Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County No. RIJ116981. Robert J. McIntyre, Judge. Affirmed.
Phillip I. Bronson, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Gary W. Schons, Assistant Attorney General, Lilia E. Garcia and Elizabeth S. Voorhies, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
McKinster, J.
Following a contested jurisdictional hearing held on October 22, 2008, a juvenile court found that minor and appellant E.H. (minor) came within the provisions of Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 for having committed the felony offense of assault with a deadly weapon and by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(1)) (par. 1), and misdemeanor vandalism (Pen. Code, § 594, subd. (b)(1)) (par. 2).
All statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise specified.
At a disposition hearing on October 28, 2008, the juvenile court declared minor a ward of the court and placed him on probation in the custody of his parents on various terms and conditions.
On appeal, minor contends that one of the probation conditions violates his right of travel and movement under the Constitution. For the reasons set forth below, we shall affirm the judgment.
I
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On September 10, 2008, a few days after engaging in a verbal confrontation with minor at Santiago High School, C.T. (the victim) was walking toward his parked car in front of his house when he noticed minor driving down the street with two companions. As the victim was getting into his car, minor made a U-turn and then pulled his four-door vehicle alongside the victim’s car.
Minor’s passengers—both of whom were wearing Halloween “executioner” style face masks—jumped out of the car and demanded that the victim get out of his car. The victim complied. Out of fear, the victim began to punch one of the masked men. All three individuals—minor and the two passengers—then began to beat the victim. Minor used a wooden stick or bat to strike the victim until he fell forward and landed on his own car. Minor then proceeded to use the bat to shatter the front window of the victim’s car.
A neighbor who lived across the street left her residence and informed minor and his passengers that the police were en route. As the three assailants ran to minor’s car, the victim grabbed one of minor’s passengers and started hitting him. Minor responded by using the wooden bat to strike the victim about the head and in the groin until the victim was immobilized. Minor then got into his car and fled with his passengers.
The victim identified minor in an in-field show up at the high school. Minor denied having participated in the incident; he told police that he left his residence at 6:45 a.m. and went directly to school.
II
ANALYSIS
Minor’s sole contention on appeal is that probation condition (e)—which prohibits minor from moving without the consent of the probation officer—is “overbroad and impinges on [minor’s] constitutional right of travel and movement.” (Capitalization and bolding omitted.) Therefore, minor argues that condition (e) must be stricken from the probation order or redrafted so it does not impinge on his constitutional right to movement and travel. The People argue that minor has forfeited his challenge to the probation condition because he failed to object to its imposition at the juvenile court. We need not address the forfeiture argument because minor’s argument fails on the merits.
“The juvenile court has broad discretion in formulating conditions of probation. [Citation.] ‘The court may impose and require any and all reasonable conditions that it may determine fitting and proper to the end that justice may be done and the reformation and rehabilitation of the ward enhanced.’ [Citation.] In planning such conditions, ‘“the juvenile court must consider not only the circumstances of the crime but also the minor’s entire social history. [Citations.]” [Citation.]’ [Citation.] ‘A condition of probation will be considered invalid if it (1) has no relationship to the crime of which the offender was convicted, (2) relates to conduct which is not in itself criminal, and (3) requires or forbids conduct which is not reasonably related to future criminality. [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (In re Jason J. (1991) 233 Cal.App.3d 710, 714 [Fourth Dist., Div. Two], disapproved on other grounds in People v. Welch (1993) 5 Cal.4th 228, 237.) “A condition of probation which is impermissible for an adult criminal defendant is not necessarily unreasonable for a juvenile receiving guidance and supervision from the juvenile court.” (In re Todd L. (1980) 113 Cal.App.3d 14, 19.) “This is because juveniles are deemed to be more in need of guidance and supervision than adults, and because a minor’s constitutional rights are more circumscribed.” (In re Antonio R. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 937, 941.)
Probation condition (e) states as follows: “Advise the Probation Officer of any change in address or telephone number. Not move without prior consent of the Probation Officer[.]” Minor contends the requirement that minor not move without his probation officer’s consent is unconstitutional. We disagree.
When a juvenile court places a section 602 ward under a probation officer’s supervision or commits the ward to a probation officer’s care, custody, and control, the “court may impose and require any and all reasonable conditions that it may determine fitting and proper to the end that justice may be done and the reformation and rehabilitation of the ward enhanced.” (§ 730, subd. (b).) Similarly, under section 727, subdivision (a), when a minor is adjudged a section 602 ward of the court, “the court may make any and all reasonable orders for the care, supervision, custody, conduct, maintenance, and support of the minor[.]” Section 727, therefore, gives a probation officer the authority to determine the most appropriate residence for a minor on supervised probation.
Accordingly, if a probation officer places a minor in an approved residence, a probation condition that ensures the officer can continue to monitor where the minor resides is “fitting and proper to the end that justice may be done and the reformation and rehabilitation of the ward enhanced.” (§ 730, subd. (b).) Thus, the probation condition that directs minor not to move without the prior consent of the probation officer is reasonably related to minor’s future criminality. Accordingly, the condition is not unreasonable and does not violate minor’s constitutional rights.
Minor raises no challenge to the constitutionality of section 727. Instead, minor simply contends that the probation condition is unreasonable and unconstitutional. In support, minor relies on two cases, In re James C. (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1198 (James C.), and In re Babak S. (1993) 18 Cal.App.4th 1077 (Babak S.). Minor’s reliance on these two cases is misplaced.
In James C., supra, 165 Cal.App.4th 1198, the minor was a United States citizen living in Tijuana, Mexico. The minor attempted to drive a stolen car across the border with undocumented aliens in the car; the minor was arrested at the San Ysidro port of entry. (Id. at p. 1201.) The juvenile court committed the minor to Camp Barrett for 365 days and stayed the commitment. (Ibid.) As a condition of probation, the court ordered that the minor return to his grandparents’ home in Tijuana, Mexico, and not return to the United States during the term of his probation. (Id. at pp. 1201-1202.) On appeal, the appellate court found that the banishment condition was unreasonable because prohibiting the minor “from entering the United States was not reasonably related to his crime of receiving a stolen vehicle or to future criminality.” (Id. at p. 1203.) The court also found that the probation condition was unconstitutional because the “probation condition effectively banished the probationer from his own country[.]” (Id. at p. 1204.) In support of this finding, the James C. court relied on Babak S., supra, 18 Cal.App.4th 1077. (James C., supra, at p. 1204.)
In Babak S., supra, 18 Cal.App.4th 1077, the juvenile court suspended a minor’s commitment to the California Youth Authority based on a probation condition that the minor reside with his parents in Iran for two years, report to the probation officer as directed, and not change his place of residence without the prior approval of a probation officer. (Id. at p. 1082.) The appellate court stated that the probation conditions effectively constituted a two-year banishment from the United States: “Notwithstanding the good intentions of all the concerned parties in this case, the probation condition lacked any reasonable nexus to Babak’s present or future criminality, violated his constitutional rights of travel, association, and assembly, and constituted a de facto deportation. In sum, we can perceive no reasonable basis for sustaining a condition requiring a minor to absent himself from the country of his residence.” (Id. at p. 1085, fn. omitted.)
Neither James C. nor Babak S. support minor’s argument in this case. Here, there has been no “banishment” of minor from the United States, his country of residence. Instead, the probation condition simply requires that minor not move without the consent of his probation officer. As discussed above, this condition is proper.
III
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: Ramirez P.J. Hollenhorst J.