Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County No. SJ11197A-B, Ernest Borunda, Judge. (Retired Judge of the San Diego S.Ct. assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to art. VI, § 6 of the Cal. Const.)
McCONNELL, P. J.
The San Diego County Health and Human Services Agency (Agency) appeals a juvenile court order, made at a six-month review hearing, continuing previously ordered reunification services for E.G. and L.G., the parents of dependent minors Elizabeth G. and K.G. (together the minors). Agency contends the court erred by continuing reunification services for L.G. despite finding he had failed to participate in any aspect of his reunification plan. Agency further contends the court erred by continuing E.G.'s services because: (1) the court's decision was based on improperly admitted evidence; and (2) the evidence at the six-month review hearing did not support a finding E.G. made substantive progress with the requirements of her case plan. Because the issues presented are moot, we dismiss the appeal.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In December 2003 one-year-old Elizabeth and two-month-old K.G. became dependents of the juvenile court and were removed from parental custody based on findings K.G. sustained nonaccidental leg fractures and bruising while in the care of her parents. During the reunification period, E.G. was arrested after confessing to military personnel that she caused K.G.'s injuries and the death of Elizabeth's twin brother Juan in December 2002.
The original autopsy report for Juan listed the cause of death as probable sudden infant death syndrome (SIDS). An amended coroner's report and amended autopsy report listed Juan's death as a homicide from smothering.
In February 2006 the court awarded L.G. sole physical and legal custody of the minors, ordered supervised visits for E.G. and terminated jurisdiction. After a military court acquitted E.G. of charges related to K.G.'s injuries and Juan's death, E.G. claimed her confession had been coerced.
Despite the previous court order prohibiting unsupervised contact, E.G. was living with the minors. Agency filed petitions in the juvenile court alleging L.G. failed to protect the minors and reiterating E.G. admitted causing K.G.'s injuries and Juan's death. The court declared the minors dependents, placed them in foster care and ordered reunification services for the parents. In an unpublished opinion, this court affirmed the jurisdictional and dispositional orders. (In re Elizabeth G. (Oct. 24, 2007, D050242).)
In its report for the six-month review hearing, Agency recommended the court terminate services for both parents. E.G. was participating in services but seemed to be merely "going through the motions." L.G., who had moved to Texas, had not maintained contact with the social worker and provided no information as to his participation in services. He had not visited the minors in a year and telephoned them only three times.
Evidence presented at the six-month review hearing showed L.G. had made no progress whatsoever with his service plan. E.G. had completed several parenting classes and an anger management class, showing motivation and interest. She also participated in a psychological evaluation and individual therapy. However, E.G. continued to deny causing Juan's death and K.G.'s injuries. The social worker believed E.G. had not made substantive progress with her service plan, and she would not benefit from further therapy.
The court found L.G. had not participated in services. The court further found E.G. participated regularly in services and made substantive progress in court-ordered treatment programs.
Counsel for L.G. then argued the court was required to continue services for L.G. if services were continued for E.G. and no Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 hearing was set. Minors' counsel disagreed, arguing the court had discretion to terminate services for one parent while continuing services for the other parent. Agency submitted on the issue, explaining that if the court continued services for L.G., those services would consist of a letter once a month asking L.G. if he wanted to terminate reunification efforts. The court decided to handle the matter "pragmatically" by continuing services for both parents to the 12-month date.
DISCUSSION
Agency contends the court erred by continuing services to both parents at the six-month review hearing. Agency also seeks our guidance on whether the court was required to continue previously offered reunification services to L.G. based solely on ongoing reunification efforts for E.G., even though L.G. failed to participate in any aspect of his reunification plan. However, because these issues are now moot, we need not address them.
An appellate court will not review questions which are moot and only of academic importance, nor will it determine abstract questions of law at the request of a party who shows no substantial rights can be affected by the decision either way. (Keefer v. Keefer (1939) 31 Cal.App.2d 335, 337.) The duty of an appellate court is to decide actual controversies and not to give opinions on moot questions or abstract propositions, or to declare principles of law that cannot affect the matter at issue in the case before it. (In re Audrey D. (1979) 100 Cal.App.3d 34, 39, fn. 4.)
An appeal becomes moot when, through no fault of the respondent, the occurrence of an event renders it impossible for the appellate court to grant the appellant effective relief. (In re Jessica K. (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 1313, 1315-1316.) A reviewing court may exercise its inherent discretion to resolve an issue rendered moot by subsequent events if the question to be decided is of continuing public importance and is one capable of repetition, yet evading review. (In re Raymond G. (1991) 230 Cal.App.3d 964, 967.) We decide on a case-by-case basis whether subsequent events in a juvenile dependency matter make a case moot and whether our decision would affect the outcome in a subsequent proceeding. (In re Dani R. (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 402, 404-405; In re Dylan T. (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 765, 769.)
Here, whether the court erroneously ordered continued services for the parents to the 12-month date is no longer a " 'live' " controversy because the 12-month date (September 25, 2007) has come and gone, and presumably, Agency provided or offered services to E.G. and L.G. during that review period. (See In re Hirenia C. (1993) 18 Cal.App.4th 504, 518.) Thus, no effective relief regarding the provision of services can be afforded Agency.
Further, during the pendency of the appeal, this court decided the issue Agency asks us to resolve. (In re Jesse W. (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 49.) Because Agency has received the guidance and clarification it sought, no additional relief can be granted beyond that already obtained. (See In re Jessica K., supra, 79 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1315-1316.)
DISPOSITION
The appeal is dismissed.
WE CONCUR: NARES, J., HALLER, J.