We disagree and uphold the validity of the transfer order. We note at the outset that the rationale and conclusions in the Connecticut Supreme Court's recent decision, In re Edwin N., 215 Conn. 277, 575 A.2d 1016 (1990), are controlling in this case. In In re Edwin N., supra, the respondent challenged the validity of the trial court's transfer of a juvenile murder case to the adult criminal docket.

We have at times found a trial court's noncompliance with a statutory requirement to be harmless error when it is clear that compliance could not have affected the outcome. See, e.g., State v. Johnson, 253 Conn. 1, 20, 29, 751 A.2d 298 (2000) (trial court's failure to order competency hearing, as required by General Statutes [Rev. to 1991] § 54-56d [d], harmless error); State v. Yurch, 229 Conn. 516, 523, 641 A.2d 1387 (trial court's failure to properly instruct jury regarding defendant's election not to testify, as required by General Statutes § 54-84 [b], harmless error), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 965, 115 S. Ct. 430, 130 L. Ed. 2d 343 (1994); In re Edwin N., 215 Conn. 277, 281-83, 575 A.2d 1016 (1990) (trial court's failure to make probable cause finding required by General Statutes § 46b-127 before transferring juvenile to regular criminal docket harmless error); see also Sander v. Sander, 96 Conn. App. 102, 118, 899 A.2d 670 (2006) (trial court's failure to make findings required by General Statutes § 46b-56c [c] before entering educational support order harmless error); New London v. Picinich, 76 Conn. App. 678, 692, 821 A.2d 782 (trial court's failure to view property in condemnation proceedings, as required by General Statutes § 8-132 [b], harmless error), cert. denied, 266 Conn. 901, 832 A.2d 64 (2003); see generally Wiseman v. Armstrong, 295 Conn. 94, 106-10, 989 A.2d 1027 (2010) (general discussion of harmless error review). We disagree with the dissent that, by engaging in a harmlessness analysis, we are reading into the § 17a112 (j) (3) (B) specific steps requirement a futility exception that the legislature intended to apply only to the requirement of reasonable reunifi

We have at times found a trial court's noncompliance with a statutory requirement to be harmless error when it is clear that compliance could not have affected the outcome. See, e.g., State v. Johnson, 253 Conn. 1, 20, 29, 751 A.2d 298 (2000) (trial court's failure to order competency hearing, as required by General Statutes [Rev. to 1991] § 54–56d [d], harmless error); State v. Yurch, 229 Conn. 516, 523, 641 A.2d 1387 (trial court's failure to properly instruct jury regarding defendant's election not to testify, as required by General Statutes § 54–84[b], harmless error), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 965, 115 S.Ct. 430, 130 L.Ed.2d 343 (1994); In re Edwin N., 215 Conn. 277, 281–83, 575 A.2d 1016 (1990) (trial court's failure to make probable cause finding required by General Statutes § 46b–127 before transferring juvenile to regular criminal docket harmless error); see also Sander v. Sander, 96 Conn.App. 102, 118, 899 A.2d 670 (2006) (trial court's failure to make findings required by General Statutes § 46b–56c [c] before entering educational support order harmless error); New London v. Picinich, 76 Conn.App. 678, 692, 821 A.2d 782 (trial court's failure to view property in condemnation proceedings, as required by General Statutes § 8–132[b], harmless error), cert. denied, 266 Conn. 901, 832 A.2d 64 (2003); see generally Wiseman v. Armstrong, 295 Conn. 94, 106–10, 989 A.2d 1027 (2010) (general discussion of harmless error review).We disagree with the dissent that, by engaging in a harmlessness analysis, we are reading into the § 17a–112 (j)(3)(B) specific steps requirement a futility exception that the legislature intended to apply only to the requirement of reasonable reunification

Viewing the proffered proof most favorably to the state, the court must decide whether the state's evidence would warrant a person of reasonable caution to believe that the respondent had committed the crime with which he was charged." State v. Edwin, 215 Conn. 277, 283-84, 575 A.2d 1016 (1990); see also State v. Marra, supra, 222 Conn. 513. In this case, the state was required to establish probable cause to believe that the defendant was guilty of intentional murder in violation of § 53a-54a, the elements of which are intent and causation.

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Edwin N., 215 Conn. 277, 284, 575 A.2d 1016 (1990). Here, there was evidence of the respondent's animus toward Blue and his threat that Blue would "get his."

General Statutes § 46b–127(c). In 1995, the legislature eliminated the previous requirement that transfer to the adult docket occur only after an evidentiary hearing and the issuance of certain written findings by the juvenile court judge to support the transfer order; see In re Edwin N., 215 Conn. 277, 280, 575 A.2d 1016 (1990) (valid transfer requires written findings after hearing); following the amendment of the transfer statute by No. 95–225 of the 1995 Public Acts, § 46b–127(a)(1) “prohibits the juvenile court from participating in any meaningful manner with respect to the transfer of those individuals at the time of the automatic transfer.” State v. Angel C., 245 Conn. 93, 115, 715 A.2d 652 (1998).

General Statutes § 46b–127(c).In 1995, the legislature eliminated the previous requirement that transfer to the adult docket occur only after an evidentiary hearing and the issuance of certain written findings by the juvenile court judge to support the transfer order; see In re Edwin N., 215 Conn. 277, 280, 575 A.2d 1016 (1990) (valid transfer requires written findings after hearing); following the amendment of the transfer statute by No. 95–225 of the 1995 Public Acts, § 46b–127(a)(1) “prohibits the juvenile court from participating in any meaningful manner with respect to the transfer of those individuals at the time of the automatic transfer.” State v. Angel C., 245 Conn. 93, 115, 715 A.2d 652 (1998).

See Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 560-61, 86 S. Ct. 1045, 16 L. Ed. 2d 84 (1966)." In re Edwin N., 215 Conn. 277, 281, 575 A.2d 1016 (1990). Our Supreme Court in considering a due process claim regarding the mandatory transfer provisions of § 46b-127 (a), held that there is no liberty interest in juvenile status prior to a mandatory transfer to criminal court.

Probable cause exists when "the state's evidence would warrant a person of reasonable caution to believe the respondent had committed the crime with which he was charged." In re Edwin N., 215 Conn. 277, 284, 575 A.2d 1016 (1990). The quantum of evidence required to establish probable cause is less than that required to establish proof beyond a reasonable doubt at trial.

Reviewing this evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining the finding of probable cause, we conclude that the court was entitled to infer that the defendant intentionally placed a gun into the passenger compartment of the victim's car and fired a shot that entered the victim's lung. A factfinder may infer an intent to kill "`from circumstantial evidence such as the type of weapon used, the manner in which it was used, the type of wound inflicted and the events leading to and immediately following the death.'" In re Edwin N., 215 Conn. 277, 284, 575 A.2d 1016 (1990). The evidence was sufficient to support a finding of probable cause that the defendant intended to kill the victim.