Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Alameda County Super. Ct. No. J160939.
Siggins, J.
J.B. is the guardian of C.S. Many years after J.B. and her husband David were appointed legal guardians of C.S. and his sister, D.S., the juvenile court sustained a modification petition filed by the Alameda County Department of Social Services. The court reinstated its jurisdiction over both minors and removed J.B. and her husband as D.S.’s legal guardians, but it dismissed the dependency as to C.S. and ordered him returned to their home.
This appeal challenges only the order reinstating jurisdiction over C.S. J.B. maintains the order is a “legal absurdity” because the same facts relied upon to support the order sustaining the allegations of the modification petition cannot also support dismissal of the dependency and return of C.S. to her home. We will not address J.B.’s claim on the merits because any issues concerning the validity of the jurisdictional order were rendered moot by the order dismissing C.S.’s dependency.
BACKGROUND
J.B. and David became the minors’ legal guardians in 1995. The current dependency proceedings were initiated in October 2009, when D.S. was 17 and C.S. was 15. The two were removed from their guardians’ home following a violent altercation between C.S. and David.
C.S. told the assigned child welfare worker that David punched him in the chest and stomach while D.S. tried to restrain him from fighting with David. C.S. said: “[T]his is ‘nothing’ because it happens all the time, ” and that he did not want to talk about it because “nothing will ever change and no one will ever be able to help.” He also said that when he was in danger at home he stayed with friends and that he did not need help from the Department because it would only cause him more problems.
C.S. told the case worker that D.S. often was locked inside the house. She was punished more than he was because he was rarely home. David got drunk at least twice a week and then would fight with C.S. and others. However, C.S. told the case worker that “he’s not afraid of anything and... that if he’s gonna die, then he is ready because it’s gonna happen sometime in his life.” C.S. had excessive absences from his school, Seneca Center, many of which were unexplained.
D.S. said David was drinking on the day he fought with C.S. and that he repeatedly punched C.S. in the face and choked him. She reported a history of chronic beatings, verbal abuse, and being locked inside the home as punishment. The family had been referred to the Department for sexual and physical abuse and neglect a number of times over the years, but the only substantiated allegation concerned a 2001 incident in which J.B. beat D.S. for bedwetting. The family was offered parenting classes and counseling at that time, but apparently did not avail themselves of the services.
David and J.B. denied abusing the children in any way. They told the case worker that C.S. stole money and didn’t listen to them, and that D.S. was a liar. As to the altercation, David said C.S. attacked him with a crowbar and that David merely held the boy down on the ground to defend himself.
The Department filed a supplemental petition that alleged C.S. and D.S. were subject to physical and emotional abuse. In addition to the allegations stemming from the October 2009 altercation, the petition alleged that J.B. would slap D.S. and pull her hair; that D.S. feared for her and C.S.’s safety because of ongoing physical abuse; that the guardians emotionally abused D.S. and called her names; that David drank to excess and beat C.S. when under the influence; that C.S. had attempted suicide and D.S. had threatened to kill herself; and that the guardians lied to C.S. and D.S. by telling them that they were adopted and their mother was dead.
The juvenile court ordered both minors detained and ordered the Department to provide reunification services and supervised visitation. The Department was granted discretion to release C.S., but not D.S., back to David and J.B.’s home.
The Department’s initial jurisdiction/disposition report recommended that the minors be declared dependents of the court and the guardians receive family reunification services. D.S., who was to turn 18 in less than a year, did not want to return home, but C.S. did. The child welfare worker’s report said it would be best if C.S. remained in foster care until David and J.B. “have demonstrated conclusively, through attendance in anger management classes, family therapy, a parenting teens class, and, for [David], substance abuse testing and counseling, and that they have learned and are committed to changed behaviors.”
The Department later changed its recommendation to decline services because the guardians failed to take advantage of the numerous services they had been offered. Up until the recent altercation, they had refused services from the Seneca Center. Since then they attended three family therapy sessions, but arrived 30 minutes late for one and 45 minutes late for another. J.B. refused to attend family therapy appointments in six different time slots and only agreed to attend on Friday afternoons, when she was told it was not possible. She and David refused to let the child welfare worker attend a meeting regarding C.S.’s Individualized Education Plan.
C.S. was temporarily placed with David and J.B.’s adult son, S.B. After some time with S.B., his behavior deteriorated and the case worker said he was pulled back into the guardians’ “orbit.” On several occasions he lost his temper and left school without permission, and one of those times he was involuntarily hospitalized after he began head banging when the police were called. He had spent the previous night, and probably more, at David and J.B.’s home, and there were numerous indications that, contrary to court orders, he was having substantial unsupervised contact with David and J.B. C.S. also missed school on a number of occasions and was suspended from riding the school bus.
The case worker believed it was unsafe to honor C.S.’s desire to return to the guardians’ care unless David and J.B. participated in family therapy, anger management classes and, as to David, alcoholism treatment. Meanwhile, D.S. was living with her biological maternal aunt, where she was doing well, and “made it clear that she does not wish to live with the [guardians] again after many years of abuse.”
In a subsequent addendum report, the Department recommended that the court terminate the guardianship and refer both children to the Permanent Youth Connection program, rather than family reunification, for child welfare services. Both children were receiving therapeutic and educational services to help them in their transition to emancipation.
The contested hearing on jurisdiction and disposition consumed days of testimony and argument over a six-month period. On June 18, 2010, the juvenile court announced its decision. It said: “This has been an incredibly long hearing for everyone. I know that not everything I do is going to make someone happy in this order; but, unfortunately, that’s not my role. I have read and considered every report involved in this case. I went back and I reviewed every order, every motion. I took copious notes of every witness including, of course, the CALICO tapes. I have considered the conversations I had in chambers with the minors. [¶] The Court has also considered the testimony and demeanor of the witnesses while they testified and the arguments of all counsel. [¶] The Court finds that the allegations in the petition are sustained by a preponderance of the evidence, and that [C.S.] and [D.S.] are children described by Welfare and Institutions Code Section 300.”
These were interviews with C.S. and D.S., taped shortly after the altercation between David and C.S.
The court declared the minors to be dependents. It found clear and convincing evidence supporting D.S.’s removal from her guardians’ custody; set aside the guardianship as to her; and committed her to the Department’s custody for placement with her maternal aunt. The court dismissed the dependency case as to C.S. and ordered that he be returned to David and J.B.’s home.
J.B.’s appeal challenges only the jurisdictional findings that C.S. was a dependent minor. David did not appeal.
DISCUSSION
J.B. makes only one argument: that the juvenile court could not properly sustain the petition as to C.S., dismiss the petition and order him returned to his guardians’ care because, taken together, the orders amount to “an idle act – a legal absurdity – which effectuated no legal purpose, but which, nevertheless, prejudiced appellant.” The Department responds that the appeal is moot because a decision to reverse the jurisdictional order “ ‘can have no practical impact or provide the parties effectual relief. [Citation.]’ ” (van’t Rood v. County of Santa Clara (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 549, 560.) We agree.
It is undisputed that the juvenile court returned C.S. to his guardians’ custody and dismissed the dependency case over him. In light of this disposition, the question is whether the court’s jurisdictional findings and order may have some potential adverse effect on J.B. that could be relieved on appeal. “ ‘As a general rule, “an appeal presenting only abstract or academic questions is subject to dismissal as moot.” ’ [Citation.] However, where a judgment dismissing the dependency action is challenged on appeal the case ‘is not moot if the purported error is of such magnitude as to infect the outcome of [subsequent proceedings] or where the alleged defect undermines the juvenile court’s initial jurisdictional finding’ ” and exercise of that jurisdiction “has resulted in orders which continue to adversely affect appellant.” (In re Joshua C. (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 1544, 1547-1548, final italics added; In re Michelle M. (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 326, 330.) “[D]ismissal for mootness in such circumstances is not automatic, but ‘must be decided on a case-by-case basis.’ [Citations.]” (In re C.C. (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1481, 1488.)
J.B. does not identify any such adverse effect here and neither do we. C.S. was returned to her custody and his dependency case was dismissed. J.B. nonetheless suggests her appeal is not moot because “[i]t is entirely possible that this family may again come under the purview of the Department, since it has been the past subject of child welfare referrals and the court retains jurisdiction over [C.S.]” because of the guardianship, and “[t]he outcome of this case could affect how a court may view potential future cases brought by the Department.” The concern is entirely speculative. “[T]he judicial function is the determination of actual controversies between parties and the court may not concern itself with settling abstract questions of law which may never be involved in an actual dispute....” (National Assn. of Wine Bottlers v. Paul (1969) 268 Cal.App.2d 741, 746.) J.B.’s observation that reversal of the jurisdictional findings will benefit her because “they will cease to be” does not persuade us that her appeal presents anything other than abstract issues.
The cases J.B. relies on are inapposite. In In re Joel H. (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 1185, 1192-1193, the juvenile court sustained allegations of abuse and permanently removed eight-year-old Joel from his great aunt’s custody, terminated the dependency, and placed the boy with his mother. The order terminating the dependency did not moot the great aunt’s appeal because the family history suggested a future likelihood that Joel could again be removed from his mother’s custody. (Id. at 1193.) In that event, the court reasoned, the jurisdictional findings and the order removing Joel from his great aunt’s custody would have res judicata effect and prevent a court from considering her for placement. (Ibid.) “Under these circumstances, a determination that the appeal is not moot will further the protection of the child, which is the primary purpose of juvenile dependency law.” (Ibid.)
In In re Hirenia C. (1993) 18 Cal.App.4th 504, 519-520, this court held that a possible de facto parent’s appeal from an order denying her standing in juvenile court proceedings concerning the foster child she raised with her former partner was not moot. Although the superior court granted the former partner’s adoption petition and terminated the dependency case concerning Hirenia’s biological parents, the appeal was not an idle act because questions concerning visitation and the appellant’s de facto parent status were still “very ‘live’ controversies.” (Id. at pp. 517-518.)
In contrast, J.B. has not shown that her appeal could have such effects. The juvenile court returned C.S. to her custody. He will turn 18 in less than a year. In these circumstances, the possibility that the jurisdictional finding will pose some obstacle to J.B. if C.S. is again removed from her custody before he reaches majority is somewhere between speculative and ephemeral.
We conclude J.B.’s challenge to the jurisdictional findings does not present a justiciable controversy. Accordingly, the appeal is moot and must be dismissed.
DISPOSITION
The appeal is dismissed.
We concur: Pollak, J., McGuiness, P.J.