Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Stanislaus County No. 509860, Nancy B. Williamsen, Commissioner.
Teri Ann Kanefield, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
John P. Doering, County Counsel, and Alice E. Mimms, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
OPINION
Before Levy, Acting P.J., Gomes, J., and Hill, J.
S.H. (mother) appeals from an order terminating parental rights (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26) to her son E. She contends the court erred when it did not find that termination would be detrimental to E. because of his relationship with either her or his sister (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i) & (v)). On review, we affirm.
All statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise indicated.
PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL HISTORY
E. was approximately two and a half years old in February 2007 when mother gave birth to her daughter M. Mother used methamphetamines during her pregnancy and tested positive for the drug at M.’s birth. In addition to having an ongoing drug problem, mother failed to care for and protect E. by allowing the maternal grandmother to care for him. The maternal grandmother had an extensive child welfare services history, including domestic violence, sexual and physical molestation, and neglect issues. These circumstances led the Stanislaus County Superior Court to exercise its dependency jurisdiction over both children.
In the meantime, the children were placed in separate foster homes and mother entered a residential treatment program. E.’s separate placement was apparently due to his special needs and challenging behaviors. He was autistic and struggled with some aggressive behavior, intense tantrums, delayed potty training, and limited verbal skills.
In the first two months of foster care and with the benefit of renewed Regional Center services, E.’s troubling behaviors significantly decreased and he made progress in potty training and verbal skills. His foster parents have since been identified as his prospective adoptive parents.
Mother also made progress in dealing with her problems. In time, respondent Stanislaus County Community Services Agency (agency) placed the infant M. in mother’s care at her residential treatment program. Mother was not yet prepared, however, to parent both her daughter and E.
Consequently, in May 2007, the court adjudged E. a dependent child, removed him from parental custody and ordered reunification services for mother. By contrast, the court permitted the infant M. to remain in mother’s care subject to family maintenance services.
Over the summer of 2007, a Regional Center services coordinator reported E. made incredible progress in his psychological and educational skills since an assessment one year earlier. The child also started overnight visits with mother. In late October 2007, after mother and her daughter moved into a clean and sober living program, E. began a trial visit with mother.
Although E. had a difficult time adjusting to his new life with mother and she had a difficult time disciplining him, the trial visit continued. Mother was very loving and patient with her children, yet passive with E. She tried to keep him calm to avoid an outburst, rather than use effective parenting techniques to help him. As a result, it was E. who was in control of the situation. In any event, the court ordered the return of E. to mother’s custody subject to family maintenance services in February 2008.
However, starting in the spring of 2008, mother’s progress began to decline. She stopped participating in domestic violence and individual counseling as well as her aftercare drug program. In the summer of 2008, she relapsed on methamphetamines and opiates. She also resumed a romantic, but violent, relationship with one of the alleged fathers of her daughter M. Mother’s care of the children was also remiss. At the agency’s urging, mother entered, but quickly left, another residential treatment program. She also would not share her children’s whereabouts with the agency.
In September 2008, the agency located the children and once again detained them. Soon thereafter, E. and his sister were placed with E.’s former foster parents. The agency petitioned (§ 387) that the court’s previous disposition of leaving the children in mother’s custody was no longer effective.
The court, in October 2008, sustained the agency’s supplemental petition under section 387 and removed both children from parental custody. In E.’s case, the court denied mother further reunification services pursuant to this court’s opinion in Carolyn R. v. Superior Court (1995) 41 Cal.App.4th 159, 166-167 (Carolyn R.). The court in turn set a section 366.26 hearing to select and implement a permanent plan for E. It also granted mother’s request for a bonding study between her and E.
In Carolyn R., supra, 41 Cal.App.4th at page 166, this court held that supplemental proceedings under section 387 do not trigger a new period for reunification efforts. Instead, for a child like E., whom the court removed from parental custody more than 12 months earlier, the court was to determine whether there was a substantial probability the child would be returned within 18 months of the date the child was originally removed. (Carolyn R., supra, 41 Cal.App.4th at p. 167.) In E.’s case, the 18-month period was to lapse in less than two weeks’ time of the court’s decision. Mother’s latest treatment program would last another 12 to 18 months.
In the sister M.’s case, the court granted mother reunification services. The court did so apparently because this was the first time the court had removed M. from mother’s custody and mother had made some limited progress towards correcting the causes necessitating the child’s out-of-home placement.
Although the court set E.’s section 366.26 permanency planning hearing for early 2009, the hearing would not commence until June of that year. The delay was attributable in part to a failed attempt between November 2008 and February 2009 at a relative placement for both children. As a result, there was a need to delay the court-ordered bonding study until E. was able to adjust to his new placement. In addition, mother was pregnant again and gave birth at the end of May 2009.
Fortunately for E., his new placement was a familiar setting. It was with his former foster parents. They maintained a relationship and regular contact with E. and his family throughout his dependency.
In the interim, mother and both children had regular weekly visits at First Step, the inpatient perinatal drug treatment program in which mother resided. As of March 2009, mother made sufficient progress that she and her daughter M. began sharing overnight visits. These mother-daughter visits, over time, expanded to weekend visits as mother continued to receive reunification services for her daughter.
Mother also petitioned (§ 388) to modify the court’s earlier order and resume reunification efforts with E. Relevant to this appeal, mother attached to her petition a March 2009 letter from her parent educator at First Step. The letter, in part, described mother’s efforts during visits with E. Mother consistently met E.’s physical and emotional needs. Nevertheless, E. struggled with leaving and mother requested help due to E.’s tantrums or refusal to comply at the end of most visits. The court set an evidentiary hearing on mother’s modification petition in conjunction with the section 366.26 hearing.
Before the hearing, the agency filed a “366.26 WIC Report” including a written bonding study as well as opposition to the mother’s petition. The children’s Court-Appointed Special Advocate (CASA) also submitted a report for E. The court read and considered each of these.
366.26 WIC Report
In its 366.26 WIC Report, the agency recommended the court find E. likely to be adopted and order parental rights terminated. E. was certain to be adopted by his foster parents.
Relevant to this appeal, the 366.26 WIC Report disclosed E.’s behaviors worsened while he was briefly in relative placement. He had negative reactions after mother would speak to him on the phone and after visits. The more she called, the worse his behaviors were. Especially after visits, E. was very defiant as well as aggressive and wet his bed. Limiting mother’s calls helped with E.’s behaviors.
Once E. returned to his former foster parents’ home, he was more stubborn and defiant. However, his behavior was gradually stabilizing and improving with the foster parents’ love and positive discipline.
However, E.’s behavior was still worse after visits and phone contact with mother. Mother was very attentive and loving towards both children during visits. E., meanwhile, tended to be more active and defiant than usual around mother.
After one of their visits, E. was extremely defiant and aggressive with mother and would not permit either her or the agency’s driver to put him (E.) in his car seat. E. jumped inside the agency’s van kicking and screaming “I hate you” to mother. A suggestion that mother and E. exchange goodbyes inside the building, instead of mother accompanying E. to the van, seemed to help.
On another occasion, E. returned from a visit with a set of keys with which he would not part. He stated mother gave him the keys for when they would return together to their old home. The situation made him more defiant and uncooperative. The family’s social worker also confirmed earlier reports from the staff at the mother’s drug treatment program that E. was very defiant and always on the run.
Bonding Study
The bonding study attached to the 366.26 WIC Report concluded it was very clear E.’s primary attachment was to the foster parents and their grandson. By contrast, E.’s attachment to his mother appeared more like an attachment to a well-known relative or good friend.
When E. was first placed with the foster parents in 2007, he was scared of everything. He hid under tables and behind things. He would not sleep in a bed but rather hid under it. He had frequent nightmares and ate voraciously as well as anxiously, as if he were afraid someone would take his food or leave him hungry. Over time, E. became less fearful and significantly attached to the foster parents and their grandson who also lived with them.
E. enjoyed his visits with mother but always wet the bed after visits. While he was described as fretful at leaving mother following visits, he was also fretful when he had to leave the foster mother. There was also a significant deterioration in E.’s behavior once he was returned to mother’s custody in 2008.
E. behaved towards the foster mother as his psychological parent. He called her “Grandma” and “Mommy.” He sought her out first, rather than mother, to meet his needs. His transition back into the foster mother’s home was quick and complete.
E. also called mother “Mommy.” She was very appropriate and affectionate when approached. However, she did little to initiate contact with E.
When mother had to leave their bonding study session, E. said goodbye and quickly returned to play. As the session came to a close, E. cleaned up reluctantly and would have preferred to stay in the room with his foster mother for quite a bit longer.
In the view of Cheryl Carmichael, the psychologist who conducted the bonding study, a permanent plan of adoption with the foster family was in E.’s best interests.
CASA Report
The CASA worker began her April 2009 report with a chronology of events related to mother and the children prior to and since the court appointed CASA in November 2008. Recently, the CASA worker spoke with E.’s teacher and was informed E. acted out negatively on the days following visits with mother. He was more prone to crying and emotional outbursts. The teacher further stated that due to E.’s autism, constant change in his environment was both emotionally and mentally disruptive to him. Change in general was detrimental to autistic children. E. did have difficulty, according to his teacher, if changes were not explained to him beforehand.
The CASA worker also reported that E. had a healthy and appropriate relationship with his sister M. The two children, in her opinion, had a “strong and evident bond.” She also described it as “a tightly knit bond that is to be expected of siblings especially after enduring hardship.” She did not explain how she reached her conclusions.
The CASA worker strongly advocated the court deny mother’s petition for reunification and the children remain together in their current placement. The CASA worker asked the court to consider “the potentially detrimental ramifications of separating these children in the future.” In particular, she believed “separation would invite feelings of resentment and a loss of self worth in E[.]” She did not include a factual basis for her concerns.
For reasons unknown to us, mother relies heavily not on this report of the CASA worker but on the CASA worker’s report prepared in M.’s case. The court took judicial notice of agency reports, specifically an interim review and a six-month review reports in M.’s case prepared after the October 2008 disposition, before ruling in E.’s case. Mother assumes the court also took judicial notice of the CASA worker’s report, which was filed separately in M.’s case. There is nothing in the record to support mother’s assumption. We therefore have not reviewed the CASA worker’s report in M.’s case.
Combined Sections 388 and 366.26 Hearing
Dr. Carmichael, the bonding study psychologist, first testified about how she conducted a bonding study. With a child as young as E. and with his disabilities, she had to compare and contrast what his attachment looked like. This was regardless of behavior and in terms of how he related to multiple people with whom he had contact. Consequently, she assessed E. with both his mother and foster mother present.
Based on all the information Dr. Carmichael gathered, it was clear E. showed the most growth and development during his time spent with the foster parent. Also, documentation from the agency, E.’s school staff, the Regional Center, and his treatment providers demonstrated E. was extremely prone to decline in his developmental status. That happened continually when he was with his mother.
E.’s needs were greater than mother’s ability to meet them. The documentation showed this was historically very clear. The psychologist’s own contact with mother also demonstrated she was passive. Mother could respond to a direct question but she did not initiate. The same thing plagued her parenting effectiveness with E. who had a grave need for active parenting. Dr. Carmichael reiterated that mother’s passive behavior put E. at an extremely high risk for developmental decline.
Kendra Gomez, mother’s parent educator at First Step, testified next. She observed mother interact with E. on 13 different occasions between the fall of 2008 and mother’s graduation from First Step in April 2009. Mother acted in a parental role towards E. and he seemed comfortable around her.
Gomez saw E. spontaneously, yet sporadically, show mother affection. Although Gomez observed a loving relationship, she had seen more affection in other parents and their children. Gomez did not see the same kind of loving bonding relationship between mother and E. that she sometimes saw with other participants in the program.
A handful of times, Gomez also witnessed E. become upset and not want to leave at the end of a visit. He would crawl under a table or play structure. The problem seemed to be E’s difficulty with making a transition. Mother had been counseled to let E. know that the time for visitation would be ending. Then, E. was able to comply. Once he was outside, he appeared to be okay.
Gomez also saw E. with his sister M. There was not much interaction between them at all. M. played with her things while E. played with his.
The agency’s family reunification worker, Rocio Rocha, was the next witness. Rocha confirmed mother consistently visited with E. on a weekly basis since the disposition on the supplemental petition proceedings. M. was also included in these visits. Since mother’s April graduation from First Step, the visits occurred at Laura’s House, a clean and sober home.
Asked to describe the interaction between E. and his sister, Rocha replied “[l]ike any other sibling relationship.” They did things together and did “their own thing.” When M. visited separately with mother, E. would inquire about her. After a day of M. being away, E. would spontaneously ask once about her. When it was explained to E. where his sister was, he was okay.
Mother testified on her own behalf. Before E.’s dependency and during the time he was returned to her custody, she claimed responsibility for feeding and bathing him as well as providing him with clothing. She was also involved in his school. On cross-examination, she conceded she had not consistently provided for E. There were only brief periods when she was able to parent in an appropriate, safe, and stable way.
By contrast, mother acknowledged E. received consistent care during the reunification period he spent in the foster parents’ home. After E. went back to live with mother, she and the children maintained contact with the foster mother who volunteered to help. Mother called the foster mother once a week or every other week for respite help. E. never lost contact with his foster mother. He was happy to go with her. Mother agreed it was good for E. and a safe situation for him to be with the foster mother.
Mother described the interaction between E. and his sister as very loving toward each other. They played with each other. E. seemed excited when his sister was at visits with mother.
Mother also testified about the difficulty E. had in the first part of 2009 when her visits with him came to an end. E. was uncooperative. According to mother, he also asked “[w]hy couldn’t he stay with [her].” Mother admitted E. also said he hated her and never wanted to come back and visit her. After that occasion, the social worker suggested mother say her goodbye in the building, rather than outside at the van. This suggestion apparently helped E. Just a week before the hearing, however, E. again had difficulty leaving after a visit. He threw a tantrum because he wanted to continue playing with the toys.
The court last heard from the foster mother. She testified to caring for both E. and his sister between October and November 2008 and since February 2009. The children got along well and showed affection for each other. She described their relationship as close.
When M. went alone to visit mother, E. would ask where M. was going. When told that M. was going with mother, E. replied M. belonged with his mother. He never asked to see M. while she was with mother nor did he ask how long M. would be gone. He also never said he missed M. He did ask when M. would be back and seemed excited when she returned.
By comparison, E. did not ask about mother or where she was. He never said he wanted to see her.
The foster mother recalled the recent occasion when mother had difficulty getting E. to leave at the end of a visit. It was over toys. The foster mother witnessed E. struggling with mother. He was “really, really angry at her.”
The week before the foster mother’s testimony, M. began a trial visit with mother. The foster mother described E. as “[s]till the same” since this informal change in his sister’s placement. E. did ask once about M. He did not seem sad at all. The foster mother told E. he would have a visit with M. so he knew he was going to see her and he appeared happy.
After closing arguments, the court denied mother’s modification petition. Having found E. was likely to be adopted, the court also terminated parental rights.
The court further ruled mother had not established termination would be detrimental to E. under either the parent/child beneficial relationship exception (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i)) or the sibling relationship exception (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(v)). Mother did regularly visit and maintain a relationship with E. yet, his special needs cried out louder for permanency and stability than was the case with most children. As for the sibling relationship, it was neither that extensive nor primary to E. Although E. seemed happy to see M., he did not seem affected in any way by their separations. The court could not find there would be any harm if there were no future contact between E. and his sister.
DISCUSSION
I. There was No Showing that Termination would be Detrimental to E.
Mother contends the court abused its discretion by not permitting E. to maintain his relationships with her and his sister through a permanent plan of legal guardianship. She assumes the record was clear-cut that E. and she as well as E. and his sister shared such strong and loving relationships that the court should have found termination would be detrimental. In her view, there was insufficient evidence E.’s parental and sibling relationships were not worth preserving. As discussed below, mother overstates the evidence in support of her argument and ignores the lack of any affirmative showing that termination would be detrimental to E.
Section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B) acknowledges termination may be detrimental to a dependent child under specifically-designated and compelling circumstances. (In re Celine R. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 45, 53.) One of those circumstances is when a parent has maintained regular visitation and contact and the child would benefit from continuing the relationship to such a degree that the child would be greatly harmed by termination. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i); In re Autumn H. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 567, 575; “beneficial relationship exception.”) Another of those exceptional circumstances is where termination would cause a substantial interference with the sibling relationship. If so, the trial court must consider the nature of the sibling relationship and go on to balance any benefit, emotional or otherwise, the child would obtain from ongoing contact with the sibling against the benefit of legal permanence the child would obtain through adoption. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(v); see In re L.Y.L (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 942, 949; “sibling relationship exception.”.)
A finding that termination would not be detrimental, however, is not a prerequisite to the termination of parental rights. (In re Jasmine D. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1339, 1347.) The statutory presumption is that termination and permanency through adoption is in the child’s best interests and therefore not detrimental. (§ 366.26, subd. (b); In re Lorenzo C. (1997)54 Cal.App.4th 1330, 1343-1344.) A party opposed to termination bears the burden of showing that termination would be detrimental under one of the statutory exceptions. (In re Zachary G. (1999) 77 Cal.App.4th 799, 809.)
Consequently, when a court rejects a detriment claim and terminates parental rights, the appellate issue is not whether substantial evidence exists to support the court’s rejection of the detriment claim. The issue for the reviewing court is instead whether the court abused its discretion in rejecting the detriment claim. (In re Jasmine D., supra, 78 Cal.App.4th at p. 1351.) For this to happen, the proof offered would have to be uncontradicted and unimpeached so that discretion could be exercised only in one way, compelling a finding in favor of the appellant as a matter of law. (Roesch v. De Mota (1944) 24 Cal.2d 563, 570–571; In re I.W. et al. (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 1517, 1528.)
A. Beneficial Relationship Exception
Courts examine the beneficial relationship exception on a case-by-case basis, taking into account the many variables which affect a parent/child bond. (In re Autumn H., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at p. 576.) “The age of the child, the portion of the child’s life spent in the parent’s custody, the ‘positive’ or ‘negative’ effect of interaction between parent and child, and the child’s particular needs are some of the variables which logically affect a parent/child bond.” (Ibid.)
Here, it is undisputed mother maintained regular visitation and contact with E. throughout his dependency. E., who was five years old at the time of the section 366.26 hearing, had spent roughly two-thirds of his life in mother’s custody.
Prior to his original detention, however, mother had a drug problem and essentially left E.’s care to his maternal grandmother who had her own history of child abuse and neglect. A court may well have considered the impact of the neglect E. suffered evident in the graphic fear and anxiety he displayed when he first entered foster care. Also, contrary to mother’s claims of providing adequate care, in just the first two months of foster care and with the benefit of renewed Regional Center services, E.’s troubling behaviors significantly decreased and he made progress in potty training and verbal skills. After mother regained custody in 2008, her ability to adequately care for E. gradually declined. There was also a significant deterioration in E.’s behavior.
Mother’s interaction with E. could be positive in that she was attentive, appropriate, and loving during visits. There was also evidence E. knew who mother was, could be loving and affectionate towards her, and enjoyed his visits with her. To the extent mother cites evidence of her positive interaction with E. over the course of his dependency, she overlooks her burden to demonstrate more than pleasant visits or frequent and loving contact. (In re L.Y.L., supra, 101 Cal.App.4th at pp. 953-954.)
In any event, their interaction also had a negative effect on E. According to multiple sources, E. acted out negatively, both at home and in school, following his visits and contacts with mother. He also tended to be more aggressive and defiant around mother.
There are also E.’s special needs, due to his autism, which mother fails to address. E. was extremely prone to decline in his developmental status and that happened continually when he was with his mother. As Dr. Carmichael testified, E.’s needs were greater than mother’s ability to meet them. Mother’s passivity was detrimental to E.’s grave need for active parenting.
In any event, for the beneficial relationship exception to apply, the law requires that:
“the parent-child relationship promote the well-being of the child to such a degree that it outweighs the well-being the child would gain in a permanent home with new, adoptive parents. (In re Autumn H.[, supra, ] 27 Cal.App.4th [at p.] 575.) A juvenile court must therefore: ‘balance[] the strength and quality of the natural parent/child relationship in a tenuous placement against the security and the sense of belonging a new family would confer. If severing the natural parent/child relationship would deprive the child of a substantial, positive emotional attachment such that the child would be greatly harmed, the preference for adoption is overcome and the natural parent’s rights are not terminated.’ (Id. at p. 575.)” (In re Lorenzo C., supra, 54 Cal.App.4th at p. 1342.)
There was simply no evidence, let alone uncontradicted and unimpeached proof, that E. would be greatly harmed if he could no longer see his mother. (In re Lorenzo C., supra, 54 Cal.App.4th at p. 1342.) Also, there was Dr. Carmichael’s opinion that E.’s attachment to his mother was less parental and more like that to a well-known relative or good friend. In the end, a permanent plan of adoption by the foster family was in E.’s best interests. Thus, we conclude the court did not abuse its discretion by rejecting mother’s claim of a beneficial relationship with E.
B. The Sibling Relationship Exception
Section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(v) provides that a court may find termination would be detrimental to a dependent child if:
“[t]here would be substantial interference with a child’s sibling relationship, taking into consideration the nature and extent of the relationship, including, but not limited to, whether the child was raised with a sibling in the same home, whether the child shared significant common experiences or has existing close and strong bonds with a sibling, and whether ongoing contact is in the child’s best interest, including the child’s long-term emotional interest, as compared to the benefit of legal permanence through adoption.” (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(v).)
Mother argues E. shared a strong bond with his sister and their relationship was “precisely” the kind the Legislature intended should defeat adoption. The court’s decision otherwise renders meaningless, in mother’s opinion, the sibling relationship exception.
Since M.’s birth in 2007, the children have lived together a majority of the time up until the section 366.26 hearing. E. knows M. is his sister. They play together sometimes, get along well and show each other affection. E. is also generally happy and excited to see M. Based on this limited evidence, the court properly found the relationship was not that extensive in terms of whether E. was raised with his sister in the same home and whether they shared significant common experiences.
As for whether E. had existing close and strong bonds with M., the record is not as settled. The foster mother did describe the children’s relationship as “close.” The CASA worker also used the phrases “strong and evident bond” and a “tightly knit bond” to describe the relationship between E. and M. in her April 2009 report. Neither, however, explained what was meant by these descriptions and mother never inquired. Mother in fact did not call the CASA worker as a witness. Also, there is no indication that the CASA worker had the credentials to offer an expert opinion on the subject.
In addition, M. had lengthier visits with mother as the section 366.26 hearing approached. Her absences from the foster home created an opportunity to see how E. reacted and in turn draw inferences on the strength of his relationship with his sister. On this point, the evidence was undisputed. E. might ask where M. was going or when she would return. However, he never asked to see M. while she was with mother nor did he ask how long M. would be gone. He never said he missed her. Remarkably, he apparently saw his sister as belonging with mother. Once his sister’s trial visit with mother began, E. was “[s]till the same” and he did not appear sad.
On this record, the court properly could have given greater weight to E.’s observed reactions, than to witnesses’ conclusory statements, and concluded E. did not have existing close and strong bonds with his sister. It is not for this court to reweigh or express an independent judgment on the evidence. (In re Laura F. (1983) 33 Cal.3d 826, 833.)
The court also properly relied on the fact that M.’s absences did not distress E. Mother’s argument otherwise ignores it was her burden to show there was a significant enough bond such that E. would suffer detriment. (In re L.Y.L., supra, 101 Cal.App.4th at p. 952.) Even so, a child’s sadness upon learning he would not be living with a sibling is not enough to show detriment for the purposes of section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(v). (In re L.Y.L., supra, 101 Cal.App.4th at p. 952.)
In any event, whether the sibling relationship exception applies depends on the court’s balancing any benefit, emotional or otherwise, the child would obtain from ongoing contact with the sibling against the benefit of legal permanence the child would obtain through adoption. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(v).) Mother claims this weighing process is problematic because the benefits of adoption cannot be measured while the strength of a sibling relationship can. Her argument ignores the law. Children have compelling rights to a placement that is stable, permanent, and allows the caretaker to make a full emotional commitment to the child. (In re Marilyn H. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 295, 306.) Also, in E.’s case, as the court noted, his special needs cried out louder for permanency and stability than is the case with most children. On this record, we conclude there was no compelling evidence that ongoing sibling contact was in E.’s best interest, including his long-term emotional interest, as compared to the benefit of legal permanence through adoption. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(v).)
To the extent mother argues it should be presumed that the strength of a sibling relationship is enough to defeat adoption, that is an argument and policy consideration better suited for the Legislature.
DISPOSITION
The order terminating parental rights is affirmed.