In re Donald MacDonald

6 Citing cases

  1. Culpepper v. State

    516 So. 2d 485 (Miss. 1987)   Cited 16 times
    Finding that "[t]he authorities are legion that the power to punish for contempt rests solely with the court condemned, and one court cannot punish a contempt against another court."

    Numerous other courts have considered this question and reaffirmed the rule that only the court offended has the power to entertain proceedings to punish the defendant. Ogletree v. Watson, 223 Ga. 618, 619, 157 S.E.2d 464, 465 (1967); Connell v. Connell, 222 Ga. 765, 767, 152 S.E.2d 567, 569 (1966); Pirkle v. State, 114 Ga. App. 244, 150 S.E.2d 881 (1966); Raht v. Southern Railway Company, 215 Tenn. 485, 387 S.W.2d 781, 787 (1965); Mayhew v. Mayhew, 52 Tenn. App. 459, 376 S.W.2d 324, 328 (1963); Graham v. State, 144 So.2d 97 (Fla. App. 1962); Gore v. Gore, 217 Ga. 478, 479, 123 S.E.2d 254, 256 (1961); Osborne v. Purdome, 244 S.W.2d 1005, 1012 (Mo. 1951); Johns v. Johns, 172 S.W.2d 770, 771 (Tex. Civ.App. 1942); State v. Tangipahoa Parish School Board, 9 So.2d 826, 827 (La. App. 1942); State v. Reeves, 189 La. 560, 180 So. 409, 410 (1938); State v. Thomas, 128 Fla. 231, 174 So. 413, 415 (1937); In re MacDonald, 110 Pa. Super. 352, 168 A. 521, 522 (1933); Ex parte Depew, 24 S.W.2d 813 (Tex.Com.App. 1930); Wilson v. United States, 26 F.2d 215, 218, (8th Cir. 1928); State v. Owens, 125 Okla. 66, 256 P. 704, 709 (1927); City of Gretna v. Rossner, 154 La. 117, 97 So. 335, 336 (1923); Greene v. Edgington, 37 Idaho 1, 214 P. 751, 752-53 (1923); Ex parte Gonzalez, 111 Tex. 399, 238 S.W. 635, 636 (1922); Farmers State Bank of Texhoma v. State, 13 Okla. Cr. 283, 164 P. 132 (1917). Indeed, this rule is recognized in Mississippi.

  2. Riccobene Appeal

    263 A.2d 104 (Pa. 1970)   Cited 36 times

    For direct criminal contempt, committed in open court, punishment of imprisonment for a definite time is imposed, and commitment of contemnors until they purge themselves of the contempt is without authority of law and a nullity: Rosenberg Appeal, 186 Pa. Super. 509, 142 A.2d 449 (1958). However, an order which confined a person for direct criminal contempt "for the period of one year or until the further order of the court" was valid as a confinement for the definite period of one year, since the additional language was considered as surplusage: In Re: Donald MacDonald, 110 Pa. Super. 352, 168 A. 521 (1933). I feel that the order of the lower court in this case met the requirement of imprisonment for a definite time, six months, so as to comply with Section 5 of the Act of November 22, 1968, supra, and the addition of the opportunity of the appellant to purge himself of the contempt did not nullify the order.

  3. State v. Doyon

    221 A.2d 827 (Me. 1966)   Cited 10 times
    In State v. Doyon, Me., 221 A.2d 827 (1966) we held that an indictment substantially like that before us covered assault with intent either to murder or to kill.

    With the law as stated, a second question is whether the language addressed by the respondent to Officer Caron embodied a threat or exhibited antagonism which cast light on his state of mind and intent at the time of the confrontation on March 12th. Within a multi-variety of definitions of the word "get" appearing in Webster's Third New International Dictionary the word is defined as meaning "to obtain by way of advantage or superiority, to bring to retribution, to take vengeance on" and slangily used means "to get even with, to get revenge." See In re MacDonald, 110 Pa. Super. 352, 168 A. 521, [5] 523, which is the only case which we have found in which the word in its vulgar sense has been passed upon. The word in either grammatical or slang usage is a familiar one and a determination of its application to the relationship between the respondent and Officer Caron was properly for the jury.

  4. Estes v. State

    6 So. 2d 132 (Miss. 1942)   Cited 5 times

    n brawls, and he is not to be menaced or threatened, either in the courtroom or elsewhere, during a term of court wherein he is serving, because of his actions in the discharge of his official duties, so long as he is within his legitimate province and has not himself become a lawbreaker under the pretense of official conduct. It would be contrary to the public interest that his mental energies should be diverted from his responsible tasks by apprehensions induced through menaces or threats as to what may happen to him personally on account of the independent and vigorous performance of his duties, and it is the obligation of the court which he serves to apply the proper disciplinary measures against those who purposely disregard the stated prohibition. That the conduct shown in this case falls within the rule, no more is necessary than the statement of that conduct, and certainly so when undenied and unexplained as it stands in this record, in which connection an interesting case is In re McDonald, 110 Pa. Super. 352, 168 A. 521. And only two suggestions are now interposed by appellant as reasons why the judgment should not be affirmed: One is that the conduct of the district attorney was such as to provoke what appellant did, and the other is that the judge did not himself see or hear what happened; and appellant quotes a sentence from Neely v. State, 98 Miss. 816, 819, 54 So. 315, 316, 33 L.R.A. (N.S.) 138, Ann. Cas. 1913B, 281, in which the court said: "There can be no such contempt of court, unless the trial judge is conscious of it." There is nothing in this record which indicates that in his cross-examination of appellant as a witness the district attorney went beyond the legitimate course of such an examination, unless it be said that the district attorney had nothing to do with the conduct of the witness in his smoking of cigarettes while on the witness stand — that this was a matter for the attention of the sheriff under the direction of the trial judge.

  5. In re Nelson

    103 Mont. 43 (Mont. 1936)   Cited 6 times

    The same rule has been applied in cases of criminal contempt by other courts. ( State v. Howell, 80 Conn. 668, 69 A. 1057, 125 Am. St. Rep. 141, 13 Ann. Cas. 501; Davidson v. Commonwealth, 213 Ky. 221, 280 S.W. 970; In re MacDonald, 110 Pa. Super. 352, 168 A. 521.) Clearly, under these authorities, the publications made in the same paper of and concerning the same court and its decisions were admissible for the purpose of corroborating the proof of intent. It is suggested that there might have been some impropriety in two members of the court testifying in this proceeding.

  6. In re Davis

    2023 Pa. Super. 156 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2023)   Cited 1 times

    Thus, there is no obligation for the court to prove that it actually witnessed the disturbance. Commonwealth v. Moody, 125 A.3d 1,10-11 (Pa. 2015) (citing Falana, supra, and In re Terry, 128 U.S. 289 (1888)); see also Commonwealth v. Brown, 622 A.2d 946 (Pa.Super.1993) (summarizing expansive view of the presence of the court requirement); In re MacDonald, 168 A. 521 (Pa.Super.1933) (threat made in rear of courtroom and heard by tipstaff was contumacious). The Supreme Court in Moody explicitly rejected the narrow reading of an act being "'in the presence of the court,' with that of it being 'personally observed' by the court."