Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Superior Court County of Santa Barbara Super. Ct. No. 1194225, Rodney S. Melville, Judge.
Mary Nativity Cannon, in pro per, Appellant.
No appearance for Respondent.
YEGAN, J.
Mary Nativity Cannon appeals from a June 2, 2007 order to vacate the real property located at 675 San Miguelito Road, Lompoc. (Prob. Code, § 17200.) The property is owned by the Doran William Cannon Trust and managed by the trustee, James P. O'Neill, who filed a petition to terminate appellant's occupancy because appellant was interfering with a tenant's use and quiet enjoyment of the property. We affirm and conclude that the probate court had jurisdiction to order appellant's ejectment.
All statutory references are to the Probate Code.
Facts and Procedural History
Appellant is the widow of Doran William Cannon who created the Doran William Cannon Trust and died March 12, 2005. The principal asset of the trust is a single family residence with outbuildings on 1.7 acres at 6745 Miguelito Canyon Road, Lompoc.
The trust instrument provides that appellant shall have the right to reside at or rent the real property to third parties "subject to her payment of all costs and expenses associated with such property, including, but not limited to, installment payments on any and all loans secured by such property, all property taxes and assessments, all homeowners' insurance premiums, reasonable costs of maintenance and repair, and payment of all charges for utilities services. Any rents she may receive that may exceed these costs and expenses shall be her own property, free of trust."
Appellant remained on the property after trustor's death and failed to pay monthly mortgage payments, property taxes, insurance, or maintenance costs. The trustee lacked funds to maintain the property and feared that the property would be the subject of a foreclosure.
In May 2007, the trustee and appellant agreed to rent out the main house so that appellant could live in a motor home or an outbuilding in back of the house. The trustee made repairs, employed a property manager, and rented the property to Danny Aasland and Lee Ann Aasland for one year commencing November 7, 2007.
After the tenants took occupancy, appellant interfered with the tenants' quiet enjoyment by attempting repairs, trespassing on property occupied by the tenants, performing yard work and breaking a house window, allowing her German Shepard to roam the property, shaving the fur off the tenants' dog, not allowing the tenants to use the waste and recycling bins, re-routing the tenants' phone line to appellant's living quarters, and reporting the tenants to child protective services for not sending their children to school (the children were home-schooled).
The trustee filed a section 17200 petition to terminate appellant's occupancy and for a writ of possession.
Appellant opposed the petition, claiming that the real property was community property and that the trustee had not provided a complete accounting. Appellant denied harassing the tenants and claimed the lease was ambiguous, that the tenants did not know where the property line was, and the tenants were neglecting the yard. In a supplemental response to the petition, appellant admitted that the house mortgage was 10 months in arrears.
Following an evidentiary hearing, the probate court ordered appellant to vacate the property and not return to the property until November 2008, when the lease expired. The order provided that a writ of possession would issue if appellant did not vacate the property by June 14, 2008.
Appellant filed a petition for writ of supersedeas which was denied September 23, 2008.
Discussion
Appellant argues that a probate court has no jurisdiction to eject or evict her from the trust property because she is a trust beneficiary.
Section 17200 vests a superior court sitting in probate with exclusive jurisdiction over matters concerning the internal affairs of a trust. Here the probate court had jurisdiction to construe the trust instrument and lease, to determine to whom trust property should pass, to determine questions concerning management of trust property, and to grant equitable relief. (§§ 17000, 17200, 17206; Estate of Heggstad (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 943, 951-952; Ross, Cal. Practice Guide Probate (Rutter 2008) [¶] 2:116.5, pp. 2-76.8 to 2-76.9) In matters affecting the internal affairs of the trust, the probate court also has jurisdiction to determine a beneficiary's occupancy and use of the trust property. (See e.g., Conservatorship of Irvine (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 1334, 1341-1343.)
The trial court found that the lease complied with the trust terms and that appellant, while represented by counsel, granted the trustee permission to lease the property. It found that the lease was valid and that appellant was interfering with the tenants' "peaceful enjoyment of the[] property. It is their [the tenants] property until November of this year. There is nothing [appellant] can do to change the fact that the trustee, with her consent, leased the property to other people."
Appellant was afforded the opportunity to be heard, presented evidence, and as a trust beneficiary, has no due process right to use or occupy the trust property to the detriment of the trust. In the words of the trial court, "the only thing that I can do to ensure that the trust assets are not wasted, that the property is not destroyed.... [Appellant] has to find somewhere else to live until November.... [¶] In the meantime, [appellant] cannot bother the tenants. She can't live there."
As a trust beneficiary, appellant is subject to the jurisdiction of the probate court. (§ 17003, subd. (a); see Estate of Beard (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 753, 755 [discussing probate court's broad equitable jurisdiction].) "[T]he probate court has the 'inherent power to decide all incidental issues necessary to carry out its express powers to supervise the administration of the trust.' [Citation.] This inherent equitable power of the probate court has long been recognized to encompass the authority to take remedial action." (Schwartz v. Labow (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 417, 427.)
The judgment is affirmed. The parties are to bear their own costs on appeal.
We concur: GILBERT, P. J., COFFEE, J.