Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Super. Ct. Nos. JVSQ0882, JVSQ0883
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, J.
M. W. (appellant), the mother of D. W. and G. W. (the minors), appeals from the juvenile court’s orders terminating her parental rights. (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 366.26, 395.)
Hereafter, undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
Appellant contends the juvenile court committed reversible error in failing to conduct a hearing after appellant indicated that she required substitute counsel. For the reasons that follow, we shall affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In March 2008, Yuba County Health and Human Services Department (HHS) filed original juvenile dependency petitions on behalf of the minors. At the time the petitions were filed, the minors were living with a family friend. The minors had been placed in a guardianship, under the care of their maternal grandmother.
The juvenile court appointed counsel to represent appellant and assumed jurisdiction over the minors. Thereafter, the superior court terminated the guardianship. In November 2008, the juvenile court adjudged the minors dependent children.
On February 25, 2009, the juvenile court received a letter from appellant. At the conclusion of that letter in a postscript, “P.S.,” appellant wrote: “My Att. has not help[ed] me [too] much[.] I wanted to write you lots of time[s] but he won’t give my letters [sic]. I’ve asked to [meet] with you before this he[a]ring[.] [H]e wouldn’t do it. Seems to me I need a new lawyer.”
At the February 25, 2009, section 366.26 hearing, the juvenile court asked what the letter was about. Appellant responded: “A lot of things. It’s important for you to read [it].” The court stated: “I think you should share [those things] with your attorney. I don’t mind reading your letter.” Appellant indicated the letter was important, and her counsel then discussed some of the contents of the letter. Appellant also made various comments. However, there was no further discussion pertaining to the issue of substitute counsel.
At the conclusion of the section 366.26 hearing, the juvenile court found it likely the minors would be adopted and terminated appellant’s parental rights.
DISCUSSION
Appellant contends she made a written request for new counsel to the juvenile court, triggering the requirement that the juvenile court hold a hearing, pursuant to People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118, in order to inquire into appellant’s apparent grievances with her counsel. Arguing her allegations “at the very least called for clarification and further inquiry,” appellant asserts the court did nothing to address her request. Accordingly, appellant claims, the orders terminating parental rights must be reversed and the matter remanded with directions that the juvenile court undertake a proper Marsden inquiry.
In a criminal case, when a defendant requests substitute appointed counsel, the trial court must permit the defendant to explain the reason for the request. (People v. Marsden, supra, 2 Cal.3d at pp. 123-124.) The court need not grant the request for substitution of counsel absent a showing that denial would substantially impair the defendant’s right to the assistance of counsel. (Id. at p. 123; People v. Turner (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 913, 917.) However, denial of the opportunity to explain constitutes an abuse of discretion. (People v. Marsden, supra, at pp. 123-124.)
In a dependency proceeding, the parents have a statutory and a due process right to competent counsel. (§ 317.5; In re Meranda P. (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 1143, 1151, fn. 3, 1153, fn. 6.) When counsel is retained and the parent believes counsel is inadequate, the parent can simply fire the retained attorney. However, parents for whom counsel is appointed cannot. These parents must have some mechanism for challenging their representation when they perceive inadequacy or the right to counsel is meaningless. Thus, juvenile courts, relying on the Marsden model, have permitted the parents to air their complaints about appointed counsel and to request new counsel be appointed.
An exhaustive Marsden hearing is not required. It is only necessary that the juvenile court “make some inquiry into the nature of the complaints against the attorney.” (In re James S. (1991) 227 Cal.App.3d 930, 935, fn. 13, emphasis in original.) Moreover, the court’s duty to permit a person represented by appointed counsel to state the reasons for dissatisfaction with counsel arises only when the person in some manner moves to discharge his current counsel. There must be, at the very least, some clear indication by the individual that he wants a substitute attorney. (People v. Freeman (1994) 8 Cal.4th 450, 480-481; People v. Lucky (1988) 45 Cal.3d 259, 281, fn. 8; People v. Richardson (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 479, 484-485.)
Here, appellant made one oblique reference to the possibility of obtaining new counsel--“[s]eems to me I need a new lawyer”--at the end of a letter, in a postscript, she wrote near the time of the section 366.26 hearing. That statement, when considered together with the remainder of appellant’s letter, appears to constitute little more than a complaint about counsel’s alleged failures to facilitate delivery of letters to and arrange meetings with the juvenile court. Accordingly, appellant’s statement, read in context, does not appear to constitute the equivalent of a Marsden motion.
In this case, absent a clear indication by appellant that she wanted substitute counsel, the juvenile court acted properly in deciding not to set a Marsden hearing at that time. (People v. Richardson, supra, 171 Cal.App.4th at p. 485.)
Having asked about appellant’s letter, the juvenile court met its obligation to make some inquiry into appellant’s grievances, such as they were. (In re James S., supra, 227 Cal.App.3d at p. 935, fn. 13.) Contrary to appellant’s assertion, the court did not ignore her. Nothing more was required.
Even assuming appellant’s statement in her letter constituted an unequivocal request for substitute counsel, we would find no Marsden error. The reason is that nothing further pertaining to a Marsden hearing or dissatisfaction with appellant’s trial counsel is contained in the record. Although appellant was present and spoke at the February 2009 section 366.26 hearings, she said nothing about the postscript of her letter, nor did she raise any Marsden issue. Presumably, appellant had resolved any previous concerns, if any, that she may have had with her trial counsel.
On this record, the juvenile court reasonably could conclude that appellant’s failure to raise any Marsden issue constituted an abandonment of her previous claim, if any. (People v. Obie (1974) 41 Cal.App.3d 744, 750 [“‘[where] the court, through inadvertence or neglect, neither rules nor reserves its ruling... the party who objected must make some effort to have the court actually rule. If the point is not pressed and is forgotten, he may be deemed to have waived or abandoned it, just as if he had failed to make the objection in the first place’”], disapproved on other grounds by People v. Rollo (1977) 20 Cal.3d 109, 120, fn. 4; People v. Alaniz (1986) 182 Cal.App.3d 903, 907 [failure to secure ruling on a motion to suppress evidence]; People v. Hill (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 16, 44 [failure to obtain ruling on a motion to strike], disapproved on other grounds in People v. Nesler (1997) 16 Cal.4th 561, 582, fn. 5; People v. Vera (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 970, 981-982 [failure to present complaints about counsel constituted abandonment of request for substitute counsel].)
There was no error.
DISPOSITION
The orders of the juvenile court terminating appellant’s parental rights are affirmed.
We concur:
BLEASE, ACTING P. J., NICHOLSON, J.