Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County No. CK37116, Stanley Genser, Commissioner.
Konrad S. Lee, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Appellant.
Andrea Sheridan Ordin, County Counsel, James M. Owens, Assistant County Counsel, Aileen Wong, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
RUBIN, J.
P.C. appeals from the dependency court’s foster care placement order for her son, D.T. After the notice of appeal was filed, the child was placed elsewhere, making the appeal moot. We therefore dismiss the appeal.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In May 2010, respondent Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) filed a petition asking the dependency court to take jurisdiction of 12-year-old D.T. because his mother, P.C., had injured him while hitting him with a belt. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 300, subds. (a), (b).) On July 23, 2010, the court placed D.T. in foster care with E.L., a family friend, over mother’s objection that E.L. would obstruct her attempt to reunify with the child. On September 9, 2010, the dependency court took jurisdiction of D.T. under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (a) after mother submitted on an allegation that she hit D.T. with a belt and scratched his face. The court ordered reunification services for mother and continued D.T.’s foster care placement with E.L.
The subdivision (b) allegation was dismissed. The petition also included allegations against D.T.’s alleged father, however we do not discuss those allegations because the alleged father is not a party to this appeal.
On September 29, 2010, mother filed a notice of appeal. On December 17, 2010, DCFS placed the minor in another foster care home. In January 2011, DCFS again switched the minor to a new foster care home. On December 28, 2010, mother filed an opening appellate brief that raised one issue: the dependency court’s order placing D.T. with E.L.
Evidence of the new placements appears in a DCFS status report that was prepared for a February 2011 status hearing. Respondent asked us to take additional evidence of that report, along with the dependency court’s minute order from the February hearing, where the court states it had read and considered the status report. Respondent’s motion also cited Evidence Code sections 452 and 459, which concern the taking of judicial notice. Because respondent’s motion was unopposed, and no appellate reply brief was filed, we deem the motion as one for judicial notice, which we grant.
DISCUSSION
DCFS contends that the appeal is moot because the minor is no longer placed with E.L. An appeal becomes moot when, through no fault of the respondent, something happens that makes it impossible for the appellate court to grant the appellant effective relief. (In re Esperanza C. (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1042, 1054-1055.) We decide on a case-by-case basis whether subsequent acts or events in a dependency case have rendered the appeal moot and whether our decision would affect the outcome of the case in a later proceeding. (Id. at p. 1055.) We will dismiss an appeal that has become moot. (In re Dani R. (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 402, 404 (Dani R.).)
In Dani R., supra, 89 Cal.App.4th 402, the mother appealed from a dependency court order that denied her request for reunification services with her child. While the appeal was pending, the dependency court granted the mother’s new petition for reunification services. The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal because the mother’s subsequent receipt of the services the dependency court had originally denied her made the appeal moot. (Id. at p. 406.)
In In re C.C. (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1481 (C.C.), the mother appealed from a dependency court order denying her request for monitored visitation with her child. While the appeal was pending, the dependency court restored monitored visitation and terminated its jurisdiction. The Court of Appeal believed the appeal was moot because the subsequent order provided the mother with the very relief she had been seeking, but decided to reach the merits of the appeal anyway. (Id. at pp. 1488-1489.)
This case falls squarely within the parameters of Dani R. and C.C. The appeal in this case is based on an order placing the minor with someone mother found objectionable. As in both Dani R. and C.C., while the appeal was pending, mother effectively obtained the relief she requested when the minor was removed from E.L.’s home and placed somewhere else. Therefore, the appeal is moot.
DISPOSITION
The appeal is dismissed.
WE CONCUR: BIGELOW, P.J., FLIER, J.