Opinion
No. 342149
07-19-2018
In re EARL, Minors.
UNPUBLISHED Wayne Circuit Court Family Division
LC No. 17-001628-NA Before: CAMERON, P.J., and JANSEN and O'CONNELL, JJ. PER CURIAM.
Respondent father appeals as of right the trial court's order terminating his parental rights to his three minor children under MCL 712A.19b(3)(g) (parent fails to provide proper care or custody), (j) (reasonable likelihood of harm if child is returned to parent's home), and(k)(iii) (parent battered, tortured, or inflicted severe physical abuse on the child). We affirm.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
In September, 2017, following an investigation regarding respondent's physical abuse of his stepson, JD, the Department of Health and Human Services (the DHHS), filed an original petition for permanent custody seeking to terminate respondent's parental rights to his own three minor children: CE, JE, and VE. It was alleged by the DHHS that in July, 2017, respondent disciplined JD outside of church by punching him in the chest with a closed fist. Respondent also "thumped" or "popped" JD in the head. The force of the punch to JD's chest caused JD to suffer a collapsed lung and pneumomediastinum. JD's injuries required hospitalization.
During a hearing on October 31, 2017, respondent made admissions that were consistent with the allegations contained within the petition. Respondent made further admissions regarding his violent criminal history and untreated mental health issues. Accordingly, the trial court took jurisdiction over the minor children. Additionally, respondent stipulated to the existence of statutory grounds to terminate his parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(g) (parent fails to provide proper care or custody), (j) (reasonable likelihood of harm if child is returned to parent's home), and(k)(iii) (parent battered, tortured, or inflicted severe physical abuse on the child).
The matter proceeded to a best interests hearing on December 11, 2017. Respondent failed to appear for that hearing. According to testimony from Child Protective Services Worker Summer Shanklin, the last time she spoke with respondent he indicated he was homeless, lacked employment, and no longer had an interest in his parental rights because the minor children's mother had initiated divorce proceedings. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court terminated respondent's parental rights. This appeal followed.
II. STATUTORY GROUNDS
Respondent first argues that petitioner failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence any statutory ground for termination of his parental rights. We disagree.
Only one statutory ground must be established by clear and convincing evidence for the trial court to terminate a respondent's parental rights to his minor child. MCL 712A.19b(3) and (5); In re Moss, 301 Mich App 76, 90; 836 NW2d 182 (2013). "This Court reviews for clear error the trial court's ruling that a statutory ground for termination has been established and its ruling that termination is in the children's best interest." In re Hudson, 294 Mich App 261, 264; 817 NW2d 115 (2011); MCR 3.977(K). "A finding is clearly erroneous if, although there is evidence to support it, we are left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made." In re HRC, 286 Mich App 444, 459; 871 NW2d 105 (2009). We give regard to trial courts when applying the clear error standard in parental termination cases because of the trial court's "special opportunity . . . to judge the credibility of the witnesses who appeared before it." In re Miller, 433 Mich 331, 337; 445 NW2d 161 (1989).
Although respondent challenges the existence of statutory grounds to terminate his parental rights, he advances in his brief on appeal that he stipulated to the existence of statutory grounds at the permanent custody hearing on October 31, 2017. This assertion is supported by our review of the record. Therefore, to the extent that respondent challenges statutory grounds for termination of his parental rights, that argument is waived. See Hudson, 294 Mich App at 264 ("Respondent may not assign as error on appeal something that [he] deemed proper in the lower court because allowing [him] to do so would permit respondent to harbor error as an appellate parachute.") Because respondent has waived this argument, we decline to address it.
III. BEST INTERESTS
We next address respondent's argument that it was not in the best interests of the minor children to terminate his parental rights, although we are unpersuaded.
MCL 712A.19b(5) provides, "[i]f the court finds that there are grounds for termination of parental rights and that termination of parental rights is in the child's best interests, the court shall order termination of parental rights and order that additional efforts for reunification of the child with the parent not be made." The prosecution must prove that termination is in the child's best interests by a preponderance of the evidence. In re Schadler, 315 Mich App at 408. A trial court must weigh all of the evidence in making a best interests determination. In re White, 303 Mich App at 713. This includes many factors, including " 'the child's bond to the parent, the parent's parenting ability, the child's need for permanency, stability, and finality, and the advantages of a foster home over the parent's home,' " as well as "a parent's history of domestic violence, the parent's compliance with his or her case service plan, the parent's visitation history with the child, the children's well-being while in care, and the possibility of adoption." Id. (citations omitted).
In this case, the record reflects that the trial court considered all of the evidence in the record for its best-interest decision and a preponderance of the evidence supported the trial court's decision. We first note that respondent did not even appear for the best interests hearing. Shanklin testified that she had spoken with respondent via telephone ten minutes prior to the best interests hearing, and respondent had indicated that because the minor children's mother was seeking a divorce, "he said he just goin' wash his hands of this whole situation." Shanklin further testified that respondent had a pending criminal case arising out of this matter, but the warrant had been cancelled due to an inability to locate respondent. In fact, respondent reported being homeless and unemployed. Additionally, respondent suffered from mental illness, but only sporadically sought and received treatment. Respondent also had a history of impulsive and violent behavior evidenced by his criminal history and repeated incidents of domestic violence involving the mother of his children. Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the trial court properly found that a preponderance of the evidence showed termination of respondent's parental rights was in the best interests of the minor children.
Affirmed.
/s/ Thomas C. Cameron
/s/ Kathleen Jansen
/s/ Peter D. O'Connell