Daniel R. McLeod, Atty. Gen., and Irvin D.Parker, John P. Wilson, Asst. Attys. Gen., of Columbia, for Complainant, cite: As to indefinite suspension being aproper and reasonable sanction under the facts and circumstancesof this case: 97 S.C. 37, 81 S.E. 279. Messrs. Thomas H. Pope and Robert D. Schumpert, of Newberry, for Respondent, cite: As to indefinite suspensionnot being a proper and reasonable sanction under thefacts and circumstances of this case: 237 S.C. 316, 117 S.E.2d 300; 246 S.C. 14, 142 S.E.2d 214; 246 S.C. 35, 142 S.E.2d 369; 177 S.E.2d 130; 1 McCord 379; 81 S.C. 290, 62 S.E. 406; 161 S.C. 627, 159 S.E. 627; 251 S.C. 305, 162 S.E.2d 256; 254 S.C. 481, 175 S.E.2d 897; 179 S.E.2d 35; 94 S.C. 414, 78 S.E.2d 227; 240 S.C. 436, 126 S.E.2d 346; 248 S.C. 47, 148 S.E.2d 869; 253 S.C. 562, 172 S.E.2d 303; 254 S.C. 481, 176 S.E.2d 125; 176 S.E.2d 412; 89 S.C. 352, 71 S.E. 952; 64 S.C. 461, 42 S.E. 433; 249 S.C. 344, 154 S.E.2d 429. June 23, 1971.
) 8 P.2d 693, 82 A.L.R. 1176; (Mo.) 128 S.W. 196; 182 N.E.2d 651, 96 A.L.R. 735; 248 N.Y. Supp.2d 373; Code of Professional Responsibility and Canons of Judicial Ethics, p. 3; 144 S.C. 252, 142 S.E. 498; 24 S.C. 266. As to the findingthat the Defendant suffers from mental and emotionalinstability within the meaning of rule 4(e) being supportedby the evidence: 81 S.C. 290, 62 S.E. 406. As to it beingproper for a Guardian ad Litem to be appointed to representRespondent: (Wash.) 444 P.2d 784; app. dis., 394 U.S. 323, 22 L.Ed.2d 310, 89 S.Ct. 1207.
Messrs. Daniel R. McLeod, Attorney General, and GradyL. Patterson, Assistant Attorney General, of Columbia, forcomplainant, cite: As to the forging the name of the PresidingJudge to decrees and filing them in public records asfinal judgment of the court justifying disbarment: (S.C.) 42 S.E.2d 369; 170 P.2d 763; 81 S.C. 290, 62 S.E. 406; 367 P.2d 148; 36 S.E.2d 243; 7 C.J.S., Attorney and Client, Sec. 23 (e); 7 Am. Jur.2d, Attorneys at Law, Sec. 27. Thomas E. Belcher, of Abbeville, Pro Se.
Messrs. Daniel R. McLeod, Attorney General, and GradyL. Patterson, Jr., and Julian L. Johnson, Assistant AttorneysGeneral, of Columbia, for Complainant, cite: As to a disciplinaryaction against a member of the bar not being acriminal action, but is a civil proceeding brought not topunish, but to protect the public, courts, and the profession: 237 S.C. 316, 117 S.E.2d 300; 123 A.L.R. 779; 161 S.C. 263, 159 S.E. 627; 33 N.W.2d 145. As to thesubmission of forged or deceptive documents to the Courthaving always been deemed sufficient grounds for the disbarmentof an attorney: 170 P.2d 763; 81 S.C. 290; 367 P.2d 148; 36 N.E.2d 243; 7 C.J.S., Attorney and Client, Sec. 23 (e); 7 Am. Jur.2d, Attorneys at Law, Sec. 27; 64 S.C. 461, 42 S.E. 433; 46 P.2d 647; 237 S.C. 316, 117 S.E.2d 300. Claude N. Sapp, Jr., Esq., of Columbia, for Respondent.
Messrs. Daniel R. McLeod, Attorney General, James S.Verner and William F. Austin, Assistant Attorneys General, of Columbia, for Complainants, cite: As to actions of theChairman of the Panel not being such as to disqualify him: 48 C.J.S. 1059, 1061; 12 S.E.2d 701, 196 S.C. 186; 116 S.C. 77, 106 S.C. 855; 57 S.C. 142, 35 S.E. 537; 48 C.J.S., Par. 94. As to the Attorney General properlytaking part in this matter: 49 S.C. 199, 27 S.E. 52; 78 S.E. 227, 94 S.C. 414; 159 S.E. 627, 161 S.C. 263. As tothe new rules not giving to witnesses before a Hearing Panelany immunity from prosecution for any perjury committed: 22 C.J.S. 1381; 42 S.E.2d 585, 210 S.C. 353. As tothe attempt of a person, especially an attorney, to procureanother person to give false testimony being a crime: 1 McCord 31, 1 McCord 349; 70 C.J.S., Perjury, Par. 80; 62 S.E. 406, 81 S.C. 290. As to testimony of one witness, asto what another witness told him the day after the accident,being competent: 69 S.E.2d 363, 221 S.C. 91; 137 S.C. 145, 134 S.E. 885; 58 Am. Jur. 463, 464. As to the taperecordings being admissible: 137 S.C. 145, 134 S.E. 885; 58 A.L.R.2d 1024, Annos.; 64 Nev. 514, 186 P.2d 351; 269 F.2d 80. As to errors, if any committed, notbeing such as to affect the results nor warrant setting asidethe findings of the Panel and Board: 94 S.E.2d 886, 230 S.C. 164; 87 S.E.2d 287, 227 S.C. 138. Messrs. S.S. Tison, Sr., of Bennettsville, and J.C. Hare and G.M. Howe, Jr., of Charleston, for S.S. Tison, Jr., cite: As to Respondent not being guilty of subornation of perjury: 240 N.C. 113, 81 S.E.2d 191; 63 S.E. 860, 5 Ga. App. 701; 92 S.E.2d 401, 244 N.C. 53; 100 S.E.2d 366, 247 N.C. 208, 63 A.L.R.2d 820; 28 S.E.2d 100, 223 N.C. 711; 70 C.J.S. 457, Perjury, Sec. 1a (1); 70 C.J.S. 548, Perjury, Sec. 79a; 70 C.J.S. 476, Perjury, Sec. 20a; 4 S.E. 793, 28 S.C. 18; 141 S.E. 1
Action in partition by Susan A. Corley and John R. McGraw against T.R. Hoyt and others. From decree of partition eliminating the defendants, T.A. Whittle and James Whittle, from participation, said defendants appeal. Mr. Barnard B. Evans, for appellants, cites: Statute ofDistributions construed: 14 Rich. Eq. 105; 3 Strob. 39; 102 S.C. 361; 89 S.C. 198; Riley Eq. 123. Deed conveyeda life estate: 102 S.C. 227; 102 S.C. 261; 88 S.C. 298; 51 S.C. 557. Remainder in fee passed at death of grantorto his heirs, before death of life tenant: 102 S.C. 261. Heirs of pre deceased child do not take: 102 S.C. 227. Man not seen for 20 years is presumed dead: 81 S.C. 290. As to the law of the case generally: 22 S.C. 512; 10 S.C. 386; 26 S.C. 450; 65 S.C. 396; 44 S.C. 503; 65 S.C. 348; 67 S.C. 130; 63 S.C. 205; 162 U.S. 439; 102 S.C. 7; 102 S.C. 41; 101 S.C. 424; 69 S.C. 294; 48 S.C. 341; 69 S.C. 285. Messrs. Ramage Crouch, J.W. Thurmond, D.S. Henderson,N.G. Evans, and Humphries Humphries for respondent, cite: Deed created fee conditional: 90 S.C. 474; 99 S.C. 308; 48 S.C. 440; 103 S.C. 203; 94 S.C. 308. Life tenant having no heirs of the body there was reversionto the heirs of grantor: 31 S.C. 27; 81 S.C. 285; 17 S.C. 551; 11 A. E. Enc. L. (2nd Ed.) 370; 91 S.C. 493. Reversion was to heirs of grantor at his death: 102 S.C. 370. Statute of Distributions, Sec. 3555, 1 Civ. Code 1912, Secs. 2, 6. Representation not admitted beyond brothersand sisters' children: 2 Bay; 3 DeS. Eq. 418; Dud. Eq. 212.
They recognizedhuman frailty and provided a way of escape in the event ofan excusable neglect: 108 S.C. 49. The Circuit Courtshould have set aside the judgment on the ground of a violationof professional ethics, on the part of Langford Richardson,attorneys at law. The Supreme Court exercisescontrol over attorneys at law even as to their fees: 84 S.C. 458. During the past one hundred and thirty-six years onlyfour members have been disbarred or suspended: 12 S.C.L. (1 McC.) 379; 81 S.C. 290; 94 S.C. 414; 97 S.C. 37. Mr. Jas. M. Richardson, for respondent, submits: Theappellant, by his motion, evidently intended to seek reliefunder section 225 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which isaddressed to the discretion of the Court, and this Court willnot exercise jurisdiction unless it be shown that there hasbeen an abuse of discretion by the Circuit Court: 17 S.C. 451; 38 S.C. 506; 51 S.C. 405; 53 S.C. 224; 64 S.C. 338; 70 S.C. 160; 82 S.C. 504; 93 S.C. 496; 105 S.C. 421. Appellant does not show excusable neglect, and, therefore,is not entitled to relief: 102 S.C. 357. Appellant has filedno certificate as required by Circuit Court Rule 19, showingthat he has a good and substantial defense upon the merits,and such omission is fatal: 107 S.C. 482. A judgmentought not to be opened for excusable neglect alone; thereshould be a prima facie showing that the judgment is wrong;and that the party sued has a good defense to the stated causeof action: 105 S.C. 421; 93 S.C. 496. The discret