Opinion
No. CP-06-016002-A
November 30, 2010
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
I. INTRODUCTION
Before this court is a termination of parental rights petition filed on October 26, 2009, by the Department of Children and Families [DCF] in the interest of Dominique K. (d.o.b. 1/29/02). DCF seeks to terminate the parental rights of Perry K., the father of Dominique K. The parental rights of the mother, Rebecca D., were previously terminated on April 2, 2009 by this court (Conway, J.). As to Perry K., the petitioner has alleged failure to rehabilitate and no ongoing parent-child relationship. General Statutes § 17a-112(j)(3)(B)(i) and (D). Perry K. appeared for trial and was represented by counsel throughout the course of the termination of parental rights proceedings. On April 2, 2009, counsel for Perry K. represented that his client was filing an acknowledgement of paternity. This court notes that there is no claim of Native American affiliation and thus finds it has jurisdiction over these proceedings. The court heard and accepted evidence on May 13, 2010, June 3, 2010, June 28, 2010 and August 5, 2010. This court also takes judicial notice of the file with respect to the prior orders and findings of the court in this matter, pursuant to the motion for judicial notice filed March 24, 2010 which was granted by the court. See also In re Jeisean M., 270 Conn. 382, 852 A.2d 643 (2004), Guerriero v. Galasso, 144 Conn. 600, 136 A.2d 497 (1957), and In re David M., 29 Conn.App. 499, 615 A.2d 1082 (1992).
These proceedings are governed by General Statutes § 17a-112 et seq. In a proceeding for termination of parental rights, the petitioner must first prove, in the adjudicatory phase, a ground for termination alleged in the petition, as of the date of the filing of the petition or the last amendment, by clear and convincing evidence. In re Joshua Z., 26 Conn.App. 58, 63, 597 A.2d 842 (1991); Practice Book §§ 32a-3(b), 35a-7. Only one ground need be established for the granting of the petition. In re Juvenile Appeal (84-BC), 194 Conn. 252, 258, 479 A.2d 1204 (1984); In re Shane P., 58 Conn.App. 234, 753 A.2d 409 (2000).
If a ground for termination is proven, the court must next consider the disposition stage. Therein the court must consider whether the facts, as of the last day of trial, establish by clear and convincing evidence that termination is in the child's best interest. As is permitted under our law, the evidence as to both adjudicatory and dispositional phases was heard at the same trial. In re Eden F., 250 Conn. 674, 688-89, 741 A.2d 873 (1999).
II. FINDINGS OF FACT
Having heard testimony and accepted documentary evidence on the above dates, this court makes the following findings of fact by clear and convincing evidence. In so doing, this court concludes that the petitioner has met its burden of proof with respect to the termination of parental rights petition as to Perry K. to the extent that it is has alleged that: 1) Perry K. is unable and unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts, 2) there is no ongoing parent-child relationship with Perry K. and Dominique, and 3) that it is in the best interest of Dominique that the parental rights of Perry K. be terminated.
Dominique K. was born on January 29, 2002. She was placed in the care and custody of DCF on January 31, 2007 pursuant to an administrative hold and then an order of temporary custody [OTC] which was subsequently confirmed on February 16, 2007. Neglect petitions were originally filed eight months prior on May 31, 2006, following a police investigation of a report on April 10, 2006 that a child was heard screaming "get off of me" and "stop touching me." When the police arrived at the residence of Perry K., and his roommate, Lee Parker, Perry K. did not open the door right away. Subsequently, the officers found four-year-old Dominique in Parker's bedroom, sitting next to Parker who was wearing only a bathrobe. Found in close proximity to Dominique were a used crack pipe, two plastic hand guns, a rifle, sex toys and pornography. Consequently, Perry K. and Parker were each arrested, charged with risk of injury to a minor, and issued a no-contact protective order with Dominique. Although she also lived in the home with Perry K. and Parker, Dominique's mother, Rebecca D., was not present at the time of the incident and was allowed to have custody of the child.
Although sexual abuse had not been substantiated given an inconclusive sexual abuse evaluation, Dominique disclosed that she touched Parker's "big boy toy," and that Perry K. had talked with her on the phone earlier in the day prior to the evaluation. Given that Rebecca D. had custody of the child and based on evidence regarding her conduct throughout DCF's involvement, this court infers that the mother had permitted this contact as well. DCF ultimately substantiated physical neglect as to the father for his lack of supervision.
On August 3, 2006, the risk of injury charge as to Perry K. was dismissed, resulting in the nullification of the accompanying protective order. Four days later, however, a second no-contact protective order was issued protecting mother and Dominique based on ongoing domestic violence between the mother and Perry K.
DCF sought the subsequent 96-hour hold and OTC after it learned on January 31, 2007, that the mother was in the emergency room, presenting as disoriented and confused. She had been prescribed psychiatric medication and morphine and was evasive as to Dominique's whereabouts. Ultimately, Rebecca D. admitted that Dominique was with Perry K. in violation of the August 7, 2006 protective order. In fact, it became apparent that Rebecca D. was ambivalent about the protective order and ultimately admitted that before and after DCF's assumption of custody, she had allowed contact between Dominique and Perry K.
Dominique was subsequently adjudicated neglected and committed to DCF on May 7, 2007. Initially, DCF was unable to effectuate service when it filed the neglect petition on May 31, 2006. The court, however, takes judicial notice of the fact that Perry K. had been served in hand on August 17, 2006 at New Haven Correctional Facility where he was apparently held for a brief period of time. He was subsequently released, and by November 9, 2006, he was defaulted for his failure to appear. In addition, Perry K. was served by abode on February 5, 2007 as to the OTC and failed to appear at the preliminary hearing on the OTC on February 9, 2007. Following the court's finding of default for his failure to appear as to that hearing, Perry K. continued to be non-appearing on February 16, 2007 for the trial on the OTC, and on May 7, 2007, the date of the adjudication and commitment. Moreover, there were additional hearings on June 20, 2007 and September 19, 2007, at which father did not appear. At all of these hearings, only the mother, Rebecca D., appeared in court.
The court notes that the court file also reflects the standard practice of appointment of court-appointed counsel for Perry K., at least as early as August 22, 2006, presumably due to information regarding his initial incarceration. Said appointment, and appearances of counsel on behalf of Perry K., however, continued throughout, notwithstanding his non-appearance for court hearings. There is no indication that counsel sought or had a basis for seeking to open the defaults as to Perry K. and no indication that Perry K. communicated with or directed his attorney to take any action on his behalf prior to his incarceration.
In addition to the April 2006 incident, DCF's concerns regarding Dominique included the extensive history of domestic violence between Perry K. and Dominique's mother, Rebecca D. In fact, DCF's original case was opened as a result of a physical altercation between Perry K. and Rebecca D. Following DCF's assumption of custody of Dominique on January 31, 2007, DCF made numerous attempts to contact Perry K. and was able to schedule a meeting with him at the DCF office on February 1, 2007. Perry K., however, failed to attend that meeting. Ultimately, Perry K. never responded to DCF's attempts to locate him and his whereabouts remained unknown for the rest of that year until DCF learned in December 2007 that he was incarcerated. Moreover, with the exception of four days in August 2006, a full protective order which was issued as to Dominique, as well as to her mother, remained in effect until Perry K.'s conviction on July 9, 2008.
On July 9, 2008, Perry K. was sentenced to seven years of incarceration, suspended after three years to serve for his violation of a protective order between him and Rebecca D. as well as for his failure to appear in the first degree. The underlying circumstances giving rise to his arrest and conviction involved being caught in Rebecca D.'s home after breaking into the home. At the time of his sentence, his anticipated release date was January 30, 2011. His thirteen other charges for violation of protective order and tampering with a witness were all nolled on that date and he received an unconditional discharge on his criminal trespass in the first degree charge as well. In addition, the court also issued a lifetime, standing criminal restraining order against Perry K. as to the mother. On that same date, the conditions of probation included that he was to have no contact with his other biological child, Perry Jr., until the child reaches 18, at which point Perry Jr. may initiate contact if he so chooses. The conditions of probation also required Perry K. to have no contact with Dominique without the express consent of DCF, to cooperate with DCF, to obtain a psychiatric evaluation and follow recommended treatment, to cooperate with a substance abuse evaluation and treatment, and to participate in domestic violence counseling. On August 7, 2009, Perry K. was granted parole and he was released on November 15, 2009. His conditions of parole included, among other things, that he: have no contact with Rebecca D. or with members of her family, have no contact with Dominique without permission of his parole officer, participate in anger management, be compliant with medication, and submit to electronic monitoring for ninety days after his discharge from a residential work release program.
Perry Jr. is a son from a prior relationship.
Given Perry K.'s significant, and self-imposed impediments toward reunification, DCF had been working toward reunification from the outset with the mother, Rebecca D. In contrast to Perry K., Rebecca D. was a viable, or at least an available, parent for purposes of reunification services. She appeared at all sixteen court hearings scheduled on behalf of her daughter until she consented to the termination of her parental rights. Perry K., on the other hand, attended no hearings of his own volition and began attending hearings only when the court's obligation to transport father as a result of his incarceration was triggered. Despite in-hand service of the original neglect petition, Perry K. never effectively disputed DCF's claim that his whereabouts were unknown nor that, until he was incarcerated, he failed to contact DCF regarding the well-being of his daughter.
In offering reunification services, DCF required that Rebecca D. address those issues which compromised her parenting, including domestic violence, substance abuse, and problems with poor boundaries in her relationship with Dominique. Compounding these problems, however, was Rebecca D.'s persistent tendency to allow contact between Dominique and Perry K., notwithstanding the full protective orders. For example, after DCF authorized unsupervised visitation between Rebecca D. and Dominique in May 2007, DCF learned that she had allowed contact between Dominique and Perry K. and was planning to arrange a future visit between Dominique and Perry K. in the park. Rebecca D. also provided Dominique with a phone which had pictures of Perry K. and was pre-programmed with the telephone number for "Satan," which from prior investigations, DCF understood to be Perry K. . Rebecca D.'s failure to abide by the protective order ultimately warranted a motion for emergency relief filed by counsel for the child on May 17, 2007, seeking an order directing the mother to abide by the no-contact order between Dominique and Perry K. The motion, referencing not only the effective criminal protective order but also the specific steps ordered by the juvenile court, was granted by the court (Conway, J.). In October 2007, Rebecca D. made Dominique "pinky swear" during a supervised visit; Dominique later reported that her mother told her that she was living with Perry K., and that her mother was making arrangements for Dominique to see her father in a park the following week. The evidence reflects numerous other incidents where, although Dominique was not present, Rebecca D. attempted contact with Perry K., even while he was incarcerated for violating the protective order as to her. Clearly, although there was a mother-child bond, Rebecca D.'s parenting skills, judgment and ability to protect Dominique were the subject of ongoing concern and treatment services.
Meanwhile, Dominique had been in therapy with the Yale Child Study Center Outpatient Clinical Services. Having started therapy while in the care of her mother beginning in November 2006, she initially presented as guarded, avoidant, hypervigilant and fearful. When she eventually was placed into foster care, more details regarding Dominique's mental health status were revealed. Her foster parents reported that Dominique experienced significant anxiety and needed constant support around sleeping, including falling asleep and staying asleep. She had nightmares from which she would wake up screaming, and she would sleepwalk all over the house. She also had dreams of strangers in her bedroom or crawling through the windows. Until June 2009, Dominique's working diagnosis was post-traumatic stress disorder.
During the course of her first two years in therapy, much of Dominique's anxiety revolved around where she would be living, i.e. with her mother or her foster family. Consequently, these were the treatment issues that were the focus of the work Meg Lyons, her therapist, was doing with Dominique. In her report to the court-appointed evaluator, Ms. Lyons noted that Dominique would show signs of decline every time changes occurred in her life, particularly when Rebecca D. was unstable and inconsistent with family therapy. For the same reasons, DCF had informed Perry K. in March 2008 that Dominique's therapist was recommending no visitation between the child and Perry K. By July 2008, Rebecca D. was still abusing substances and was inconsistent in attending services. Ultimately, notwithstanding Dominique's bond with her mother, because of mother's lack of progress and Dominique's need for stability and security, DCF filed its termination of parental rights petition as to both parents on December 15, 2008.
Contradicted only by Perry K. whom this court finds not credible, all of the evidence indicates that Dominique has never expressed positive memories of, or feelings for, Perry K. since coming into DCF's care. When she came into care at the age of five, she related that he showed her movies that frightened her. During a supervised visit with her mother in July 2008, Dominique stated that her father was in jail because he did bad things to her. At trial, Ms. Lyons testified that Dominique had shared no positive experiences or memories of her father. Although Dominique was young when in the care of her father, according to Ms. Lyons, Dominique may not have understood the content of what was going on around her but children as young as age three can still remember the "affect" of a person, including yelling, screaming and unpredictability. Dominique's social worker testified that in trauma therapy with Ms. Lyons, the child has drawn pictures of her father and then scratched them out, saying he hurt her mommy and that he hurt her.
As noted above, Dominique did not discuss her father when she first came into care except to say that he had exposed her to movies that had frightened her and that he was in jail because he did bad things to her. She did not elaborate further on these statements at the time. When she first came into care, she experienced a lot of fear taking baths, indicating that Perry K. hurt her during those periods, dunking her head into the water. Dominique began to disclose more in therapy in April 2009, around the time that she and her therapist were addressing the issue of her mother's consent to the termination of her parental rights. When asked to address her feelings and to identify events which were upsetting or confusing to her, Dominique discussed saying good-bye to her mother and how children get separated from their moms when "dads do bad things." When asked by her therapist if there was anything she wanted to add to this, she wrote "touched my private parts, be mad at Perre," which the therapist understood to be Perry. When asked whether or not she wanted to have renewed contact with her father, Dominique wrote "no, no, no, no, no . . ." and that she was "mad at Perre." When she has talked about Perry touching her private parts, she has also pointed to her private parts.
In challenging DCF's allegation of no ongoing parent child relationship between himself and Dominique, Perry K. insists that Dominique is strongly bonded to him and in fact, he vociferously asserts that Dominique preferred him to her mother. As one example in support of his contentions, he claims that Dominique always preferred that he, rather than Rebecca D., "wipe her bottom." Given all of the ways one might describe one's parent-child relationship, this court finds that this is a bizarre and disturbing example offered by Perry K. in the context of sexual abuse allegations of a four-year-old. In addition, his attempt to facilitate a relationship with Dominique by sending her a singing musical card with the song "Kiss You All Over" is also troubling, and at the very least, an example of extremely poor judgment.
Moreover, Perry K.'s persistent claims of the lack of bond between the mother and child are wholly contradicted by the evidence and underscore the extent to which this court finds he lacks credibility. Mother's judgment notwithstanding, there was a bond between the mother and child. While Dominique struggled with her conflicted feelings toward her mother and the developing bond, sense of safety and nurture she enjoyed with her foster family, she nevertheless remained bonded to her mother. Ms. Lyons testified that Dominique had a very warm attachment to her mother even though there were persistent concerns that theirs was more of a peer relationship.
For example, Rebecca D. shared with Dominique during a supervised visit the fact of her pregnancy with another man and her subsequent abortion.
Ms. Lyons further testified that Dominique endured a series of traumatic events in life, including sexual abuse while in her father's care, domestic violence between her father and mother, removal from her mother's care and then two placements in foster care. This series of traumas has resulted in an intense need for a sense of safety, consistency and stability. According to Ms. Lyons, when Dominique experiences safety, stability, and consistency, her psychological well-being improves. Conversely, when she experiences anxiety and stressors, she becomes symptomatic.
In assessing Perry K.'s viability for reunification and visitation, court appointed psychologist, Dr. Ines Shroeder, observed that the father tends to focus on his own needs above the needs of those around him. He tends to be self-centered and driven to meet his own desires. At times, he has little thought as to the impact on others as he strives to make his goals. He may take advantage of relationships in an effort to gain something he desires. He tends to struggle to be impatient, often preferring to get what he wants immediately.
Relevant to these personality characteristics is Perry K.'s identification as a Satanist, which he discussed at some length with Dr. Schroeder. Based on her interview with Perry K., Dr. Schroeder concluded that his beliefs provide him underlying rules to live by which encourage self-preservation, view of the self as the only `God' to worship, and advocate materialism and individualism. By striving for things that make him happy in the moment, Perry K. believed that he did not need to abide by the norms of society.
Dr. Schroeder described Perry K. as someone with a sense of entitlement and self-focus, who "seeks to fulfill his own goals without thought to the impact on others." She further observed that he "tends to have no remorse for his actions if they were justified in meeting his needs. Again, this follows his belief that he should strive for the things he wants in the moment. He denies any problems in his behavior and explains away any criticisms. He tends to break society rules when it benefits him, even those `rules' that are laws."
Given the child's circumstances, Dr. Schroeder stated that she would consider recommending contact with Perry K. only if Dominique has the opportunity to process past trauma, finds ways to cope with her fears and sentiments, and then desires to communicate with Perry K. Giving Dominique control would provide her some sense of safety and limit the anxiety any meetings could produce. Even if she was not sexually abused by Perry K., Dominique has linked him to that time and views him as failing to keep her safe. According to Dr. Schroeder, forcing Dominique to see him would retraumatize her and likely lead to decompensation.
Consequently, Dr. Schroeder recommended against allowing visitation between Perry K. and Dominique. Dr. Schroeder confirmed the diagnosis of post-traumatic stress disorder based on her three prior evaluations and interviews of Dominique from December 2006 through January 2009, as well as input from collateral sources, including her discussions with Ms. Lyons, DCF, the foster parents and Dominique's mother.
In referencing the timing of other disclosures made by Dominique with respect to Perry K., Dr. Schroeder explained that "[c]hildren who suffer trauma and are then removed from their biological home have many things to address in treatment. Initially, they often have to cope with the loss of the previous relationships and the anxiety of the new placement. They may harbor fears about disclosing traumas and fears that the new setting will lead to further trauma. They struggle to trust that subsequent relationships will last or that therapy is a safe environment to divulge things. Any abuse they suffered is often too difficult to address while the pressing issues of stability to their home is addressed. Once they have found stability and safety and security in their settings and life in general, they can begin to process other traumas they have suffered."
With respect to Dominique, Dr. Schroeder noted that it can be "difficult for Dominique to profess this abuse in a setting where she does not trust the person or where she feels anxious or upset. If she senses that people will be upset with her for disclosing, she may find it hard to make statements. It seems reasonable that she has made disclosures to those who have earned her trust."
Moreover, Dr. Schroeder also observed that prior to the termination of her mother's parental rights, Dominique "was unsure of her future placement and unstable in her emotions. It has taken months to resolve those emotions to then turn her attention to the abuse she incurred . . . She has grown to trust those around her and to accept her safety in their care. She has developed a bond with her present therapist and has started to share information about her abuse. Given these issues, it is not surprising to find her disclosing information she has not disclosed initially."
In this context, the court finds that the child was conflicted in her feelings toward her mother, to whom she was still attached, and the feelings she has for her foster parents, with whom she feels nurtured and safe. As Dr. Schroeder had written in her evaluation of February 2009, "Dominique has the perspective that the world is a hostile environment outside of her foster family. She often desires to retreat to the safety they have established for her. She sees her foster parents as very protective of external forces. She has a sense of peace and calm in this home. Although she loves her mother, she continues to harbor fear about what it might be like to live with her again, where they might live and who she may encounter living with her biological mother."
Given the nature of the mother's relationship with the child, and her history of failing to protect the child, this court is not troubled by the timing of the child's disclosure in April 2009. This court notes the compelling psychological testimony by Dr. Schroeder, the child's history and experience with her mother both before and during reunification efforts, as well as the fact that Perry K. managed to talk with Dominique just prior to the sexual abuse evaluation years before. In this context, the timing of Dominique's disclosure at the time of the mother's consent appears consistent with the child's likely perception of who can and who cannot keep her safe.
The court notes that the statute of limitations for prosecution of sexual offense against minors, General Statutes § 54-193a, currently requires prosecution of such offense "within thirty years from the date a victim attains the age of majority or within five years from the date the victim notifies any police officer . . . of the commission of the offense . . ." In interpreting a prior incarnation of that provision, our Supreme Court in State v. George 280 Conn. 551, 910 A.2d 931 n. 6 (2006), noted that the relevant operative provision had been amended in 2002 to increase the limitation period from two years to thirty years from the age of majority. The Court further elaborated in footnote 11 on the public policy concerns implicated by the statute of limitations provisions, observing that "[b]eginning in the late 1980's lawmakers across the country became increasingly aware that young victims often delay reporting sexual abuse because they are easily manipulated by offenders in positions of authority and trust, and because children have difficulty remembering the crimes or facing the trauma it can cause . . . Child molestation cases are difficult to prosecute, because young victims of sexual abuse often have difficulty remembering the dates and times of the violations, the number of acts involved, and the nature of the acts. They also have difficulty reporting the abuse immediately thereafter, even to their own parents. They may have been dissuaded from reporting the abuse either because of shame, fear that they themselves did something wrong, or because of intimidation by the perpetrator." Id. citing J. Comparet-Cassani, "Extending the Statute of Limitations in Child Molestation Cases Does Not Violate the Ex Post Facto Clause of Stogner," 5 Whittier J. Child Fam. Advoc. 303, 307-09 (2006).
When asked where Dominique felt safe to deal with her trauma, Dr. Schroeder agreed that Dominique felt safe in her therapy sessions with Ms. Lyons but her sense of safety was primarily coming from her foster home. Her foster family is her primary relationship, where she is told on a constant day-to-day basis that she is loved, cared-for and safe. The routine and consistency of that message is critical in order for Dominique to trust and believe that it is true. Conversely, if she were forced to begin reunification with someone whom she has identified as her perpetrator and someone who has hurt her, her progress could be undermined or stunted. Given previous disruptions, another disruption could lead her to believe that there is no point in making connections or bonds in the future because she will believe that no matter what she does or with whom she lives her life will be in constant upheaval.
Perry K. manifests a complete disregard and insensitivity to Dominique's pressing need for healing which is premised on stability in her emotional life and home environment. He dismisses the sexual abuse allegations and Dominique's fear of him, and asserts blithely that his roommate, Lee Parker, was solely responsible for her abuse. Putting aside the allegations that he also sexually abused her, this court finds that Perry K. does not have any appreciation for the impact of the trauma Lee Parker inflicted on his child while she was in his care. He bears no sense of responsibility or concern that, under his care and custody, Dominique was surrounded by guns, drugs, other weapons and pornography in the bedroom of his roommate, who was wearing only a bathrobe.
As Dr. Schroeder observed, Perry K. believes he has the right to strive for anything that will make him happy, rather than what anyone else needs. She further observed that Perry K. "views his present situation as the fault of those around him. He does not feel he has been treated justly. He is fully focused on his needs without full understanding of how traumatizing it would be to his daughter to re-engage with the person she has stated has harmed her. Again, given his faith and beliefs, his view of striving for his needs in the moment is tantamount."
The court notes again that in the first two years in which DCF had an open case, Perry K.'s whereabouts were either unknown or he was subject to a full protective order prohibiting him from having any contact with his daughter. Notwithstanding the protective order, and consistent with Dr. Schroeder's testimony and evaluation, Perry K. apparently did not perceive a need to attend court hearings, since he could see Dominique as he wished, taking advantage of Rebecca D.'s apparent weakness in failing to protect her daughter. His brazen failure to honor court orders is wholly consistent with his psychological profile as described by Dr. Schroeder. Laws, orders, and figures of authority are irrelevant to him and apparently so are Dominique's wishes, concerns, wellbeing and mental health. For Perry K., his needs are paramount and this court finds that to be completely incompatible with Dominique's need for safety, security and stability.
As Dr. Schroeder has opined, Dominique should not be forced to have any contact with Perry K. until, and if, she is ready. If she is told that she must visit with someone she believes is a perpetrator to her, she will sense that the people who have kept her safe thus far do not have the capacity to keep her safe.
The court also notes that once incarcerated, Perry K. was then notified of his right to participate in administrative case reviews. Following the issuance of the treatment plan for Dominique, these administrative case reviews [ACR] are held every six months, and review with participants the child's mental health status, progress in treatment as well as DCF's assessment of services provided to the family toward reunification, and whether or not other permanent plans must be made. As an incarcerated parent, Perry K. participated via teleconference with the regularly scheduled ACRs in April 2008, April 13, 2009 and October 8, 2009. Subsequent to his release, on March 29, 2010, he attended the ACR personally with his court appointed attorney.
It is not clear why father did not participate in the October 2008 ACR.
At the April 2008 ACR, Perry K. expressed no objection to the reunification plan with Rebecca D., indicating that he was confident of his release and agreed to contact DCF after his release. During the April 13, 2009 ACR, Perry K. requested that Dominique be placed with a family who practices Satanism, to which DCF responded that they had no families practicing Satanism. Perry K. expressed his belief that Dominique did not want to see him because she was being taught about God. Despite these issues, there is no indication that Perry K. asked for an administrative hearing to challenge this or any other concerns relevant to reunification or services.
For Dominique, her foster family has provided for her a haven of security and safety while in their care. Her social worker has testified that her sense of connection is so strong that she has insisted on changing her entire name, and she presses her social worker for the time when she need no longer visit her as her social worker. As Dr. Schroeder has stated in her evaluation, "Dominique deserves permanency in a place where she has received support, love and nurturance. She has established strong bonds with this foster family and views herself a part of the family. She has made statements to the foster family about her future and being with them long term. According to her therapist, she has become more emotionally stable over the last few months and has made great progress. It would be detrimental to her emotional health to disrupt the efforts she has made . . ."
In the months prior to her testimony, Dominique's therapist changed her diagnosis of Dominique to adjustment disorder with anxiety which is the emergence of behavioral and emotional symptoms in response to a stressor which impact social and emotional functioning. She testified that this kind of diagnosis only resolves once stressors like DCF, attorneys or even her therapist, is diminished. When court hearings are scheduled, and her guardian ad litem and DCF visits her, Dominique becomes more tearful, moody, and more fearful and she has trouble sleeping. While Dominique may not understand what is going on, she questions why her DCF worker is visiting and why her guardian ad litem is asking her about Perry K. This causes her anxiety. Ms. Lyons testified that this occurs because Dominique's greatest fear is being removed from her foster parents.
III. ADJUDICATION
A. REASONABLE EFFORTS
In order to terminate parental rights, unless the court grants the petition due to the consent of the respondent parent, DCF must prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that it made "reasonable efforts to locate the parent and to reunify the child with the parent . . ." General Statutes § 17a-112(j)(l). "[The] court need not make that finding, however, if the evidence establishes that the parent is unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Shaiesha O., 93 Conn.App. 42, 47, 887 A.2d 415 (2005). See In re Jorden R., 293 Conn. 539, 979 A.2d 469 (2009). Moreover, "such finding is not required if the court has determined at a hearing pursuant to Section 17a-111b, or determines at trial on the petition, that such efforts are not required . . ." General Statutes § 17a-112(j)(1).
"The word reasonable is the linchpin on which the department's efforts in a particular set of circumstances are to be adjudged, using the clear and convincing standard of proof." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Shaiesha O., supra, 93 Conn.App. 48. Although "[n]either the word reasonable nor the word efforts is . . . defined by our legislature or by the federal act from which the requirement was drawn . . . [r]easonable efforts means doing everything reasonable, not everything possible." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Ryan R., 102 Conn.App., 608, 619, 926 A.2d 690, cert. denied, 284 Conn. 923, 924, 933 A.2d 724 (2007); In re Mariah S., CT Page 23089 61 Conn.App., 248, 255, 763 A.2d 71 (2000). The court must look to events that occurred prior to the date the petition was filed, to determine whether reasonable efforts at reunification were made. In re Shaiesha O., supra, 93 Conn.App. 47.
In deciding whether it has met its burden regarding whether Perry K. was unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts as of October 2009, the court notes that DCF's obligation to assess progress toward reunification and permanency is circumscribed by federal as well as state law. One superior court articulated a comprehensive and thoughtful analysis of this obligation as defined by federal law, thus providing context for DCF's decision to file its termination petition in this case.
This cardinal principal of child protection was re-enforced within child protection agencies by the passage of the Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997 (ASFA), Pub.L. No 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115 and codified in various sections of 42 U.S. Code (1998). A major purpose of ASFA was to clarify issues of permanency planning not specifically addressed in earlier federal legislation. ASFA focused on two aspects relating to permanency; 1) reasonable efforts and 2) permanency planning. Both changes were directed at expeditious planning to either reunify the child with the family of origin or to terminate parental rights within one year. Pursuant to earlier state and federal laws, children had been permitted to "drift" in foster care for long periods of time while waiting for the possible rehabilitation of their parents. ASFA was enacted to prevent lengthy periods of impermanent conditions.
In the first instance, ASFA limited the circumstances under which the state must pursue reasonable efforts to reunify families. 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15). But, more to the point of this case, Congress directed the states to conduct permanency hearings within twelve months after a child enters foster care to determine whether the child will be returned to the family of origin or made available for adoption.
These federal mandates have been adopted and codified in Connecticut statutes, notably in § 46b-129 wherein wholesale changes have been made to comply with the federal law. Specifically in point, § 46b-129(k) requires DCF to file with the court within nine months of placement a motion for review of a permanency plan for children in state care. Further, the Commissioner is directed to file for termination of parental rights not later than 60 days after the permanency plan of adoption has been approved. (§ CT Page 23090 46b-129(k)(4)). This timetable is not optional. It is the law of the land and reflects a sense of Congress and the will of the people as expressed by our legislature that permanency decisions should be made within one year. Presumably, this is a reasonable period to wait for parental rehabilitation when weighed against the child's need for a permanent placement.
Articulation of Denial of Stay, In re Zion R., Superior Court Child Protection Session at Willimantic, Docket no. W10-CP06-015070, (Foley, J. August 11, 2008).
DCF's claim that Perry K. was unwilling and unable to benefit from reunification efforts therefore must be considered in light of its federal and state statutory obligation to either return a child in their care to her biological home within a year or pursue adoption. In addition, General Statutes § 17a-110a, also requires that within six months of out-of-home placement, DCF must "complete an assessment of the likelihood of the child's being reunited with either or both parents, based on progress made to date." In this case, upon the date of adjudication and commitment in May 7, 2007, the court (Conway, J.) ordered DCF to file its motion for review of permanency plan by October 31, 2007, nine months after the order of temporary custody.
By the time the motion and plan was filed on October 30, 2007, Perry K.'s whereabouts had been unknown for nine months, and he had a full protective order for over a year and one-half prohibiting contact with Dominique as well as with Rebecca D. He willfully failed to appear at any juvenile court hearings concerning his child during that period, even though he was served in hand as to the neglect petition and served by abode with respect to the orders of temporary custody. Only Rebecca D. was working with DCF, appearing at court hearings and availing herself of reunification services. Perry K. missed the only meeting DCF managed to schedule with him in February 2007 and virtually ignored their involvement in his daughter's life during this period. This court concludes that Perry K. had no intention of or interest in working with DCF toward reunification as long as Dominique's mother was ambivalent about the protective orders that were in effect for Dominique's, as well as for her own, safety.
In the second year of DCF's custody of Dominique, Rebecca D. continued to make minimal progress. Perry K. had been incarcerated in December 2007 and by July 2008, sentenced to seven years, suspended after three years, with a maximum release date of January 2011. Therefore, as of the second permanency planning hearing on December 1, 2008, Dominique was approaching her second full year in foster care with diminishing prospects of reunification with Rebecca D. and no realistic prospect of reunifying with Perry K. While incarcerated, Perry K. was offered rehabilitation services via the Department of Corrections and later through parole services. However, the cumulative effect of the full protective order, his intention to keep his whereabouts unknown, and his violation of the protective order resulting in his sentence rendered such services of limited value. This is especially so given Dominique's need for permanency and her ongoing need to heal from the trauma she had endured while in Perry K.'s care. As such, this court finds by clear and convincing evidence that DCF has met its burden of proving that Perry K. is unable and unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts.
Our courts have repeatedly observed that incarceration cannot, by itself, be the basis for a termination of parental rights. See e.g. In re Devon W., 124 Conn.App., 650, 661 (2010). At the same time, our courts have not allowed parents to use their incarceration as a defense to the reasonable efforts ground, when their own conduct has rendered them unavailable for meaningful reunification with their child. Id. ("Although we agree that incarceration alone is not a sufficient basis to terminate parental rights . . . incarceration nonetheless may prove an obstacle to reunification due to a parent's unavailability."). In In re Devon W., the respondent was incarcerated for the child's entire lifetime and for most of the time of department's involvement. Similarly, in this case, Perry K.'s whereabouts were unknown, until he was incarcerated in December 2007, which is where he remained as of the adjudicatory date of the termination petition.
This court is aware that the prior petition to terminate Perry K.'s parental rights was denied by the court (Conway, J.) based on its finding that DCF failed to make reasonable efforts. But In re Jorden R., supra, 293 Conn. 542, issued after the court issued that first decision, our Supreme Court made clear that the trial court "can find that a parent is unwilling or unable to benefit from reunification services without first finding that reasonable efforts were made to reunify the parent with [his] child." See also In re Jaiden S. 120 Conn.App., 795, 993 A.2d 1017 (2010).
One of the factors relevant to the court in denying the termination petition as to Perry K. was that the protective order as to Dominique lapsed on the date of his conviction in July 2008. The court found that unbeknownst to DCF, the issue of contact was then superseded by conditions of probation which prohibited contact with his minor children except with DCF's approval. DCF also did not realize until trial on the first termination petition that the standing criminal restraining order issued to protect the mother for her lifetime was not extended to Dominique. In denying the termination petition as to Perry K., the court (Conway, J.) concluded that once visitation was essentially at the discretion of DCF with respect to Dominique, that fact triggered an obligation to at least consider father/daughter contact.
This court, however, is not bound by the court's findings and conclusions in the prior trial since DCF has alleged that Perry K. is unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification services, pursuant to General Statutes § 17a-112(j)(1), which inexplicably, DCF did not allege in the first petition. Consequently, the prior court's comment on the issue of whether the petitioner could potentially prevail in the future as to Perry K.'s ability and willingness to benefit from reunification services, suggesting that burden could not be met without independent expert testimony, is essentially dicta.
In its decision in In re Jorden R., our Supreme Court engaged in extensive analysis of General Statutes § 17a-112(j)(1) as well as § 17a-111(b), clarifying the reasonable efforts requirement. In definitively holding that the "unwilling and unable to benefit" language is an alternative finding to the reasonable efforts requirement, the Supreme Court recognized that there may be circumstances under which the trial court could excuse reasonable efforts. In re Jorden R., supra, 293 Conn. 554. Moreover, in footnote thirteen, the Court observed that our statutes provide different avenues for a court to determine that reunification efforts are not necessary. Specifically, a court could find at a hearing prior to or at the time of the termination petition that reunification efforts are not required based on aggravated circumstances enumerated in § 17a-111b. "In the absence of aggravated circumstances, the department must make reasonable reunification efforts until the petition is heard or, if it deems a parent unable or unwilling to benefit from such efforts, may either provide reunification services nevertheless or decline to do so." Id.
Notably, one of the enumerated aggravated circumstances includes whether a "parent had inflicted or knowingly permitted another person to inflict sexual molestation or exploitation . . . on the child." § 17a-11b(B). In its discretion, the petitioner did not pursue this ground nor the acts of omission or commission ground under § 17a-112(j)(C) as it had alleged in its first termination petition. Noting that our Supreme Court has observed in State v. George, supra, 280 Conn. 551 n. 6, the inherent difficulties in prosecuting sexual abuse cases of a minor, this court cannot comment as to whether the petitioner would have prevailed had it chosen to pursue this theory of termination. At the same time, the availability of such a ground underscores the clear public policy choice that certain conduct is so contrary to the best interests of the child that a court could simply find that reunification is not required, without finding that a parent is even unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts. Nevertheless, our Supreme Court also made clear that the aggravated circumstances provisions are not the only way a court might find that reunification efforts are not required. In re Jorden R., supra, 293 Conn. 539 n. 12.
Interestingly, our Supreme Court commented on the potential incongruity of the former option of providing reunification services in certain cases where the petitioner may determine relatively early on in the case that a parent is unable or unwilling to benefit or where aggravated circumstances under § 17a-111b exist. Id. n. 15. Indeed, the statutory obligation of the court to provide specific steps pursuant to yet another provision of the child protection statutes, § 46b-129(b), may also seem either incongruous, superfluous and/or futile where adjudicatory grounds other than failure to rehabilitate are being alleged. For example, from the outset of its involvement in a case, the petitioner may be prepared to assert and prove adjudicatory grounds of no ongoing parent-child relationship, which requires not only that there be evidence of no ongoing parent-child relationship but that it would be detrimental to allow further time for a relationship to develop. To be both consistent with the second prong of that allegation, the petitioner could reasonably decline to offer services while pursuing reunification services with the other, available and/or potentially appropriate parent. As the Supreme Court noted in In re Jordan R., the petitioner takes the risk that a trial court may ultimately disagree. Id. Nevertheless, DCF may reasonably determine that it is a risk worth taking, especially if it has a good faith belief that the child could be further traumatized by reunification efforts.
The court notes as well that it could be misleading to a parent to be asked to participate in services when it is clear from the outset that even full or substantial compliance may be inadequate for purposes of reunification. See e.g. In re Jaiden S., supra, 120 Conn.App. 795 (where father who failed to disclose that he was a registered sex offender nevertheless had complied with many specific steps and argued that the filing of the termination petition was premature). In any event, our courts have long observed that "it is axiomatic that the law does not require a useless and futile act." In re Antony B., 54 Conn.App. 463, 476, 735 A.2d 893 (1989).
This court finds even more troubling circumstances in which a child of sufficient wherewithal might be further traumatized or her mental health treatment compromised should she become aware of the potential that she might be reunified with her father. In this case, Dr. Schroeder forcefully stated that requiring Dominique to see her father would re-traumatize her and likely lead to her decompensation. As observed by our appellate court in In re Vincent B., 73 Conn.App. 637, 645, 809 A.2d 1119 (2002), "making no efforts to reunify a parent and his or her child may be reasonable in certain circumstances . . ."
In this light, this court concludes that the facts of this case compel its finding that Perry K. is unable and unwilling to benefit from reunification services. This court finds that at no point, from DCF's involvement in the case through to the adjudicatory date of October 2009, was there a period in which Perry K. was either willing or able to benefit from reunification services. The fact that the criminal court lifted the absolute prohibition of contact between Perry K. and Dominique at the time of his conviction in July 2008, leaving visitation to DCF's discretion, does not transform Perry K. into a parental figure more able or amenable to reunification or rehabilitation services, especially in light of the circumstances which he created for himself.
Moreover, given the above facts, this court does not require expert testimony for it to find that Perry K. was unable and unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts. Nevertheless, this court does accord great weight to the opinion of the court-appointed evaluator, Dr. Schroeder, whose opinion was sought to address that very issue, as well as the issue of contact between Perry K. and Dominique. As to whether Perry K. is unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts, however, Dr. Schroeder's opinion simply reaffirms the obvious; Perry K.'s needs are paramount and that he has no compunction about violating the law, including protective orders. Moreover, this court also reasonably infers that Perry K. had no intention of working with DCF and until his incarceration, he certainly felt no need to submit himself voluntarily to the jurisdiction of this court, in which his daughter's care and custody were the subject of neglect petitions since May 2006.
As the superior court in In re Zion has observed, "The time frame of deciding the issue of permanent placement of a child within one year is more than a mere statement of state and federal law and more than a pious platitude recited in our case law. It represents the consensus thinking of child development authorities." Articulation of Denial of Stay, In re Zion R., supra, Superior Court Child Protection Session at Willimantic, Docket no. W10-CP06-015070, (Foley, J. August 11, 2008).
This consensus is not only embodied in state and federal law, its imperative is compelling when viewed in light of Dominique's circumstances. The evidence before this court is that Dominique endured significant trauma under her parents' care, and consequently she endured the trauma of removal and two foster placements as well. As her therapist and Dr. Schroeder have convincingly asserted, Dominique's ability to heal from those traumas is compromised without the assurance of safety and stability. When she experiences any threat to her safety or stability, Dominique sleepwalks or has terrifying nightmares. This court concludes that Dominique's desperate need for permanency is inextricably tied to her need to move forward from the traumas that besieged her before she was placed into care.
"Our case law similarly recognizes that time is critically important for children. Our Supreme Court has long recognized the deleterious effect of prolonged temporary care of abused and neglected children. In re Juvenile Appeal (84-CD), 189 Conn. 276, 292, 455 A.2d 1313 (1983). The Appellate Court has also noted, "[b]ecause of the psychological effects of prolonged termination proceedings on young children, time is of the essence . . ." In re Alexander V., 25 Conn.App. 741, 748, 596 A.2d 930 (1992), aff'd, 223 Conn. 557, 613 A.2d 780 (1994)." Id.
B. NO ONGOING PARENT-CHILD RELATIONSHIP
The court may grant a petition for termination of parental rights "if it finds by clear and convincing evidence that . . . (3) . . . (D) there is no ongoing parent-child relationship . . ." General Statutes § 17a-112(j). This ground is established when there is no on-going parent-child relationship with the parent, which is defined as the relationship that ordinarily develops as the result of a parent having met, on a continuing, day-to-day basis, the physical, emotional, moral and educational needs of the child and when allowing further time for the establishment of the parent-child relationship would be detrimental to the best interests of the child. General Statutes § 17a-112(j)(3)(D).
"This part of the statute requires the trial court to undertake a two-pronged analysis. First, there must be a determination that no parent-child relationship exists, and second, the court must look into the future and determine whether it would be detrimental to the child's best interest to allow time for such a relationship to develop . . . In considering whether an on-going parent-child relationship exists, the feelings of the child are of paramount importance . . . The ultimate question is whether the child has no present memories or feelings for the natural parent . . . Feelings for the natural parent connotes feelings of a positive nature only." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) CT Page 23096 In re Jonathan G., 63 Conn.App. 516, 525, 777 A.2d 695 (2001). Where the child's feelings toward the parent are ambivalent, there must be a finding that "no positive emotional aspects of the relationship survive." In re Jessica M., 217 Conn. 459, 470, 586 A.2d 597 (1991). See also In re Brea B., 75 Conn.App. 466, 470, 816 A.2d 707 (2003). No on-going parent-child relationship contemplates, inter alia, a situation in which, regardless of fault, a child either has never known his or her parent, or that no relationship has ever developed between them. In re Juvenile Appeal (Anonymous), 181 Conn. 638, 645-46, 436 A.2d 290 (1980). Moreover the ground contemplates a relationship that would result if a parent has met on a "day to day basis, the physical, emotional, moral and educational needs of the child . . ." Id.
In this case, the evidence is clear and convincing that Dominique has no positive memories or feelings for Perry K. She had a warm, albeit sometimes peer, relationship with her biological mother, but she has described her father as someone who has hurt her as well as her mother. Her therapist and Dr. Schroeder testified that Dominique was exposed to domestic violence between her parents and that the impact of that exposure was itself traumatizing to her. Dominique has described Perry K. as having touched her private parts and she is angry with him as a result. She recalls that Perry K. showed her movies which frightened her. In response to whether she would be willing to visit with Perry K., she vehemently and in writing responded "No, no, no, no."
This court concludes, therefore, that Perry K. caused and perpetuated the lack of an ongoing parent child relationship between himself and Dominique. See In re Alexander C., 67 Conn.App. 417, 421, 787 A.2d 608 (2001). Dominique's negative memories and feelings towards Perry K. are clearly a result of the trauma she endured and was exposed to while in his care.
Having found that there is no ongoing parent child relationship, this court also finds by clear and convincing evidence that to allow further time for a parent child relationship to develop would be highly detrimental to Dominique's best interest. It is clear that in her years of placement and in therapy, she had been forced, by circumstances entirely beyond her control, to deal with instability in her home life and anxiety as to whether she will be returned to her mother's care. At the time the second termination petition was filed in October 2009, Perry K. was still incarcerated and Dominique had been in foster care for nearly three years.
At the same time, DCF's involvement was precipitated by the child's exposure to sexual abuse and domestic violence. In light of the fact that she has made allegations that Perry K. was not only a perpetrator of domestic violence but sexual abuse toward her, forcing the prospect of reunification with him would simply be devastating to this child.
Moreover, this court finds compelling and credible the evidence that Dominique's ability to process these much more complicated, deeper traumas is compromised by the extent to which her home life is unstable. Her foster parents have done their best to reassure her that she will be safe in their care and that they love her. When she sleep walks, has nightmares causing her to scream, or expresses fear that strangers are coming through her bedroom window, it has been her foster parents who have been by her side. Yet, even in a home that is reassuring and comforting, foster care is extremely difficult for children because it is inherently uncertain. No one charged to act in her best interest, DCF, her attorneys, her foster parents or her therapist, can tell her what she most needs to hear. Dominique is a very bright and sensitive child, but also fragile. She is attuned to anything that might threaten her safety and stability in her current home. While a necessity for the duration of this case, visits by DCF social workers and her lawyers are constant reminders that her home is not yet permanent or secure.
Each of these factors amounts to compelling evidence, separately and cumulatively, that it is detrimental to Dominique's best interest to allow a relationship to develop between her and her father. This court finds that the petitioner has met its burden as to this adjudicatory ground.
IV. DISPOSITION
Needing only to find one adjudicatory ground, this court also finds by clear and convincing evidence that it is in the best interests of Dominique K. that the rights of Perry K. be terminated. In addition to all of the evidence this court has found in support of the adjudication, the court also credits the therapist's opinion that Dominique's greatest fear is that she might be removed from her current foster home, where she has deep feelings of attachment, a sense of safety and security, and a feeling of belonging. She has intentions of changing her name in a clear attempt to demonstrate her desperate need to move on in her life and to become a part of the only family she has trusted to keep her safe. She longs for the day that her DCF social worker will have no obligation to visit her as a foster child; she desperately wants the court proceedings around her care and custody to be finalized so that her attorney and guardian ad litem will cease asking her about Perry K. This court finds that Dominique's most fervent wishes for herself are also clearly in her best interest.
In arriving at this conclusion, the court also considers the seven factors outlined in General Statutes § 17a-112(k) as to Perry K. The court notes, however, that under In re Quanitra M., 60 Conn.App. 96, 758 A.2d 863 (2000), the seven factors set forth in § 17a-112(e) serve simply as guidelines to the court and are not statutory prerequisites that need to be proven before termination can be ordered.
1. The timeliness, nature and extent of services offered or provided to the parent and the child by an agency to facilitate the reunion of the child with the parent.
Given its allegation that Perry K. was unwilling and unable to benefit from reunification services, DCF concedes that it did not provide reunification services or seek specific steps until September 2009, following the issuance of the decision denying the first termination of parental rights petition. This court finds, however, that when Perry K.'s whereabouts became known, and he was essentially forced to acknowledge DCF's involvement in his child's life via his incarceration, DCF gave him notice of administrative case reviews and opportunities to participate in them via teleconference.
Pursuant to General Statutes § 17a-15, DCF is required to "prepare and maintain a written plan of care, treatment and permanent placement of every child and youth under the commissioner's supervision, which shall include but not be limited to a diagnosis of the problems of each child or youth, the proposed plan of treatment services and temporary placement and a goal for permanent placement of the child or youth, which may include reunification with the parent, long term foster care, independent living, transfer of guardianship or adoption. The child's or youth's health and safety shall be the paramount concern in formulating the plan."
"The commissioner shall at least every six months, review the plan of each child and youth under the commissioner's supervision for the purpose of determining whether such plan is appropriate and make any appropriate modifications to such plan." Id.
"Any child or youth or the parent or guardian of such child or youth aggrieved by any provision of a plan prepared under subsection (a) of this section, or by the commissioner's decision upon review under subsection (b) of this section, or . . . aggrieved by a refusal of any other service from the commissioner to which he is entitled, shall be provided a hearing within thirty days following a written request for the same directed to the commissioner." Id.
DCF ensured that Perry K. had notice of the proceedings before this court as well as notice and an opportunity to be heard as to administrative case reviews of Dominique's treatment plan. Therefore, he had an opportunity to hear what the treatment plan was for Dominique, the progress that was or was not being made toward reunification, what services were being offered to the family and to challenge the appropriateness of services offered or denied to the family. DCF therefore complied with both statutory and regulatory directives. See also Regs., Conn. State Agencies, § 17a-15-1 et seq.
2. Finding regarding whether the Department of Children and Families has made reasonable efforts to reunite the family pursuant to the Federal Child Welfare Act of 1980, as amended.
The court notes that there was a prior finding by the court (Conway, J.) that DCF did not make reasonable efforts to reunify. This court finds that Perry K. was unable and unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts and consequently, the failure to offer services under the facts of this case does not preclude termination of parental rights. As discussed previously, the Federal Child Welfare Act also mandates that DCF move toward reunification or permanency and adoption within one year of the child's placement. In this case, Perry K. was not in a position to be reunified with the child at any time in her first year placement, when a full protective order was in place and his whereabouts were unknown. He was not in a position to be reunified in her second year of placement, during which time he was incarcerated and subsequently convicted and sentenced to seven years, suspended after three years to serve, bringing his maximum release date to January 2011. By the third year of placement, he was released on parole in November 2009 and DCF had filed its second petition to terminate his parental rights, essentially asserting that Perry K. was still unable to benefit from reunification services.
3. Finding regarding the terms of any applicable court order entered into and agreed upon by any individual or agency and the parent, and the extent to which all parties have fulfilled their obligations under such order.
The court finds that Perry K. failed to abide by a full protective order which had been in place, with the exception of four days in August 2006, since April 2006 through to July 2008. The court further notes that because he failed to appear at any of the hearings relative to the underlying neglect petition, including the order of temporary custody, Perry K. was defaulted for failure to appear and no specific steps were ordered as to him. Although In re Justice V., 111 Conn.App. 500, 959 A.2d 1063 (2008), underscored the statutory obligation and importance generally for the court to issue specific steps, the absence of specific steps is not fatal to a petition to terminate parental rights. This is so especially in this case where this court is basing its adjudication on the ground of no ongoing parent child relationship and finding that it would be detrimental to the best interest of the child to allow a relationship to develop. Id. See also In re Michael M., 29 Conn.App. 112, 126, 614 A.2d 832 (1992); In re Shavoughn K., 13 Conn.App. 91, 99-100, 534 A.2d 1243 (1987), cert denied, 207 Conn. 805, 540 A.2d 374 (1988).
4. Findings regarding the feelings and emotional ties of the child with respect to their parents, any guardian of his person and any person who has exercised physical care, custody or control of the child for at least one year and with whom the child has developed significant emotional ties.
As this court has already found, Dominique has strong negative feelings for Perry K. and does not wish to see him. In contrast, she is strongly bonded to her foster parents and foster family, with whom she has been placed since April 10, 2007. She feels safe, secure and cherished in this home, and the anxieties and terror she endures when stressed are attended to with much love and caring. Her foster sister sleeps in her room and Dominique derives much comfort from this. As her therapist has testified, her greatest fear is being removed from her foster home.
5. Finding regarding the age of the child.
Dominique was born January 29, 2002. She is 8 years old and will be 9 years old in two months. She has been in foster care since she was five years old.
6. Finding regarding the efforts the parent has made to adjust her circumstances, conduct, or conditions to make it in the best interest of the child to return him to his home in the foreseeable future, including, but not limited to: (A) the extent to which the parent has maintained contact with the child as part of an effort to reunite the child with the parent, provided the court may give weight to incidental visitations, communications or contributions and (B) the maintenance of regular contact or communication with the guardian or other custodian of the child.
The court notes that Perry K. has complied with his conditions of parole since his release clearly requires that he do so. Such compliance, while laudable, is inadequate given the trauma endured by Dominique and in any event, comes too late given his failure to make his whereabouts known, his failure to abide by protective orders, and his resulting incarceration during the first three years of DCF's involvement in this case.
7. Finding regarding the extent to which a parent has been prevented from maintaining a meaningful relationship with the child by the unreasonable act or conduct of the other parent of the child, or the unreasonable act of any other person or by the economic circumstances of the parent.
The fact that Perry K. has no relationship with Dominique that is positive, nurturing or meaningful is wholly a consequence of his own actions, and not as a result of the unreasonable acts of the mother or of any other person, including DCF, nor is it the result of his economic circumstances.
In accordance with the best interests of the child pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. § 17a-112(j)(2), by clear and convincing evidence, and based upon all of the foregoing, the court finds that termination of the parental rights of Perry K. as to Dominique K., is in her best interests.
It is accordingly, ORDERED that the parental rights of Perry K. are hereby TERMINATED as to Dominique K. . The Commissioner of the Department of Children and Families is hereby appointed statutory parent. The agency is directed to facilitate the adoption of Dominique K. as expeditiously as possible. The Clerk of the Probate Court with jurisdiction over any subsequent adoption of Dominique K. shall notify in writing the Deputy Chief Clerk of the Superior Court for Juvenile Matters, New Haven Session, 239 Whalley Avenue, New Haven, CT 06511 of the date when said adoption is finalized.
A case plan shall be submitted within thirty (30) days from the date of this judgment, and further reports shall be timely presented to this court as required by law.
Judgment may enter accordingly.