Opinion
B164432.
11-21-2003
In re DOUGLAS S., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. DOUGLAS S., Defendant and Appellant.
Cheryl Barnes Johnson, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, Robert R. Anderson, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Assistant Attorney General, Deborah J. Chuang, and Nora Genelin, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Minor, Douglas S. (Douglas), appeals from the judgment entered upon an order sustaining a Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 petition alleging that he committed arson of the property of another in violation of Penal Code section 451, subdivision (d). According to Douglas, his confession should not have been admitted because it was obtained in violation of Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 (Miranda). Additionally, he contends that the evidence at trial was insufficient to establish the malice element of section 451, subdivision (d). For reasons we discuss, we disagree. Affirmed.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On April 25, 2002, Officer Kathleen Flores of the Glendora Police Department responded to a report of a palm tree fire at a residence. Upon her arrival, she saw a blackened, smoking palm tree. Officer Flores spoke with Cindy Ann Lafave (Lafave), a neighbor, and asked for a description of any possible suspects. According to Lafave, the fire had been set by a white male, approximately 14 years old, wearing an orange T-shirt.
Lafave, who was a health clerk at Douglass high school, told Officer Flores that a few days earlier she saw Douglas with some friends. He made three or four unsuccessful attempts to light a pine tree on fire with a lighter. Lafave saw Douglas again the following day. This time Douglas was alone. He stopped at the pine tree, but did not try to light it on fire. He just paused and looked at it before continuing home.
The police department forwarded Officer Floress report to Officer Jason Tibbetts, the school resource officer for the Glendora Police Department at Douglass high school. Douglass name was listed in the report as a person with possible knowledge about the arson.
On May 16, 2002, at approximately 1:30 p.m., Officer Tibbetts called Douglas into his office on the school campus. He did not lock or close the door. He did not handcuff Douglas, nor did he brandish his gun. No other police officers were present and he did not question Douglas in an accusatory tone. He told Douglas that he was investigating an arson and asked him if he knew the person responsible. Douglas responded, "Yes. I did." Officer Tibbetts asked again, "Who did it?" and Douglas replied, "I did."
At trial, defense counsel objected to Officer Tibbettss testimony based on Miranda. The trial court overruled the objection and found "that it was not necessary, under these circumstances, to inform [Douglas] of his rights pursuant to the Miranda case." More specifically, the trial court stated that it "[did] not find, based on the facts presented and accepting what [Officer Tibbetts] has told [the court] today as credible, that this [was], in fact, a custodial interrogation."
When testimony resumed, Officer Tibbetts recounted the events of April 25, 2002, leading up to the palm tree fire as told to him by Douglas. Douglas said he was walking by 129 North Underhill with two other students when the others dared him to light the palm tree on fire. Douglas took a lighter from his pocket, went to the tree, and began to light it on fire. Once it caught fire, he ran home in fear of getting into trouble. On the way, he dumped the lighter in some bushes and retrieved it later. After Douglas made the confession, Officer Tibbetts detained him, told him that he was being detained for the crime of arson, and advised him of his Miranda rights, which Douglas told the officer he understood. The entire interview lasted three or four minutes.
Upon sustaining the Peoples petition, the juvenile court declared Douglas to be a ward of the court and placed him on home probation with enumerated conditions for a maximum term of three years.
This timely appeal followed.
DISCUSSION
I. Douglass statement was properly admitted.
There is no merit to Douglass contention that his statement to Officer Tibbetts was obtained in violation of Miranda.
In Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. 436, the United States Supreme Court held that a person questioned by the police after being "taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way" must first "be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed." (Id. at p. 444.) Statements obtained in violation of this rule cannot be used to establish guilt. (Ibid.) The Miranda advisements are required only when a person is subjected to "custodial interrogation." (Miranda , at p. 444; People v. Mickey (1991) 54 Cal.3d 612, 648.) "Custodial interrogation" means "any situation in which `a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way." (People v. Mickey , supra, at p. 648, quoting Miranda, supra, at p. 444.)
The test for whether an individual is in custody is "objective . . . : `[was] there a "formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement" of the degree associated with a formal arrest." (Thompson v. Keohane (1995) 516 U.S. 99, 112; see also People v. Stansbury (1995) 9 Cal.4th 824, 830.) Factors which may be considered to determine whether custody has attached include: "`"(1) the site of the interrogation; (2) whether the investigation has focused on the subject; (3) whether the objective indicia of arrest are present; and (4) the length and form of questioning." [Citations.]" (In re Joseph R. (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 954, 958-959. Consideration of the totality of the circumstances is the proper standard for both adult and juvenile offenders. (In re Bonnie H. (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 563, 577.)
"`In considering a claim that a statement or confession is inadmissible because it was obtained in violation of a defendants rights under [Miranda], we accept the trial courts resolution of disputed facts and inferences, and its evaluation of credibility, if supported by substantial evidence. [Citation.] Although we independently determine whether, from the undisputed facts and those properly found by the trial court, the challenged statements were illegally obtained [citation], we "`give great weight to the considered conclusions of a lower court that has previously reviewed the same evidence." [Citations.]" (People v. Whitson (1998) 17 Cal.4th 229, 248.)
In our case, the trial court did not find the questioning of Douglas by the school resource officer to be a custodial interrogation triggering the need for a Miranda warning. After reviewing the totality of the circumstances of the interview, we agree. First, the site of the interrogation did not mandate such a warning. Students are frequently called into the offices of school resource officers. It would be impractical to require these officers to advise every student of his or her rights simply because the questioning occurs in a police setting. (See People v. Stansbury, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 832 [holding that a reasonable person would not consider that he or she was in custody despite being questioned in the jail area of the police station].) As the trial court suggested, "where kids are brought into the school-based police officers office there on campus and a police officer wants to ask the kid about some crime that may have occurred, even if it may be that . . . the officer believes that that kid may have done it, that that automatically means that the officer has to Mirandize that young man, . . . that is not what the courts have held." This would be especially true under the circumstances of the brief and routine questioning that occurred in this case.
Officer Tibbettss inquiry did not focus solely on Douglas. Douglass name was the only one listed in connection with the arson in Officer Floress report. However, Officer Tibbetts testified that Douglas was not the prime suspect. Douglass name was simply listed as someone who might have knowledge of the crime or identity of the perpetrator.
Furthermore, there are no idicia of arrest to be found in the record. The tone of the interview was not accusatory. Moreover, no elements of coercion were present. Neither a gun nor handcuffs were used. Officer Tibbetts did not even close the door. He simply interviewed Douglas for no more than three or four minutes before Douglas volunteered a confession. Under these circumstances, the record supports the trial courts conclusion that the statement was lawfully obtained. (People v. Chutan (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 1276, 1282-1283; In re Joseph R., supra, 65 Cal.App.4th at pp. 959-961.)
II. Sufficiency of the Evidence
We review the judgment of the juvenile court applying the substantial evidence standard of review: we resolve all conflicts in the evidence in favor of the prevailing party, and we draw all reasonable inferences in a manner that upholds the verdict. (Holmes v. Lerner (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 442, 445; Kuhn v. Department of General Services (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 1627, 1632-1633 (Kuhn).) We then "determine whether the evidence thus marshaled is substantial." (Kuhn, supra, at p. 1633.) We have defined "`[s]ubstantial evidence" to be "evidence of ponderable legal significance, evidence that is reasonable, credible and of solid value." (Roddenberry v. Roddenberry (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 634, 651.)
The same standard of appellate review is applicable in considering the sufficiency of the evidence in a juvenile proceeding as in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction. (In re Cheri T. (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 1400, 1404; In re Jose R. (1982) 137 Cal.App.3d 269, 275.)
"A person is guilty of arson when he or she willfully and maliciously sets fire to or burns or causes to be burned or who aids, counsels, or procures the burning of, any structure, forest land, or property." (§ 451.) Section 450, subdivision (e) defines "maliciously" as "a wish to vex, defraud, annoy, or injure another person, or an intent to do a wrongful act, . . ."
Douglas does not contest the fact that he lit the palm tree on fire. He claims he did not do it "maliciously." Douglas splits hairs when he argues that the evidence lacks a showing of an intent to bring about "another wrongful act such as defrauding, annoying or injuring another person." As the People correctly note, arson is a general intent crime. The specific intent to set fire to or burn or cause to be burned the relevant structure, property, or forest land is not an element of arson. (People v. Atkins (2001) 25 Cal.4th 76, 84.) The uncontested evidence that Douglas took the lighter out of his pocket and lit the palm tree on fire sufficiently demonstrates Douglass "intent to do a wrongful act." (§ 450, subd. (e).)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: BOREN P. J. & DOI TODD, J. --------------- Notes: All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated.