Opinion
June 4, 2004
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
This memorandum of decision addresses a petition brought to terminate the parental rights (TPR) of DaM and AnN, the biological parents of DqM, born June 10, 1999. The Department of Children and Families (DCF or department) filed the TPR petition at issue on November 27, 2003, alleging that each respondent had failed to achieve statutory rehabilitation; the petition also alleged that AnN had abandoned DqM, and that no ongoing father-son relationship was in existence. For the reasons stated below, the court finds these issues in favor of the petitioner, and terminates both respondents' parental rights.
Trial of this highly-contested matter took place on October 20 and 21, 2003, and on February 5, 2004. The petitioner, the child and DaM were vigorously represented throughout the proceedings. Those parties submitted detailed, thorough and well-researched briefs which were of great assistance to the court in resolving the legal and factual issues suggested by the wide-ranging evidence in this case. AnN did not participate in the TPR trial.
Prior to reaching her majority, DaM was also served by her court-appointed guardian ad litem (GAL). The court (Cohn, J.) vacated the appointment of DaM's GAL on December 26, 2002. DqM's attorney also served as his statutory GAL.
The court file reflects that AnN was amply provided with notice concerning the juvenile court proceedings affecting his son, but he has never appeared for any scheduled hearings. No counsel has been appointed to represent AnN's interests. In this case, given AnN's unknown location and his total lack of involvement in DqM's life, appointment of counsel would serve no valid purpose.
The Child Protection Session of the Superior Court, Juvenile Matters, has jurisdiction over the pending case. Notice has been provided in accordance with the applicable provisions of the Practice Book. No action is pending in any other court affecting DqM's custody.
I. FACTUAL FINDINGS CT Page 8808
The Court has thoroughly reviewed the verified petitions, the TPR social study, and the multiple other documents submitted in evidence which included: court documents; DCF records; a resume; psychological reports; providers' records; a physician's affidavit; and a certificate of completion. The court has utilized the applicable legal standards in considering this evidence and the testimony of the numerous trial witnesses, who included: a clinical psychologist; a preschool intervention program coordinator; DCF social workers; and the child's foster mother. The court also received a report from DqM's GAL, who was subject to cross examination. In re Tayquon H., 76 Conn. App. 693, 705-06, 821 A.2d 796 (2003). Upon deliberation, the court finds that the following facts were proven by clear and convincing evidence at trial.
The Social Study for Termination of Parental Rights was submitted in evidence as Exhibit 3. Practice Book § 35a-9.
"It is well established that in cases tried before courts, trial judges are the sole arbiters of the credibility of witnesses and it is they who determine the weight to be given specific testimony." In re Antonio M., 56 Conn. App. 534, 540, 744 A.2d 915 (2000); see also In re Hector L., 53 Conn. App. 359, 366, 730 A.2d 106 (1999). "The probative force of conflicting evidence is for the trier to determine . . . In re Ashley E., 62 Conn. App. 307, 316, 771 A.2d 160, cert. denied 256 Conn. 910, 772 A.2d 601 (2001)." In re Jonathon G., 63 Conn. App. 516, 528, 777 A.2d 695 (2001). "The trial court . . . is not bound by the uncontradicted testimony of any witness . . . and is in fact free to reject such testimony . . . The trier . . . has the right to accept part or disregard part of a witness' testimony." (Citations and quotation marks omitted.) In re Deana E., 61 Conn. App. 197, 208, 763 A.2d 45 (2000), cert. denied, 255 Conn. 941, 768 A.2d 949 (2001).
Although DaM did not testify at trial, the department did not timely request the court to draw any adverse inference therefrom and, accordingly, the court did not advise her that such silence could be used against her in the TPR matter. Accordingly, the court has assessed the evidence and reached its decision in this case without drawing any inference from the respondent's silence. See In re Samantha C., 268 Conn. 614, 641, 651, 666 (2004).
Additional facts will be referenced as necessary.
I.A. HISTORY OF THE PROCEEDINGS
DaM was born on March 1, 1984. Now a high school graduate, DaM received special education services along with DCF's support in reaching this goal. DaM has worked at a fast food restaurant, at a local music theater, as a receptionist and child-care worker at her church, and as a part-time teaching assistant. (Exhibit 3; Testimony of ToM.)
When she was in her early teens, DaM commenced a relationship with AnN. Their child DqM was born on June 10, 1999, about three months following DaM's fifteenth birthday. DaM's involvement with AnN ended when the child was several months old, leaving the respondent mother to care for DqM alone. (Exhibit 12.)
DaM explains that she and AnN are no longer together because "she would rather be by herself"; she will not permit AnN to develop a relationship with his child. (Exhibit 12.)
DqM came to DCF's attention on March 10, 2000, upon a referral from the local hospital where DaM had taken the baby for treatment of his asthma. (Exhibit 3; Testimony of LaB.) DCF soon received additional reports from DaM's family indicating concerns for the respondent mother's oppositional behavior, lack of care for the child, financial needs and relative homelessness. Upon investigation, DCF found that the room in which DaM lived with her son was unkempt and unsanitary due to the presence of dirty diapers "covering the floor and filling the dresser." (Exhibit 3.) On March 12, 2000, when a family member reported that DaM was unable or unwilling to administer her child's asthma medication, DCF executed a 96-hour hold and took custody of DqM. (Exhibit 3.)
Through extended family arrangements, DaM and DqM had lived with various relatives. However the respondent mother consistently declined to comply with her family's expectations concerning her personal conduct, or her conduct toward the baby. (Exhibit 3.)
On March 15, 2000, the court (Swienton, J.) issued an ex parte Order Of Temporary Custody (OTC), finding that in placement with his mother, DqM was "in immediate physical danger from [his] surroundings." (Exhibit 4.) On that date DCF also filed a neglect and uncared for petition, alleging that DqM was being "denied proper care and attention, physically, educationally, emotionally or morally; . . . being permitted to live under conditions, circumstances or associations injurious to [his] well-being, and/or that his home cannot provide the specialized care which [his] physical, emotional or mental condition . . . requires." (Exhibit 6.)
Specifically, DCF alleged that DqM was completely dependent upon adult care due to his age; that he suffered from asthma but failed to receive adequate attention from DaM; that the conditions in which he lived with DaM were deplorable and unsanitary; that the child's father's whereabouts were unknown and that the father had no plan for the child. (Exhibit 6.)
I.B. EVENTS FOLLOWING THE OTC AND NEGLECT PETITION OF MARCH 15, 2000
On March 24, 2000, the court (Keller, J.) sustained the OTC and imposed specific steps upon DaM. Among other things, these steps required DaM to make progress in achieving basic parenting skills; to become educated about her child's special medical conditions; to cooperate with therapy as to the child's medical needs; to demonstrate appropriate behavior toward the child during visits; to cooperate with the process of identifying the child's father; to work with the foster family and Birth to Three services. As a minor, DaM still required stable housing for herself; her temporary custody was assigned to JeC, a maternal uncle, by the local Probate Court. Accordingly, the steps also ordered DCF to explore independent living for DaM, while facilitating visitation, expediting training so DaM could care for her son's asthma, and implementing the steps including visitation. (Exhibits 3, 9, 10.)
These steps were signed in court by both DaM and her then-serving GAL. (Exhibit at 10.) See footnote 2.
See In re Jennifer W., 75 Conn. App. 485, 487 n. 3, 816 A.2d 697, cert. denied, 263 Conn. 917, 821 A.2d 770 (2003) (statutory basis for "birth to three" program). The steps also required DaM to: keep appointments set by DCF; execute releases; secure and maintain adequate housing and legal income; refrain from substance abuse or involvement with the criminal justice system; keep DCF apprised of her whereabouts; and visit the child as often as permitted by DCF. (Exhibit 10.)
On July 5, 2000, both DaM and DqM evaluations by Nancy Randall, Psy.D., as ordered by the Juvenile Court. (Exhibit 12.) At the time, Dr. Randall determined that although DaM's "intellectual functioning falls within the range of mental retardation, adaptive behavior scales do not indicate that she would be appropriately diagnosed as mentally retarded." (Emphasis added.) (Exhibit 12; see also Exhibit 13.) Dr. Randall then proposed that despite her cognitive limitations, DaM could respond well to counseling and hands-on, supervised parenting education, learning "to do things in new ways" and thereby meeting young DqM's needs. (Exhibit 12.)
Dr. Randall is a skilled licensed clinical psychologist who has long experience in assessing the mental health needs of both children and adults, including adults affected by mental retardation and low cognitive levels. (Exhibit 14.)
On July 25, 2000, in response to Dr. Randall's recommendations, DCF referred DaM to the eight-week parenting class offered through the PIP program (Preschool Intervention Program) sponsored by CREC, a regional council providing specialized educational services. At this time, DCF also referred DaM to CREC's parent aide services. (Exhibit AA.) On August 28, 2000, DCF referred DaM for individual counseling at IOL, a local, specialized mental health treatment center. However, DaM refused the opportunity to participate in therapy at the IOL. (Exhibit 3.)
On October 30, 2000, upon DaM's no contest plea, the court (Keller, J.) adjudicated DqM to be an uncared-for child with specialized needs. The court imposed a second set of specific steps upon DaM. Largely reiterating the March 2000 steps, the court newly ordered DaM to participate in individual counseling at her high school; accept parent aide services; undergo substance abuse testing and receive services from the ADRC; work with the PIP program; and remain in residence with JeC. The court further designated a specific visitation schedule with which both the respondent mother and DCF were to comply. As to DCF, the court ordered the agency to "advise mother of child's medical, well child and other appointments to allow her to participate . . . [and] provide all counsel with copies of PIP reports . . ." (Exhibit 11.)
I.C. EVENTS AFTER THE UNCARED-FOR ADJUDICATION OF OCTOBER 30, 2000
On December 12, 2000, KlFC began extending family reunification services to DaM, while she was living with and receiving the support of JeC and his family. After a month of KlFC's preparatory services, DqM was returned to DaM's care, at JeC's home, on January 19, 2001. However, the mother-child reunification was short lived.
While the respondent mother lived with him, JeC attempted to help DaM address her problems with personal hygiene, chronic enuresis, and school attendance. (Exhibits 3, 9.)
On February 9, 2001, DqM again required hospital care for treatment of his asthma, fever, and vomiting. Although a follow-up medical appointment was made to ensure the child's continued good health after discharge from the hospital, DaM failed to bring DqM in for care as scheduled. (Exhibit 3.) In addition, by late February 2001, when DaM was nearing her seventeenth birthday, JeC reported that he was no longer able to meet the respondent mother's needs. As this maternal uncle was unwilling to provide a home for her or DqM, and without other resources, mother and child became homeless. After having spent one month under DaM's supervision, DqM was returned to DCF foster care on February 21, 2001, so that an appropriate caretaking living environment could be secured for him. KlFC's family reunification services for DaM were then suspended. (Exhibit 3; Testimony of ToM.)
DaM herself entered DCF foster care in March 2001, when the department submitted a neglect and uncared for petition along with an OTC. On March 27, 2001, DaM was committed to the care and custody of the department. In foster care, DaM continued to have issues with hygiene, enuresis and oppositional behavior. (Exhibit 3, 9.)
On March 8, 2001, DaM began receiving parenting instruction and support services from a CREC-trained parent aide. The parent aide services continued while DaM was in foster care; she successfully completed the program on July 12, 2001. (Exhibits 8, AA; Testimony of LaB.)
On May 11, 2001, at DCF's referral DaM underwent a multi-disciplinary evaluation at a local children's hospital. Consistent with the psychological conclusions reached by Dr. Randall, the hospital team found that DaM demonstrated anger and low tolerance for frustration. Although the team and the psychologist at DaM's school recommended long-term counseling to help her develop social skills, the respondent mother refused to participate in such therapy. (Exhibit 3.)
After many months, DaM finally agreed to attend individual counseling. On January 4, 2002, DCF referred her to CFS for this service. However, DaM advised the department that she was not comfortable working with CFS, and that she preferred individual counseling with her own pastor. DaM received individual pastoral counseling from January 23, 2002 though March 27, 2002; at which point she unilaterally discontinued this treatment. (Exhibit 3; Testimony of LaB.) Just after her 18th birthday in March 2002, however, DaM entered into an agreement with DCF, so that she remained eligible to receive training and assistance from DCF's adolescent unit. (Exhibit 3.) At DCF's referral, DaM participated in the life skills program sponsored by CRT, a local community group.
DaM was unable to obtain individual counseling at the high school identified in October 2000 specific steps, as she entered another school. (Exhibit 11; Testimony of LaB.)
In January 2003, DaM began working part-time at a church center, performing office work and providing some child care. (Exhibits 9, 13; Testimony of ZaR.) When DaM completed the CRT life skills program in March 2003, DCF actively attempted to engage the respondent mother's interest in a supportive housing setting, such as that sponsored by the department's Transitional Living Apartment Program (TLAP). In residence at the TLAP, DaM could continue to develop her independent living skills, eventually obtaining her own individual apartment supported by DCF's adolescent unit. However, DaM found the TLAP to be inconveniently located, and refused to follow DCF's recommendation. (Exhibits 9, B.)
On March 21, 2003, DCF referred DaM to the PIP program for therapeutic supervised visitation with DqM and additional parenting education regarding "safety, parenting skills, nutrition information and child development." (Exhibit 15.) This comprehensive, highly appropriate CREC-sponsored PIP program provided DaM with "two-hour weekly supervised visits as well as parenting skills/feedback." (Exhibits 9, 15, 16; Testimony of KrT.)
By the spring of 2003, DaM's reading skills had improved. She prepared for graduation from high school in the spring of 2003, and planned to continue her studies by enrolling at a local community college. (Exhibit 13.) However, on several occasions during the spring and summer of 2003, DaM left her foster home without notice, and spent days at a time living elsewhere without timely advising DCF, her foster mother, or DqM's foster mother of her whereabouts. In the summer of 2003, DCF offered to assist the respondent mother in obtaining placement with the Job Corps, to further hone her life skills and to help her develop a stable lifestyle. The respondent mother refused to participate in the Job Corps, but worked part-time as a teacher's assistant at a local middle school. (Testimony of ToM; ZaR.)
DaM remained enrolled with the PIP therapeutic visitation program in the fall of 2003. (Exhibit 16.) The petitioner initiated this TPR action on November 27, 2003.
During the summer of 2003, DaM's participation in the PIP program was deferred for a number of weeks while she attended a young adults' camp, to which she had been referred by DCF. (Exhibits 15, 16; Testimony of LaB.)
II. ADJUDICATION — DaM, THE MOTHER
In the adjudicatory phase, with regard to the allegation of failure to achieve rehabilitation brought against DaM, the court has considered the evidence and testimony related to circumstances occurring through the close of trial. Upon review, as discussed below, the court has determined that statutory grounds for termination exist as to the respondent mother.
"Under § 17a-112, a hearing on a petition to terminate parental rights consists of two phases: the adjudicatory phase and the dispositional phase. During the adjudicatdry phase, the trial court must determine whether one or more of the . . . grounds for termination of parental rights set forth in [§ 17a-112(j)] exists by clear and convincing evidence. The commissioner . . . in petitioning to terminate those rights, must allege and prove one or more of the statutory grounds." (Citation omitted.) In re Quanitra M., 60 Conn. App. 96, 102, 758 A.2d 863, cert. denied, 254 Conn. 903, 762 A.2d 909 (2000); see also In re Brea B., 75 Conn. App. 466, 469-70, 816 A.2d 707 (2003).
Generally, Practice Book § 35a-7(a) provides that "[i]n the adjudicatory phase, the judicial authority is limited to evidence of events preceding the filing of the petition or the latest amendment, except where the judicial authority must consider subsequent events as part of its determination as to the existence of a ground for termination of parental rights." However, the commentary to Practice Book § 35a-7 elucidates subsection (a) of the Rule as follows: "Postadjudicatory evidence may be considered in the adjudicatory phase in a termination of parental rights case alleging the grounds of no ongoing parent-child relationship or failure to rehabilitate. In re Amber B., 56 Conn. App. 776 [, 746 A.2d 222] (2000); In re Stanley D., 61 Conn. App. 224 [230, 763 A.2d 83] (2000); In re Latifa K., 67 Conn. App. 742 [, 789 A.2d 1024] (2002)." (Emphasis added.)
II.A. LOCATION AND REUNIFICATION EFFORTS
As a predicate to granting a petition to terminate parental rights, the court must find by clear and convincing evidence that "DCF has made reasonable efforts to locate the parent and to reunify the child with the parent, unless the court finds in [the TPR] proceeding that the parent is unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts provided such finding is not required if the court has determined at a [permanency planning] hearing . . . that such efforts are not appropriate . . ." General Statutes § 17a-112(j)(1); see also In re Ebony H., 68 Conn. App. 342, 348, 789 A.2d 1158 (2002); In re Amneris P., 66 Conn. App. 377, 386, 784 A.2d 457 (2001). Applying the requisite legal standards and construing the statute in accordance with § 17a-112(p), the court finds this issue in favor of the petitioner. She has met her burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that the reunification efforts extended to DaM were reasonable in this matter, and also by proving that DaM is unable or unwilling to benefit from the reasonable reunification efforts contemplated by § 17a-112(j)(1). In re Ebony H., supra, 68 Conn. App. 348.
"Although `[n]either the word reasonable nor the word efforts is . . . defined by our legislature or by the federal act from which the requirement was drawn . . . [r]easonable efforts means doing everything reasonable, not everything possible.'" (Internal quotation marks omitted, external citation omitted.) In re Mariah S., 61 Conn. App. 248, 255, 763 A.2d 71 (2000), cert. denied, 255 Conn. 934, 767 A.2d 105 (2001). "[R]easonableness is an objective standard . . . and whether reasonable efforts have been proven depends on the careful consideration of the circumstances of each individual case." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Hector L., CT Page 8850 53 Conn. App. 359, 372, 730 A.2d 106 (1999). Only "reasonable" efforts are required as "[i]t is axiomatic that the law does not require a useless and futile act." (Citation omitted.) In re Antony B., 54 Conn. App. 463, 476, 735 A.2d 893 (1999).
Section 17a-112(p) establishes that the provisions of § 17a-112(j)(3)(A) "shall be liberally construed in the best interests of any child for whom a petition under this section has been filed."
At trial, the present parties stipulated that no court had previously ruled regarding the propriety of continuing reunification efforts for DaM and her son.
II.A.1. REASONABLE EFFORTS FOR DAM, THE MOTHER
A review of the clear and convincing evidence impels the conclusion that the reunification efforts available to DaM were reasonable under the circumstances of this case. DCF provided the family with appropriate family treatment and permanency plans; case management services; and administrative case reviews. DCF appropriately investigated and then attempted mother-son reunification using DaM's uncle JeC as a family placement resource. (Exhibit 3.) When the reunification failed and DaM was committed, DCF arranged for DqM's foster mother to supervise visits at the child's foster home. Thereafter, DCF brought DqM to visit with the respondent mother at her foster home. During these visits, either DqM's foster mother or DaM's own DCF foster mother provided supervision, behavior modeling and parenting instruction on a direct one-on-one basis. (Exhibit 13.) DCF again attempted to reunite mother and son at DaM's foster home, although this effort also failed. (Exhibit 3.) Throughout, transportation has been provided to facilitate DaM's visits with DqM. (Exhibit 15, 16; Testimony of KrT.)
DaM has provided no basis, in law or reason, upon which the court could reasonably conclude that in extending reunification services, DCF is obligated to duplicate services already being provided to a parent through a coordinate program, or services which the parent accesses on her own. See generally In re Roshawn R., 51 Conn. App. 44, 56-57, 720 A.2d 1112 (1998).
Moreover, as described in Parts I.B. and C., DCF provided DaM with timely referrals to a wide variety of highly appropriate service providers, taking the respondent's cognitive level and emotional status into consideration when determining what "reasonable efforts" to make for reunification. DCF proffered services included: the CREC-PIP parenting class, KlFC's family reunification services; a CREC parent aide; a team evaluation at a local hospital; individual counseling at IOL and CFS; additional parenting education and therapeutic supervised visitation at PIP; CRT's life skills program; supportive housing through DCF's TLAP; and additional life skills through the Job Corps. In addition, DaM has received parenting instruction on a direct basis from the foster mothers involved in this case. DaM was evaluated by and had the benefit of recommendations from a psychologist after school, and she accessed individual counseling through both her school social worker and her pastor. (Exhibit 13.)
In so doing, DCF provided AnL services which were designed to meet her specific needs, not just "reunification efforts . . . provided to mentally healthy parents." In re Antony B., supra, 54 Conn. App. 479.
After her July 2000 psychological evaluation, Dr. Randall had recommended specific reunification services for the respondent mother including intensive, continued parent training "through the services of a parent aide or similar hands-on type of teaching," along with counseling to help her develop better judgment and an appropriate understanding of parent-child and service-provider related issues. (Exhibit 12.) The evidence clearly and convincingly establishes that by proffering the services described above, DaM had access to both such parenting education services and counseling opportunities that were appropriate to meet her psychological needs and cognitive levels. In re Antony B., supra, 54 Conn. App. 479. The PIP parenting education program in which DaM initially participated was sponsored by CREC, an agency dedicated to meeting participants' special educational needs. The services of the CREC parent aide and KlFC's family reunification program were similarly directed at meeting the respondent mother's need for hands-on instruction in how to care for her son. The referrals to individual counseling at the IOL and CFS offered appropriate opportunities for DaM to "develop better judgment" and caregiver-related skills, although the respondent mother declined to participate in these services. The parenting education and subsequent therapeutic visitation in which DaM participated at PIP was well-suited to the respondent mother's learning style and parenting deficits, also meeting Dr. Randall's recommendations; PIP instruction was rendered on an individual basis, dealing with subjects like basic hygiene and safety issues, clothing needs, and parent-child communication. (Testimony of KrT.)
The court credits Dr. Randall's July 2000 assessment that DaM required these services, even though the respondent mother "denied that there was anything wrong with the way she cared for her son in the past, . . . [and saw] no need for treatment or changes." (Exhibit 12.)
Although DaM's counsel would have the court find to the contrary, the evidence clearly and convincingly established that DCF met its obligation required to take the respondent mother's mental limitations into consideration when designating and extending appropriate reunification services. See Respondent Mother's Brief, p. 5 (January 9, 2004) (Mother's Brief). The department cannot reasonably be faulted for not having found a way to force a respondent parent to accept or participate in reunification services and programs, even while that parent is herself a youth committed to DCF's custody. See In re Mariah S., supra, 61 Conn. App. 257-58; see also In re Natalia G., 54 Conn. App. 800, 803, 737 A.2d 506 (1999). Through the clear and convincing evidence of the nature and bountiful scope of reunification efforts extended by the department in this case, the petitioner has met her burden of proving that reasonable reunification efforts were extended to DaM, as contemplated by § 17a-112(j)(1).
DaM has argued that the court is precluded from finding that DCF made reasonable reunification efforts because the department "failed to follow through with informing the service providers regarding mother's cognitive limitations," thereby leaving her needs inadequately addressed. Mother's Brief, p. 7. As previously discussed, however, the service providers in this case were each able and willing to accommodate the respondent mother's cognitive constraints, although DaM's lack of cooperation created barriers which prevented the success of most efforts. DaM rejected highly appropriate recommendations for individual counseling at the IOL or CFS, and she refused to cooperate with the proposal for long-term social-skills counseling tendered by her school psychologist and the hospital team. Moreover, DaM spurned the department's proffer of residential support at TLAP although this program had available individual counseling which like the other mentioned resources, which was appropriate to meet her needs. Thus, even if DCF could be found to have failed to adequately apprise PIP or any other provider of DaM's cognitive limitations,"[i]n light of the entire record, the failure to provide [such information], while a lapse, does not make the overall efforts of the department fall below the level of what is reasonable." In re Alexander T., 81 Conn. App. 668, 673 (2004); see also In re Ebony H., supra, 68 Conn. App. 350.
Through this and other similar arguments, the respondent mother has asked the court to find that she was entitled to a special level of attention and services from DCF, due to her noted cognitive limitations. However, DaM has also asked the court to acknowledge that notwithstanding these limitations, she has attained several worthy personal goals: finishing high school, working at lawful employment, and enrolling at a community college. (See Testimony of LaB, ToM, Dr. Randall.) While the court appreciates DaM's personal accomplishments, the respondent mother's cognitive limitations warranted the provision of reunification efforts that met her special needs through individualized parenting instruction and counseling. As discussed in Part II.A.1., DCF met its legal obligation to provide DaM with access to such appropriate services. Nonetheless, as discussed in Part II.A.2., DaM remains unable or unwilling to benefit from those reunification efforts that are reasonably appropriate to her case, notwithstanding her personal and/or academic achievements. In re Antony B., supra, 54 Conn. App. 479.
DaM may also argue that DCF's reunification efforts were not reasonable because the department did not provide her with written, specific care instructions, as Dr. Randall recommended in July 2000. (Exhibit 12.) Such argument also fails, however, as the court finds that the care instructions and parenting behaviors described in the March and October 2000 steps functioned as reasonable, albeit not exemplary, efforts to adhere to Dr. Randall's proposal. See In re Mariah S., supra, 61 Conn. App.; see also In re Alexander T., supra, 81 Conn. App. 673; In re Ebony H., supra, 68 Conn. App. 350. Moreover, specific written directions would have been of little, if any, benefit to DaM, given her inability or unwillingness to adequately respond to parenting-style instructions from authority figures, and her limited benefit from direct one-on-one modeling of parenting skills and care guidance extended through other teaching modalities. See Part II.A.2.
DaM may further argue that DCF failed to make reasonable efforts at reunification because the department never investigated her sister, FaM, as placement resource for her, instead relegating the respondent mother to foster care. This argument fails too, in view of DaM's admission that FaM had no room available for her. (Testimony of ZaR.) As FaM was unable to provide housing for DaM, it is unreasonable to assume that she could have hosted both the respondent mother and her young son. Accordingly, the court finds FaM's potential role to be of little weight in ascertaining the reasonableness of DCF's reunification efforts. Those efforts were overall not only appropriate, but abundant and meaningful in light of the respondent mother's adolescent status and specific circumstances, and in light of her young child's particular needs. See In re Amneris P., 66 Conn. App. 386; see also In re Alexander T., supra, 81 Conn. App. 673; In re Ebony H., supra, 68 Conn. App. 350.
II.A.2. DAM's UNWILLINGNESS OR INABILITY TO BENEFIT FROM EFFORTS
In addition, evidence adduced from both the psychological expert and experience over the years clearly and convincingly establish that DaM is unable or unwilling to benefit from reasonable reunification efforts, contemplated by the alternate prong of § 17a-112(j)(1). In reaching this as determination, the court fully credits Dr. Randall's well-founded opinions concerning the respondent mother's unresolved emotional issues and personality characteristics which render her unable or unwilling to timely benefit from statutory reunification efforts. As the court-appointed psychological evaluator cogently explained, despite the extension of valid and timely reunification efforts, the respondent mother "[u]nfortunately . . . has not been able to develop adequate parenting skills, despite the services that have been provided for her . . . She is likely to require long-term assistance from treatment providers to help with her own needs, and it is not likely that she could adequately meet [DqM]'s needs even with this help." (Emphasis added.) (Exhibit 13.) The court further credits Dr. Randall's grim prognosis that respondent mother's lack of ability or willingness to effectively absorb parenting instruction from others impels the result that there exists little likelihood that any additional training or instruction would bring this respondent to point where she could safely and effectively parent her child. (Testimony of Dr. Randall.)
In reaching the determination that DaM is unable or unwilling to timely benefit for reasonable reunification services, the court credits and acknowledges her March 2003 completion of the CRT life skills program. (Exhibit B; Testimony of ToM.) However, at her April 2003 psychological interview, DaM reported only that she had "learned to budget money and shop for discounts" although the life skills program's broad curriculum also teaches: personal hygiene; management of health and medical care; techniques for submitting school and job applications; job interview demeanor; basic home maintenance; and driver's education. (Exhibits 13, B; Testimony of ToM.) Although DaM had attended and completed the life skills program, it is apparent that she obtained only a fraction of the intended benefit. Moreover, any acquired benefit was likely to assist DaM in managing her own life, not preparing her for serving as a caring, communicative, cooperative parenting resource for her son. See Part II.B.
"The psychological testimony from professionals is rightly accorded great weight in termination proceedings." (Internal quotation marks and citation omitted.) In re John G., 56 Conn. App. 12, 24, 740 A.2d 496 (1999). See also Part II.B.
As discussed in Part II.B., Dr. Randall reached this cogent opinion after her second full, court-ordered evaluation. As the opinion is also consistent with the other evidence in this case, the court credits and adopts the psychological evaluator's conclusion, which expressly accommodated the age and needs of the child at issue when concluding that: "[DaM] has had a significant period of time in which to rehabilitate, yet she continues to show serious deficits in her parenting skills and judgment. It is not likely that she will be able to make significant progress on these issues in the near future. She has had many services offered to her, but continues to minimize her own need for change . . . It is not reasonable to believe that [DaM] will be able to take on care of [DqM] in the foreseeable future." (Exhibit 13; see also Testimony of Dr. Randall.)
Dr. Randall's opinion is consistent with other evidence which indicates that DaM is unable or unwilling to implement basic parenting skills, even when she has been offered the opportunity to serve as DqM's primary caretaker. When DCF attempted to reunify mother and son in January 2001, DaM had already participated in the CREC-PIP parenting education classes and had dedicated assistance from the KlFC family reunification program. Nonetheless, DaM was unable or unwilling to appropriately attend to DqM's special medical needs when the child was returned to her care; as found in Part I.C., the respondent mother failed to bring the child to the appointment that had been scheduled to make sure he received post-hospital care for his asthma. When DCF later offered a second effort at physically reunifying mother and son, DaM was unwilling or unable to agree to the reasonable condition that she cooperate with her own foster mother in caring for the child. Instead, DaM remained "unwilling to accept feedback and/or suggestions from her foster mother regarding DqM," and rejected placement of DqM in her own foster home "if she was not going to be the sole guardian of him." (Exhibit 3.) These experiences emphatically illustrates DaM's inability or unwillingness to benefit from reasonable reunification efforts, and her fundamental, immature unwillingness to put her child's best interests ahead of her own.
DaM's experiences with therapeutic visitation similarly show that she remains unable or unwilling to benefit from reasonable reunification efforts. As fully described in Part II.B., DaM demonstrated a low degree of cooperation with DqM's foster mother and her own foster mother when DCF promoted in-home visitation; the respondent mother either could not, or would not, adopt the proper child care and management techniques promoted by the supervising foster parents. (Exhibit 3.) When commencing PIP's supervised visitation/parenting program in the spring of 2003, DaM initially seemed ready to "become a nurturing, effective positive influence in her son's life;" however, the program staff soon observed that the respondent mother's progress was impeded by her rigidity, defensiveness and lack of cooperation, even though individual counseling and adjunct services had long been available to her. (Exhibit 15.) At PIP, DaM was functionally unable or unwilling to implement instruction related to providing effective discipline; to utilize program time for parenting, not personal, purposes; or to communicate with her child in a manner appropriate to his age. The respondent mother's fundamental rigidity, personality style, and resistance to professional intervention continued to interfere with PIP-staff's efforts to help DaM improve her parenting skills. By September 2003, after providing parenting-training for a number of months, PIP's program coordinator warned that the respondent mother could "only benefit [from that agency's services] if she commits herself to becoming a positive parent in her son's life." (Exhibit 16; Testimony of KrT.) As DaM has remained unable or unwilling to acquire the requisite level of commitment to the practical and functional aspects of serving as DqM's caretaking-parent, the CREC's-PIP services remain ineffective and their benefits are unfulfilled in this case.
While DaM sometimes demonstrated the ability to be "very personable and friendly" with the PIP staff, this attribute was only inconsistently apparent. In contrast, DaM's communications with young DqM inappropriately took place on a "peer" level. DaM could not, or would not, develop the ability to respond to her son as a parent should to a child, despite appropriate services and attention from PIP instructors. (Testimony of KrT.)
Moreover, as also discussed in Part II.B., experience shows that even when she has access to individual counseling as an element of reunification services, DaM is unable or unwilling to achieve effective a timely, sufficient degree of benefit. For instance, DaM rejected DCF's 2000 referral for individual therapy at the IOL. She refused to participate in long-term therapy to promote development of social skills, as recommended by the hospital team and her school psychologist in 2001. (Exhibit 3.) DaM was unwilling to engage in the individual counseling services at CFS in 2002, and she rejected the proffer of comprehensive individual support services through the TLAP program in 2003. DaM was unable or unwilling to benefit even from the pastoral counseling she had elected, instead prematurely terminating that therapy before its completion. DaM was apparently willing to accept individual counseling from her school social worker. However, the evidence clearly and convincingly establishes that while such therapy may have had a positive effect upon the respondent mother's ability to manage her personal affairs, it had little timely, therapeutic effect upon the respondent mother's parenting skills. (Exhibit 13; see also Exhibit 3; Testimony of ZaR.)
Reviewing the evidence in its totality, it is clearly and convincingly apparent that DCF's reunification efforts were thwarted by DaM's own behavior in failing to cooperate with or accept services, "not the conduct of the department." In re Amelia W., 62 Conn. App. 500, 506, 772 A.2d 619 (2001); see In re Ebony H., 68 Conn. App. 342, 350, 789 A.2d 1158 (2002). As DaM remains unable or unwilling to timely benefit from any reunification services contemplated by § 17a-112(j)(1), the petitioner has met her burden of proof on this issue. See In re Amneris P., supra, 66 Conn. App. 385 (parent must respond to reunification efforts in a timely way so as to assist the child).
DaM may attempt to argue that DCF failed to undertake reasonable efforts at reunification under the analysis utilized by In re Vincent B., 73 Conn. App. 637, 809 A.2d 1119 (2002), cert denied, 262 Conn. 934, 815 A.2d 136 (2003). Salient factual distinctions, however, render the Vincent B. result inapposite to the present matter. First, in Vincent B., scarce services were made available to the respondent father, while in the present case, DCF made multiple, appropriate services available to DaM. Second, unlike DaM, the parent in Vincent B. had successfully participated in "a long-term inpatient substance abuse treatment program to treat a lengthy alcohol addiction." In re Vincent B., supra, 73 Conn. App. 642. He had apparently achieved functional recovery, as in that matter "[t]he record shows no evidence of relapses." Id., 644. Third, the psychological expert in Vincent B. had formed her opinion concerning the respondent father's inability or unwillingness to benefit from reunification efforts based only upon an evaluation performed " prior to his successful completion of the treatment program." (Emphasis added.) Id., 646. In this case, on the other hand, there is no reliable evidence establishing that DaM achieved the necessary benefit from participation in individual counseling, although she herself had elected to attend pastoral counseling and confer with her school social worker, rather than participate in DCF-recommended services at CFS, the IOL, or through the TLAP. Fourth, the court-appointed psychologist in the present case rendered serial evaluations over time, allowing her to consider the nature and extent of services proffered to the respondent mother, and to assess the degree, if any, to which she had agreed to participate in services and/or had progressed in ameliorating her parenting deficits. Dr. Randall's reliable data thus differed markedly, in nature and degree, from that available to the In re Vincent B. expert. Fifth, based on this reliable data, Dr. Randall clearly and convincingly established that, from a psychological perspective, DaM is unable or unwilling to successfully reap the requisite benefit from reunification services, again illustrating that the Vincent B. result is inapposite to the present case.
II.A.3. ROLE OF DaM'S FOSTER CARE STATUS
In addressing the § 17a-112(j)(1) issues in this case, the court has fully acknowledged that the department served as the legal guardian for DqM and DaM when both child and mother were minors. See § 46b-129(j); Parts I.B. and C. DaM contends that her own DCF social worker failed to provide the degree of support to which she was entitled as a youth committed to the DCF custody. Because of this "nonfeasance," DaM asserts that the department "may have obstructed the reunification between [her] and her son [DqM]," such that the petitioner cannot succeed in proving that reasonable statutory efforts at reunification had been made. Mother's Brief, p. 7. Through this contention, the respondent mother calls into question the interface between Connecticut General Statute Section 17a-112(j)(1) and Connecticut General Statute Section 17a-112(k)(7).
As aptly noted by DqM's counsel, this assertion is not pertinent to the question of whether or not the respondent mother is "unable or unwilling" to benefit from reasonable efforts at reunification, the alternate prong of § 17a-112(j)(1). Child's Brief, pp. 5-8.
The Appellate court generally addressed this issue in In re Victoria B., 79 Conn. App. 245, 829 A.2d 855 (2003). Noting that "[t]here is a distinction between a finding on reasonable reunification efforts under § 17a-112(j)(1) and consideration of the same under § 17a-112(k),"the court affirmed that the first subsection must be approved by clear and convincing evidence in the adjudicatory phase, as a prerequisite to termination of parental rights. In re Victoria B., supra, 79 Conn. App. 257. By contrast, § 17a-112(k) requires the court to make a written finding in the dispositional phase, which the court does not reach unless the adjudicatory criteria have already been met. Id., 558-59; see, e.g., In re Alexander T., supra, 81 Conn. App. 673; In re Eden F., supra, 250 Conn. 689; In re Baby Girl B., 224 Conn. 263, 293, 618 A.2d 1 (1992). The Victoria B. analysis emphasizes that as one of the seven statutory factors, a finding made pursuant to § 17a-112(k)(7) serves "simply as [a] guideline . . . to assist the court in its determination of the child's best interest, and [such] factor need not be proven by clear and convincing evidence." (Citation omitted.) In re Victoria B., supra, 79 Conn. App. 245. While similar facts or even identical evidence may serve as the basis for findings made pursuant to § 17a-112(j)(1) and § 17a-112(k), each legislatively mandated conclusion thus has a distinct burden of proof, and a distinct role in the outcome of the TPR case.
An objective review of the relevant evidence reflects that DaM's adolescent social worker provided an adequate, though not laudable, level of support in the respondent mother's personal life. This worker assisted DaM in addressing personal issues related to hygiene, dressing, education and employment by making appropriate referrals to the CRT life skills program, and to DCF's Key Services residential program when the respondent mother's placements disrupted. Although she made no specific referrals to individual counseling services, the worker received reassurance about the respondent mother's emotional status from the school social worker with whom DaM elected to share confidences even while rejecting multiple other therapeutic providers. When DaM began to demonstrate a pattern of rejecting the reasonable rules at her foster home during the spring of 2003, the adolescent worker failed to appropriately use this opportunity to make additional referrals for mental health assessment or treatment, either due to ennui or in response to the respondent mother's long history of rejecting similar counseling recommendations. (Testimony of ToM.) The respondent mother has invited the court to find that DCF's level of attention to DaM, the adolescent ward, was both sub-par and obstructive of the reunification efforts employed in this case. However, given the totality of the evidence, including the abundant evidence of DaM's refusal to participate in myriad counseling and support services offered to her in connection with DqM's case, as well as the respondent mother's failure to cooperate with or benefit from PIP's intensive parenting-education services, the court declines to accept this invitation.
However, even if it is found that DCF and/or its adolescent social worker failed to properly assist DaM in meeting her own day-to-day personal needs as a committed youth, such evidence would not preclude a finding that DCF had met its burden as established by § 17a-112(j)(1). As the petitioner has aptly commented, "[t]heoretically and in practice, a judge can make a finding under § 17a-112(k) that is somewhat favorable to the parent, and still [find a basis for terminating] the rights of the parent under § 17a-112(j). For example, in the case of In re Victoria B., . . . although the trial court found in its consideration of the seven factors of § 17a-112(k) that there was the existence of the parent-child bond, the court suit went on to find that termination was in the best interest of the child." Petitioner's Memorandum of Law (January 9, 2004), citing In re Victoria B., supra, 75 Conn. App. 262. Thus, although it does not reach such conclusion in the present matter, the court could find that DCF had a duty to provide adequate personal support for its adolescent ward, had failed to fulfill that duty, and even that such failure interfered with the maintenance of a parent-child relationship. However, such findings would not be fatal to the § 17a-112(j)(1) allegations where, as here, the petitioner has proved, by clear and convincing evidence, that the department otherwise made such efforts to effectuate mother-son reunification as were reasonable under the circumstances of this case, and that the respondent mother was unable or unwilling to benefit from such reunification efforts. In re Ebony H., supra, 68 Conn. App. 348; In re Amneris P., supra, 66 Conn. App. 386. See also Part IV.A.7.
Upon consideration of the totality of the evidence and the foregoing findings of fact, the court concludes "that the department had offered appropriate services and sufficient time for reunification of the respondent with the child, but the respondent had not taken advantage of the services offered and that, despite recent progress, given the nature and severity of her mental health problems and the uncertain prognosis for achieving stable mental health, it was unreasonable to conclude that she would be able to parent the child effectively within a reasonable period of time." In re Victoria B., supra, 79 Conn. App. 245. See Parts II.A.1 and 2. As such, the petitioner has met her burden of proving the reunification element established by § 17a-112(j)(1).
II.B. FAILURE TO REHABILITATE — § 17a-112(j)(3)(B) — DaM, THE MOTHER
The petitioner alleges that the court should terminate DaM's parental rights because she has failed to achieve rehabilitation within the meaning of § 17a-112(j)(3)(B). DaM counters that she has visited with DqM, and that she has made progress in acquiring the skills necessary to serve as a responsible parent for her son. As DqM was found to be uncared-for with specialized needs on October 30, 2000, the critical issue for this court is whether the respondent mother has achieved rehabilitation in the statutory sense. Applying the requisite legal standards and construing the statute in accordance with § 17a-112(p), the court finds this issue in favor of the petitioner.
It is the respondent's inability or unwillingness to function as a parent, now or in the reasonably foreseeable future, and not her cognitive limitations, personality style, or mental health status per se, that leads the court to find that DaM has failed to achieve rehabilitation in the context of this case. See In re Jessica S., 51 Conn. App. 667, 673, 723 A.2d 356, cert. denied, 251 Conn. 901, 738 A.2d 1090 (1999).
Several aspects of the clear and convincing evidence in this case compel the conclusion that DaM has yet to achieve a sufficient degree of rehabilitation with regard to her underlying issues of anger and hostility, poor judgment, and parenting deficits as would encourage the belief that at some reasonable date in the future she could assume a responsible position in DqM's life. See In re Daniel C., 63 Conn. App. 339, 354, 776 A.2d 487 (2001); In re Ashley S., supra, 61 Conn. App. 665; In re Sarah Ann K., supra, 57 Conn. App. 448. First, the evidence concerning DaM's psychological status clearly and convincingly establishes that her capacity to parent DqM has long been, and still remains, significantly impaired. The court fully credits the evidence adduced through Dr. Randall, the court-appointed clinical psychologist who based her thorough and detailed written opinions and testimony upon serial assessments which included appropriate testing of DaMs' cognitive and emotional functioning, review of DCF records, and collection of clinical data including first hand observations of the respondent mother's behavior in and outside the presence of her son.
DqM's attorney has provided a thoughtful summary of the clear and convincing evidence establishing the respondent mother's failure to achieve statutory rehabilitation. Brief on Behalf of the Minor Child, pp. 6-7 (January 9, 2004). (Child's Brief.) See also Part II.A.2. of this opinion, discussing DaM's failure to achieve rehabilitation in the context of her inability or unwillingness to timely benefit from reunification efforts contemplated by § 17a-112(j)(1).
Comparing the results of Dr Randall's separate court-ordered psychological evaluations makes it abundantly clear that DaM has not developed a satisfactory degree of improvement in her capacity to serve as an emotionally stable, mature, and dependable parent for DqM. Dr. Randall first assessed DaM's parenting capacity in July 2000, when DqM was a year old, having been out of the respondent mother's care for approximately four months. Based on her detailed, reliable evaluation, Dr. Randall concluded that DaM then lacked the elements of "intellectual skills, coping abilities, and emotional controls to provide consistent, nurturing care" for her child, who was completely dependent upon others to meet all his daily needs. (Exhibit 12.) Nearly sixteen and a half years old, DaM was overwhelmed by the degree of care that DqM required, yet her rehabilitation was significantly hindered by her underlying psychological unwillingness to seek help from others, her poor understanding of interpersonal relationships, compromised impulse control, and denial or minimization of her problems in meeting DqM's needs. Although she obviously desired to raise her own son, DaM self-centeredly "tend[ed] to allow her own needs to take precedence over his needs. This is potentially quite dangerous for such a young child." (Exhibit 12.)
See footnote 24.
As set forth in Parts I., II.A. and IV.A.1., many cognitively-relevant services were made available to DaM after Dr. Randall's first evaluation. Notwithstanding these referrals and DaM's involvement with the CREC-PIP parenting aide, parenting classes and KlFC's services, her pastoral counseling, and her meetings with her school social worker, the respondent mother had made little improvement in her parenting skills or emotional controls by the time of Dr. Randall's April 2003 evaluation. By that date, DaM had just turned nineteen and was ostensibly finishing her special education high school program; no longer an infant, DqM was nearing his fourth birthday, thus requiring consistent, reliable supervision from caregivers willing and able to meet the emotional and physical challenges presented by an active pre-school child. The court fully credits Dr. Randall's opinion that, psychologically speaking, it was still clearly and convincingly apparent that the respondent mother lacked the impulse control, emotional maturity and parenting skills necessary to meet her young son's particular needs. (Exhibit 13; Testimony of Dr. Randall).
The court-appointed psychological examiner reached this conclusion based upon DaM's still-apparent deficits in implementing appropriate ways to control DqM's behavior; her low threshold for frustration; and her persistent tendency to become overwhelmed; along with her limited cognitive functioning and concomitant difficulty in solving problems related to her son's changed developmental needs. (Testimony of Dr. Randall.) Poor judgment remained a problem with regard to DaM's ability to serve as a responsible parent; as Dr. Randall explained, DaM's participation in services had still not measurably improved her "limited understanding of things . . . and this interferes with her ability to make good choices with regard to herself or her son." (Exhibit 13.) Repeat psychological testing indicated that "even if parenting training was able to help her to provide adequate parenting at one stage of the child's childhood, it could not be expected to necessarily help her at a later stage." (Exhibit 13; Testimony of Dr. Randall.) DaM's acquisition of a diploma represented measurable progress insofar as the respondent mother's ability to meet her own, personal needs is concerned. However, despite the passage of time, DaM still had "little understanding of what kind of demands would be placed upon her to raise [DqM]." (Exhibit 13.) Thus, although the respondent mother had made some progress during the hiatus between Dr. Randall's two psychological valuations, by April of 2003 she was still not "very close" to being capable of serving as a responsible parent for the child. (Testimony of Dr. Randall.)
The court credits Dr. Randall's clear and straightforward testimony explaining that even if DaM could learn to take care of the preschooler, she would not be able to generalize that information and apply it to the care of an older child. Moreover, the respondent mother cannot recognize her own incapacity, and tends to blame those who attempt to help her for her own parenting failures. The constellation of these deficits leads to the conclusion that DaM lacks the underlying capacity to gain necessary parenting skills in the near future, so as to enable her to serve as a responsible caretaker for her child. (Testimony of Dr. Randall.)
In 2000, Dr. Randall observed that "it is questionable whether [DaM] will be able to earn a high school diploma or GED . . . [as] her reading skills are very low and do not allow her to benefit from written materials." (Exhibit 12.) As found in Part I.C., however, DaM has improved her reading ability, and has completed a local high school's special education curriculum. At the time of trial, Dr. Randall credibly opined that even if DaM had achieved apparent academic goals, these accomplishments would not in and of themselves, or in conjunction with any other progress that had been made, indicate any increase in the respondent mother's ability to solve child-care or parenting-related problems. (Testimony of Dr. Randall.)
In reaching the determination that DaM has not achieved the capacity to meet her son's particular needs, and that she is not likely to gain such capacity in the foreseeable future, the court has remained cognizant of the principal "that rehabilitation does not require a parent to be able to assume the full responsibility for a child without the use of available support programs. In re Jennifer W., supra, 75 Conn. App. 499; see also In re Luis C., 210 Conn. 157, 167, 54 A.2d 722 (1989); In re Migdalia M., 6 Conn. App. 194, 203, 504 A.2d 533, cert. denied, 199 Conn. 809, 508 A.2d 770 (1986)." (Emphasis added.) In re Victoria B., supra, 79 Conn. App. 253. However, the clear and convincing evidence establishes that even if adequate and appropriate supports were available for and extended to assist DaM in raising DqM throughout his childhood, the respondent mother lacks the psychological capacity to cooperate with such a support system. Despite her counseling and her desire to care for the child, DaM remains unable to form trusting bonds with others who seek to assist her. Although there are "family members in the area who have tried to help her out from time to time, . . . [DaM] has been unable to sustain strong relationships with most of these relatives over time." (Exhibit 13.)
Even if non-relative community support services were available to help DaM serve as a safe, effective parent for DqM, the respondent mother's less-than-satisfactory response to the PIP providers' efforts in 2003 clearly and convincingly establishes that she remains psychologically unable or unwilling to adequately utilize such a community support system so as to benefit her child, and ensure his physical security. (See Exhibit 13.) Moreover, as found in Part II.A.1., DaM has expressly rejected a number of applicable self-support services and placements that would have provided appropriate support for both mother and child. Thus, from a psychological perspective, the evidence clearly and convincingly establishes that DaM has failed to achieve rehabilitation in the statutory sense. In re Amneris P., supra, 66 Conn. App. 384-85; In re Sarah Ann K., supra, 57 Conn. App. 448; In re Ashley S., supra, 61 Conn. App. 665.
A second aspect of the clear and convincing evidence also establishes that DaM has not achieved statutory rehabilitation, and that she will not be able to play a responsible role in her son's life in the reasonably foreseeable future. The empirical evidence establishes that despite an initial expectation that DaM could progress in improving her parenting capacity, experiences with service provider show that the respondent mother remains unable, or unwilling, to develop the communication skills or emotional stability necessary to serve as a responsible caretaking resource for her child. (See Exhibits 3, A.) In re Jonathon G., supra, 63 Conn. App. 528 (court's province to determine which evidence, if any, is to be credited in a bench case); In re Deana E., supra, 61 Conn. App. 208. As such, she has failed to achieve a sufficient degree of rehabilitation within the meaning of § 17a-112(j)(3)(B).
See footnote 32.
Experience has shown that DaM has consistently rejected opportunities to utilize individual counseling, even though such services were necessary to assist her in achieving rehabilitation. (Exhibit 12.) Although DCF referred DaM to therapy at the IOL in 2001, in an effort to help her learn how to cope with her anger, frustration, and obvious parenting deficiencies, she failed to attend her scheduled appointment; did not reschedule this meeting; and thereafter refused to participate in counseling with this provider. (Exhibit 3.) In 2002, DaM similarly rejected appropriate individual therapy at CFS and refused to cooperate with the social-skills counseling recommended by the hospital team and her school psychologist. Thereby, she again bypassed the opportunity to address her persisting anger and parenting issues while her son was still relatively new to foster care. While DaM instead chose to attend pastoral counseling, she had only a very brief experience with this process; made little if any progress; and thereafter permitted only the non-specific counseling provided by her school social worker. (Exhibit 3; Testimony of LaB.)
Counsel for the minor child has chronicled the experiences which clearly and convincingly establish that DaM has failed to achieve the ability, or even the willingness, to provide appropriate, safe care for her son even in a highly structured setting. "[S]ince her son has been in DCF custody, [DaM] has been afforded at least three different opportunities for placements that would have allowed her to live with [DqM] in a situation where she would have the support of others to assist her in developing her parenting skills and working toward independent living. In the first instance, [DaM and DqM] were placed together in the home of [DqM's uncle, JeC]. The placement failed and [DqM] was returned to foster care . . . See Petitioner's Exhibit 13 at 3. [DaM] was also offered a placement with [DqM] at [TLAP] where she would have been provided with day-to-day supervision and training that would have assisted her in developing the necessary skills to independently parent her son. [DaM] declined that placement. Petitioner's Exhibit 3 at 10. Finally, DCF proposed placing DqM in the same foster home were [DaM] currently resides. Once again, [DaM] refused that placement, indicating that she did not want [DqM] living with her unless she could be his `sole guardian.' Petitioner's Exhibit 3 at 10." Child's Brief, pp. 6-7. See also (Exhibits 3, 9, 13; Testimony of LaB, ZaR.) DaM's explanation that she rejected TLAP because the location was inconvenient, and that she would not care for her son unless she could be his "sole guardian" demonstrates that despite working with the CREC-PIP parent aide, attending parenting classes, and receiving KlFC's services, DaM remained as inappropriately egocentric as she had been when her son was placed in DCF custody; she still inappropriately "tend[ed] to allow her own needs to take precedence over [DqM's] needs" as Dr. Randall had concluded in July 2000. (Exhibit 12.) The evidence which clearly and convincingly establishes that DaM has rejected safe, secure and child-based placements in the past, supports the firm inference that she will similarly fail to accept opportunities for such placements in the future.
"It is the right and the duty of the trier of fact to draw reasonable and logical inferences from the evidence . . . In considering the evidence introduced in a case, triers of fact are not required to leave common sense at the courtroom door . . . nor are they expected to lay aside matters of common knowledge or their own observations and experience of the affairs of life, but, on the contrary, to apply them to the facts at hand, to the end that their action may be intelligent and their conclusions correct." (Brackets, quotation marks, and external citation omitted.)
DaM's repeated experiences with supervised visitation similarly proves that she has failed to achieve statutory rehabilitation, as she still lacks the capacity to meet her son's particular needs. During the period in late 2001 when DCF arranged for weekly mother-son visits at the foster home, DaM was only moderately attentive to DqM's needs, and failed to adequately cooperate with the foster mother's apt parenting suggestions. (Exhibits 3, 9; Testimony of LaB.) DaM often responding to parenting instructions in an angry and obstinate manner. The department reasonably responded to this lack of progress by moving DaM's supervised visits to DCF's offices, where appropriate child-care instruction could also be given. (Testimony of LaB.)
In the fall of 2001, DCF arranged for a six-hour Saturday visit to be added to the mother-son visitation regimen; DqM's transportation to these weekend visits was to be provided courtesy of DqM's foster mother. After late May 2002, DqM's foster mother refused to provide any transportation due to DaM's hostility and oppositional conduct, however, so the Saturday visits had to be discontinued. Moreover, the uncontroverted evidence establishes that during the four-month period of weekend visitation, DaM took her child to a relative's home without approval; failed to return the child in time for his ride home; and demonstrated a pattern of rude, disrespectful behavior toward DqM's foster mother. (Exhibit 3.)
DaM's experience with the CREC-PIP supervised visitation program in 2003 further indicates that she has made only inconsistent and inadequate progress in achieving the rudimentary goals of understanding or applying fundamental precepts of child development, improving parent-child communication, learning appropriate discipline techniques or achieving other parenting skills (Exhibits 15, 16.) The court fully credits the testimony of the PIP program coordinator, a skilled, experienced, and certified parent educator, who explained that during the majority of the therapeutic visitation sessions, DaM was unwilling to accept instruction; only minimally focused on the program's curriculum, preferring to attend to personal matters such as phone calls; failed to provide DqM with an appropriate amount of physical interaction; and was unable or unwilling to communicate with the child in a manner that suited his developmental stage. (Testimony of KrT.)
Yet another aspect of the empirical evidence establishes that DaM has not yet achieved the ability to manage her frustrations and impulses, so that she could serve as a stable, reliable parenting figure for her young son. Commencing in the spring of 2003, when she was nineteen years old, DaM began to absent herself from her own foster home, staying out all night without telling the foster mother or DCF where she could be located. DaM left her placement on May 30, 2003; she was gone for four days. On July 19, 2003, DaM again ran away from her foster home; she did not report her whereabouts to her foster mother until July 22nd. On July 23, 2003, DaM again ran away from the foster placement. On July 30th, she reported to her foster mother that she had been running away to her sister's house in Hartford. (Testimony of ToM; LaB.) Such uncooperative, oppositional and immature behavior is strongly indicative of the likelihood that DaM still deals with frustration in an inappropriate manner, failing to respond positively to challenging situations but impulsively deciding to serve her own purposes without regard to the consequences. This conduct is inimical to the type of consistent and reliable behavior patterns required of a parent who is able, and willing, to provide the type of safe, secure and structured lifestyle required by a young boy such as DqM.
The empirical evidence related to DaM's "run away" conduct is consistent with Dr. Randall's opinion that the respondent mother presents a danger to her son because she has limited problem-solving capacity, poor judgment, and inadequate impulse control to make appropriate caretaking decisions for him. Dr. Randall explained that because DaM remains psychologically unable or unwilling to utilize objective information to solve new problems, the rigors of child-care would create a ceaseless supply of frustrating circumstances with which she is ill-prepared to deal in a healthy manner. Dr. Randall has opined that unless DaM was able and willing to modify her conduct, any child in her care would face an unreasonable risk of abuse when the respondent mother felt frustrated. (Exhibit 13; Testimony of Dr. Randall.) After DaM has had so many opportunities to achieve rehabilitation, without making a reasonable degree of progress, it would be unreasonable for a court to take such a risk on DqM's behalf. See § 17a-112(p).
In reviewing the empirical evidence indicating that DaM remains unable to serve her child in a responsible parenting position, the court credits and acknowledges the fact that she has made some progress in managing her own life. This progress is represented by, for instance, her 2002 decision that she should be transferred from one school to another due to poor relationships with other students; her participation in the CRT life skills program; and her ability to find employment and remain in school. (Exhibit B; Testimony of LaB.) However, there is insufficient evidence for which the court could reasonably conclude that these accomplishments indicate any improvement in DaM's significant parenting deficits, poor judgment in child-care related issues, or problems related to impulse control, frustration and hostility. Overall, while DaM may have improved her ability to manage her personal affairs, the clear and convincing evidence establishes that she still has not developed the critical quality at stake, to wit, the willingness and ability to care for the particular needs of the child at issue. See In re Amneris P., 66 Conn. App. 384-85; In re Ashley S., supra, 61 Conn. App. 665; In re Sarah Ann K., supra, 57 Conn. App. 448.
A third aspect of the clear and convincing evidence further establishes that DaM has not achieved a degree of rehabilitation that is sufficient to enable her to serve as a valid parent for DqM.: Although she has complied with some of the specific steps assigned to assist her in achieving rehabilitation, DaM has failed to fulfill a number of other, significant measures. For instance, although the specific steps required her to cooperate with DCF in identifying DqM's father, DaM refused information about AnN other than this name and a last-known local residence, hindering DCF's attempts to locate him. (Exhibits 3, 7, 8, 9.) When she lived at her own foster home, DaM somewhat complied with the step requiring her to maintain a residence. However, as noted above, she has rejected the opportunity to obtain stable housing by entering DCF's TLAP apartment, and in the spring of 2003 she developed a pattern of leaving the foster home without notice. Thus, while "[h]er plan is to raise her son by herself" DaM thereby failed to comply with the steps' implicit obligation to obtain a living arrangement that would also meet the needs of her son. Despite earning a degree and acquiring employment, DaM has made no progress in securing housing that would provide a safe, secure environment in which to raise the child. (Exhibit 13.)
DCF has conceded that DaM has complied with a number of the specific steps at issue in this case. For instance, she has maintained a responsible work schedule, continued in school, avoided involvement with law enforcement agencies, and has made progress in her ability to dress appropriately and tend to her own personal needs. (Exhibits 3, 9; Testimony of LaB, ZaR.)
Technically, DaM may appear to have complied with the steps' specific requirement that she visit her son as often as DCF permitted. However, as described above, DaM's uncooperative conduct towards DqM's foster mother led to the discontinuation of a valuable opportunity for her to spend time with the child on Saturdays. Moreover, even at visits, DaM did not consistently meet her son's needs, leaving his diapers unchanged, failing to provide him with food, and communicating with him in a manner not appropriate to his age and needs. (Testimony of LaB, KrT.) The visits were too often one-sided in favor of the respondent mother, and thus insufficiently productive to establish that she has the ability to maintain a stable parent-child relationship with DqM. See In re Michael L., 56 Conn. App. 688, 694, 745 A.2d 847 (2000); In re Amy H., 56 Conn. App. 55, 60, 742 A.2d 372 (1999). Thus, DaM's attendance at visits is insufficient to show that she has complied with the steps, or to demonstrate that she has achieved statutory rehabilitation.
"In determining whether a parent has achieved sufficient personal rehabilitation, a court may consider whether the parent has corrected the factors that led to the initial commitment, regardless of whether those factors were included in specific expectations ordered by the court or imposed by the department." (Emphasis added; citations omitted.) In re Vincent D., 65 Conn. App. 658, 670, 783 A.2d 534 (2001). Thus, even if it is found that DaM has satisfactorily complied with each of the specific steps, "successful completion of the petitioner's expressly articulated expectations is not sufficient to defeat the petitioner's claim that the parent has not achieved sufficient rehabilitation. In re Vincent D., supra, 65 Conn. App. 670." In re Jennifer W., supra, 75 Conn. App. 500. Applying these principles to the present case, the overwhelming psychological and empirical evidence establishes that the respondent mother remains limited by her persistent inability or unwillingness to identify and respond to DqM's needs, by her high level of frustration and low degree of impulse control, and by her failure to cooperate and effectively benefit from service providers. Thus, she has failed to achieve statutory rehabilitation in a timely manner, considering the age and needs of her young child.
Based on all the facts presented in this case, the court finds that DaM's rehabilitation is not foreseeable within a reasonable time. In re Daniel C., supra, 63 Conn. App. 353. In reaching this conclusion, the court has analyzed the respondent mother's relative lack of present rehabilitation as it relates to DqM's particular needs for a responsible parent who can provide him with emotional stability, security, and consistency. Even if DaM should now actively engage in rehabilitation, successfully attempting to address her psychological needs and resolving her parenting deficits, those efforts would be "too little and too late" for DqM given the three and a half years that have passed since his October 2000 adjudication as an uncared-for in child. In re Sheila J., 62 Conn. App. 470, 481-82, 771 A.2d 244 (2001). Having spent more than four years in foster care, young DqM should not be burdened by having to wait any longer for DaM to achieve a sufficient degree of rehabilitation that enables her to function as a responsible caretaker who is able to fulfill his particular needs. In re Amneris P., supra, 66 Conn. App. 385.
DaM's attorney movingly argues that she has demonstrated sufficient personal maturity and accomplishments to warrant the continuance of her legal relationship to DqM. Respondent Mother's Brief pp. 4-5 (January 9, 2004) (Mother's Brief). While finding this argument unpersuasive, the court fully appreciates the advances DaM has made in achieving the ability to manage her own affairs, along with the degree to which she has adhered compliant to the specific steps and, including those requiring that she visit her child. Moreover, in assessing DaM's degree of rehabilitation, the court has adhered to the axiom that "rehabilitation does not require that a parent be able to assume the full responsibility for a child without the use of available support programs . . ." In re Victoria B., supra, citing, inter alia, In re Migdalia M., supra, 6 Conn. App. 203. "Although the respondent's contentions are noble, she fails to apprehend the requirements of § 17a-112(j)(3)(B)." In re Vanna A., 83 Conn. App. 17, 23 (2004). A valid assessment of a parent's status not only requires the court to consider the parent's personal progress per se, but also demands that the court "analyze the respondent's rehabilitative status as it relates to the needs of the particular child" at issue. (Quotation marks omitted; emphasis added.) In re Amneris P., supra, 66 Conn. App. 384-85. "Thus, even if a parent has made successful strides in her ability to manage her life and may have achieved a level of stability within her limitations, such improvements, although commendable, are not dispositive on the issue of whether, within a reasonable period of time, she could assume a responsible position in the life of her child." (External citations omitted.) In re Victoria B., supra, 79 Conn. App. 255. Viewed from this perspective, the clear and convincing evidence establishes that any rehabilitation DaM may have achieved falls short of that required to meet the needs of her child at present, and further establishes that she lacks the capacity to learn to parent him as he grows and changes during his elementary, middle and high school years.
The respondent mother in In re Vanna raised a number of issues similar to those presented by DaM's counsel through cross-examination at trial, and emphasized through the Mother's Brief. The Appellate Court's opinion in In re Vanna was published on May 18, 2004.
In reaching this conclusion, the court has paid scarce heed to the petitioner's proof that DaM maintains a "messy room." The court has, however, fully credited the clear and convincing evidence relating to the respondent mother's long-standing problems with hygiene, tolerance for accumulation of debris, willingness to inhabit a chaotic environment, and her frequent inattention to DqM's sanitary needs. These latter qualities are indeed contrary to the provision of safe, effective parenting for a young child.
DaM also argues that her love for and continuing interest in parenting DqM outweighs any evidence that she has not yet achieved rehabilitation. As Dr. Randall aptly commented, it is clear that DaM "loves her son and wants to be able to have an ongoing relationship with him," even though she "lacks either the parenting skills that she would require to care for DqM or the understanding of her own deficits in this area." (Exhibit 13.) However, in a case such as this, DaM's love for the child and her ostensible commitment to caring for him ". . . is simply not enough" to overcome the abundant, clear and convincing evidence that she cannot be a competent parent to her son because she cannot provide him with the "nurturing, safe and structured environment" to which he is entitled, despite her efforts at rehabilitation. In re Ashley S., supra, 61 Conn. App. 667, citing In re Eden F., supra, 250 Conn. 707-08
In its totality, the evidence of DaM's accomplishments pales in comparison to DqM's needs for constant, adequate attention and supervision to safeguard his physical well-being; for emotional support and guidance so that his psychological needs can be met; and for a secure, predictable, and consistent environment that he can call home. Despite the meaningful efforts of DCF and other service providers, the clear and convincing evidence establishes that while DaM may have made progress toward becoming an adult, she still lacks the fundamental emotional capacity and social stability to serve as safe and effective caregiver for her young son. The degree of rehabilitation she has achieved "is less than that which would encourage a belief that . . . she can assume a responsible position in the child's life within a reasonable time." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Vanna A., supra, 83 Conn. App. 23. Psychologically, empirically, and in her less-than-full attention to the specific steps, the clear and convincing evidence in this case establishes that DaM has failed to achieve rehabilitation as contemplated by § 17a-112(j)(3)(B).
As the clear and convincing evidence establishes that DaM remains without the qualities necessary to successfully parent DqM and that she lacks the ability to assume a responsible position in his life within a reasonably foreseeable time in the future, the petitioner has proved DaM's failure to achieve rehabilitation pursuant to § 17a-112(j)(3)(B).
III. ADJUDICATION — AnN, THE FATHER CT Page 8832
In the adjudicatory phase relating to AnN, the court has considered the evidence related to circumstances and events prior to November 27, 2003, the date upon which the TPR petition was filed, insofar as the allegation pertaining to abandonment is concerned. With regard to the allegations of failure to achieve rehabilitation and lack of an ongoing parent-child relationship brought against AnN, the court has also considered the evidence and testimony related to circumstances occurring through the close of trial. Upon review, as discussed below, the court has determined that statutory grounds for termination exist as to the respondent father.
See footnote 18.
III.A. EFFECT OF DEFAULT FINDINGS FOR AnN
AnN has been the subject of multiple findings of default in connection with these juvenile court proceedings. On May 4, 2000, the court (Swienton, J.), found that despite due notice, AnN had failed to attend any of the court hearings related to the OTC or the then-pending neglect petition. In response, the court entered a finding of default against him with regard to neglect petition. AnN did not attend the October 2000 court hearing at which DqM was adjudicated a uncared-for child; on that date, the court (Keller, J.) found him to be in default. On December 3, 2002, following submission of the TPR petition, the court (Dannehy, J.) ordered that respondent father be provided with notice by publication of the proceedings scheduled for December 26, 2002. On January 8, 2004, the court (Burke, J.) ordered that respondent father be provided with notice by publication of the TPR proceedings scheduled to take place on February 5, 2004. On February 5, 2004, after hearing, this court found that the respondent father had been provided with full and fair notice of the hearings scheduled for both December 26, 2002 and February 5, 2004, as required by law and the applicable Practice Book provisions. As AnN had failed to appear at these hearings despite due notice, this court finds him in default.
Juvenile court proceedings concerning neglected, uncared-for or dependent children, as well as TPR matters, are civil proceedings as a matter of law. In re Samantha C., supra, 268 Conn. 641; General Statutes § 46b-121(a); Practice Book § 32a-2. As the pending TPR allegations against AnN are civil in nature, the defaults against him effectively admit the petitioner's material allegations related to location and reunification efforts. These admissions conclusively determine that the petitioner has prevailed on each of the elements at issue in the adjudicatory phase. Commissioner of Social Services v. Smith, 265 Conn. 723, 732-33 (2003) (parent who fails to respond to pleadings "is deemed to have judicially admitted the underlying facts of the support petition"); see also Bank of America, FSB v. Franco, 57 Conn. App. 688, 693, 751 A.2d 394 (2000).
In an abundance of caution, appropriate to the gravity of the TPR issues at hand, the court has further addressed the petitioner's presentation of evidence that satisfy the specific adjudicatory grounds alleged against AnN. See Parts III.B. and C.1., 2., and 3.
III.B. LOCATION AND REUNIFICATION EFFORTS — AnN
AnN has had no contact with DqM since the child entered DCF's care in mid-March 2000. His whereabouts have been unknown to DCF since that time, although the department made diligent efforts to locate the respondent father by attempting to elicit relevant information from DaM, contacting the Department of Corrections, inquiring of governmental support enhancement-agencies, searching local telephone service providers and using the internet. (Exhibits 3, 7, 8, 9.) The court has provided due notice by publication, as described in Part III.A.; however, AnN never made himself available for participation in these proceedings.
Moreover, the clear and convincing evidence establishes that AnN has never made any affirmative effort to learn about the health and well-being of any child that may have been born to him and DaM. He has never contacted DCF in an attempt to obtain information about the child. (Exhibit 3.) As AnN was functionally unavailable to DCF, it would have been futile and therefore inappropriate for the department to have extended any efforts at reunifying him with DqM. In re Antony B., supra, 54 Conn. App. 476. AnN's failure to make himself available for involvement with DCF, coupled with his failure to respond to the court's due notice concerning ongoing legal proceedings affecting the child, provides a clear and convincing basis for concluding that, as a practical matter, the respondent father was "unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts" contemplated by the statute at issue. Thus, the petitioner has further met her burden of proving the requisite elements of § 17a-112(j)(1).
III.C. STATUTORY GROUNDS FOR TERMINATION — AnN, THE FATHER III.C.1. ABANDONMENT — § 17a-112(j)(3)(A)
The petitioner first alleges that AnN abandoned DqM within the meaning of § 17a-112(j)(3)(A). In the absence of evidence to the contrary, applying the requisite legal standards and adhering to § 17a-112(p), the court finds this matter in favor of the petitioner.
Section 17a-112(j)(3)(A) authorizes termination of parental rights for"[t]he child [who] has been abandoned by the parent in the sense that the parent has failed to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern or responsibility as to the welfare of the child . . ."
"`Abandonment focuses on the parent's conduct . . . Attempts to achieve contact with a child, telephone calls, the sending of cards and gifts, and financial support are indicia of interest, concern or responsibility for the welfare of a child . . . Abandonment occurs where a parent fails to visit a child, does not display love or affection for the child, does not personally interact with the child, and demonstrates no concern for the child's welfare . . . Section 17a-112 does not contemplate a sporadic showing of the indicia of interest, concern or responsibility for the welfare of a child . . . The commonly understood obligations of parenthood entail these minimum attributes; (1) express love and affection for the child; (2) express personal concern over the health, education and general well-being of the child; (3) the duty to supply the necessary food, clothing and medical care; (4) the duty to provide an adequate domicile; and (5) the duty to furnish social and religious guidance.'" (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Deana E., supra, 61 Conn. App. 193.
A review of procedural history of this case, focusing on AnN's conduct, clearly and convincingly reveals that the respondent father has abandoned his child as contemplated by the statute. In re Deana E., supra, 61 Conn. App. 193. As found in Part III.A., the court has found in default because, despite due notice, he failed to appear at or to participate in the preliminary juvenile court hearings or the TPR proceedings. As found in Part III.A., the defaults against AnN thus establishes admission of the material allegation of abandonment, conclusively determining that the petitioner has prevailed on this ground. Commissioner of Social Services v. Smith, supra, 265 Conn. 732-33; Bank of America, FSB v. Franco, supra, 57 Conn. App. 693.
Other the clear and convincing evidence, focused on AnN's conduct, also establishes that he has abandoned DqM within the meaning of § 17a-112(j)(3)(A). From October 30, 2000, when DqM was adjudicated an uncared-for child, through the filing of the TPR petition on November 27, 2003, the respondent father failed "to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern or responsibility as to the welfare of the child . . ." In re Deana E., supra, 61 Conn. App. 193. The evidence clearly and convincingly establishes that during this period, and through the time of trial, AnN never contacted DaM or made efforts to ascertain whether a child had been born as the result of their union. AnN never requested visitation with DqM or communication opportunities of any type. AnN's whereabouts have been unknown to DCF since the submission of the original neglect petition. (Exhibits 3, 7, 8.) AnN has never acknowledged the child's birthday or commemorated other special events with him; never expressed love or affection; never communicated personal concern; and never supplied necessary financial support, shelter, food, clothing, medical care, social or religious guidance. (Exhibit 3.) In re Deana E., supra, 61 Conn. App. 193.
Thus, whether measured by the date on which the TPR was filed against him, or measured by the facts reflecting AnN's conduct as of the time of trial, the evidence in this matter clearly and convincingly establishes that the respondent father has failed the test of meeting "[t]he commonly understood obligations of parenthood" identified in In re Deana E., supra, 61 Conn. App. 193. Accordingly, based on clear and convincing evidence presented in this case, the petitioner has met her burden of proving that AnN's abandonment of DqM, pursuant to § CT Page 8835 17a-112(j)(3)(A).
III.C.2. PARENTAL FAILURE TO REHABILITATE — § 17a-112(j)(3)(B)
The petitioner next alleges that the court should terminate AnN's parental rights because he failed to achieve rehabilitation within the meaning of § 17a-112(j)(3)(B). As DqM was found to be an uncared-for child on October 30, 2000, the critical issue for this court is whether the respondent father has assumed the ability to assume a responsible position in his son's life. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, applying the requisite legal standards and construing the statute in accordance with § 17a-112(p), the court finds this issue in favor of the petitioner.
Several aspects of the clear and convincing evidence in this case compel the conclusion AnN has neither the capacity nor willingness to achieve a sufficient degree of rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that at some reasonable date in the future he could serve as a safe, reliable parent for DqM. See In re Daniel C., supra, 63 Conn. App. 354; In re Ashley S., supra, 61 Conn. App. 665; In re Sarah Ann K., supra, 57 Conn. App. 448. First, AnN has never even attempted to obtain any information about a child he may have fathered with DaM, despite published notice of court proceedings. He has never made an effort to contact the child, and he has never had contact with DqM, so that he remains an absolute stranger not only to the child, but also to the court. AnN's absence from court proceedings demonstrates his total disinterest in the child, and thereby emblematizes an overwhelming parenting deficit. (Exhibits 3, 7, 8, 9.)
Second, as a practical matter, AnN does not know his child, having never visited him. As Judge Rogers has wisely opined, "It is fundamental that a parent must demonstrate the ability to be consistent in his contact with his [child] in order to prove rehabilitation to the status of a responsible parent . . . If a parent consistently fails to visit with his [child], he is clearly not prepared to care for the [child] on a regular basis with or without services." In re Leonard N., Superior Court, judicial district of Middlesex, Child Protection Session (Rogers, J., Jun. 29, 2000). Even if support services could be made available to AnN, to assist him in caring for his son, the respondent father's lack of experience in interacting with AnN impels the entirely reasonable inference that he would be unwilling or unable to utilize such supports. See In re Kristy A., AC24000 (officially released June 8, 2004). As AnN lacks any experience in communicating with, attending to, safekeeping, or nurturing DqM, it is reasonable to conclude that he lacks the capacity to meet his young child's particular needs.
Third, although no specific steps were imposed upon AnN, due to his absence from court, the evidence clearly and convincingly establishes that the respondent father has failed to adequately "correct . . . the factors that led to the initial commitment . . ." In re Vincent D., supra, 65 Conn. App. 670 (issuance of written expectations is not a predicate to petition's proof of parental failure to achieve rehabilitation). AnN has never provided a physical home for the child, never protected him from the misguided parenting efforts of DaM, and never indicated any ability or willingness to meet his obligation as DqM's biological father. AnN's absence from his young son's life, having abandoned DqM to the care of DaM, is a factor that clearly contributed to the conditions causing the initial commitment. Given AnN's continued absence from his child's life, and his continued inattention to the legal issues pending before this court, it is clear that the respondent father's original parenting deficits have never been corrected.
Furthermore, based on all the facts presented in this case and the logical inferences drawn therefrom, the court finds that AnN's rehabilitation is not foreseeable within a reasonable time. In re Daniel C., supra, 63 Conn. App. 353. In reaching this conclusion, the court has analyzed AnN's relative lack of present rehabilitation as it relates to DqM's particular needs for a responsible parent who can, and is willing to, provide the emotional stability, security, and consistency the child requires at his young age. Even if AnN should now make himself available to DCF and/or to the court, actively engaging in rehabilitation and reunification efforts, such contributions would be "too little and too late" for AnN to achieve any timely benefit therefrom, in view of the many years DqM has spent in foster care. In re Sheila J., supra, 62 Conn. App. 481-82.
As the clear and convincing evidence establishes that AnN lacks both the qualities necessary to successfully parent his son and the ability to assume a responsible position in his life within a reasonably foreseeable time in the future, the petitioner has proved AnN's failure to achieve rehabilitation pursuant to § 17a-112(j)(3)(B).
III.C.3. LACK OF ONGOING PARENT-CHILD RELATIONSHIP — § 17a-112(j)(3)(D)
The petitioner next alleges that no ongoing parent-child relationship exists between AnN and DqM, that the child's best interests will not be served by allowing additional time for this relationship to be developed, and that the TPR petition should be granted pursuant to General Statutes § 17a-112(j)(3)(D). In the absence of evidence to the contrary, applying the requisite legal standards and construing the statute in accordance with § 17a-112(p), the court finds this matter in favor of the petitioner.
General Statutes § 17a-112(j)(3)(D) provides for the termination of parental rights "where there is no ongoing parent-child relationship, which means the relationship that ordinarily develops as a result of a parent having met on a day to day basis the physical, emotional, moral and educational needs of the child and to allow further time for the establishment or reestablishment of such parent-child relationship would be detrimental to the best interest of the child."
The relevant legal algorithm first requires the court to determine whether a statutory father-child relationship exists in this case. In re Jonathon G., supra, 63 Conn. App. 525. The clear and convincing evidence establishes that AnN has always ceded to others the privilege and burden of actively engaging in "the relationship that ordinarily develops as a result of a parent having met on a day to day basis the physical, emotional, moral and educational needs" of his child. § 17a-112(j)(3)(D). As discussed in Part III.C.1., AnN has never even attempted to assert any type of connection to or contact with his biological son. Moreover, DqM has never met AnN, and the child has absolutely no present, positive feelings for his biological father. In re Jonathon G., supra, 63 Conn. App. 525. As a result of the respondent father's failure to adequately respond to DqM's needs in any way, no statutory ongoing parent-child relationship exists between them.
Section 17a-112(j)(3)(D) "`. . . requires the trial court to undertake a two-pronged analysis. First, there must be a determination that no parent-child relationship exists, and second, the court must look into the future and determine whether it would be detrimental to the child's best interest to allow time for such a relationship to develop . . . In considering whether an ongoing parent-child relationship exists, the feelings of the child are of paramount importance . . . The ultimate question is whether the child has no present memories or feelings for the natural parent . . . Feelings for the natural parent connotes feelings of a positive nature only . . .' In re Tabitha T., 51 Conn. App. 595, 601-02, 722 A.2d 1232 (1999)." (Internal and external quotations omitted.) In re Jonathon G., supra, 63 Conn. App. 525. See also In re Brea B., 75 Conn. App. 466, 470, 815 A.2d 1261 (2003).
Moreover, the evidence clearly and convincingly establishes that it would be detrimental to the child's best interests to allow additional time for such a parenting relationship to be developed. In re Jonathon G., supra, 63 Conn. App. 525. To meet DqM's best interests a parenting figure must be able and willing to timely assume a caretaking role in the child's life; this role is well-filled by each of the child's foster parents. Considering the evidence in its totality, it is clearly and convincingly apparent that AnN lacks these requisite parenting skills, so that DqM's best interests cannot be served by allowing additional time for a valid, statutory parent-child relationship to develop between this father and his son.
The factors related to determining a child's best interests are further discussed in Part IV.B. See footnote 56.
"It is reasonable to read the language of no ongoing parent-child relationship to contemplate a situation in which, regardless of fault, a child either has never known his or her parents, so that no relationship has ever developed between them, or has definitively lost that relationship, so that despite its former existence it has now been completely displaced." (Citations omitted.) In re John G., supra, 56 Conn. App. 22. Such construction is applicable to the present case, where the clear and convincing evidence establishes that any valid parenting relationship AnN may have developed with DqM has been definitively lost due to his fundamental lack of interest in or attention to his biological child. See In re Mariah S., supra, 61 Conn. App. 260. As the clear and convincing evidence in this case establishes that no ongoing parent-children relationship exists between AnN and DqM, and that it is not in the best interests of the child to allow more time for him to develop a relationship with the respondent father, the petitioner has met her burden of proof under § 17a-112(j)(3)(D).
IV. DISPOSITION
As the court has concluded that statutory grounds for termination exist, it next "must determine whether termination is in the best interests of the child." (Citation and quotation marks omitted.) In re Quanitra M., supra, 60 Conn. App. In the dispositional phase, the court considered the evidence and testimony related to events occurring through the close of trial.
The remaining element of the termination of parental rights statute requires that before granting a duly noticed petition for such termination, the court must find, "by clear and convincing evidence . . . that termination is in the best interest of the child." § 17a-112(j)(2).
"[T]he question . . . to be decided in a dispositional phase is whether it is in the best interests of the child to sever the parent-child relationship. That is different from the question of who should have custody of the child if termination of parental rights is determined to be in the best interests of the child. See Practice Book § 33-5 [now § 33a-9]." In re Carissa K., 55 Conn. App. 768, 776, 740 A.2d 896 (1999). "In making this determination, the trial court can consider all events occurring prior to the date of the dispositional hearing, including those occurring after the filing of the termination petition." (Citation omitted.) In re Kasheema L., 56 Conn. App. 484, 488, 744 A.2d 441 (2000).
IV.A. SEVEN STATUTORY FINDINGS
The court has made each of the seven written factual findings required by General Statutes § 17a-112(k) based upon the evidence presented at trial, and has considered the evidence relevant to each of these findings when determining DqM's best interests. See In re Victoria B., supra, 79 Conn. App. 257 et seq.; In re Jonathon G., 63 Conn. App. 516.
"The factors . . . serve simply as guidelines to assist the court in its determination of the child's best interest, and each factor need not be proven by clear and convincing evidence. In re Quanitra M., 60 Conn. App. 96, 104-05, 758 A.2d 863, cert. denied, 255 Conn. 903, 762 A.2d 909 (2000)." In re Victoria B., supra, 79 Conn. App. 259.
IV.A.1. TIMELINESS, NATURE AND EXTENT OF SERVICES — § 17a-112(k)(1)
Multiple timely and appropriate services were made for DaM, as set forth in Parts I.B. and C., II.A. and B. Those services included: appropriate family treatment and permanency plans; case management services; and administrative case reviews; attempted mother-son reunification in residence with the family of JeC, DaM's maternal uncle and at DaM's own foster home; visitation at the foster homes and at DCF; behavior modeling and parenting instruction on a direct basis from the foster mothers; transportation to facilitate visitation; CREC-PIP parenting class, KlFC's family reunification services; a CREC parent aide; a multi-disciplinary evaluation at a local children's hospital; individual counseling at IOL and CFS; social-skills counseling through the school system; additional parenting education and therapeutic supervised visitation at PIP; a life skills program through CRT; supportive housing through DCF's TLAP; and additional life skills through the Job Corps. Moreover, DaM accessed individual counseling for two months through her pastor, and also accessed attention from her school social worker.
Timely reunification efforts or service referrals were inappropriate and unnecessary to AnN under the circumstances of this case, given his lack of response to court notices about the ongoing proceedings affecting the welfare of his son.
IV.A.2. REUNIFICATION EFFORTS PURSUANT TO FEDERAL LAW — § 17a-112(k)(2)
DCF made reasonable efforts to reunite DaM and DqM, pursuant to the federal Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, as amended, through the provision of timely reunification services as described above. Furthermore, the court has previously found that DCF made reasonable efforts to prevent the removal of DqM from his home, as contemplated by the federal legislation at issue. In this case, no reunification efforts were appropriate for AnN and DqM.
IV.A.3. COMPLIANCE WITH COURT ORDERS — § 17a-112(k)(3)
As found in Part II.B., DaM partially complied with multiple aspects of the court-ordered specific steps. No court orders were in effect for AnN.
IV.A.4. THE CHILD'S FEELINGS AND EMOTIONAL TIES — § 17a-112(k)(4)
At her July 2000 psychological evaluation, Dr. Randall discerned an extent bond between DqM and respondent mother. (Exhibit 12.) In November 2002, DCF admitted that DqM enjoyed his visits with DaM and appears to be bonded to her. (Exhibit 3.) However, the depth and nature of this bond remained limited. The court credits Dr. Randall's observation that during the interactional evaluation in April 2003, DqM "seemed to feel comfortable with [DaM], . . . there were not any signs that they were very close . . . Overall, the interactions between [DqM] and his mother were very superficial." (Exhibit 13; see also Testimony of LaB.) The evidence permits the clear and convincing inference that DqM has never known his father, and that he therefore has no emotional times to this respondent.
In contrast, DqM has developed a strong emotional bond with the members of his foster family with whom he has lived for many years. He looks to his foster parents for support, security, and guidance. (Exhibit 3; Testimony of SoL.)
IV.A.5. AGE OF THE CHILD — § 17a-112(k)(5)
DqM was born June 10, 1999; he is fast approaching his fifth birthday. DqM spent the first month of his life in the hospital; the remainder has been spent in DCF foster care.
IV.A.6. PARENT'S EFFORTS TO ADJUST THEIR CIRCUMSTANCES — § 17a-112-(k)(6)
AnN has not maintained adequate contact with DCF, nor with the foster parents or DCF regarding the status of the child, and has made no efforts whatsoever to serve in the position of a parent. While DaM has made some efforts to acquire the psychological health and caretaking skills necessary to conform her conduct to acceptable parental standards, she has not enhanced her parenting capacity to an sufficient degree, although her son has spent more than four years in foster care. Giving either respondent additional time would not likely bring his or her performance, as parents, within acceptable standards sufficient to make it in DqM's best interests to be reunited with either one.
IV.A.7. EXTENT TO WHICH PARENTS WERE PREVENTED FROM MAINTAINING A RELATIONSHIP WITH THE CHILD — § 17a-112(k)(7)
No unreasonable conduct by the child protection agency, foster parents or third parties prevented either AnN or DaM from maintaining relationships with DqM, nor did the economic circumstances of either respondent prevent such relationships, although the limitations and restrictions inherent in the foster care system were in effect. The court provided the respondent father with ample notice of the ongoing proceedings, and DCF made diligent, albeit unsuccessful, efforts to locate him. Thus, AnN's own lack of interest in or inattention to DqM's welfare, and not the conduct of others, prevented his development of a relationship with his son. See Part III.A.
Even though DaM attempted to restrict AnN's access to the child, the evidence clearly and convincingly establishes that the respondent father made no effort whatsoever to counter her efforts. See footnote 8.
In her brief and at trial, DaM argued that the conduct of DCF and others actively prevented her from maintaining a parent-child bond with DqM. As found in Parts II.A. and B., however, the evidence clearly and convincingly establishes that it was DaM's own behavior, and not that of others, that interfered with both reunification efforts and the rehabilitation process. The court declines to adopt DaM's proposed conclusions on this issue, finding insufficient basis therefore.
The court nonetheless addresses DaM's relevant claims as required by Practice Book § 64-1.
DaM argues that DCF unreasonably impeded her ability to benefit from CREC-PIP's parenting education services, and effectively prevented her from maintaining a relationship with DqM because the department failed to advise PIP about her limited cognitive skills. DaM urges the court to conclude that if her PIP instructor was fully aware of the respondent mother's deficits, she would have had the opportunity to "`repeat things or go about [the parenting process] in a different way.'" Mother's Brief, p. 4. (See Testimony of KrT.) In addressing this issue, the court credits the testimony establishing that upon referring DaM to PIP's services in March 2003, DCF appropriately advised the provider of the need to address the respondent mother's cognitive limitations. (Testimony of LaB.) Moreover, the court has previously concluded that the CREC-PIP multi-modal education plan, with both group visitation experiences and individual parenting was clearly adequate to meet the respondent mother's specific needs, but that DaM herself interfered with the efficacy of that program. See Parts II.A.1. and 2. (Testimony of KrT.) Under all the circumstances, PIP's services constituted a "reasonable" effort at reunification and promotion of a continuing mother-child bond, although this effort was overwhelmed by DaM's underlying and unresolved personality style and unwillingness to cooperate with those who sought to help her understand how to be a more effective parent. In re Antony B., supra, 54 Conn. App. 476.
In addition, DaM argues that DCF's failure to provide her with adequate reunification efforts caused significant interference with her ability to maintain a significant psychological role in her son's life. Mother's Brief, p. 7. This argument must also fail, as it rests in large part upon DaM's erroneous assumption that the department made referrals to services providers who were not equipped to adequately accommodate her cognitive limitations. As found in Parts II.A.1. and 2., DCF offered DaM multiple opportunities to participate in individualized counseling, one-on-one parenting education, and supported, supervised residence with her son in several settings. Throughout, however, the respondent mother largely refused to accept the department's offer of highly specific, dedicated services which would have meant both her personal needs and the needs of her child. See In re Mariah S., supra, 61 Conn. App. 257-58; see also In re Natalia G., supra, 54 Conn. App. 803.
DaM may further argue that DCF unreasonably interfered with the reunification process or the parent-child bond because the department failed to utilize FaM as placement resource. As discussed in Part II.A.1., this argument erroneously assumes that FaM had room available to house either DaM and/or the child. (Testimony of ZaR.) At its best, the evidence shows only that FaM's home was the site to which the respondent mother resorted when she left her own foster home on multiple occasions during the spring and summer of 2003; there is no evidence, however, from which the court might infer the nature or extent of living room or parenting support available at FaM's residence. Moreover, even if FaM was unable to provide housing for the respondent mother and her son, however, the totality of the evidence leaves the court with insufficient basis for discerning how such a placement would have aided DaM in meeting the rehabilitation goals at issue. See In re Ebony H., 68 Conn. App. 342, 350, 789 A.2d 1158 (2002).
In assessing the degree to which she may have been prevented from maintaining a bond with DqM, the court joins counsel for the minor child in disapproving of the minimal attention paid to DaM's personal needs by the adolescent social worker team assigned to her individual case. Child's Brief, p. 8. However, the court further joins DqM's attorney in concluding "that while some of the actions of [DaM]'s adolescent caseworker were lamentable, they did not prevent [DaM] from maintaining a meaningful relationship with her son." Child's Brief, p. 8. See In re Alexander T., supra, 81 Conn. App. 673; In re Ebony H., supra, 68 Conn. App. 350. In reaching the conclusion that the department did not unreasonably interfere with the maintenance of a parent-child bond in this case, the court has honored DaM's request to acknowledge the relative imbalance of the agency's "expertise and dominant position" versus respondent mother's youth, inexperience, emotional style and parenting impairments. Mother's Brief, p. 7. Indeed, our law recognizes that "the most essential and basic aspect of familial privacy [is] the right of the family to remain together without the coercive interference of the awesome power of the state." (Internal quotation marks and citation omitted.) Pamela B. v. Ment, 244 Conn. 296, 310, 709 A.2d 1089 (1998). However, the "right to family integrity is not absolute. Our courts have long recognized that the state's intervention in family matters is justified when it is found to be in the best interest of the child . . . The welfare of the child is paramount to all other considerations, and the right of the parent to its . . . control must yield to the State when, because of the neglect of its natural guardians, the State assumes its guardianship and protection." (Internal quotations marks omitted; internal and external citations omitted.) In re Tayquon H., 76 Conn. App. 693, 699-700, 821 A.2d 796 (2003).
In addressing this aspect of the respondent mother's argument, the court has also remained aware that "[t]here is a distinction between a finding on reasonable reunification efforts under § 17a-112(j) and consideration of the same under § 17a-112(k)." In re Victoria B., supra, 79 Conn. App. 257. In the dispositional phase of a termination of parental rights hearing, where the court addresses the finding mandated by § 17a-112(k), "the emphasis appropriately shifts from the conduct of the parent to the best interest of the child." (Citation and quotation marks omitted.) Id. As counsel for the minor child reminds us, "the Department is not required to prove by clear and convincing evidence that all seven of the enumerated factors have been satisfied in order for the Court to find that termination is in the best interests of the child. In re Quanitra M., [ supra, 60 Conn. App. 105] . . . Indeed, in Quanitra M., the court specifically concluded that a trial court could find that termination is in the best interests of the child despite a finding that `one segment of the many factors considered in a termination proceeding' might suggest a contrary result . . . Thus, even if the Court were to find that the actions of one or more DCF social workers unreasonably interfered with DaM's ability to maintain a meaningful relationship with [DqM], a review of the remaining factors and consideration of the best interests of [DqM] could nevertheless leave the court to conclude that termination of [DaM]'s parental rights is appropriate." Child's Brief, pp. 7-8. See also Petitioner's Memorandum.
IV.B. BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD — § 17a-112(j)(2)
In determining whether it would serve DqM's best interests to terminate the respondents' parental rights, the court has applied the appropriate legal standards to the facts of this case. Under such scrutiny, the clear and convincing evidence establishes that it is not in DqM's best interests to continue to maintain any legal relationship with either AnN, whom he has never known, nor with DaM, who is "not in a position to care for the child's particular needs and . . . there is no reason to believe that she will be in a position to do so within a reasonable time in the future. In re Mariah S., supra, 61 Conn. App. 248. Therefore, based on the clear and convincing evidence presented, the court finds this issue in favor of the petitioner.
In determining whether termination of the respondents' parental rights would be in DqM's best interests, the court has examined the multiple relevant factors, including his interests in sustained growth, development, well-being, stability and continuity of [His] environment; his length of stay in foster care; the nature of his relationship with his foster parents and biological parents; and the degree of contact maintained with his biological parents. In re Alexander C., 60 Conn. App. 555, 559, 760 A.2d 532 (2000); In re Shyina B., 58 Conn. App. 159, 167, 752 A.2d 1139 (2000). The court has also considered "the genetic bond shared by a biological parent and his or her child, [which] although not determinative of the issue of the best interest of the child, is certainly a factor to consider." (Citations and quotation marks omitted.) In re Savanna M., 55 Conn. App. 807, 816, 740 A.2d 484 (1999). The court has also balanced DqM's intrinsic need for stability and permanency against the benefits of maintaining a connection with his biological parents. See Pamela B. v. Ment, supra, 244 Conn. 314 (child's physical and emotional well-being must be weighed against the interest in preserving family integrity).
In reaching this determination, the court adopts Dr. Randall's eloquent summary of young DqM's particular needs: "DqM is of [such] an age that he requires a permanent home to grow up in. He is old enough to understand whom his family is and it is important for his ongoing development that he be able to form permanent attachments with his family . . . Though he knows [the respondent mother] as a visiting resource, he does not know her as a parental figure . . . [DqM] has been out of his mother's care for most of his life and needs to have a sense of stability with regard to his future placement. He needs to be able to form permanent attachments with his family and they with him. DaM is not likely to be able to provide adequate home for him for some time. Therefore, it is recommended that DqM be freed for adoption into an alternative permanent home." (Exhibit 13.)
In deciding that termination of parental rights will serve DqM's best interests, freeing him for adoption into a "permanent home," the court has acknowledged that this psychologically fragile child was moved from placement to placement during the early part of his stay in DCF foster care. However, he has spent approximately four years in residence with his current foster family. (See Exhibits 3, 7, 8; Testimony of ZaR, GAL's report.)
The evidence clearly and convincingly establishes that young DqM is comfortable and happy in his foster home, where he receives the consistent, structured support and affection demanded by his developmental stage. DqM enjoys interacting with and adopting age-appropriate attributes from the three other children living here. He responds well to limits set by his foster parents, and has developed appropriate social skills such as sharing and cooperating with others. DqM's asthma is now reasonably well controlled, although it is more problematic during the winter months; his foster parents administer a nebulizer and assist him in using an inhaler when necessary, so that the child's medical needs are fully met in this placement. DqM reciprocates his foster parents' love and affection for him. They consider DqM to be a part of their family, and they would like to adopt him. (Exhibit 3; Testimony of SoL.)
In a termination proceeding, the court may properly consider the suitability of proposed adoptive parents when addressing the child's best interests. In re Vincent D., 65 Conn. App. 658, 666, 783 A.2d 534 (2001). However, while considering the attributes of DqM's current foster family, the court has fully adhered to the axiom that "a judicial termination of parental rights may not be premised on a determination that it would be in the child's best interests to terminate the parent's rights in order to substitute another, more suitable set of adoptive parents." In re Baby Girl B., 224 Conn. 263, 280, 618 A.2d 1 (1992), cited in In re Denzel A., 53 Conn. App. 827, 835, 733 A.2d 298 (1999).
DqM's GAL-cum-attorney knows DqM well, and has visited his foster home on many occasions. The court credits the GAL's report that DqM represents himself to be a part of the family with whom he has lived for the past four years. He relies upon both his foster parents as more emotional and physical support, guidance, and protection. Consistent with the great weight of evidence presented, the court further credits the GAL's opinion that this child's best interest will be served if the extent parental rights are terminated, so that he can be freed for adoption. In contrast, the child's best interests cannot be served by requiring him to remain any longer in the legal limbo established by the DCF's lengthy efforts to promote reunification, DaM's prolonged failure to benefit from rehabilitation efforts, AnN's absence from the family unit, and the ongoing litigation process itself. See In re Amneris P., supra, 66 Conn. App. 385; see also In re Jonathan M., 255 Conn. 208, 233 and fn 24, 764 A.2d 739 (2001).
DaM may argue that termination of parental rights is unreasonable in a case such as this, where she is affected by cognitive limitations, emotional impairments, and limited life experience. Having considered such issues, however, our courts have previously decided that termination of parental rights is appropriate in a case where a respondent's situation renders him or her incapable of or unwilling to meet a child's special needs by serving in a responsible caretaking role. In this matter, having balanced DqM's intrinsic need for stability and permanency against the benefits of maintaining a connection with either DaM or AnN, and having acknowledged the mental health limitations affecting the child's mother, the court is constrained to rely upon the clear and convincing evidence in this case which establishes that the child's best interests will be served by termination of the respondents' parental rights. Pamela B. v. Ment, supra, 244 Conn. 313-14; see also In re Antony B., supra, 473.
"`Termination has been consistently recognized as being in the best interest of the child when the parent has a mental deficiency or illness which renders her unable to provide the child with necessary care.' In re Nicolina T., 9 Conn. App. 598, 605, 520 A.2d 639, cert. denied, 203 Conn. 804, 525 A.2d 519 (1987)." In re Antony B., supra, 473. Moreover, the court declines to accept the argument that DaM "has made long strides toward being a responsible parent and that she was in a better position to parent the child at the time the petition was filed than when the department initially removed the child from her custody . . . [D]espite the progress that she has made in improving her own life, her relative youth does not excuse her from failing to take advantage of the many opportunities she was offered to prepare herself for parenthood and to bond with her [son] through counseling and visitation." In re Mariah S., supra, 61 Conn. App. 267.
In asking the court to delay termination although DqM has spent four years in foster care, DaM would have the court put the respondent mother's needs ahead of the child's significant need for permanency. However, as Judge Brenneman has sagely opined, in child protection matters, "[i]t is the responsibility of all the adults involved to give the [child's] interest top priority over their own emotional objectives . . ." In re Luke, 20 Conn. Sup. 316, 326-27; 498 A.2d 1054 (1985). It is fundamental that "long-term stability is critical to a child's future health and development." In re Eden F., supra, 250 Conn. 709. The clear and convincing evidence leaves no question that neither of DqM's biological parents are now able, or will in the near future be able, to fulfill the child's critical needs. The court joins DqM's attorney and the court-appointed psychological evaluator in concluding that termination of parental rights will be in the child's best interests because only under these circumstances will the child become available for permanent placement in a stable, safe, and secure home environment without having to encounter disruption and turmoil. Thus, this child is entitled to the benefit of ending, without further delay, the long period of uncertainty as to the availability of his biological parents as caretakers, so that he can be placed in a permanent home with loving and responsible caretakers who are now available to him.
Accordingly, with respect to the best interests of the child contemplated by § 17a-112(j)(2), by clear and convincing evidence, and based upon all of the foregoing, including the testimony and evidence presented, the court herein terminates the respondents' parental rights to the minor child, DqM.
IV. ORDER OF TERMINATION
WHEREFORE, after due consideration of DqM's sense of time, his need for a secure and permanent environment, the relationship he has with his foster parents, and the totality of circumstances; and having considered all the statutory criteria and having found by clear and convincing evidence that grounds exist for termination of parental rights; and having concluded that the termination of the parental rights at issue will be in DqM's best interests, the court issues the following ORDERS:
That the parental rights of DaM and AnN are hereby terminated as to the child DqM.
That the Commissioner of the Department of Children and Families is hereby appointed the statutory parent for DqM for the purpose of securing an adoptive family or other permanent placement for him.
That a permanency plan shall be submitted within 30 days of this judgment, and that such further reports shall be timely presented to the court, as required by law. That primary consideration for adoption of DqM shall be offered to his current foster parents, unless otherwise directed by the court.
BY THE COURT,
N. Rubinow, J.