Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, No. J215049 Elizabeth Riggs, Judge.
McINTYRE, J.
The juvenile court adjudged D.W. a ward of the court under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 after finding she unlawfully took money and personal property valued at more than $400 from Francisca Melendez. She challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the court's true finding that the property's value exceeded $400, constituting grand theft rather than petty theft. We affirm the judgment.
FACTS
On November 22, 2006, D.W. stole a purse from Melendez. At trial, Melendez testified that the stolen purse contained a wallet, keys, identification, sunglasses, two cellular telephones, makeup, and $30 in cash. She testified that the purse and wallet were designer items and valued them at $100 and $120, respectively. On cross-examination, Melendez admitted the items were given to her and could have been counterfeits. Melendez testified the value of her designer sunglasses to be $150 and again admitted they were a gift. She valued each telephone at $60 and the makeup at $35. No testimony was given as to the value of the keys and identification. Other than establishing that the purse, if a designer brand, could be valued at more than $500, the defense provided no rebuttal evidence as to the value of the stolen items.
DISCUSSION
D.W. challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the court's true finding that the value of the property exceeded $400. She asserts that Melendez' estimates of value, without further investigation or inquiry by the investigating officer, were speculative and did not establish the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.
In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence on appeal, the critical inquiry is whether substantial evidence supports the finding of the trier of fact, not whether the evidence proves guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. (People v. Crittenden (1994) 9 Cal.4th 83, 139; People v. Mincey (1992) 2 Cal.4th 408, 432.) We view the evidence favorably to the judgment and presume the existence of every fact the court or jury could reasonably deduce from the evidence. (People v. Ochoa (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1199, 1206.) When different inferences can be reasonably deduced from the facts, we will not substitute our deductions for those of the trier of fact. (Western States Petroleum Assn. v. Superior Court (1995) 9 Cal.4th 559, 571.)
The owner of stolen property may testify as to its value (People v. Coleman (1963) 222 Cal.App.2d 358, 361; People v. Haney (1932) 126 Cal.App. 473, 475-476) and the trier of fact can evaluate what weight to give such evidence. (See, e.g., CALJIC No. 14.27.)
Here, Melendez testified as to the value of her property. During cross-examination, the defense focused on the fact Melendez did not purchase the purse, wallet, and sunglasses, but rather received them as gifts. However, the manner in which Melendez received the items goes to her personal knowledge of the value, which relates to her capacity to perceive and recollect. (Evid. Code, § 702.) D.W. did not object to the admission of the valuation testimony at trial and has therefore waived this claim on appeal. (Evid. Code, § 353; People v. Rogers (1978) 21 Cal.3d 542, 548 ["questions relating to the admissibility of evidence will not be reviewed on appeal in the absence of a specific and timely objection in the trial court on the ground sought to be urged on appeal"].) True, during cross-examination, defense counsel asked questions about the basis of Melendez' valuations. But that was all. And that was not enough to constitute an objection.
Except for establishing a higher value for the purse if it was authentic, D.W. presented no evidence disputing Melendez' valuations of the stolen property. Thus, substantial evidence supported the court's finding that the stolen property was valued at more than $400.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
WE CONCUR: McDONALD, Acting P. J., AARON, J.