25. Washington courts recognize the "chief incidents of ownership of property as the right to possession, use and enjoyment, and to sell or otherwise dispose of it according to the will of the owner." Wasser & Winters Co. v. Jefferson County, 84 Wn.2d 597, 599 (1974) (citing In re Estate of Eckert, 14 Wn.2d. 497 (1942)). 26.

25. Washington courts recognize the "chief incidents of ownership of property as the right to possession, use and enjoyment, and to sell or otherwise dispose of it according to the will of the owner." Wasser & Winters Co. v. Jefferson County, 84 Wn.2d 597, 599 (1974) (citing In re Estate of Eckert, 14 Wn.2d. 497 (1942)). 26.

[1, 2] We have identified the chief incidents of ownership of property as the right to its possession, use and enjoyment and to sell or otherwise dispose of it according to the will of the owner. In re Estate of Eckert, 14 Wn.2d 497, 128 P.2d 656 (1942). In Sloan Shipyards Corp. v. Thurston County, 111 Wn. 361, 365, 190 P. 1015 (1920), we held that the person assessed need not have a perfect and unencumbered title to the property but only that he should be vested with the apparent legal title, or with the possession coupled with such claims and evidence of ownership as will justify the assumption that he is the owner.

rue, a child has no standing at law or in equity either before or after the death of his parent to attack a conveyance by the parent as being without consideration, or in deprivation of his right of inheritance. Wootton v. Keaton, 168 Ark. 981, 272 S.W. 869; Ehrlich v. Tritt, 316 Ill. 221, 147 N.E. 40; Childress v. Childress, 298 Ill. 185, 131 N.E. 586; Rhodes v. Meredith, 260 Ill. 138, 102 N.E. 1063, Ann. Cas. 1914D, 416; McLaughlin v. McLaughlin, 241 Ill. 366, 89 N.E. 645; Jones v. Jones, 213 Ill. 228, 72 N.E. 695; Thorne v. Cosand, 160 Ind. 566, 67 N.E. 257; Lefebure v. Lefebure, 143 Iowa 293, 121 N.W. 1025; Clester v. Clester, 90 Kan. 638, 135 P. 996; Doty v. Dickey, 29 Ky. Law Rep. 900, 96 S.W. 544; Ross v. Davis, 345 Mo. 362, 133 S.W.2d 363, 125 A.L.R. 1111; Brashears v. State ex rel. Oklahoma Public Welfare Commission, 194 Okla. 66, 156 P.2d 101; Mandel v. Bron, 270 Pa. 566, 113 A. 834; Hanes v. Hanes (Tex.Com.App.), 239 S.W. 190, overruling motion for rehearing 234 S.W. 1078; In re Eckert's Estate, 14 Wn.2d 477, 128 P.2d 656; In re Peterson's Estate, 12 Wn.2d 685, 123 P.2d 733; Roy v. Roy, 113 Wn. 609, 194 P. 590; Schumacher v. Draego, 137 Wis. 618, 119 N.W. 305. When a person is induced by fraud or undue influence to make a conveyance of his property, a cause of action arises in his favor, entitling him, at his election, either to sue to have the conveyance set aside, or to sue to recover the damages for the pecuniary injury inflicted upon him by the wrong.

The concept of title or ownership is a concept describing a bundle of rights in rem with respect to property, of indeterminate duration, residuary in character and includes the right to possess, use, consume, destroy and alienate the subject matter of that ownership. Ackerman v. Port of Seattle, 55 Wn.2d 400, 409, 348 P.2d 664 (1960); In re Estate of Eckert, 14 Wn.2d 497, 504, 128 P.2d 656 (1942); Litel v. Marsh, 33 Wn.2d 441, 446, 206 P.2d 300 (1949); Salmond on Jurisprudence 246-49 (12th ed. P. Fitzgerald 1966). When therefore the court awarded the plaintiff "the equity in the home . . . together with the household furniture contained therein" it awarded to the plaintiff the bundle of rights constituting the equity, one of which was the right of possession.

Nash Miami Motors v. Bandel, Fla. 1950, 47 So.2d 701. While it is possible to separate ownership of a motor vehicle from the right to possession, in most instances it is fundamental that one of the chief ingredients of "ownership" in property is the right to its possession. In re Eckert's Estate, 1942, 14 Wn.2d 497, 128 P.2d 656. Plaintiffs having asserted a right to possession of the automobile by having established a prima facie presumption of ownership, it became incumbent upon the defendant to submit proofs countering those of the movant. The defendant, in opposition to the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment, filed the affidavit above alluded to, which in essence asserted to show her right to possession on the basis of equitable title. The defendant's affidavit was sufficient to establish a genuine issue of fact, namely, the right to possession, and it was error for the court to have entered the summary judgment for the plaintiffs.