2012)

    On the other hand, the Tenth Circuit has held that the term "willful" in subsection (a)(6) requires the court to determine whether the defendant knew or believed the act was substantially certain to result in injury, a subjective standard. In re Englehart, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 22754. Where proof of the defendant's knowledge with regard to substantial certainty is required, the defendant is unlikely to admit that he or she acted with actual knowledge an injury would result.

  3. In re Gordon

    Case No. 03-12444 ABC, Adversary No. 03-1330 HRT (Bankr. D. Colo. Dec. 1, 2003)   Cited 23 times

    Based upon the above N.L.R.B. findings, and using a legal standard identical to the standard dictated by the Tenth Circuit cases, the Piper court found the debt at issue to be nondischargeable. In re Branoff, 2000 WL 1701366, 165 LRRM 2757 (Bankr. E.D. Mich 2000), is also a post- Kawaauhau case. It was decided in a bankruptcy court in the Sixth Circuit which adheres to the same legal standard for § 523(a)(6) cases as that adopted by the Tenth Circuit. See, In re Englehart, 229 F.3d 1163, 2000 WL 1275614 at **2 (citing Markowitz v. Campbell ( In re Markowitz), 190 F.3d 455, 465 n. 10 (6th Cir. 1999)). There, the bankruptcy court also granted summary judgment to the N.L.R.B. The opinion sets forth in detail the factual findings of the prior action, focusing on the debtor's threats and harassment of employees over potential interest in unionizing, and the debtor's actions in closing one business and opening another to evade potential union obligations.

  4. In re Scott

    294 B.R. 620 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 2003)   Cited 25 times
    Separating the same three elements into five

    Emphasis is placed under this approach on the debtor's knowledge or belief concerning the consequences of his or her actions. In re Englehart, 2000 WL 1275614 at *2. According to the so-called objective approach, an injury is willful for purposes of § 5323(a)(6) only if the debtor subjectively intended to cause injury or there was an objective substantial certainty of injury as a consequence of his or her actions. See Matter of Miller, 156 F.3d 598, 604 (5th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1016, 119 S.Ct. 1249, 143 L.Ed.2d 347 (1999).

  5. Ally Fin. Inc. v. Matthew (In re Matthew)

    Case No. 15-12605 (Bankr. D. Kan. Jul. 13, 2016)   Cited 1 times

    See Mitsubishi Motors Credit of America, Inc. v. Longley (In re Longley), 235 B.R. 651, 657 (10th Cir. BAP 1999) (intent to injure may be established by direct or indirect evidence; citing Restatement (Second) of Torts §8A, intended consequences includes those that are substantially certain to result from the act). See also Via Christi Regional Medical Ctr. v. Englehart (In re Englehart), 229 F.3d 1163 [Table], 2000 WL 1275614 (10th Cir. 2000) (willful and malicious injury turns on debtor's subjective intent or state of mind - he must have wished to cause injury or believed it was substantially certain to occur); In re Schupbach, 500 B.R. 22, 35 (Bankr. D. Kan. 2013). See Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b).

  6. IN RE BURD

    Case No. 05-19991-R, Adv. No. 06-01133-R (Bankr. N.D. Okla. Aug. 17, 2007)   Cited 3 times

    Geiger, 523 U.S. at 61-62, quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A, Comment a (1964) (emphasis in original). Cited with approval in Via Christi Reg'l Med. Ctr. v. Englehart (In re Englehart), 229 F.3d 1163 (Table), 2000 WL 1275614, at *3 (10th Cir. 2000) (unpublished opinion) (approving subjective formulation of the substantial certainty test in Budig and Mitsubishi Motors Credit of America, Inc. v. Longley (In re Longley), 235 B.R. 651 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 1999) and stating that "the `willful and malicious injury' exception to dischargeability in § 523(a)(6) turns on the state of mind of the debtor, who must have wished to cause injury or at least believed it was substantially certain to occur."). Although Geiger defined "willful," it did not define "malicious."

  7. In re McDonald

    Case No. 05-30016-R, Adv. No. 06-01027-R (Bankr. N.D. Okla. Aug. 4, 2006)

    Geiger, 523 U.S. at 61-62, quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A, COMMENT A (1964) (emphasis in original). Cited with approval in Via Christi Reg'l Med. Ctr. v. Englehart (In re Englehart), 229 F.3d 1163 (Table), 2000 WL 1275614, at *3 (10th Cir. 2000) (unpublished opinion) (approving subjective formulation of the substantial certainty test in Budig and Mitsubishi Motors Credit of America, Inc. v. Longley (In re Longley), 235 B.R. 651 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 1999) and stating that "the `willful and malicious injury' exception to dischargeability in § 523(a)(6) turns on the state of mind of the debtor, who must have wished to cause injury or at least believed it was substantially certain to occur."). Although Geiger defined "willful," it did not define "malicious.

  8. In re Conner

    302 B.R. 509 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 2003)   Cited 24 times
    Ruling on summary judgment that finding of “vexatious” conduct under section 2503 met standard under § 523

    Emphasis is placed under this approach on the assessment of the finder of fact of the likelihood of injury instead of the debtor's knowledge or belief. In re Englehart, 2000 WL 1275614 at *3.          Regardless of which of these approaches we adopt here , we conclude from the evidence presented by plaintiffs in support of their motion for summary judgment in this adversary action that the debt for counsel fees and expenses debtors owe to plaintiffs was for a willful and malicious injury to plaintiffs or their property.

  9. Jones v. Jernigan

    29 N.M. 399 (N.M. 1924)   Cited 16 times

    Since the same damages would have been assessed by the application of the erroneous rule, defendants were not prejudiced by the error, and the judgment of the court below should not be reversed on this error alone. Lockhart v. Wills, 9 N. M. 344, 54 Pac. 336; In re Englehart, 17 N. M. 304, 128 Pac. 67, 45 L.R.A. (N. S) 237, Ann. Cas. 1915A, 54; Goldenberg v. Law, 17 N. M. 546, 131 Pac. 499; Colbert v. Journal Publishing Co., 19 N. M. 156, 142 Pac. 146; Trauer v. Meyers, 19 N. M. 490, 147 Pac. 458. See, also, Redman v. Adams, supra. However, if it again becomes necessary to assess damages, the correct measure should be applied.