Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County No. DL036065, David A. Hoffer, Judge.
Richard Power, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Gary W. Schons, Assistant Attorney General, Steve Oetting and Marissa Bejarano, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
OPINION
SILLS, P. J.
Edwin C., a minor, challenges the juvenile court’s order declaring him a ward of the court (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602) after finding true allegations Edwin committed first degree burglary. The court placed Edwin on probation with various terms and conditions appropriate to this finding.
The minor also admitted violating Penal Code section 415, subd. (1). This offense occurred during a separate incident and is unrelated to the issues raised on appeal.
Seizing on the fact that the crime occurred in a carport, not a home, enclosed garage, or other standard inhabited dwelling, Edwin argues the court’s true finding denied him due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution because he was convicted of burglary in the absence of any evidence he entered a structure described in the burglary statute. (Pen. Code, § 459.)
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
Under People v. Thorn (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 255 (Thorn), the determination of whether the structure at issue is part of an inhabited dwelling, as required under section 459, focuses on whether the structure is “‘“functionally interconnected with and immediately contiguous to”’” portions of an inhabited dwelling. (Id. at p. 262). Moreover, the structure must be constructed in such a way that “‘a reasonable person would believe that the element of the building in question enclosed an area into which a member of the general public could not pass without authorization.’ [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 265.) Based on our review of the testimony of the witnesses and photographs of the carport in question, we reject the minor’s contentions and affirm the judgment.
I
FACTS
One day in late June 2009, Edwin C. and five of his friends ditched school and decided to go to Newport Beach. The boys decided to go by bus, and during the approximately 45 minute bus ride, they talked about stealing some bicycles when they got to their destination. The boys walked together through various alleys in Newport Beach looking for bicycles, but without any particular plan. However, when they noticed that people were staring at them, the boys decided to separate into two groups of three before searching any further.
When the two groups meet each other sometime later, no one had a bicycle, but one of the boys had a pair of bolt cutters. A couple of the boys, including Edwin C., expressed doubts about their enterprise and decided to remain behind when three other boys went to steal some bikes from a carport about two blocks away.
The carport in question has three full walls, one of which is a shared wall with a ground floor apartment in the building, and it is situated directly beneath the burglary victim’s second story apartment unit, thus providing the floor for its second story apartment. There is no door that leads directly into any particular apartment, but there is a door opening onto a private walkway that leads to the apartments. The carport provides parking solely for designated residents of the building, and these residents store personal possessions, including bicycles, inside. In fact, there are only two distinguishing features that differentiate this carport from a garage: the carport does not have a door leading directly into any particular apartment, nor does it have a garage door, which would completely enclose the space.
When the boys arrived at the carport, one of them went inside and discovered three bikes. The bikes were secured to the back wall by a large chain and lock. As a second boy approached the bikes with bolt cutters in hand, a motorcycle police officer appeared on the scene. The appearance of the officer scared the boys out of the carport and into the alley. The boys tried to run away from the scene, but the officer pursued them. He detained one boy and broadcast a description of the other two boys. The two other boys ran back to where the rest of the group was waiting for them. After they explained what happened, all five boys panicked and ran for the beach. Sometime later, a police officer saw them sitting on a park bench at the beach, asked them some questions, and eventually arrested four of the five boys, including Edwin, for burglary.
II
DISCUSSION
A conviction of first degree burglary requires entry of an “inhabited dwelling house” with the intent to commit a felony. (§§ 459, 460.) The statute is designed to “to protect the peaceful occupation of one’s residence” against intrusion and violence; therefore, the phrase “‘inhabited dwelling house’” has been broadly construed. (People v. Cruz (1996) 13 Cal.4th 764, 775-776.)
The minor admits his involvement in this case, but argues he did not commit burglary because the carport is not an inhabited dwelling. “In determining whether a structure is part of an inhabited dwelling, the essential inquiry is whether the structure is ‘functionally interconnected with and immediately contiguous to other portions of the house.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Rodriguez (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 1101, 1107.) “‘Functionally interconnected’ means used in related or complementary ways. ‘Contiguous’ means adjacent, adjoining, nearby or close. [Citations.]” (Ibid.)
Prior cases have applied this definition to garages attached to a residence but lacking an entrance to the residence and concluded they constitute inhabited dwelling houses for the purposes of the burglary statute. (People v. Ingram (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 1397, 1404, overruled on other grounds in People v. Dotson (1997) 16 Cal.4th 547, 560; In re Edwardo V. (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 591, 594-595.) Similarly, carports attached to a residence have been held to be functionally interconnected to the residence and thus part of the inhabited dwelling house. (People v. Thorn, supra, 176 Cal.App.4th at p. 263 [carport area roofed by apartment building and comprising the entire ground floor of that building found to be an inhabited dwelling for purposes of statute]; In re Christopher J. (1980) 102 Cal.App.3d 76, 80 [carport attached to a residence with a roof and a wall along one side found sufficient to meet statutory definition].)
The carport at issue in Thorn was located directly underneath the apartments, provided parking facilities only for designated residents of the apartment complex. This allowed the designated residents to park their vehicles off the street “in a covered location with convenient access to their living space in the apartments above via the communal stairways adjacent to the carports.” (People v. Thorn, supra, 176 Cal.App.4th at p. 263.) The Thorn court also found significant the fact that use of these carports by the designated residents was “inextricably related or complementary to their living space in the apartments above. Thus, the carports [were] ‘functionally interconnected’ with the inhabited dwelling.” (Ibid.)
We reach a similar conclusion with respect to the carport here. The minor seeks to avoid this result by noting the carports in Thorn were accessible only through a courtyard. This is distinct, but not one that supports the minor’s argument. Although this particular carport is off an alley, it is also directly under the victim’s apartment, enclosed on three sides, and its roof forms the floor of the second story apartment unit. Further, it has a door that leads to the entrances of the apartments. Thus, for the reasons cited in Thorn, the evidence demonstrates a “functional[] interconnect[tion]” between the carport and the apartments such that it is an integral part of the living space. (People v. Thorn, supra, 176 Cal.App.4th at p. 263.)
The minor argues we should follow the reasoning of the court in In re Amber S. (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 185 (Amber S.). We disagree. Amber and an accomplice were caught in the act of stealing hay bales from a structure described by the owner as an “‘open pole barn.’” (Id. at p. 186.) “The structure was open on all sides, consisting of a roof and overhang held up by poles.” (Ibid.) Here, the stucco structure was enclosed on three sides, and its ceiling constituted part of the floor of the second story apartment. Therefore, Amber S. is inapposite.
The minor also asserts no reasonable person would expect protection from unauthorized intrusions, given that the carport was open to the public alleyway. In Thorn, the court, applying the principles stated in People v. Valencia (2002) 28 Cal.4th 1 (Valencia), rejected this argument. Valencia addressed “whether penetration into the area behind a window screen amounts to an entry of a building within the meaning of the burglary statute when the window itself is closed and is not penetrated.” (Id. at pp. 3-4.) The court held that where “the outer boundary of a building for purposes of burglary is not self-evident... a reasonable belief test generally may be useful in defining the building’s outer boundary. Under such a test, in dealing with items such as a window screen, a building’s outer boundary includes any element that encloses an area into which a reasonable person would believe that a member of the general public could not pass without authorization.... The test reflects and furthers the occupant’s possessory interest in the building and his or her personal interest in freedom from violence that might ensue from unauthorized intrusion.” (Id. at p. 11.) The court concluded “a window screen is clearly part of the outer boundary of a building for purposes of burglary. A reasonable person certainly would believe that a window screen enclosed an area into which a member of the general public could not pass without authorization.” (Id. at p. 12.)
Applying this test, the Thorn court concluded the carports open entrance marked the outer boundary of the attached apartment building for purposes of the burglary statute, finding the situation “directly analogous to the area behind the window screen in Valencia in that a reasonable person certainly would believe that the carport ‘enclosed an area into which a member of the general public could not pass without authorization.’ [Citations.]” (People v. Thorn, supra, 176 Cal.App.4th at p. 265.) The court relied, in part, on evidence that residents of the apartment building immediately noticed the defendant “lurking” in the carport area and called the police.
Here, although no physical barrier prevented the boys’ entry into the carport and no members of the public saw them enter it, the boys did flee when the motorcycle officers arrived. It seems clear the boys understood they had entered an area into which the general public could not pass without violating some type of social convention. In sum, the carport involved here constitutes a private, individually designated parking area in which the victim had a possessory interest for the purpose of parking his car and storing his bicycles as well as other personal possessions. Thus, as in Thorn, the entry into the carport amounted to entry into an inhabited dwelling house within the meaning of the burglary statute.
III
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
WE CONCUR: RYLAARSDAM, J.IKOLA, J.